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Abstract 
 
 
This is a novel study of the German press’ visual and textual coverage of the wars in 
Bosnia (1992-95) and Kosovo (1998-99). Key moments have been selected and 
analysed from both wars using a broad range of publications ranging from extreme-right 
to extreme-left and including broadsheets, a tabloid and a news-magazine, key moments 
have been selected from both wars. 
 
Two sections with parallel chapters form the core of the thesis. The first deals with the 
war in Bosnia and the second the conflict in Kosovo. Each section contains one chapter 
on the initial phase of the conflict, one chapter on an important atrocity – namely the 
Srebrenica Massacre in Bosnia and the Račak incident in Kosovo – and lastly a chapter 
each on the international involvement which ended the immediate violence. The 
coverage of nine national publications is closely examined for each timeframe. The 
thesis examines how the various events were covered, what sources were used and what 
insights the publications conveyed. Where possible, a further comparative perspective 
has been added by the inclusion of German parliamentary debates and the relevant UN 
press releases. This provides a useful comparison between the political discourse and 
the coverage of the German press. 
 
Special attention has been paid to four key themes, which emerged from the research. 
Firstly, the changing perceptions of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the 
issue of who was to blame for the conflicts; secondly, how various armed forces, 
including the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army were presented 
in the German press; thirdly, the persistent presence of the Second World War as well as 
the Holocaust and how they shaped the press’ interpretation of the violence; and lastly, 
how Germany’s role in the Balkans – both in the realms of diplomacy and military 
intervention – was evaluated by the national press. Pictures and cartoons accompanying 
the textual coverage were included to present a more rounded picture of press coverage. 
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Remarks 
 
 
When writing about the diverse and war-torn Balkan region, the mere reference to a 
locality in its Bosnian, Serbo-Croatian or Albanian form can indicate allegiance to one 
national narrative. I have chosen the form which is most common in the English 
language, which happens to be Serbo-Croatian in most cases. Consequently I refer to 
Kosovo rather than Kosova or Kosovë; Račak instead of Reçak and Priština in the place 
of Prishtinë or Prishtina, to name a few examples. The only exception is in direct 
citations from primary sources and secondary literature. This does not reflect any 
partisanship with a particular national narrative or interpretation of history. 
Accordingly, terms such as Chetnik and Ustasha will be used in its anglicised form. 
Direct citations may use different spellings, such as Četnik or Ustaša.     
 
For ease of reading I have translated the German sources to English. All translations are 
my own, unless stated. All images have been removed from this version due to 
copyright reasons. References to the pictures have been left in the text. None of the 
material can be reproduced without permission from the original copyright holder. 
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Introduction  
 
In the early 1990s, the world in general, but especially Europe found itself in a 
whirlwind of political changes: the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in the same year, Germany’s unification in 1990, as well as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. In this larger context, right on Western Europe’s doorstep, 
Yugoslavia descended into a decade of violence that enveloped Slovenia (1991), Croatia 
(1991-1995), Bosnia (1992-1995) and later Kosovo (1998-1999), all with a varying 
degree of intensity. This thesis will examine the last two wars in detail. Bosnia had a 
pre-war population of approximately 4.3 million. The bitter four-year war was marked 
by war crimes and displaced more than 2.2 million people according to the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR).
1
 The death toll of the war remains disputed, ranging between the 
more recent estimate of 102,000
2
 and initial approximations of 200,000.
3
 Several years 
later, violent conflict intensified in Kosovo. Until the cessation of violence in June 
1999, there had been approximately 10,000 fatalities (an upper estimate) and 90% of 
Kosovo’s population of 2 million people had been forced to leave their homes.4 
Meanwhile, back in Germany, the average citizen was trying to make sense of 
the Balkan conflicts, turning to the national media as a main source of information. 
Why had violence erupted? What armed forces were engaged in conflict? Who were the 
victims and who the perpetrators? Was Germany getting involved? If so, why? The 
                                                 
1
 Scott Pohl and Naveed Hussain “Jolie highlights the continuing suffering of the displaced in Bosnia”, 
UNHCR, 6 April 2010, Online Source: http://www.unhcr.org/4bbb422512.html, accessed 01.10.2012 and  
Mark Cutts, “The humanitarian operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: dilemmas of negotiating humanitarian 
access”, UNHCR Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No. 8, Online Source: 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c58.pdf, accessed 20.11.2012. 
2
 Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, “War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results”, European Journal of Population, 
21:2, (2010),  p. 207. 
3
 Nedim Dervišbegovic, “Revised death toll for Bosnian war”, Bosnian Institute, 23 December 2004, 
Online Source: http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1985, accessed 20.11.2012. 
4
 Mark Webber, “The Kosovo war: A Recapitulation”, International Affairs, 85:3 (2009), p. 451 and U.S. 
State Department, “Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo”, May 1999, Online Source: 
http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/erasing-history.pdf, accessed 29.10.2012. 
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international coverage of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo is frequently associated with 
the famous quote “the first casualty when war comes, is truth” which is attributed to the 
American Senator Hiram Johnson, though the Greek philosopher Aeschylus has also 
been credited. The common perception reinforced by this quotation is that rather than 
reporting ‘the truth’, ‘the media’ manipulated public opinion to support the 
controversial international interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Such claims suggesting 
intrigue call for an in-depth examination of this coverage, which my thesis offers by 
examining examples of the German press.  
Analysing the textual and visual coverage of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo 
in nine German national publications – namely Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, die tageszeitung, BILD-Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Junge 
Freiheit, Konkret and Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung – forms the basis of this 
thesis. I argue that the German press’ explanation for the violence was initially 
diversified in blaming various factors including long-existing tensions, but quickly 
pointed to the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević as solely responsible. Moreover, 
while other military formations (such as Sarajevo’s forces and the Kosovo Liberation 
Army) were also reported on in the German press, Serbia was considered the primary 
source of violence. Thirdly, the Second World War significantly influenced the German 
press’ coverage of Bosnia, but steadily decreased during the reporting of the Kosovo 
War. Lastly, Germany’s role in the region as perceived by the national media, was 
initially portrayed as independent, but after 1991/92 was seen as firmly based in alliance 
politics. 
The examination of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo through the prism of 
selected German publications offers a unique narrative of recent events that differs 
distinctly from the more common diplomatic history. A press-analysis exposes the 
interpretations presented to the broad public as the conflicts unfolded, which were 
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tailored to a non-specialist, yet often targeted readership and without the benefit of 
hindsight. While of course television was an omnipresent factor in the news-cycle of the 
1990s, the print media nevertheless played a crucial role in informing the public, as well 
as initiating and reporting on important debates. The German press is a particularly 
interesting case study for two reasons. Firstly, as will be elaborated in the subsequent 
chapter, both conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo were instrumental in shaping Germany’s 
post-unification foreign policy. Having accomplished the unification of East and West 
Germany in 1990, the country which had become the demographically largest in 
Western Europe faced questions regarding its role within the European Community 
(EC)/European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the 
world in general. While Chancellor Helmut Kohl had assured the world that Germany’s 
post-unification future would be inextricably linked to Europe,
5
 it remained unclear how 
this would reflect in the realities of the country’s foreign policy when confronted with 
war in Europe.  
Moreover, the violence in Bosnia, which some observers termed ‘genocidal’, 
raised questions about the extent to which collective memory of the Holocaust should 
influence Germany’s foreign policy towards the Balkans. How would Germany 
negotiate the politics of collective memory and the duties of membership in a military 
alliance when faced with the deployment of soldiers into active combat, as was the case 
in Kosovo? Such matters naturally consumed the country’s policy-makers. However, 
analysing how they were conveyed to the German public in the national press and to 
what extent these larger discourses coloured the print media’s coverage of the violence 
in Bosnia and Kosovo offers a new understanding regarding the debates that engaged 
the broad public and what arguments they were presented with.   
 
                                                 
5
 Kristina Spohr, “German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political 
Memoirs,” The Historical Journal, 43:3, (2000), p. 878. 
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Doctoral thesis: aim and structure 
 
By studying the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in conjunction, analysing 
publications’ visual materials disregarded to date, as well as examining largely 
understudied time-periods in these wars, this thesis introduces a new approach and aims 
to fill various gaps in existing studies, which will be discussed at length in a moment. 
Starting with the first point, no media analyses have examined the violence in both 
Bosnia and Kosovo together, in spite of their regional, chronological and causal 
interconnections. In doing so, my thesis offers a more nuanced interpretation of larger 
themes linked to both case studies. For example, the sole focus on – and in some cases 
excessively populist depiction of – the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in the 
German press coverage of the 1999 NATO-intervention cannot be fully understood 
without studying the press’ portrayal of him during the Srebrenica Massacre, the Dayton 
negations and the early violence in Kosovo. Moreover, comparing the German press 
coverage of Bosnia and Kosovo reveals an increasing readiness of the international 
community to intervene militarily, as well as the press’ support for this, which started in 
Bosnia (especially after the Srebrenica Massacre) and culminated in the 1999 NATO-
intervention in Kosovo and Serbia. Lastly, Germany’s transformation to contribute to 
such a military intervention was a separate process which was closely linked to the 
developed conception of collective memory of the Holocaust in Germany and how 
important the national press deemed the country’s past in analysing its contemporary 
foreign policy.  
Studying the coverage of this near decade of violence and warfare in nine 
publications demands a condensation of the period. Consequently I have chosen to limit 
my analysis to three key timeframes from each war in two parallel sections. I examine 
the initial phases of each conflict, one atrocity – namely the Srebrenica Massacre in 
12 
 
Bosnia and the Račak incident in Kosovo – and lastly the international involvement 
which ended the immediate violence. In Bosnia these were the diplomatic negotiations 
in Dayton, Ohio which terminated the war, and with regard to Kosovo I analyse the 
early period of NATO’s bombardment of Serbia and Kosovo.   
The press’ explanation of the violence in Bosnia in the lead-up to the war 
reveals a mixture of blaming the Yugoslav army directly or portraying the region as 
backward and dominated by ancient rivalries. Milošević was only linked to the violence 
by one newspaper. Moreover, the German press coverage of the Srebrenica Massacre, 
during which more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed by Bosnian-Serb forces 
within mere days in July 1995, is revealing. What has since become known as the worst 
war crime in Europe since the Second World War has found considerable attention in 
the secondary literature. However, analysing the German press coverage enables new 
insights regarding the restricted state-of-knowledge as the massacre occurred. Indeed, 
the international community along with the press was unable to access Srebrenica for 
several months following the massacre, which significantly impacted the quality of 
information available to the publications. While various German newspapers 
consequently had a reduced interest in piecing together the events, others showed a 
prolonged curiosity.  
The peace negations in Dayton have never been analysed through the lens of the 
German media coverage. Studying this timeframe reveals that the German press 
criticised international politicians for including Milošević, who they termed a ‘war-
monger.’ Moreover, as more information about Srebrenica became available several 
months after the massacre, the press demonstrated a continuing interest. Lastly, the 
national press evaluated Germany’s role in the negotiations as marginal, which reveals 
that the country was systematically losing its importance in the national press coverage 
of the war in Bosnia. While in the early phase of conflict in Bosnia (1991/92) 
13 
 
Germany’s unilateral recognition Croatia’s and Slovenia’s independence was 
considered the result of deep diplomatic understanding, by 1995 Germany was no 
longer attributed any special role on the international stage by its own press.  
In the second part of my thesis, I analyse how the rising violence in Kosovo was 
reported on, how the armed forces involved were portrayed and the manner in which 
both Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian civilians were represented. Subsequently, I re-
examine the incident in Račak – a Kosovo-Albanian town where 45 people were killed, 
though it remains disputed if these were massacred civilians or Kosovo-Albanian 
combatants – and four weeks of the NATO-intervention in Kosovo, both in 1999. The 
analysis of the Račak incident is crucial, not only because the German press’ treatment 
of this controversial topic reveals a strong anti-Serbian stance which was much more 
distinctive than in the early phase of the violence (1998). The chapter also analyses the 
German press coverage of the time-period leading directly to the NATO-intervention, 
which has never been studied from this vantage point. My analysis reveals what themes 
and nuances were dominant in the press’ understanding directly before the first 
deployment of German soldiers into active combat since the Second World War. This 
leads directly to the last timeframe analysed in this thesis: the beginning of the NATO-
intervention. Examining the press coverage of a country at war reveals a completely 
new phenomenon that had not appeared in the previous chapters. For the first time there 
was a clear-cut political division in the publications: the conservative press supported 
the intervention while the centre/left and extreme-right publications opposed it. This in 
turn also exposes that there was a wide range of interpretations available to the German 
public from the very beginning of the war.  
In the course of my analysis, it is not my intention to test the content of the 
German press coverage according to veracity or against a universally accepted narrative 
of events – if there is such a thing. Rather, I present and analyse what the publications 
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reported and how certain interpretations and viewpoints were communicated. However, 
where necessary, I contextualise the reporting with material from the secondary 
literature to illuminate certain nuances in the coverage.  
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
I examine these selected timeframes by analysing a broad selection of national 
German print media. As previously mentioned, the nine publications selected reflect the 
political spectrum from extreme-right to extreme-left, while simultaneously including 
broadsheets, a tabloid, a news-magazine, and a weekly newspaper targeting Germany’s 
Jewish population. It was not possible to include regional publications due to the 
volume of material. The primary sources that form the basis of this thesis are: Die Welt, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), die tageszeitung 
(taz), BILD-Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Konkret, Junge Freiheit (JF) and Allgemeine 
Jüdische Wochenzeitung (AJW). While the latter cannot be classified in a right-left 
spectrum, the remaining publications can be categorised as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of publications ranging from extreme-left to extreme-right 
 
Konkret 
Extreme-
left 
Extreme
-right 
JF 
Centre 
FR 
Left-
leaning taz 
Spiegel 
Conservative Welt 
FAZ 
BILD 
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An important aspect of my selection of primary sources was to analyse many 
different and at times contradicting voices and perspectives and how these divergent 
interpretations may have coloured or even added to the readers’ understanding of the 
violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, the wide spectrum of publications ranging 
from extreme-right to extreme-left and diverse target-audience including a tabloid,  
broadsheets and a weekly news-magazine encompass the plurality of views present in 
German society. Consequently, rather than referring to the blanket term of ‘the German 
media’ the analysis of the various publications allows me to trace when a left-right 
divide defined the interpretations, which rarely occurred until the coverage of the 1999 
NATO-intervention in Kosovo and Serbia. Instances where publications were not 
confined by their political affiliations were more frequent and could be found in the 
German press’ use of sources in the Srebrenica coverage, allocating responsibility to 
Milošević during the Dayton reporting, and the treatment of Serbian civilians as victims 
during the NATO-intervention in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, to name a few examples.  
The publications selected for this thesis differ in their dissemination numbers 
and publishers, which is worth exploring in more detail. Unless specified, all circulation 
numbers listed below consist of the four quarters in 1999. This is the most recent year of 
data available online from the “Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der 
Verbreitung von Werbeträgern” (IVW), an institute which monitors the circulations of 
all major German publications.
6
 IVW does not hold any data regarding the circulation 
of JF and Konkret in 1999, consequently current numbers were used in these two cases.  
                                                 
6
 Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung und Verbreitung von Werbeträgern, Online Source: 
http://daten.ivw.eu/index.php?menuid=1&u=&p=&detail=true, accessed 01.07.2012. 
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Publication Circulation Numbers 
BILD-Zeitung 4.500.000 (daily) 
Der Spiegel 1.060.000 (weekly) 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 446.636 (daily) 
Die Welt 257.096 (daily) 
Frankfurter Rundschau (FR) 191.645 (daily) 
die tageszeitung (taz) 59.360 (daily) 
Konkret 42.288 (monthly) 
Junge Freiheit 19.483 (weekly) 
Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung 
(AJW) 
9.405 (weekly/bi-weekly) 
Table 1: Circulation numbers of German publications 
 
Unfortunately, no circulation numbers are publicly avialable for all years studied in this 
thesis (1991-1992, 1995 and 1998-1999). However, considering the circulation numbers 
from 2012,
7
 one can conclude that roughly the dissemination of these publications does 
not fluctuate significantly. 
Starting with the mainstream publications, Die Welt is a conservative daily 
newspaper and is owned and published by the biggest German print-media 
conglomerate Axel Springer GmbH, which also owns Germany’s most widely read 
daily newspaper, BILD-Zeitung, a conservative daily tabloid. As Phillip Oltermann, a 
German journalist wrote in the London Review of Books, “Bild’s trademark tone is a 
characteristically tabloid moral indignation combined with a saccharine empathy…”8 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) is a centre-right daily paper. According to its 
website, it is owned by a specifically created foundation, FAZIT, to ensure its unbiased 
                                                 
7
 Welt: 257.828; FAZ: 370.386; FR: 120.823; taz: 56.357; Der Spiegel: 937.068; and BILD: 2.716.574.  
8
 Philip Oltermann, “In Berlin”, London Review of Books, 34:13 (2012), p. 25. 
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position.
9
 Frankfurter Rundschau (FR) is a left-leaning daily newspaper which declared 
insolvency in November 2012.
10
 die tageszeitung (taz), another left-leaning daily, is 
owned by a cooperative and is published by the ‘Friends of the alternative tageszeitung’ 
(Freunde der alternativen tageszeitung e.V.)
11
 According to the paper, it rejects upper 
case letters in its title to distinguish itself from the ‘main-stream’ press. Der Spiegel, a 
centre-left weekly news-magazine, was founded by Rudolf Augstein in 1947, who 
remained its part-owner and intermittent contributor until his death in 2002.
12
  
In the category of more specialised media I included Allgemeine Jüdische 
Wochenzeitung (AJW), which is a weekly and from 1994 a bi-weekly newspaper 
published by the ‘Central Council of Jews in Germany.’13 It is seen as the most 
important Jewish periodical in the German language area. Junge Freiheit is a far-right 
weekly newspaper founded in 1986, which is published by its own publishing house.
14
 
The newspaper has been investigated by the Verfassungsschutz, or the Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westfalia and Baden-Württemberg for its 
‘right-wing’ content.15 Konkret is a monthly magazine founded in 1957 and has been 
labelled ‘radical left’ by the Federal Ministry of the Interior.16 The magazine is 
published by its own publishing house.
17
 Sunday-editions have not been included, as 
only Welt and BILD published them in the 1990s. Consequently incorporating them 
would have introduced an imbalance in favour of the conservative press.  
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Almost all primary sources were available in the central newspaper archive in 
Berlin, the Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. In the case of the tabloid 
BILD, parts of the inventory were accessible at the Zentral- und Landesbibliothek in 
Berlin-Mitte. Junge Freiheit made its issues from 1991-1992 available to me from its 
own archive in Berlin-Wilmersdorf when the Zeitungsabteilung had a gap in its 
resources. FAZ, Welt and taz (until 1994) could also be found in the British Library’s 
newspaper-archive in London-Colindale. The news-magazine Spiegel has made all its 
past issues public in a substantial online-archive (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/), 
which can be accessed for free. Konkret has produced a CD-ROM containing all its 
editions between 1974-2009. However, this digital archive does not include any images 
aside from the covers of the magazines. Consequently Konkret will not be included in 
the image analyses throughout the thesis. All articles cited in this thesis were translated 
by the author.  
Complementing the print media analysis I examined transcripts from German 
parliamentary debates to embed the press coverage in the on-going political debate. 
However, my intention is not to examine what links or exchanges of information existed 
between the political establishment and national press as such conclusions would be 
merely speculative with the material available to me. Rather I elucidate what themes 
dominated the parliamentary debates in comparison to the interpretations offered by the 
press. As chapters one and four focus on broad issues such as how the German press 
explained the violence and how they presented the opposing parties, the parliamentary 
debates were not included here. In addition, I draw on press releases by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in chapter three, which analyses the coverage of the 
Srebrenica Massacre, as the UN’s involvement at this time was extraordinary due to the 
stationing of UN-troops in Srebrenica. Owing to their close involvement, the official 
statements issued by the organisation’s only binding decision-making body added an 
19 
 
important facet. The parliamentary debates were available at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science’s library collection while the UN-press releases were 
supplied electronically by the Reference Team at the UN’s “Dag Hammarskjöld 
Library” in New York City.  
I had hoped to find journalists’ memoirs to analyse the extent to which their 
biographies and personal experiences may have influenced their interpretation and 
coverage of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. This could have added an interesting 
perspective to my analysis of the articles they authored. While numerous monographs 
about Bosnia and Kosovo have been produced by German journalists, a close analysis 
of these works revealed that all but one book by the taz-journalist Erich Rathfelder were 
historical or political accounts rather than memoirs.
18
 As many Balkan-correspondents 
were trained historians
19
 – some had even obtained doctoral degrees in this field – 
perhaps they preferred to contribute to the existing literature in this format rather than 
through personal reflections. Due to this scarcity of publicly available first-hand 
accounts, it is difficult to assess what personal or professional factors may have 
influenced the authored articles. However, where such inferences are possible, I have 
drawn on the journalists’ biographies. 
In contrast, the analysis of the German press’ visual content – in the form of 
pictures and cartoons – proved to be a valuable facet of the German press’ reporting. 
Both types of visual materials offer a distinctive medium that can express more subtle 
viewpoints which are at times left unsaid in texts. Thus the images published alongside 
the textual coverage of the violence can offer insights into how a publication interpreted 
the violence on a more emotional and subjective level. Moreover cartoons offer a format 
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in which opinion can be expressed much more bluntly than in text. The nature of 
caricatures demands the condensation of complex subject-matters to effectively 
communicate a desired message. The reliance on stereotypes in this process reveals 
important nuances regarding a publication’s views of a conflict as well as the actors 
involved, and is therefore also a crucial element of an in-depth media analysis as 
executed in my thesis. For example, the articles covering the Srebrenica Massacre shied 
away from blaming the international community for not intervening, perhaps due to the 
uncertain information available at the time, which resulted from the inaccessibility of 
the area. However, the caricatures published in almost all publications expressed a 
scathing criticism of the international community’s inaction. This dichotomy between 
articles and cartoons underlines the importance of including both in a media-analysis, as 
they give a more well-rounded impression of the message conveyed by the press.
20
  
 
 
Note on Terminology 
 
 At this point, a brief note on terminology is necessary. Two controversial terms 
will re-appear throughout this media analysis of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, namely 
‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ According to Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, in 
some cases the two are difficult to distinguish, as there can be an overlap.
21
 The term 
‘genocide,’ a compilation of the Greek word ‘genos’ meaning race or tribe and the Latin 
‘cide’, which means killing,22 was more commonly used than ‘ethnic cleansing,’ until 
the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s.
23
 The former was coined in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish 
jurist Raphael Lemkin, who, in the context of the National-Socialist Holocaust, defined 
genocide as  
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a coordinated plan…[with the objective of disintegrating] the political and social institutions of 
culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups and 
the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the 
individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an 
entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, 
but as members of the national group.
24
 
Lemkin’s rather narrow definition foresaw the complete destruction of a national group 
and was the basis for the broader “United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” which was passed in 1948. Articles I and II 
stated that all contracting parties would “…undertake to prevent and punish” genocide, 
which was defined as “…acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group…”25 The Convention listed these acts in five 
bullet points: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
26
 
 
This definition of genocide with its focus on ethnic and national groups has since been 
criticised as too limiting, as it disregards the systematic killing of political enemies, for 
example, as practiced by Joseph Stalin.
27
 Nevertheless, it continues to form the crux of 
the UN Genocide Convention. The legal obligation of the contracting parties to stop 
genocide when it occurs anywhere in the world is the most important point of the 
document and is the central difference for the international community between 
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genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing,’ which does not demand such a binding international 
reaction.
28
  
The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was formally defined by the UN in 1994 as 
“…rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove 
from a given area persons from another ethnic or religious group,”29 which seems to 
reflect the way it was used and understood prior to 1994. However, this is often difficult 
to demarcate from other forms of mass violence, as Andrew Bell-Fialkoff explained. 
“At one end it is virtually indistinguishable from forced emigration and population 
exchange while at the other it merges with deportation and genocide.”30 According to 
the historian Norman Naimark, the first peoples to use the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ to 
describe their experiences was the Serbian minority population living in Kosovo, who in 
the 1980s felt discriminated against by the dominant Kosovo-Albanian population.
31
 
However, it became more widely known during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s and 
was generally associated with the Serbian policy towards Bosnian Muslims and later 
Kosovo-Albanians. As Bell-Fialkoff stated, “the central aim of the Serbian campaign 
[was] to eliminate a population from the ‘homeland’ in order to create a more secure, 
ethnically homogeneous state…”32 
 The utilisation of the two terms ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not merely a 
matter of semantics and will be traced throughout the German print media coverage. 
The distinction between these terms was imperative to the formation of Germany’s 
foreign policy and the press’ interpretation of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. Thus, 
I will pay special attention to the manner in which these terms were employed in the 
German press and with what intention. For example, did publications use ‘genocide’ to 
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suggest an international intervention to stop it, as the UN Genocide Convention 
stipulates? Were there instances where the term was rather used as a hyperbole to shock 
the reader of the gruesome violence? Considering these significant repercussions, I will 
refrain from using both terms on my own accord throughout this thesis. Instead I will 
draw on vocabulary such as violence or killings. While at times such vague terminology 
may appear forced or disparaging to the reader, this ensures that I do not superimpose 
the conflictive terms where they were not initially utilised. This in turn allows a more 
distinct linguistic analysis: when they appear in this thesis, the terms will either be 
paraphrased or in quotation. In both cases a reference will indicate the source. The only 
exception is the Srebrenica Massacre, which I analyse in chapter three. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has designated 
Srebrenica to have been genocide. As the word is part of the legal understanding of the 
massacre, I deem it acceptable to utilise it without restrictions.  
 
 
Media Analyses: War-journalism in Bosnia and Kosovo 
 
At this point, the existing media analyses pertaining to Bosnia and Kosovo must 
be considered. There is no single, coherent work devoted to comparing the coverage of 
both wars, though numerous authors have grappled with the two case studies separately. 
Most of the existing literature can be divided according to the reliability of their 
methodology. The works in the first and larger section are marked by a questionable 
methodology, frequently offering polemic and unsubstantiated statements without 
referencing their claims.
33
 This becomes particularly evident in several works which 
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repeat the same anecdotes, portraying them as proven facts while rarely referencing 
their origin. The most memorable example is the statement made by the French 
journalist, Jérome Bony, who investigated alleged rape victims near Tuzla, Bosnia. 
Following international media reports on the mass rape of Bosnian women, Bony 
claimed that 50 kilometres from Tuzla, word of mouth reported 4000 raped women; 20 
kilometres from Tuzla, this number shrunk to 400; 10 kilometres from Tuzla, only 40 
women were spoken of; and on site, Bony could only locate 4 raped women. This was 
subsequently used by various authors between 1998 and 2006 to underline the extent of 
media misinformation and exaggeration.
34
 None of the authors indicated the source of 
this anecdote, but rather referred to it as a well-known fact. Moreover, the recycling of 
the same unreferenced incident in works produced in the course of eight years could 
indicate either lack of more evidence or lazy research.  
 Other works by journalists and academics devoted to the Kosovo War are also 
marked by their superficial method of sparse referencing, rendering them equally 
unreliable. Moreover, they exhibit a lack of in-depth engagement with the subject-
matter, following the general argument that ‘the media’ had manipulated public opinion 
into supporting the NATO-intervention in Kosovo.
35
 However, none of the authors 
elaborated how ‘the media’ manipulated, how its impact on public opinion could be 
measured, what important information was concealed and to what effect. Phillip 
Knightley’s monograph The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-
Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo is one such example. Knightley – an avid opponent 
of the NATO-intervention in Kosovo – claims that the alliance had a monopoly of 
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information, which he argues NATO used to manipulate the media in its favour. 
However, most of his claims are unsubstantiated. For example he posits that NATO-
members had a “…meticulously prepared system of propaganda and media 
control…[which] swung into action…” as the bombardment of Serbia and Kosovo 
commenced. Thus Knightley suggests that all media outlets in the 19 member-states 
acted in coordination without explaining how this was done or who may have 
spearheaded such an endeavour in the separate member-states, which ranged from 
Turkey to Canada. Without giving sources for his claims, he vaguely stated that 
pressure was exerted “…in NATO-countries to publish atrocity stories from 
Kosovo…”36 While Knightley’s claims could be plausible, his unsubstantiated claims 
render his work unreliable. Nonetheless, it must be noted that no research has been 
produced disproving these wide-spread allegations of NATO manipulating information 
during the Kosovo War. Similarly, Thomas Deichmann, a German free-lance journalist, 
posits in his contribution to Philip Hammond’s and Edward Herman’s edited volume 
that  
German politicians claimed that NATO was not waging war, but defending human rights and 
attempting to thwart a genocide Milošević had long planned. Such claims were not only repeated 
uncritically, but actively promoted by journalists who were openly partisan.
37
 
Without citing any examples of specific publications or contrasting politicians’ 
statements with the articles published in German print media, Deichmann’s work can be 
placed in the category of unreliable studies that suffer from an unsubstantive 
methodology. 
The second category contains far fewer works, but boasts sound academic 
research and reliable conclusions.
38
 Alexander Neu’s monograph Die Jugoslawien-
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Kriegsberichterstattung der Times und der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (2004), is a 
published doctoral thesis that analyses one German and one British ‘quality paper’ 
using quantitative and qualitative methodologies and is also based on extensive 
secondary reading about media theories. Neu traces word repetitions, and the frequency 
of certain terms in the coverage of the violence in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995.
39
 
Neu’s qualitative section sets out to analyse the content of the publications’ news policy 
and how this was influenced by underlying ideologies. Here he concludes that the 
coverage in both conservative publications, which Neu terms ‘opinion leaders’ 
conveyed their “political-ideological determined world view of the armed conflict…” in 
Bosnia.
40
 Interestingly, Neu’s study is the only media analysis which also examined 
cartoons about Bosnia, concluding that unlike the British Times, FAZ used political 
cartoons to form public opinion by creating a positive and negative image of actors.
41
 
While his descriptions are very detailed and substantiate his argument, his study does 
not feature any of the described cartoons, which significantly diminishes the 
explanatory power of his discussion. Neu’s conclusions are valuable, however his focus 
on international comparisons between a single British and German newspaper does not 
allow an in-depth focus on German themes, which I achieve in this thesis. 
The remaining three works boasting a scholarly methodology are journal 
articles, which compare the press coverage of the Kosovo War in various European 
countries. Rossella Savarese’s article “‘Infosuasion’ in European Newspapers: A Case 
Study on the War in Kosovo” (2000) offers a qualitative comparison of selected French, 
Italian, German, British and Spanish newspapers, contrasting the coverage in various 
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European broadsheets. This study investigates international heads of state and how their 
rhetoric influenced the media’s perception of events in Kosovo. Examining the week 
before and the first week of the NATO bombings, the author identifies rhetorical 
devices such as ‘name calling’ and ‘guilt technique’ used by politicians such as Tony 
Blair and Bill Clinton, as well as various publications studied to persuade the readership 
of the legitimacy of the war. One conclusion of particular interest for my research is that 
Savarese found the allusions to Hitler and the Holocaust as not unique to German 
publications, which could also be found in the Italian Il Corriere della Sera and 
France’s Le Monde.42 
A similar, comparative approach was taken by Reiner Grundmann and his co-
authors, who present a quantitative evaluation of the coverage in selected European 
newspapers during the 3-month NATO-bombings in Kosovo and Serbia. In their article 
“National Elites and Transnational Discourses in the Balkan War: A Comparison 
between the French, German and British Establishment Press” (2000), the authors claim 
that there was a “…degree of transnationalisation of discourses about the Kosovo 
crisis”.43 Grundmann and his co-authors had reached this conclusion due to the 
comparably detached style of reporting all three newspapers featured. Moreover, the 
French and British papers showed as much interest in German actors as the German 
FAZ. Based on the quantitative re-occurrence of specific terms such as ‘Kosovo’ in 
combination with ‘war’, ‘Germany’, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ the authors profess to detect 
a unity in the semantic coverage of the European newspapers. In spite of thematic 
convergences, they argue, there was a tendency specific in German publications to 
‘demonise’ Milošević and other Serbian actors, noting that German politicians and press 
frequently “…use[d] the vocabulary of the Third Reich (e.g. concentration camp, 
genocide/Völkermord) and directly compare[d] the events in the Balkans to the Nazis 
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ethnic cleansing.”44 This conclusion is qualified when compared to the German press’ 
utilisation of these same terms in other timeframes, as analysed in my thesis. While the 
weight of such language must not be underestimated, its gravitas is reduced when 
considering that this terminology was employed from the early stages of the Bosnian 
conflict and was not unique to the time-period at which Germany was engaged in a 
military intervention.  
The last media analysis worth considering is particularly important, as it is the 
only German study. Christiane Eilders and Albrecht Lüter’s article, “Germany at War: 
Competing Framing Strategies in German Public Discourse” (2000) analyses editorials 
from five leading daily newspapers in Germany – Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau and die tageszeitung – during 
NATO’s 3-month bombardment of Kosovo in March-June 1999. The authors 
demonstrate that the majority of the editorials did not devote their content to the 
historical origins of the conflict. Rather prognostic editorials were the most frequent, in 
which the author speculated how the war would unfold or what this would mean for the 
international community.
45
 The authors concluded that there was a high degree of 
consensus in the German media, in spite of the publications’ differing political 
affiliations. As previously mentioned, I reach the same conclusion in my analysis of the 
NATO-intervention, but also conclude that this was unique to the German press’ 
coverage at this time. Conversely, the coverage of the previous timeframes analysed in 
my thesis did not have such a clear affiliation. Another argument put forward by Eilders 
and Lüter asserted that “the transformation of the German self-image was apparently 
already complete before the war started and [thus the country’s past] did not require 
further discussion.”46 This self-image was strongly linked to Germany’s National-
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Socialist past and how it influenced contemporary foreign policy. My analysis supports 
these findings, but when examined in conjunction with the two previous chapters on the 
violence in Kosovo, as well as the three chapters on the war in Bosnia, my thesis argues 
that a distinct transformation of this domestic discourse occurred in the German press. 
This progression of a transformed conception of collective memory as I trace 
throughout my thesis underlines the value of the comparative analysis of German war-
journalism about Bosnia and Kosovo.  
The three media analyses authored by Savarese, Grundmann et al., as well as 
Eilders and Lüter all address the Second World War and language reminiscent of this 
time, but reach divergent and at times contradicting conclusions regarding its 
importance. This demands a deeper examination of the German collective memory of 
the Holocaust and what effects the utilisation of such analogies to the Second World 
War had specifically on the German readers’ understanding of the violence in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. To an international readership, comparisons between Milošević and Hitler 
may have justified an international intervention to stop the despotic Serbian leader. 
However, for the German reader, this comparison elicited more profound questions: 
what lessons had the country learned from its National-Socialist past? And if Milošević 
was likened to Hitler, should or could these lessons be applied to the Balkans of the 
1990s? How was the Holocaust collectively remembered and did this influence the 
German print media coverage of Bosnia and Kosovo? The latter interconnection has not 
been considered in depth in previous scholarship, but can offer a new perspective of the 
subject matter, as I will show in this thesis. In order to analyse these matters thoroughly 
and embed the German press coverage of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo in a larger 
context of collective memory of the Holocaust, an excursion to the academic discourse 
on this topic is necessary. Following the traumatic Second World War and upon 
30 
 
learning the full extent of the Holocaust, the German public went through various stages 
of coming to terms with their country’s past and collectively remembering it.  
 
 
Politics of Memory: Collective Holocaust-memory and German foreign policy 
 
The emergence, evolution and transformation of collective memory in post-war 
West-Germany has been widely covered, both in German and English language 
literature, though there is no single work that systematically studies the theme.
47
 
However, a general consensus exists in the literature that ‘generational memory’ 
dominated the collective memory of the Holocaust, which is exposed most clearly in the 
dichotomy between the adults of the ‘Adenauer Era’ (1949-1963) and their children 
who belonged to the ‘1968-generation’. The latter are often linked to the student 
movement at German universities in the late 1960s, from where they derive their name, 
though the student movements were not an exclusively German phenomenon. A third 
generational shift occurred in the early 1990s, when an ‘internationalisation’ of the 
responsibility for the Holocaust developed. 
Beginning chronologically, Dan Michman’s edited volume, Remembering the 
Holocaust in Germany, 1945-2000: German Strategies and Jewish Responses gives a 
systematic overview of the progression and transformation of memory discourse. 
Michman and his contributors focus on the ‘Adenauer era’, named after Germany’s first 
post-war Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, arguing that it was marked by two distinct 
attitudes: “…‘to put this chapter behind us’, [paralleled with]…an awareness of 
responsibility…”48 In one chapter, Jeffrey Herf elaborates the argument by claiming that 
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a ‘Schlussstrichmentalität’ dominated the immediate post-war years and that the 
German people urgently desired to ‘draw a line’ and forget about the past.49 Bernhard 
Giesen’s contribution to Jeffrey Alexander’s edited volume Cultural Trauma and 
Collective Identity largely agrees with this conclusion, claiming that the Adenauer era 
was dominated by a ‘coalition of silence’ during which German society was 
overshadowed by a ‘moral numbness’ regarding the recent past. He contends that 
Germans were aware of their responsibility for the Holocaust, but were unable to face 
both the resulting trauma as well as the victims so shortly after the Second World 
War.
50
  
This changed with the next generation, the colloquially-named ‘1968-
generation,’ which called for – amongst other demands – a more public awareness of 
Nazi crimes.
51
 Hans Kundnani’s book Utopia or Auschwitz: Germany’s 1968 
Generation and the Holocaust is particularly useful in understanding the centrality of 
Germany’s past to the 1960s student movement. The author dives into a historical and 
biographical account of the 1968-generation’s leaders. Based on extensive research and 
interviews with key figures, Kundnani – a London-based journalist – offers a very 
valuable understanding of the German 1968-movement and its influence on later 
politics. As Kundnani elaborates, the slogan “Nie wieder Krieg”, or “never again war” 
became the utmost paradigm and the most important lesson from the National-Socialist 
past for the 1968-generation. Many individuals later found their political home in the 
pacifist Green Party, which was founded in 1980. Amongst them were two prominent 
“68-ers”, Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Foreign Minister between 1998 and 2005 and 
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Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a German and French politician and Member of the European 
Parliament since 1994.
52
 
 This shift in generational memory implicated a gradually increasing public 
responsibility for the Holocaust. Historians have regarded the ‘Betroffenheitsdiskurs’ or 
‘discourse of dismay’ which dominated the memory culture of the 1980s and early 
1990s as its climax in Germany. A deep, all-encompassing shame defined Germany’s 
interpretation of its recent past, which had not existed thus far.
53
 The centrality of the 
victims in this new discourse relegated Germany to be the ‘country of perpetrators’, 
causing communal guilt and shame to transcend the collective memory of the 
Holocaust.
54
 
After this peak, various authors have argued that an internationalisation of the 
Holocaust memory and Nazi crimes in general occurred starting in the early 1990s. 
Lothar Probst traces this tendency in historical research, which he argues increasingly 
considered the role of Swiss banks, the French Vichy Regime and the analysis of 
various countries which had supported the persecution of the Jews and other enemies of 
the Nazis. Moreover, the refusal of certain European neighbours to admit Jewish 
refugees from Nazi-Germany was a prominent theme, Probst argues.
55
 Here a shift 
occurred from blaming solely Germany to including other international actors without 
diminishing Germany’s responsibility. Bernhard Giesen identifies this progression as a 
‘metaphysical guilt’, which applies to all human beings, not just Germans.56 As a result, 
the historical burden stemming from the Holocaust began to shape and influence global 
discourse on international human rights and international tribunals as well as 
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humanitarian-motivated military interventions.
57
 As the Holocaust historian Yehunda 
Bauer summarises, “the Holocaust has…become the symbol for genocide, for racism, 
for hatred of foreigners, and of course for anti-Semitism…”58 This in turn has led to 
repeated comparisons between the Holocaust and other international crimes against 
humanity.  
As this short excursion has demonstrated, the collective memory of the 
Holocaust in West-Germany evolved in various stages and similarly had a varying 
effect on the country’s foreign policy. Consequently, the conclusion that the Second 
World War and collective memory thereof influenced the German media coverage of 
the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, as other media studies have deduced, must be 
considered with more discernment. While various other studies have concluded that the 
Holocaust influenced the language and interpretation of various international 
publications in their coverage of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo, the discourse of 
collective memory has never been systematically applied to the international media 
coverage of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. As the secondary literature has shown, 
the early 1990s were a time of transition from the all-encompassing, exclusively 
German shame of the Betroffenheitsdiskurs to a more diluted, international conception. 
 
German Foreign Policy 
 
Parallel to the progression of collective memory in Germany, the changing 
nature of post-1945 German foreign policy must be considered at this point.
59
 A number 
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of academics have argued that West-German foreign policy after the Second World War 
was marked by a sense of responsibility evoked by the country’s previous militarism as 
well as the Holocaust, which resulted in an unwillingness to assert military power to 
attain national interests.
60
 Labels such as ‘tamed power’ [Peter Katzenstein] or ‘civilian 
power’ [Hanns Maull] to describe Germany encapsulate this foreign policy.61 Defining 
the latter term as “…a particular foreign-policy identity which promoted 
multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration…,”62 Maull 
postulates with this seminal theory that Germany’s militaristic past created a hesitance 
to step outside multilateral bodies in terms of foreign policy. Indeed, Germany refused 
military involvement, even within its multilateral alliance structures. Simultaneously 
this meant that post-war West-Germany was largely reliant on the “guaranteed 
protection” from America and NATO, Nina Philippi postulates.63 In this context, 
Germany’s foreign minister between 1992 and 1998, Volker Rühe, coined the term 
‘culture of reticence.’64  
However, the unification of East and West Germany in 1990 was a significant 
turning point, after which the country had to reposition itself in the global context. 
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Amongst other issues, its foreign political stance had to be redefined, which included 
the discussion whether German forces should and would participate in “collective 
security actions”, as Ronald Asmus called them.65 From the vantage point of a strong, 
unified Germany, retaining Rühe’s concept of ‘culture of reticence’ as a continuing 
foreign policy approach was viewed by some as continuing proof that the country had 
learned from its past by limiting its militaristic possibilities. Opponents saw it as an 
‘easy way out’ with regard to collective security – benefitting from multilateral 
structures while not contributing enough.
66
 Germany faced this dilemma debating 
various UN and NATO-missions of the early 1990s such as Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia 
and later Bosnia, to which Germany was asked to contribute forces by its alliance-
partners.
67
   
Against this backdrop of finding a new and comfortable foreign policy for a 
unified Germany while simultaneously adhering to the demands of its allies, 1994 was a 
noteworthy milestone. On 12 July, Germany’s Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Grundgesetz enabled the participation of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations with 
a majority approval in the Bundestag.
68
 While the constitutional framework of 
multilateral peacekeeping operations had been subject to debate since the early 1990s, it 
was the “high emotions surrounding the war in former Yugoslavia [that] finally pushed 
the out-of-area debate towards its…resolution” Jonathan Bach writes.69 Consequently, 
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future involvement in collective security missions which included UN, NATO and 
WEU
70
-deployments outside of the alliance’s territory was legally possible.71  
In spite of this ground-breaking shift in the country’s legal framework, 
Germany’s past and the lessons to be learned from it remained a prominent issue. Bach 
asserts that the 1994 court ruling was more than a judicial decision. Rather it reinforced 
the political questions of ‘normalcy’ and ‘historical responsibility’ in relation to German 
foreign policy.
72
 Accepting on the one hand that the country held a particular obligation 
to deliberate about employing militaristic means to implement its foreign policy, 
various politicians (especially from CDU und FDP) argued that Germany could not 
continue to restrain itself from combat while its allies shoulder the burden of 
international security. Consequently, a ‘discourse of normalcy’ could be detected in 
political speeches of the 1990s, as Bach postulates. The ‘normalcy’ arguments 
maintained that in light of Germany’s size, economic strength and geographical 
location, it had to assume a more prominent position in collective security. “This role is 
nothing less than what is ‘normal’ for a country with Germany’s characteristics,” as 
Bach paraphrased Kinkel.
73
 Moreover this allowed the country to meet its allies’ 
expectations regarding Germany’s contribution to ‘global peace-keeping tasks.’74 The 
opposition parties SPD, the Green Party and PDS initially objected to this interpretation 
of Germany’s historical responsibly leading to ‘normality,’ arguing that the lesson to be 
drawn from the country’s past was never to engage in combat again, even as part of a 
peacekeeping-mission.
75
 However, as Nina Philippi demonstrates, from 1992 onwards, 
                                                 
70
 Western European Union, a forum for matters of European security and defence. 
71
 Philippi, Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze, p. 53.  
72
 Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, pp. 121 and 130-136; and Schwab-Trapp, Kriegsdiskurse, 
pp. 115-119. 
73
 Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, p. 140. 
74
 Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, pp. 141-142. 
75
 Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration, p. 145. 
37 
 
various opposition politicians also called for military intervention in Bosnia to stop the 
on-going violence.
76
  
Indeed, the violence in former Yugoslavia proved instrumental in solidifying a 
post-unification foreign policy in Germany.
77
 Josef Janning contends that for many 
observers, the Yugoslav wars eroded the legitimacy of pacifism and argues that 
Germany should discard any illusionary pacifism and no longer seek special excuses for 
free-riding in terms of foreign policy.
78
 Similarly, Adrian Hyde-Price argues that in 
Bosnia one was “…confronted by mass murder and ethnic cleansing, [and thus] 
traditional pacifist ideas proved inadequate,” allowing room for political 
transformation.
79
 Michael Schwab-Trapp asserts that while previously Germany’s past 
did not allow German soldiers to engage in active combat, a new argumentation 
developed that Germans had a particular duty because of their past. Consequently they 
were responsible, even obliged, to prevent or combat comparable crimes elsewhere in 
the world, which echoes Bernhard Giesen’s concept of ‘meta-physical guilt’.80 Hence, it 
was during the Balkan violence in the early 1990s that for the first time, the German 
past was used to legitimise a military intervention rather than a non-intervention.
81
  
However, as the violence spread to Kosovo in the late-1990s, the foreign 
political predisposition in Germany changed.
82
 By the time violence erupted in Kosovo, 
Kohl’s government had been replaced by a red-green coalition which had been elected 
in October 1998. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
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and Foreign Minister Joseph – more widely known as Joschka – Fischer of the Green 
Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) governed Germany. Both parties were traditionally 
sceptical of war; the Green Party had even been founded on the principle of pacifism. 
Nonetheless, it was this government that decided to contribute Bundeswehr-soldiers to 
the 1999 NATO-intervention in Kosovo, initiating the first deployment of German 
soldiers into active combat since the Second World War. This decision was explained 
by drawing on the previously mentioned paradigm ‘Never again war’ which was 
associated with ‘Never again Auschwitz’. Accordingly, Fischer along with other 
politicians of the Red-Green coalition argued that in the case of Kosovo, military means 
were necessary to ensure that genocide would not ensue and human rights were 
protected.
83
 This will be further discussed in the chapter discussing the German press 
coverage of the Račak incident and the NATO-intervention.84 However, for now it is 
important to note the changing perceptions and interpretations of German foreign 
policy, which permeated the 1990s and thus influenced the country’s stance on the 
violence in Bosnia and later Kosovo. The extent to which Germany’s past still played a 
role in the German press’ debates about the country’s involvement in the region will be 
traced in this thesis. 
 
 
Explaining the Violence 
 
Moreover, it is worth considering how selected secondary literature explains the 
Balkan violence of the 1990s. It must be noted that the literature considered here 
includes works produced by historians and journalists, the latter being particularly 
relevant as they produced much of the post-1990s literature on the region. Scholars of 
Balkan history must be aware of the depth of involvement by many authors – whether 
                                                 
83
 Ludger Volmer, Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik – ein schwieriges Verhältnis: Eine Ideen-, 
Programm- und Ereignisgeschichte grüner Außenpolitik, (Münster, 1998), pp. 464-467 and 563. 
84
 See pp. 254-263 and 300-301. 
39 
 
they are historians or journalists – and must be sensitive to potential bias. I will indicate 
where possible if a personal partiality skews the historical perspective.  
A distinct divide presents itself according to the explanations given for tensions 
in the region before the 1990s and after the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. While 
older research paints a picture of a region plagued by ancient hatreds throughout various 
historical eras,
85
 literature produced in the wake of the Balkan wars largely dismisses 
this stance. Instead it identifies Slobodan Milošević’s nationalist policies as the primary 
cause for violence. This progression can be traced in two works produced by Ivo Banac, 
a Croatian historian at Yale University. Banac’s seminal work, The National Question 
in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (1984), represents the pre-1990s consensus in 
the literature that antagonism between Serbs and Croats was central to the region’s 
long-standing tensions.
86
 To support his argument, the author gives a thorough overview 
of the Serbian and Croatian parties and paramilitary groups between 1918 and 1921, 
their political motivations, and how these fuelled pre-existing tensions.
87
 However, in a 
later article “Sorting out the Balkans: three new looks at a troubled region” (2000), 
Banac asserts that Milošević was the “…primary engineer of the Bosnian war”, moving 
from a pre-1990s standpoint to a revised, post-1990s view of the causes for the region’s 
problems.
88
 However, one must also be aware of a potential bias in Banac’s work. 
While the Croatian-born historian had emigrated to America in 1959 and was therefore 
geographically removed from Yugoslavia’s disintegration, his family ties could have 
influenced his interpretation of deeming Milošević the primary perpetrator of the war.  
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The progression from one school of thought to another in Banac’s two studies 
epitomises the transformation of the historiographical understanding of the region, 
catalysed by the wars in Bosnia and Croatia during the early 1990s. These wars and 
their horrific war crimes, as well as the international community’s involvement in 
securing peace in the region resulted in a heightened scholarly interest. As a result, there 
was an influx of literature since the mid-1990s that attempts to explain the complexities 
of the region and its conflicts to a wide readership.
89
 Some of the most well-known 
works on Balkan history belong to this body of literature and were frequently authored 
by journalists who had witnessed and reported on the wars.
90
 On the one hand this 
enriches the historical narratives with unique perspectives from eyewitnesses. 
Simultaneously however, this same involvement could also have clouded the authors’ 
interpretations who may have a partial account of the war depending on where they 
were reporting from, who their sources were and whether they spoke the local language.   
In the introduction to their edited volume, Yugoslavia and its Historians: 
Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s the editors Norman Naimark and Holly 
Case lament that journalists had become the foremost producers of Balkan history since 
the 1990s. While Naimark and Case – both historians at American universities – do not 
elaborate on what the repercussions of this may be, they do assert that their own work 
aims to compensate for this one-sided approach.
91
 The contributions, many written by 
Serbian and Croatian historians, offer a broad history of the Balkans ranging from the 
Middle Ages to the wars of the 1990s. Thomas Emmert’s chapter, “A Crisis of Identity: 
Serbia at the end of the century”, is particularly interesting for our purposes, as it argues 
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that the comparisons between Milošević and Hitler, as well as Serbia and the Third 
Reich were not a phenomenon exclusive to the media coverage of the 1990s. Politicians 
and academics engaged in comparable debates. Emmert cites for example, President 
Clinton’s Memorial Day speech in 1999, during which he equated Milošević’s Serbia 
with Hitler’s Germany. The author further refers to Harvard Professor Daniel 
Goldhagen, author of the seminal monograph Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996), in 
which he argues that the majority of Germans supports Hitler’s policies.92 Emmert 
draws attention to a magazine-article authored by Goldhagen in 1999 in which he 
compared Serbia to Nazi Germany by bluntly labelling the Serbian people “Milošević’s 
willing executioners.”93 Here, Goldhagen argues that “Serbia’s deeds are, in their 
essence, different from those of Nazi Germany only in scale.”94 Such drastic 
comparisons underline the responsibility which was attributed to Milošević and by 
extension to “the Serbs”.  
Noel Malcolm’s two seminal monographs Bosnia: A Short History (1994) and 
Kosovo: A Short History (1998) – neither of which is short – offer a very detailed 
history of the two countries from the Middle Ages to the wars in the 1990s. Malcolm’s 
formidable range of sources, extending from Latin to Serbo-Croatian, forms the basis 
for his well-researched, in-depth analyses. The British historian does not see tensions 
from previous centuries as the catalyst for the violence of the 1990s. Rather he argues 
that the Serbian aggression promulgated by Milošević’s nationalist policies caused the 
bloody wars.
95
 In his 1998 work on Kosovo, the British historian explores the cultural 
and historical importance of the region and its centrality in the Serbian nationalist myth, 
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which fuelled the violence of the late 1990s in Kosovo.
96
 Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that the book was published in 1998 and consequently does not incorporate the 
1998-1999 Kosovo War and its repercussions. 
 While Malcolm’s influential books are products of careful historical research, 
his role within the Yugoslav Wars must not be disregarded. Writing for the British 
publications Daily Telegraph and The Spectator during the wars, his journalistic 
perspective may have influenced his work. Unfortunately his articles from the wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo are not available online; neither on the publications’ websites, nor 
the electronic database for newspapers and periodicals, Nexis UK.
97
 Consequently his 
journalistic interpretations cannot be contrasted with his academic conclusions.  
Christopher Bennett’s immediate post-war monograph Yugoslavia’s bloody 
collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (1995) contends that while tensions and 
persecutions may have existed in the past – particularly during the Second World War – 
these were not adequate explanations for the recent wars.
98
 The author dismisses the 
Serbian claims of being the victims of Croatian ‘ethnic cleansing’ as well as their 
confinement in Croatian concentration camps during the Second World War as 
nationalist propaganda myths with the aim of self-victimisation.
99
 Rather he focuses on 
the atrocious war crimes committed by Serbians during the 1990s, which he argues 
inevitably led to ‘burning hatred’ that would prevail for years to come.100 Bennett’s 
unbalanced account clearly favours the anti-Serbian narrative which must also be read 
with some scepticism for other reasons. While his bibliography offers a wide range of 
sources, including Serbian, Croatian and Slovene literature, he uses references sparingly 
and thus does not always validate his claims with references. Moreover, as the author 
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himself reveals, his mother was Slovenian and he had been a journalist in Slovenia and 
Croatia during the wars. His personal involvement with the subject matter and potential 
preconditioning to one side of the conflict due to family ties arguably influenced 
Bennett’s assessment. 
 Francine Friedman’s book Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Polity on the Brink is a 
rare exception to the discourse dominant in the literature produced immediately after the 
wars, which focused on Milošević’s culpability. Friedman portrays Milošević as the 
dominant and violent figure within this region, but also considers Croatia’s Franjo 
Tudjman and his role within the decade of wars. The author asserts that Bosnia’s 
diversity and long-term history made the country an easy target for any violently 
nationalistic leader striving for territorial hegemony to accentuate the differences and 
perhaps antagonism amongst its population.
101
 By diluting the blame placed on the 
individual Milošević, Friedman begins to merge a post-1990s stance with some pre-
1990s-arguments. Friedman substantiates her well-referenced claims with a wide range 
of secondary literature published in English, Serbo-Croatian and Bosnian, though 
primary sources are sparse and limited to selected UN and World Bank reports. 
Clearly a shift occurred throughout the secondary literature in explaining the 
violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and following wars, turning away from the theory 
of ancient hatreds and focusing on Milošević’s policies. However, religious differences 
were rarely referred to in this context. This near-complete absence is jarring, as all 
literature almost unanimously utilised the labels Serbs, Croats and Muslims to describe 
the various sections of the Yugoslav population, suggesting a religious dimension.  
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Gaps in the Literature 
 
 This thesis closes various gaps identified in the existing literature. Firstly, I 
applied the various stages of Holocaust memory to the national print media coverage of 
Bosnia and Kosovo. In doing so, this thesis delves significantly deeper than merely 
concluding that the Holocaust influenced the vocabulary used by international press 
outlets. Rather, I found that the collective memory of the Holocaust, which continued to 
evolve throughout the 1990s, influenced the German press’ understanding of the wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo to a varying degree. While the importance of the Holocaust in the 
German war journalism was not persistently present in the press’ coverage, these 
vacillations did not necessarily reflect the stages of collective memory traced in the 
afore-mentioned academic discourse. Consequently the systematic and nuanced 
application of the manner in which collective memory influenced the German press 
coverage of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo allows deeper conclusions on the influence 
of Germany’s past on its foreign policy towards Former Yugoslavia. This is one of 
several gaps in the literature my thesis will close.  
Another is the selection of my primary sources. As noted earlier, the only 
examples of German press that have been analysed with regard to their coverage of the 
conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo were taken from the daily ‘established press,’ 
completely disregarding the most widely-read newspaper, the daily tabloid BILD as 
well as the popular and influential news-magazine Der Spiegel. More marginal 
publications targeting specific audiences, such as the extreme-left Konkret, the extreme-
right Junge Freiheit and the Jewish publication Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung 
have never been included in a media analysis studying the war-journalism of Bosnia and 
Kosovo.  
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This broad selection of primary sources combined with the analysis of both the 
visual as well as the textual coverage allows a more extensive analysis of the German 
media landscape and enables a more comprehensive understanding of how the violence 
in Bosnia and Kosovo was covered. This comparative approach sheds light on what 
emphases were placed in numerous publications and thus dominated the interpretation 
of the violence as well as what idiosyncrasies other outlets presented that coloured the 
coverage. Moreover, it enables a more comprehensive scrutiny of themes specific to 
Germany’s historical and cultural self-understanding. In this respect, the role of 
collective memory of the Holocaust and its impact on the press’ understanding and 
interpretation of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo will be one focus. 
 Considering the weight of Germany’s history throughout the coverage of 
Bosnia and Kosovo, the German Jewish newspaper Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung 
is worth considering in depth. Here I wanted to find out: did the Jewish publication 
mirror and disseminate Holocaust analogies? Did the newspaper represent the view that 
the Jewish experiences of the Holocaust may have been trivialised by such 
comparisons? Were articles written in a way that allowed the readership to identify with 
the suffering of Bosnians and Kosovo-Albanians? Was the first deployment of German 
soldiers into active combat during the Kosovo War reported with special interest? Two 
authors, Beham and Becker, allege that during the Bosnian War, PR-companies 
specifically targeted the Jewish audience in America, aiming to gain their support for 
the Bosnian side.
102
 Unfortunately neither author offers any supporting evidence to 
substantiate this claim of a direct correlation between specific PR-campaigns and the 
support of the American Jewish lobby for the Bosnian War. Nonetheless, the matter of a 
specifically Jewish readership and their perception of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo 
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are worth considering in more detail as it has never been applied to the German case-
study.  
Even though the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo was inter-connected and 
included some of the same actors, there have been no studies of whether the previous 
war in Bosnia influenced the understanding of the conflict in Kosovo and coloured the 
media coverage of the latter. The comparative approach taken in this thesis allows me to 
consider questions such as: how did the press’ analysis and portrayal of regional actors 
change from the coverage of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo? Did the Bosnian War 
influence the journalists’ analysis of the violence in Kosovo? For example, did they 
jump to conclusions regarding the responsibility for war? How did the influence of 
Germany’s National-Socialist past develop throughout the 1990s with regard to Bosnia 
and Kosovo? Can a progression be traced?  
 
 
 Methodology 
 
Methodologically, this thesis takes a qualitative approach, analysing articles, 
editorials, as well as pictures and cartoons. Considering the sheer volume of material, I 
initially experimented with a quantitative approach. This could have had a summarising 
significance to illustrate the frequency of certain keywords, themes, or word 
combinations in the press-coverage. After initial quantitative tests, I found this approach 
unsatisfactory, as it did not allow an in-depth engagement with the archival source 
material, which is the crucial foundation for the historical analysis I wanted to carry out. 
Consequently, the underlying issues of analogies, language, or specific interpretations 
are given more attention than the mere frequency of their usage. As Shoemaker and 
Reese assert in their monograph, Mediating the Message, “knowing how many times a 
sports-caster refers to black athletes doesn’t tell us whether the coverage reflects 
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fairness or prejudice.”103 This colloquial citation encapsulates the methodological 
approach to thematic analysis taken in this doctoral thesis. The in-depth analysis of the 
themes and interpretations presented in textual and visual reporting at the time allows 
the analysis of issues and topics which were deemed important as the conflicts were 
unfolding. These may differ from the themes explored in later scholarship and will be 
pointed out where relevant. Nonetheless, I have retained some quantitative 
considerations to give the reader a general sense of how many articles and images were 
published; the ratio between images and articles and how these quantities developed or 
regressed in the course of the coverage of the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars. These 
quantitative comparisons are particularly relevant in the conclusion. The image analysis 
is integrated in the textual analysis with the exception of chapters thee and five – 
studying the coverage of the Dayton negotiations and the Račak incident – which 
feature separate sections for images, as these did not portray the negotiations or the 
incident themselves. 
The new perspective on the wars offered by the extensive analysis of selected 
German press highlights them as seminal historical sources which are crucial to 
understand how certain subject matters were perceived and portrayed amidst the on-
going conflict. Consequently, this thesis will contribute an important historical narrative 
of the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars from the perspective of the German print media as well 
as addressing and contributing to many important contemporary debates through its 
analysis of key topics such as Germany’s national identity and the country’s role in the 
world.  
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Media Theory and Image Analysis 
 
Due to the focus on print media as an instrument to analyse the wars in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, some theoretical approaches from the discipline of media studies must 
briefly be explored. Much of the literature on war journalism – which is frequently 
portrayed as a crucial facet of modern warfare
104
 – explores the question of who 
generates news and under what circumstances. In this respect, media theory has 
traditionally focused on the role of the journalist, frequently referencing the 
‘gatekeeper-theory,’ coined in 1950 by David Manning, as well as the ‘agenda-setting-
theory’ put forward by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972. The former sees 
the journalists literally as ‘gatekeepers’ of information who subjectively select the 
content of the news-cycle and thus what aspect of world affairs the readers learn 
about.
105
 Similarly, the ‘agenda-setting-theory’ asserts that  
…by selecting and reporting the news, the press influences not so much what we think, but it 
tells us what to think about. Through their daily selection and coverage of news, media exert an 
influence on public attention to the issues, problems, and opportunities in society.
106
 
This centrality of the journalist and his or her selection of news and how to interpret and 
present it, emphasises that “…there is no such thing as an objective observer of 
reality,”107 as Shoemaker and Reese phrased it.  
However, more recent approaches moved away from this focus on the journalist. 
The ‘media framing’ theory, developed in the early 1990s, refers to ‘the media’ as an 
abstract entity. This theory argues that “mass media actively set[s] the frames of 
reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events” and in doing 
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so constructs a social reality which determines the way news is interpreted.
108
 This 
approach can be seen as an extension of the ‘agenda-setting-theory,’109 though 
“…framing is [more] concerned with the presentation of issues” in the press.110 
Christiane Eilders and Albert Lüter identify three frames in their application of the 
framing theory to German press-coverage of the Kosovo War: diagnostic, prognostic 
and motivational. The first conceives an article to offer a diagnosis of the war, giving an 
explanation for the violence. Articles written with a prognostic frame aim to give an 
outlook of how the war may develop. The motivational frame targets the reader to feel 
as through ‘we’ must do something, creating a collective sense of responsibility.111 The 
systematic categorisation into frames suggests that every article is written with a certain 
agenda in mind.  
While these media theories introduce useful concepts in some respects which 
have shaped my thesis – and indeed have been utilised in some media analyses on the 
wars in Bosnia and Kosovo
112
 – analysing the German coverage through only these 
vantage points is restricting. For example, the urgency to interpret all articles through 
set frames also limits the analysis, as the frame pre-determines the analysis of sources. 
Broaching the media analysis without pre-existing labels in mind allows an evaluation 
of more subtle themes and nuanced debates which may have been included in the press 
coverage.  
In addition to these media theories, the use of images in war journalism and their 
effects must be considered to gain deeper understanding of the reporting. In spite of the 
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modern techniques of photo-editing, pictures are often still associated with capturing 
and portraying “the truth.” However, various scholars have deemed this too simple and 
have discussed the complex role of images in war-journalism. Nonetheless, aside from 
two exceptions, this has not been systematically applied to the reporting in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Neu’s previously mentioned media analysis addresses the topic with regard to 
two newspapers covering Bosnia.
113
 The only study about images and war-journalism 
pertaining to Kosovo is Alexander Nikolaev’s article entitled “Images of War: Content 
Analysis of the Photo Coverage of the War in Kosovo.” Nikolaev’s main argument 
states that the visual coverage of the Kosovo War in the American news-magazines 
Newsweek, Time and US News & World Report predominantly showed Serbs as 
perpetrators and Kosovo-Albanian civilians as victims without including images of 
Serbian civilians and Kosovo-Albanian soldiers.
114
 Consequently the author concludes 
that the photo coverage presented a statistical imbalance and bias towards the Serbians. 
The article’s purely quantitative methodology limits the readers’ engagement with the 
actual images – of which none were printed, though it does offer some valuable 
theoretical starting points for an image analysis. Moreover, apart from corroborating 
conclusions already known about the international media coverage – that Serbians were 
portrayed as perpetrators more frequently than Kosovo-Albanians – this article does not 
substantially add to the subject of images in the press-coverage of the Kosovo War. The 
focus on purely quantitative evaluations of images without comparing them to the texts 
they were published with also narrows the conclusions one can draw regarding the 
information conveyed to the reader. This aspect will be included in my thesis.  
Susan Sontag, perhaps the most eminent scholar on this topic, takes a more 
qualitative approach. Sontag lived in Sarajevo for several months while the Bosnian 
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capital was besieged between 1992 and 1995 and intermittently draws on the Bosnia 
War amongst others to substantiate her arguments.
115
 Explaining the value of pictures, 
Sontag states that “…photographs alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking 
at...,”116 making a far-away event much more “real.”117 However, Sontag and other 
scholars also voice caution with regard to press pictures, also in the Bosnian War. 
Firstly, the impact of images was concertedly employed by “both sides” of the Balkan 
Wars to visually enhance a one-sided narrative of the conflict. Sontag gives the example 
that in the early 1990s, Serbs and Croats disseminated the same images of children who 
had died during a siege of a village, claiming these were “their” losses.118 Similarly, 
Lieutenant General Walter Jertz’s book on Kosovo states that NATO was constantly 
struggling to counter the images disseminated by “Serbian propaganda”, quoting the 
NATO-spokesman Jamie Shea that “pictures must be controverted with pictures.”119 
Sontag further cautions that the reader must realise that an image does not 
merely capture reality and certainly does not present a “truth”. “In deciding how a 
picture should look, in preferring one exposure to another, photographers are always 
imposing standards on their subjects…”120 Consequently, Sontag argues, pictures are an 
interpretation, as much as any other form of art. Alexander Nikolaev elaborates this 
point in his previously discussed article, in which he emphasises the mood of a picture 
as invaluable, as it adds another dimension of interpretation. The attitude of an image is 
equally important, as this “actively inserts latent content” into an image, Nikolaev 
argues.
121
 These somewhat immeasurable concepts of mood, attitude and purpose are of 
course difficult to trace in a media analysis, where the image is often referenced with 
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only the press agency which supplied it. Nonetheless, regarding an image with these 
notions in mind can offer additional insights; taking for example the well-known image 
from the Bosnia War below.  
 
Figure 2: Photo taken by Ron Haviv, Bijeljina, Bosnia, April 1992
122
 
 
While the viewer has very little concrete information about the individuals in this 
image, one impression when viewing the above image (figure 2) is the sensation that 
one side is much more powerful than the other. Backed up by a large military-truck in 
the background, these armed soldiers or paramilitaries – who feel so safe that they are 
not even wearing helmets for protection – patrol the streets, exerting disproportionate 
violence on ostensibly unarmed civilians.  
 This interpretation, which is strongly influenced by Nikolaev’s notions of mood 
and attitude, gives the viewer a seemingly clear insight into the violence. If this image 
were to be printed alongside a newspaper-article about a Bosnian-Serb paramilitary 
formation wreaking havoc in a town, killing numerous Muslim inhabitants, the viewer’s 
mind would immediately transfer this information onto the image, even though the latter 
did not reveal any of this. Such deductive reasoning emphasises the impact an image 
can have due to mere interpretation. For as Susan Sontag posited about the same 
picture:  
…actually…[it] tells us little. At the most this: that the war is hell [arguably an 
interpretation]
123
 and that young, slender men armed with guns are able to kick older, plump 
women…in the head... The image does not tell us that she is a Muslim, though it is doubtful she 
is anything else [again, an interpretation].
124
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This assessment underlines how quickly interpretations are interwoven with the 
observance of an image, which is particularly important to remember because pictures 
are often not challenged as being one of many interpretations. 
However, as Sontag highlights, the reader or viewer is not alone in interpreting 
an image. She argues that a further level of judgment is superimposed by news editors 
and photo editors by deciding which should be published in a newspaper. Here, the 
benchmark of what these individuals deem “good taste” and publishable material further 
narrows what the reader ultimately sees.
125
 This selection process, reminiscent of the 
“gate-keeper-theory”, is illustrated when comparing the “typical” newspaper images 
(figures 4 and 5) delineating the atrocities of the Bosnian War and the graphic image 
below.  
 
Figure 3: Personal photograph, Sarajevo History Museum, taken in October 2010 
 
 
This graphic picture of violent killing (figure 3) was part of an exhibition in the local 
history museum in Sarajevo in October 2010. The caption in the museum explains that 
it depicts victims of Sarajevo’s Markale Massacre on 28 August 1995, which killed 37 
civilians and wounded 90.
126
 This picture was taken by a Reuters photographer and 
would probably have been available to the Western media amongst many others. 
However, the Western press opted for less gruesome images of the Bosnian violence 
which typically showed the desolation of the war much less graphically. 
  
Figure 4: FR, 8 April 1992, p. 1    Figure 5: taz, 5 Dec. 1991, p. 8 
 
It is evident from this brief theoretical debate that visual analysis is highly 
complex as well as controversial. The images’ significance in addition to the textual 
war-journalism about Bosnia and Kosovo has not received much attention, particularly 
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from a qualitative perspective. However, images are more revealing of subtle 
assumption and stereotypes, as they are able to express things without words, often 
eliciting extreme emotions. This is one reason for my decision to include them. Another 
is that images have barely been analysed and thus never been contextualised with the 
articles that were published along-side the images. Such a comparison, as offered in this 
thesis, allows a more concrete evaluation of the effect images can have within war-
journalism. It has enabled me to examine the extent to which the images reinforce the 
message of the textual coverage or if they introduced an alternative interpretation, for 
example. In this respect, cartoons are crucial, but have been completely disregarded in 
all but one
127
 existing media analyses. Considering the satire inherent to and expected of 
political caricatures, along with the artistic freedom attributed to the caricaturist, a 
cartoon allows a publication to disseminate a perhaps controversial opinion very bluntly 
which might be inappropriate in writing. Thus the inclusion of cartoons is revealing and 
a crucial facet of a media analysis. The examination of this genre as presented in this 
thesis is novel. 
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Chapter 1 
Background: Key Historical Milestones 
 
 
While each chapter entails an overview of the secondary literature relevant to 
that specific aspect of the conflicts or wars, at this point it is worth considering some of 
the larger background issues relevant to this thesis. Given the complexities of Bosnia, 
Serbia and Kosovo as individual countries, as well as the region as a whole, it is not 
possible to give a comprehensive historical background. Rather I will consider certain 
key periods that introduced factors which later became relevant during the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and were thus repeatedly referenced in the 
course of the German press coverage. These pertinent historical milestones are: the 
region’s medieval history, specifically the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and the advent of 
three major religions, as well as World War Two.  
During the Middle Ages, three main religious groupings – namely Christian 
Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam – took root in the region, while the Serbian 
interpretation and memory of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo lay the foundation of divisive 
nationalism, which was crucial in the wars in the 1990s. Moreover, during the Second 
World War, the Croatian and Serbian resistance movements Ustasha and Chetniks 
emerged, which were revived as associations during the wars in the 1990s. While a 
wide range of sound academic studies is available on the history of the Balkans,
128
 it is 
useful to highlight a number of key topics at this juncture. 
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Medieval Balkans 
 
 Beginning with the first époque, the medieval history of the Balkans is a dense 
narrative of varying powers dominating the region in turn. Particularly the Hungarian, 
Serbian and Ottoman Empires were important influences to the religious and cultural 
composition of the region.
129
 During the Middle Ages, the Balkans split into an “Eastern 
and Western cultural zone”, as Vladimir Dedijer and his co-authors termed it. While 
Serbia and Macedonia were strongly influenced by the Byzantine Empire and hence the 
Orthodox Church, the Western Balkans were dominated by Charlemagne’s Roman-
Catholic Franks.
130
 Further religious and political influences were introduced to the 
Balkans in the course of the Ottoman conquest in late 14
th
 century. By the 1380s, the 
Ottoman armies had reached Serbian territory and without strong regional defences 
from the deeply divided and competing local rulers, they quickly took over the land, 
reaching Bosnia in 1388.
131
 Throughout the different cultural zones, various competing 
cultures, religions and alphabets established themselves. The effects are still visible in 
the present day: in Serbia, the Serbian-Orthodox Church is dominant and a Cyrillic 
alphabet is used; in Croatia Roman-Catholicism is the primary religion and the Latin 
alphabet is used. Bosnia is more diverse: though Islam is the dominant religion, Latin 
letters are used here as well.  
 
 
1389: Battle of Kosovo and Serbia’s National Myth 
 
 One particular battle, which occurred during the 1380s Ottoman conquest of 
Serbia and Bosnia stands out. In 1389 the Serbian Prince Lazar attempted to halt the 
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Ottoman advance at Kosovo Polje, the field of the blackbirds.
132
 Sultan Murad 
triumphed over his Serbian counterpart, who was captured and executed. During the 
following five centuries of Muslim rule, Islam was solidified in the region. While this 
battle could have been overlooked as one of many battles in the Medieval Balkans, it 
became a watershed milestone in the Serbian national narrative, and with the rise of 
nationalism in the 19
th
 century was transformed into a national myth. 
Michael Sells systematically reconstructs the creation of this Serbian national 
myth surrounding the 1389 battle in his monograph.
133
 He argues that amidst the epoch 
of 19
th
 century literary romanticism, the battle became a central theme in Serbian epic 
poetry and immortalised Prince Lazar as a hero.
134
 He explains: 
Lazar’s death represents the death of the Serb nation, which will not be resurrected until Lazar is 
raised from the dead and the descendants of Lazar’s killers [Muslims] are purged from the 
Serbian people.
135
  
With quotes from various speeches, excerpts from plays and poems as well as visual 
material, Sells elaborates how central the 1389 battle has become to the Serbian national 
conscience. Taking a purely historical perspective, the British historian Noel Malcolm 
argued that “…the truth is a little less dramatic” and that this single battle did not lead to 
the demise of the Serbian nation.
136
 Instead Malcolm attributes Serbia’s eventual 
downfall to the dominant strength of the Ottoman forces over a number of years. 
Comparing the myth’s content with the proven historical facts goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, more important for our purposes is that the 1389 battle became a 
turning point for the region and that the myth returned as central to the Serbian national 
narrative during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  
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The role of Religion 
 
One important product of Balkan medieval history was the presence of three 
strong religious spheres in the Balkan region: Catholicism, Islam and Serbian 
Orthodoxy. Consequently, the role of religion must be considered. Judaism had been 
introduced to the Balkan region during the Roman rule of Yugoslavia, though the 
Jewish population was insignificant in number when compared to Catholicism, Islam 
and Serbian Orthodoxy.
137
 Many key works on Balkan history identify the coexistence 
of various religions as a distinguishing, but not truly dividing factor for the Bosniaks,
138
 
Serbians and Croats.
139
 As Malcolm explains, “…it was not state policy [in Bosnia] to 
convert people to Islam or make them behave like Muslims…”140 Due to the absence of 
forced conversions by Muslim rulers, along with a large measure of political and 
cultural autonomy for non-Muslims, the subsequent centuries were not marked by 
religious persecutions or conflicts but rather peaceful coexistence.
141
 
According to Mark Mazower and Fred Singleton, religious differences only 
gained prominence when they were combined with nationalism in the late 19
th
 century, 
though both reiterate that this was a pan-European phenomenon and not singular to the 
Balkans.
142
 For example, Mazower postulates that “if there was no ethnic conflict 
[during the Ottoman rule of the Balkans], it was not because of ‘tolerance’ but because 
there was no concept of nationality among the Sultan’s subjects...”143 Similarly 
Singleton argues that “Orthodoxy and national identity were inextricably intertwined, 
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and religious leaders became the spokesmen of national revolt.”144 Schatzmiller expands 
on the interpretation that 19
th
 century nationalism fomented religious tensions in the 
introduction to her edited volume, in which she asserts that “Islam…only became the 
divisive and decisive factor in the conflict [of the 1990s] when it was combined with 
ethnic nationalism.”145 Whether Islam was the discordant religion, as Schatzmiller 
postulates, or Orthodoxy, as Singleton posits, remains unclear. However, the scholars 
agree that by the dawn of the 20
th
 century, the region was entrenched in religious and 
national differences.
146
  
 
 
World War Two 
 
Departing from the medieval Balkans, the second historic milestone relevant to 
this thesis lies several centuries ahead. On the 6 April 1941, Nazi-Germany and its allies 
attacked Yugoslavia and initiated an occupation that lasted until 1945. Serbia came 
under direct German administration. Other parts of Yugoslavia were distributed 
amongst Hitler’s allies that had also launched the attack, namely Italy, Bulgaria and 
Hungary.
147
 In addition, a fascist “Independent State of Croatia” was created, which 
consisted of Croatia, Slavonia
148
 as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina and was known by its 
Serbo-Croatian initials, NDH.
149
 Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Croatian fascist 
movement, Ustasha,
150
 became the head of this puppet-state. Malcolm summarises the 
history of Yugoslavia during the Second World War as “…the story of many wars 
piled…on top of another…”151 In the first instance, there was the most obvious war 
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between Nazi-Germany and Yugoslavia. Another conflict was that between the fascist 
occupiers and their Croatian allies, the Ustasha, against the local resistance movements, 
but there was also a war between the two main resistance formations themselves: the 
Royalist Serbian Chetniks
152
 and communist Partisans. While the latter pursued the goal 
of creating a communist Yugoslav state, the Royalists aimed to reinstate the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia under Serbian command. Amongst them were ‘rabid Serb nationalists,’ 
as Malcolm labelled them, whose aim was to achieve a homogenous Serbian land.
153
 
As in other countries, the deportation of the local Jewish population ensued 
shortly after the Nazi-occupation.
154
 However, as Malcolm writes, “anti-Semitism was 
of only secondary concern to Ustaša ideologists…” Their primary goal was to eliminate 
the considerable Serbian minority – 1.9 million out of a population of 6.3 million – from 
NDH-territory.
155
 Fred Singleton, holds Croatia’s fascist leader Ante Pavelić, whom he 
labels a ‘Puppet-Führer’, responsible for the persecution of the Serbian civilians. 
Basing his research on an extensive selection of both Yugoslav and English secondary 
literature and memoirs, he claims: “the [NDH-]regime declared that one of its chief 
objectives was to ‘purify’ Croatia of alien elements, especially the Serbs.”156 Vladimir 
Dedijer, a former Yugoslav Partisan fighter and later historian, as well as Josip Tito’s 
official biographer, also portrayed Pavelić to have followed Hitler’s example. “Taking 
the Nurnberg laws as a model,…[Pavelić] passed a legal decree on April 30, 1941, on 
the protection of Aryan blood and the honour of the Croatian people…”157  
The epitome of the NDH’s elimination of ‘alien elements’ was the concentration 
camp Jasenovac, where thousands of Serbians died along with other persecuted 
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minorities including Jews and Roma.
158
 Various works have explored this topic in 
detail,
159
 though Dedijer’s detailed account of the Ustasha-camp and the killing methods 
used against its prisoners is the most comprehensive.
160
 Most important for our purposes 
is the argument in Macdonald’s monograph, who states that Jasenovac remained 
distinctly dominant in the Serbian collective memory of the 1990s and was frequently 
drawn on to reiterate the crimes the Serbian people had been subjected to.
161
 Though 
Malcolm’s seminal work only mentions Jasenovac once as a side-note, significantly he 
terms NDH’s policies towards the Serbs as ‘genocidal’.162 This is important to keep in 
mind during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s when Serbians argued that 
they had been victims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and even ‘genocide’ by Croatians. 
Moreover, it was used to explain the Serbian treatment of distinctive, or as some 
nationalist politicians perceived it, hostile identities including Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims. 
The last ‘layer’ of war Malcolm had spoken about in his monograph was the 
conflict between the fascists and the communist Partisans, who were led by Josip Broz 
Tito. These partisans belonged to the Yugoslav Communist Party, which consisted of 
approximately 6.000 members by 1940.
163
 Their ultimate victory over the fascists and 
the Chetniks led to the creation of a communist Yugoslav state in 1945, which consisted 
of six republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and 
Montenegro), as well as two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo). Tito ruled 
this Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the mantra ‘Unity and 
Brotherhood.’ By superimposing Communism on the diverse republics, which in some 
                                                 
158
 Mark Biondich, The Balkans: Revolution, War & Political Violence since 1878 (Oxford, 2011), p. 140. 
159
 For example Vladimir Dedijer, Jasenovac: das jugoslawische Auschwitz und der Vatikan (Freiburg, 
2011); David Bruce Macdonald, Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda 
and the War in Yugoslavia (Manchester, 2002); Jovan Byford, “‘When I Say ‘the Holocaust’, I Mean 
‘Jasenovac’: Remembrance of the Holocaust in Contemporary Serbia” East European Jewish Affairs, 
37:1 (2007), pp. 51-74. 
160
 Dedijer, Jasenovac, pp. 145-161 
161
 Macdonald, Balkan Holocausts?, p. 160. 
162
 Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 192.  
163
 Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 177.  
62 
 
cases were at enmity with one another, academics generally agree that tensions 
stemming from various historical eras ranging from the Middle Ages to the Second 
World War, subsided.
164
 However, after Tito’s death in 1980, a decade of political 
instability and conflict ensued, which escalated in the 1990s. 
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Chapter 2 
1991-1992: The Descent into War – early German press coverage 
 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s heralded a decade of war 
and atrocities. The region’s geographical proximity to Western Europe and that it was 
the first war in Europe since the Second World War awoke the international 
community’s interest.  
 
 
Historical Background  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yugoslavia began to crumble due to a number 
of political and economic reasons. Slobodan Milošević (1941-2006), a communist 
apparatchik, became President of the Serbian Republic within Yugoslavia in 1989. In 
this position, Milošević’s foremost political goal was to uphold Serbia’s position as the 
strongest and most dominant republic in Yugoslavia.
165
 Consequently, mere months 
after becoming the Serbian President, he introduced constitutional reforms. Citing 
inefficiencies of Tito’s 1974 constitution, Milošević weakened the federal authority in 
favour of a stronger centralised state ruled from Belgrade.
166
 As a result, “most non-
Serb nationalities believed that they were handicapped by a system in which Serbs were 
proportionally overrepresented in federal institutions…”, such as the Yugoslav Peoples’ 
Army (JNA).
167
 Opposing the Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia 
declared their independence in June and October 1991, respectively. 
Germany readily supported both countries, willing to recognise their self-
government. At this time, Germany was led by a conservative-liberal coalition of the 
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Christian-Democrats (CDU) and the Free Liberal Party (FDP). Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
(CDU) and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), who was replaced by 
Klaus Kinkel (FDP) in 1992, were the most important German actors with regard to the 
country’s policy towards the Balkans. Widely known as the “father of German unity”, 
Kohl had spearheaded the successful unification of East and West Germany in 1990 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
168
 This process of unification had been strongly 
influenced by the notion of the peoples’ right to self-determination,169 which in turn 
coined the Kohl government’s foreign policy in the Balkans. Thus, both Kohl and his 
respective Foreign Ministers supported the republics’ striving for independence.   
The EC-members had initially been divided in their reactions to these 
declarations. While Great Britain and France feared that a disintegrated Yugoslavia 
would cause severe geo-political instability in the region, Germany insisted on the right 
to self-determination of the Yugoslav republics and endorsed both as independent 
republics on 23 December 1991.
170
 The remaining EC-members followed on 15 January 
1992.
171
 Germany’s hasty recognition, often referred to as an Alleingang,172 caused 
considerable discord in the EC, as Daniele Conversi draws out in his monograph. 
Fearing an exceedingly confident and assertive Germany so soon after unification, the 
author argues that particularly British politicians accused Germany of pursuing a 
‘Fourth Reich’, which Conversi terms ‘German-bashing’.173 The author further argues 
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that contrary to the EC’s allegations, Germany’s policies did not accelerate the 
Yugoslav Wars. 
The reasons for Germany’s hasty recognition has puzzled many scholars and 
been attributed to various reasons. Among them range disillusionment of the EC’s 
disparate and previously ineffective policies and the aim to allow other countries the 
right of self-determination, which had been granted to Germany in the course of its 
recent unification.
174
 Furthermore, Marie-Janine Calic’s chapter in Alex Danchev’s and 
Thomas Halverson’s edited volume International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict 
(1996) alludes to Germany’s historical experiences as a further influential factor that 
influenced the country’s foreign policy in Yugoslavia. “Many Germans believed that 
inherited guilt obliged the Federal Republic to assume responsibility for the people in 
the former Yugoslavia.”175 Unfortunately Calic does not investigate this plausible 
argument further.  
Mere months after Croatia and Slovenia had gained international recognition of 
their independence, the same political desire engulfed Bosnia. However, Bosnia’s 
population was much more diverse, comprising of roughly 43% Muslims, 32% Serbs 
and 18% Croats. This constellation proved onerous for the pursuit of independence, as 
the 32% Bosnian Serbs demanded that Bosnia remain a part of the Serbian dominated 
Yugoslavia. Due to this internal divergence, the EC made its recognition of Bosnia’s 
independence contingent on a referendum, which was held from 29 February to 1 March 
1992. As the report sumitted by the international election monitors summarised, 
approximately 63% of Bosnia’s population voted, of which 99% were in favour of 
                                                 
174
 Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia”, pp. 569-607; Lawrence Freedman, “Why the West Failed”, Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 
1994-1995), pp. 53-69; Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure (London, 1993); 
Hanns Maull, “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis” Survival, 37:4, (1995-96), pp. 104. 
175
 Marie-Janine Calic, “German Perspectives” in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.), 
International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (Houndmills, 1996), p. 72. 
66 
 
Bosnia’s independence.176 The missing percentage was predominantly the Serbs living 
in Bosnia who had largely boycotted the referendum, as they felt it did not represent 
their views, but that simultaneously they did not have a strong enough voice to make 
their concerns heard.
177
 Regardless, as the majority of Bosnia’s population had voted in 
favour of the country’s independence, Bosnia declared its independence on 1 March 
1992 and was officially and unanimously recognised by the EC on 6 April. In response 
to Bosnia’s declaration of independence, what was left of Yugoslavia declared war on 3 
March 1992, as had been the case when the EC had recognised Croatia’s and Slovenia’s 
independence several months earlier. In all cases these wars were led by the JNA and 
spearheaded by Yugoslavia’s strongest republic, Serbia. While the war in Slovenia 
lasted mere ten days, ending with Slovenia’s victory on 7 July 1991, the violence in 
Bosnia and Croatia lasted nearly four years. 
 
This chapter will examine the German print media coverage between 1 
December 1991 and 9 May 1992, which encompasses the months leading up to and the 
initial weeks of the Bosnian War. Themes explored in this chapter include the German 
press’ explanations for the violence, the role of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) in 
the coverage, while also examining issues such as language and authorship. In this 
period, the extreme-left magazine Konkret only published one article pertaining to the 
Balkans.
178
 Its content did not cover any of the issues analysed in this chapter, but will 
be included where fitting. Lastly, it must be noted that as this period leading up to the 
Bosnian War overlapped with the on-going war in Croatia, some of the articles drew on 
the Croatian case-study to underline their arguments. However, due to largley the same 
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actors and connected relevant themes, the German press coverage is very relevant to the 
Bosnian case-study.  
 
 
Explaining the violence 
 
With the tensions increasing in Bosnia, the first questions inevitably addressed 
the reasons for this violence. BILD only published 47 articles on the Balkans in total – a 
mere fraction compared to 190 taz-articles and 258 in FAZ – of which none addressed 
the historic background of the violence or why the conflict ignited. This can be 
attributed the tabloid’s general style. Articles were very short – no longer than 30 to 50 
words – and thus only covered the bare minimum of current events, if that. In contrast, 
most publications contextualised their day-to-day coverage with references to specific 
historical events, which were congruent with those discussed in much of the secondary 
literature, namely: the Ottoman rule of the Balkans;
179
 the 1914 assassination of the 
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo that sparked World War One;
180
 the 
Second World War
181
 – which will be discussed in more detail in a moment – and Tito’s 
Communist Yugoslavia.
182
 The common conclusion was that hatred between Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims had existed throughout all of these periods, explaining the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia with these rivalries. None of the publications provided 
coherent historical narratives, and when offering a historical context at all, articles 
frequently alluded to it superficially in a single sentence or paragraph at most while 
concentrating primarily on current affairs.
183
 This may have resulted from the 
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complexity of Balkan history or the limited space available in the articles. However, this 
could also result from the nature of news, which “…is not about long-term processes 
but about short-term events…Reporters tend to be more interested in events than 
causes.”184  
These references to ancient rivalries were phrased in very general terms. For 
example a Spiegel-article mentioned almost casually that “the Serbs, who are still 
aspiring a Groβreich…” were waging a war for territory.185 Similarly an article in FR 
stated that “briefly one can say that in the entire Balkan-peninsula, the idea of national 
identity has constantly been misused as an instrument by great powers…”186 Lastly, a 
taz-article asserted in equally general terms that Balkan “politicians like nothing more 
than to talk about the past…Polemics replace arguments. Abrasiveness eliminates 
reason.”187 This vague word-choice left the reader with the impression that Yugoslavia 
was a powder-keg, threatening to explode at any time. However, the reader actually 
gained very little insight where this antagonism came from and how century-old 
conflicts could fuel discontent in the 1990s. It must be noted that this missing depth did 
not necessarily result from the correspondents’ ignorance regarding the complexities of 
Balkan history. Rather, as previously mentioned, the ‘ancient hatreds’ theory was the 
common interpretation found in the literature produced before the 1990s which would 
have informed a journalist at that time.
188
  
FAZ and taz also portrayed the abstruse hatreds in cartoons. Both conveyed 
disbelief that 20
th
 century politics could be marked by seemingly out-dated concepts 
such as historical hatreds.   
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Figure 6: taz, 19 December 1991, p. 12:  
-“Woah! Modern art in the hallowed halls of the Foreign Office?” 
- “Nope, that’s the new service dress for the future Ambassador in Slovenia and Croatia!” 
 
The exchange between the two onlookers in taz’s caricature portrayed the insistence on 
ancient rivalries as ridiculous. The contrast between the formally-dressed men and the 
medieval armour is very stark, implying a different level of sophistication between ‘the 
West’ and ‘the Balkans.’ This is further underlined by the evaluation that medieval 
armour was modern art, implying that history was very present and topical in the Balkan 
region.   
Two FAZ-cartoons, published several months apart, were equally dismissive of 
ancient rivalries influencing present-day politics. 
  
Figure 7: FAZ, 30 March 1992, p. 3   Figure 8: FAZ, 4 May 1992, p. 3   
 
Both cartoons portrayed the Serbian character in the same way: as a man dressed in 
traditional clothing, with a rugged beard and Chetnik insignia on his hat. In both cases 
the Chetnik is the sole initiator of violence. While figure 8 also criticises the EC’s 
inability to stop the violence, the central message of FAZ’s visual representations was 
that the Serbian protagonist, but also his Bosnian victim in figure 8, were stuck in their 
backward, out-dated ways. This condescension created a stark dichotomy between ‘the 
Balkans,’ which appeared barbaric and uncivilised, and ‘the West’. The vague yet 
judgemental representation of Yugoslavia as a backward powder-keg may have 
coloured the broad public’s understanding of the evolving conflict and prohibited a 
deeper engagement with the region, its history and the sources of its problems.  
 
 
World War Two 
 
Amidst this vague yet threatening notion of ancient hatreds, the Second World 
War was particularly relevant in the German press coverage. As detailed in chapter one, 
70 
 
two opposing extremist actors during the Second World War were Croatia’s fascist 
Ustasha and the Serbian Chetniks. Both had perpetrated war crimes against their enemy, 
specifically targeting civilians. The radical formations in Croatia and Serbia that were 
forming in the 1990s used the Ustasha or Chetniks as role models, adopting their 
predecessors’ names and insignia. All publications except BILD saw the antagonism 
stemming from these two opposing extremist formations and their echo as pivotal to 
explain the violence of the 1990s, though they interpreted this nexus very differently. 
While FR, Spiegel and AJW primarily focused their blame on the fascist Ustasha, FAZ, 
Welt and taz concentrated on the Chetniks’ culpability. JF lay in the middle of these two 
factions. 
Starting with the first category, Daniel Riegger’s FR-article argued that the 
Ustasha-crimes had never been processed or reconciled sufficiently and were therefore 
resurfacing in the 1990s.
189
 Without offering any further details, the reader was left with 
self-constructed images of fascist war crimes, which implicitly blamed Croatia in the 
1990s for reviving their fascist tendencies. A similarly vague yet accusatory tone could 
be found in two Spiegel-articles published in January and March 1992, which presented 
the Ustasha as the primary perpetrators of atrocities during the Second World War. In 
January, Walter Mayr reported that in one case “during the Second World War” – 
without offering a date or location – Serbian civilians had been massacred by the Nazis’ 
elite troops, the Schutzstaffel (SS), along with collaborating Ustasha and Muslims. By 
reminding the reader that the Ustasha had collaborated with the Nazis, they were 
immediately discredited in most readers’ mind, though the article gave no concrete 
information.
190
 In March, Spiegel featured an interview with the main Serbian 
opposition leader against Milošević, Vuk Drašković. While Drašković also blamed 
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Serbian nationalism for the violence in the 1990s, he primarily blamed the Ustasha. He 
argued that “for 45 years the Croats imputed the Ustasha-crimes to the Germans. But 
now it has been historically proven that the Germans [themselves] were horror-stricken 
over the gruesome Croatian methods.”191 Again the reader did not gain any knowledge 
about the details of the horrific cruelty. However by presenting them as so extreme that 
even the Nazis were shocked by them, the reader was left with a vague yet appalling 
view of the Ustasha’s brutality.  
AJW’s articles also focused exclusively on Ustasha’s culpability, but introduced 
a novel aspect by concentrating on its anti-Semitism, arguing that Tudjman aimed to 
revive these sentiments amongst Croats in the 1990s.
192
 Wolf Oschlies’ article reiterated 
that Tudjman’s movement resembled the Croatian Ustasha, or as the author called them 
‘Croatian Jew-butchers.’ Oschlies corroborated his accusations of Tudjman for being 
anti-Semitic by drawing on his autobiography, where Tudjman wrote that ‘only’ 
30,000-40,000 people had been killed in the Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac. 
The author continued that a more accurate estimate was 300,000, most of whom had 
been Jews.
193
 AJW’s articles primarily focused on Tudjman’s anti-Semitism and placed 
the Jewish victimhood in the centre of their narrative. Consequently they did not explain 
the historical antagonism between Ustasha and the Serbian Chetnik; the latter was even 
mentioned by name. These articles could have led the reader to believe that the ancient 
tensions, which were now being revived, had existed between fascist Croatians and 
Jews.  
An article in the extreme-right JF did focus on the Serbian-Croatian nexus, 
while simultaneously presenting many of the issues from AJW’s articles very 
differently. In a June article by Michael Paulwitz, the author defended Tudjman and his 
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association with the Ustasha, praising him for valuing the Ustasha-state, which had 
broken a taboo. The author postulated that its previous ‘demonisation’ had been a part 
of Tito’s Yugoslav ‘reason of state’ and had merely been utilised to hinder Croatia’s 
striving for independence. The article then continued that Tudjman had rightfully 
corrected the frequently cited number estimating that 700,000 Serbians had been killed 
in the Jasenovac concentration camp, positing that 60,000 people had been killed in all 
Croatian camps combined.
194
 The different numbers cited in JF and AJW suggests the 
level of disagreement amongst various parties regarding historical facts. While JF did 
not extrapolate the antagonism from the Second World War to the violence of the 
1990s, its praise for Tudjman’s historical revisionism proves the paper’s positive 
disposition towards Croatia. 
In contrast to the previous publications, FAZ, Welt and taz drew on the 
antagonism between Croats and Serbs during World War Two to blame the Serbs for 
the on-going violence. For example on 24 April 1992, FAZ-editor Johann Georg 
Reiβmüller wrote that the hatred between Croats and Serbs during the Second World 
War resulted in gruesome massacres on both sides. However, at the end of the war, 
Reiβmüller continued, the Serbian Chetniks “…carried the murder to a genocidal 
climax…” Moreover, the author asserted that the Croatian people had continually 
searched for a peaceful pan-Slavic solution, but all efforts failed because of perpetual 
Serbian offensives. “Only the Serbian war of aggression in this past year…[had] finally 
disposed the Croats of this idea,”195 he argued. The author’s complete disregard for 
Ustasha war crimes combined with his utilisation of the loaded term ‘genocide’ to 
describe the Chetniks’ atrocities underlined his one-sided comprehension of past events. 
According to him, Croatia had always been a peace-seeking country beside its brutal 
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Serbian neighbour. Reißmüller’s pro-Croatian interpretation appeared in numerous 
articles,
196
 which merited the scornful title of being a ‘Croat-protector’ as stated by 
Spiegel-founder Rudolf Augstein.
197
  
The single Konkret-article published about the Balkans in this time-period 
discussed exactly this matter. In the magazine’s January edition, Wolfgang Pohrt cited 
various pieces of writing by Reißmüller which displayed particular anti-Serbian 
tendencies. In one example Pohrt quoted, Reißmüller had recently stated that ‘the Serbs’ 
had assaulted the Croatian population. Pohrt contested that “whether the Serbs are as 
Reißmüller portrays them – which is hard to imagine – or if one can say at all what the 
Serbs are like, is completely insignificant…” to Reißmüller.198 This very good point 
begs a more differentiated analysis that avoids blanket-terminology such as ‘the Serbs’. 
Unfortunately Reißmüller has been retired for over ten years and was not available for 
an interview.
199
 However what must be recorded at this point is FAZ’s interpretation of 
the antagonism during the Second World War in a manner which favoured the Croatian 
Ustasha.  
Surprisingly the left-leaning taz took a similar approach, discrediting Serbian 
politics and arguing that Serbia distorted history to serve its agenda and reignite old 
tensions. For example, in a January-article Erich Rathfelder accused the country of 
making the co-existence of Serbs and Croats difficult by insisting on apologies from 
Croatia for murdering Serbs and Jews during the Second World War.
200
 Interestingly, 
the article did not describe the atrocities committed by the Ustasha and instead focused 
only on Serbia’s allegedly unjust claims of victimhood, which he claimed perpetuated 
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the conflict. Another taz-article reported that some Serbian politicians were insisting 
that Serbia had fallen victim to ‘genocide’ perpetrated by the fascist Ustasha during the 
Second World War.
201
 Readers at the time may have interpreted this use of the term 
‘genocide’ as inflated and may consequently have challenged such claims.  
The portrayal of the Serbians’ exaggerated claims was further corroborated by a 
taz-interview with Tudjman, in which he dismissed the linkages between the fascist 
Ustasha and the contemporary violence. At this point it is worth noting that taz was the 
only publication at the time to report Tudjman’s response to these allegations. In the 
interview, which he gave during a state-visit in Bonn,
202
 he stated that while ‘extremist 
elements’ such as Croatian militias wearing old Ustasha-uniforms certainly existed, 
these were very few in number. Moreover the Croatian President reiterated that he had 
distanced himself from the Ustasha many years ago and insisted on democratic 
developments.
203
 Significantly, the interview is also marked by lacking discernment. 
For example, even though Tudjman insisted that he had distanced himself from the 
Ustasha, the article does not remind the reader – nor follow-up with Tudjman in the 
interview – that the fascist formation’s insignia, songs and legends had been 
reintroduced by Tudjman, showing a clear affiliation between his contemporary 
movement and the fascist party.
204
  Just as FAZ and taz, the conservative broadsheet Welt also focused on the 
Serbians as the main perpetrators of war crimes during the Second World War. 
However, Welt’s East-Europe correspondent Carl Gustaf Ströhm took a different 
approach by placing Bosnia within the historical antagonism. Ströhm concentrated on 
the massacres perpetrated by Serbians against Bosnia’s Muslim population and 
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consequently never mentioned their Croatian counterparts.
205
 He argued that the 
Serbians’ ‘bloody butchery’ of the 1940s resulted in a paralysing fear which still 
dominated the politics of the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović, whom critics had 
deemed ‘weak’ due to his keen interest to preserve peace, even if this meant conceding 
to Serbia diplomatically.
206
 Shortly after the Bosnian War commenced in April 1992, 
Ströhm mirrored the victimhood of Bosnians to the contemporary conflict: “air-
strikes…[were] launched, Muslims praying in a mosque…[were] gunned down…”207 
This focus on the Serbian atrocities against Bosnia’s defenceless population both during 
the Second World War and in the 1990s gave Welt’s readership the perception that the 
Bosnian Muslims had been victimised for several decades – to the extent that in the 
1990s they were too paralysed by fear to counteract the Serbian aggression.  
The centrality of the Second World War to explain the historical context to the 
readers is unmissable in the German coverage. However the divergent interpretations 
offered by the press regarding the Serbian-Croatian antagonism during the Second 
World War underlines how differently historical narratives can be constructed. 
Moreover it is striking how little the uninformed reader actually learned about this 
historic background of the region. None of the articles cited concrete numbers of 
Croatian and Serbian victims during World War Two, nor specific war crimes which 
may have fuelled the antagonism. Rather the articles gave a sense of general, barbaric 
violence seeping into the 1990s from the dark age of fascism.  
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The Jewish Dimension 
 
The interpretation that fascist elements were returning to the Balkans can also be 
traced in selected articles in AJW, FR and taz. These three publications singled out the 
theme of Jews living in Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, introducing a unique 
perspective to interpret the violence. Starting with AJW’s articles, these are remarkable, 
as they presented Yugoslavia’s Jewish population as the primary victims of the violence 
in the 1990s.
208
 None of them framed the on-going violence in former Yugoslavia as a 
conflict between Croats, Serbs and Muslims. For example on 16 April 1992, an AJW-
article reported that Israel was planning the evacuation of all Jews living in Bosnia. It 
elaborated that since the beginning of the violence in the Balkans last year, 210 of the 
5000 members of Yugoslavia’s Jewish communities had already left for Israel.209 In a 
second article, published a week later, the author Wolf Bruer reported that with war 
breaking out in Bosnia, “thousands of civilians had to flee, including many belonging to 
the local Jewish communities.” The author continued that 160 Jews had already left 
Sarajevo for Belgrade, where they felt safe, though another 1200 Bosnian Jews were 
still in the fought-over territories.
210
 The sole focus on the Jewish victims of the war is 
jarring and disregards the basic framework of the conflict. This arguably skewed the 
perception of the subject matter significantly, underlining the one-dimensional 
interpretation offered by this Jewish cultural publication.  
In addition to AJW’s coverage, the theme of the Jewish identity as a noteworthy 
factor also influenced the interpretation of the on-going violence in the left-leaning FR 
and taz. The former featured an interview with the Serbian theatre scholar Dragan Klaić 
which focused on his Jewish heritage. With questions such as “you lived as a Jew 
amongst Serbs?” the interviewer led the conversation into the same direction as AJW’s 
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articles, in which the Jewish community in former Yugoslavia was studied. Klaić 
explained that he had never been exposed to anti-Semitism and had always seen himself 
as a Yugoslav more than a Jew. However, with the break-up of Yugoslavia, this identity 
no longer existed, leaving him with an indeterminable status.
211
 While his struggle to 
construct an identity other than Yugoslav is crucial in light of the country’s 
disintegration, the reader is left in the dark why the journalists assumed that Serbians 
would have demonstrated anti-Semitist tendencies. A taz-interview with a French 
philosopher introduced the same theme equally clumsily. The opening question – “does 
your Jewish heritage play a role in your decision to side with Croatia in the current 
conflict?” – deflected from the intended content of the interview, namely the 
international community’s role in the conflict.212 Similar to the FR-article, the larger 
context of the centrality of Jewish heritage in this conflict was not explained. Moreover, 
both interviews portrayed Serbia as a particular threat to the Jewish population in the 
Balkans while contradictorily AJW’s article had reported that 160 Jews from Sarajevo 
had sought refuge in Belgrade. This adds to the assessment that taz’s and FR’s pieces 
were arbitrary and could have benefitted from more explanatory context. Perhaps the 
intended effect was to encourage German readers to associate anti-Semitism with 
Serbia. 
 
 
The role of Religion 
 
As discussed previously, various historians identified religion as a cause for 
tensions when combined with nationalism in the 19
th
 century.
213
 With the resurgence of 
nationalism in the wake of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, religion 
returned as a divisive factor. Noel Malcolm postulates that parallel to the rise of Serbian 
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and Croatian nationalism fortified by the policies of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo 
Tudjman, the Bosniaks strengthened their Muslim identity through a nationalist 
movement. Its conduit was the party of the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegović (1925-
2003), the SDA,
214
 which expressed its religious component through symbols such as 
the green crescent.
215
 In addition, “…Islamic symbols and quotations from the Koran 
started to show up among [Bosnian] army units…”216 Moreover, the party emphasised 
its policy of Muslim nationalism in its “Statement of Programmatic Principles”, which 
was published in March 1990. This declared that the SDA would “…revitalise this 
national consciousness of BH [Bosnia-Herzegovinian] Muslims and insist on respect for 
the fact of their national distinctness…”217  
Izetbegović was an appropriate leader for this cause, as his person was strongly 
associated with Islam. He had been jailed in 1983 for “alleged anti-state activities.”218 
These charges arose from Izetbegović’s publication Islamic Declaration, which “…the 
former communist authorities in Yugoslavia interpreted as a call for the introduction of 
fundamentalist Sharia law in Bosnia-Hercegovina…”219 Malcolm dismisses this 
interpretation as ‘propaganda,’ countering that  
this treatise, written in the late 1960s, is a general treatise on politics and Islam, addressed to the 
whole Muslim world; it is not about Bosnia and does not even mention Bosnia.
220
  
Ivo Banac agrees that although Izetbegović “…champion[ed] a new Islamic order, he 
underscore[d] its commitment to the freedom of conscience [and] women’s rights…”221 
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Nonetheless, in the 1990s, as Yugoslavia disintegrated and Bosnia defined an 
independent identity, Izetbegović’s party drew heavily on Muslim characteristics to 
define their identity. This in turn was exclusionary towards other religious groups – the 
largely Catholic Croats and predominantly Orthodox Serbians – who also lived in 
Bosnia.  
In spite of this presence of religious divisions, the German press barely referred 
to religion as a reason for the Bosnian conflict between December 1991 and early May 
1992, which is puzzling as all publications adopted the common term ‘Muslims’ for 
Bosniaks.
222
 Indeed, an uninformed reader may not even have realised that Serbs were 
predominantly Orthodox and Croats mostly Catholic. The religious dimension was only 
alluded to in isolated cases and primarily in Spiegel.
223
 For example, Walter Mayr wrote 
a detailed exposé on the war, in which he described an Imam he met at a mosque in 
Sarajevo, who carried a loaded pistol under his robe and organised armed training for 
members of his congregation five times per week in the event of a Serbian ambush.
224
 
This portrayal of the Muslim territorial defence as a violent paramilitary formation with 
religious overtones alluded to a religious dimension in the conflict, which no other 
publication expressed so blatantly. A single Welt-article mentioned a religious 
dimension to the conflict. Carl Gustaf Ströhm reported that Izetbegović had been 
imprisoned by the communists for his religious publication.
225
 After giving details of 
the increasing violence, the author concluded that Izetbegović had two options: 
“…either subservience to Serbia and the army or open conflict. That could lead Bosnia 
to a religious war between Muslims and Orthodox [Christians]…”226 These isolated 
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cases which mentioned religion did not see it as a cause for the conflict, but rather a 
symptom of it and a way in which the violence would develop.   
 
 
The Role of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army 
 
In addition to this historical context or lack thereof, the publications took more 
contemporary factors into account when designating the responsibility for the on-going 
violence, namely Milošević and the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA).227 Starting with 
the latter, the JNA was one of the main military actors in the Bosnian and Croatian 
Wars. After their declaration of independence, Milošević used the army as a vessel to 
re-establish a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia and inclusive of the secessionist republics. 
Due to this centrality of the army in the violence, all publications except JF focused 
primarily on the JNA to explain the violence. The secondary literature does not treat the 
JNA with the same prominence. Interestingly, FAZ consistently placed the army’s name 
in quotation marks when referring to it, perhaps to underline the fact that it did not 
represent the entire Yugoslav population, but rather the dominant Serbian section of it.  
Before studying each publication individually, the coverage of one specific EC-
report is worth noting, as four publications – Welt, FAZ, FR and Spiegel – all picked up 
on it in early December 1991. As the articles stated, the report had been confidential but 
was leaked to the press.
228
 No other information was given regarding the framework of 
the report, for example why it had been compiled or who its authors were. It called JNA 
‘cowardly and immoral’ and claimed that the army purposefully and preferably targeted 
schools, museums and hospitals and also massacred civilians, as FAZ, Welt and Spiegel 
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reported.
229
 FR was the only newspaper to elaborate that the report had also accused 
Croatian forces of “brutal and deliberate violence.”230 This selective coverage indicated 
that FR was much more inclined to report both viewpoints than the other publications. 
Considering Spiegel’s previous reporting about the antagonism between Croats and 
Serbs during World War Two, which took a pro-Serbian stance, it is surprising that 
Spiegel did not follow FR’s example and remind the reader of Croatian war crimes. This 
discrepancy could be explained with the larger context of the Spiegel-article, which 
elaborated that the Croatian city of Osijek had been bombarded even after a cease-fire – 
the fourteenth – had been negotiated. This disregard for diplomatic endeavours and 
Serbian aggression may have fuelled Spiegel’s selective coverage of the EC-report 
focusing on JNA’s war crimes.  
Apart from covering this EC-report, Welt did not pay much attention to JNA. 
Only two other articles stated that the army was responsible for “…the bloody disregard 
of minorities and human rights…”231 and that the army’s attacks on Bosnia were 
unprovoked.
232
 FAZ and BILD on the other hand focused much more on JNA. One 
FAZ-article for example portrayed the army as the crux of the violence, quoting EC-
diplomat Lord Carrington who had stated “…that the ‘Peoples’ Army’…[was] the true 
evil in all this confusion.’”233 Other articles conjured the vision of an uncontrollable 
force, which was the main perpetrator of war crimes.
234
 For example, FAZ’s Balkan-
correspondent Viktor Meier asserted in one article that “…the ghosts which Milošević 
awoke, especially the army,…[were] now autonomous…”235 Similarly, BILD singled 
out the ‘Serbian-dominated’ Yugoslav army to be breaking cease-fires, rendering it 
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solely responsible for the violence and consequently encouraging a one-sided 
interpretation of the subject-matter.
236
 In a further article, the tabloid referred to the 
‘Kommunistenarmee’, a derogatory form of ‘Communist army’, as one of the main 
actors in the war.
237
 There was no cross-reference to JNA nor an explanation why it was 
deemed a communist army. Consequently this term seemed to be a deliberate attempt 
on behalf of BILD to denigrate the Yugoslav army by associating it with communism.  
Rather than creating the sense of general calamity caused by JNA, articles in taz, 
FR and Spiegel were more concrete, reporting on specific atrocities. One such taz-article 
drew on a piece from the British broadsheet The Guardian, which reported of a 92-year-
old Croatian farmer who had been brutally mowed down by a JNA-tank.
238
 taz’s Roland 
Hofwiler reprocessed this part in an article,
239
 though interestingly he left out other 
excruciating details of Ian Traynor’s original account. The latter had also reported that 
Croatian civilians had their throats slit by Yugoslav soldiers and were then laid beside 
dead pigs to symbolise that the Croatians were swine.
240
 FR also referred to and 
summarised the same Guardian-article, though it equally avoided the graphic details 
Traynor had reported.
241
 Rather, the more abstract assessment made by a JNA-reservist 
was emphasised: “‘they loot, rape, even butcher.’”242 In addition to its articles, taz also 
published a memorable cartoon treating JNA’s crimes. 
 
Figure 9: taz, 9 January 1992, p. 12 
- “In order to prevent a further regrettable disruption of the cease-fire, the leadership Peoples’ 
National Army has decreed the order… 
- “…to exclusively use silencers from now on!” 
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 While such coverage may have caused anti-Serbian sentiments amongst the 
readers, various articles in FR and taz created a balance by simultaneously reporting on 
atrocities committed by Croatian forces.
243
 Reports about massacred Serbian civilians 
offered by these two publications indicate a differentiated portrayal of the matter. 
Similarly, Spiegel questioned Serbia’s sole responsibility for the violence in general. 
The matter was first addressed casually in a December article, in which the author 
referred to the civil war, “…for which supposedly Serbia alone…[was] 
responsible…”244 The piece did not further explore the theme of culpability and an 
inattentive reader may have even read over the significant word ‘supposedly’. However, 
this balanced portrayal that JNA-soldiers were not the only armed forces involved was 
largely lost amidst the graphic and thus more memorable articles about JNA’s atrocities. 
 
 
Milošević – the main culprit? 
 
While JNA was deemed the primary source of the violence by the German press, 
none of the publications mentioned the names of specific generals who controlled this 
vague entity. Neither was Milošević as an individual allocated much responsibility by 
the German press at this time. Indeed, JF, BILD and AJW did not mention him by name 
throughout this entire five-month period and FR did so only in passing.
245
 The 
conservative Welt was the only publication at this time which identified Milošević as 
responsible for the on-going violence. He was referred to as the ‘großserbischer246 
Milošević’ who “…unleashed the first bloody war in Europe since 1945.”247 Moreover 
Welt reported that the Serbian leadership “…display[ed] a downright obsession for 
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territorial conquest…”248 and that Milošević personally was responsible for 
disseminating propaganda.
249
 Welt explained all failing diplomatic efforts with 
Milošević’s unwillingness “…to conform to a European peace settlement.”250 Indeed, in 
spite of the EC-negotiated cease-fires, “…Milošević and his generals…[were] happily 
marching on….”, upsetting these brief moments of peace.251 
This remarkable interpretation found solely in Welt departs from the state-of-
knowledge found in the secondary literature at the time. While much of the secondary 
literature produced towards the end of and after the Bosnian War points to Milošević’s 
culpability to explain the violence
252
 – indeed Norman Cigar argues that the Bosnian 
genocide was part of a concerted Serbian war strategy
253
 – this interpretation could not 
be found in 1991/92, as Welt’s articles were published. This pioneering analysis can be 
partially explained by the biography of the broadsheet’s Balkan-correspondent, who 
authored most of these articles. Dr. Carl Gustaf Ströhm, a historian, was a starkly anti-
communist conservative who also wrote a column for the extreme-right Junge Freiheit 
until his death in 2004. As his obituary in Welt stated, Ströhm took pride in not 
interviewing high-ranking Communist officials while he was the broadsheet’s East-
Europe correspondent.
254
 This anti-communist stance may also have coloured Ströhm’s 
perception of Milošević, who commenced his career in the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
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A further explanation for his staunch anti-Milošević standpoint could be his role as 
adviser to the Croatian President Tudjman, as one of his obituaries in JF reveals.
255
  
FAZ, taz and Spiegel explored the Serbian leader’s role in the ever-increasing 
violence, though unlike Welt, all three publications dismissed the notion that Milošević 
as an individual held much responsibility. The general consensus was that he was a man 
whose powers were declining. For example, taz’s Erich Rathfelder stated in January that 
with Milošević’s steadily dwindling popularity, it was only a matter of time before 
Serbian leaders outside of Serbia, namely Milan Babić in Croatia and Radovan Karadžić 
in Bosnia would become more powerful.
256
 By March another taz-article predicted that 
the opposition would overthrow Milošević.257 The conservative FAZ presented a similar 
interpretation, though significantly this can be found predominantly in the broadsheet’s 
political cartoons.
 258
 
  
Figure 10: FAZ, 4 January 1992, p. 3  Figure 11: FAZ, 9 January 1992, p. 3 
 
The two examples shown above delineated a powerless Milošević, though both 
expressed very different subliminal messages. The first portrayed him as having no 
power or control over the Yugoslav constituent republics, even though he was armed. 
This underlined that Milošević was not taken seriously or perceived as a threat by any 
republics or regions except Montenegro and Kosovo, which were shaking with fear. 
Figure 11 showed the Serbian President Milošević as one individual amongst many. 
Veljko Kadijević, a JNA-General, Blagoje Adžić, Yugoslavia’s Minister of Defence, 
and Vojislav Šešelj, President of the Serbian Radical Party, were shown marching next 
to Milošević, implying that he had to share power with them. The three military 
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individuals were portrayed as more threatening and powerful than Milošević, who was 
wearing a statesman’s black suit. Together, all four individuals ignored the insignificant 
EC and UN, which is armed with only an umbrella to emphasise its impotence.  
Spiegel painted a similar picture, reporting that independent paramilitary 
formations were ‘lurking around’, which Milošević was unable to control.259 Another 
article portrayed Milošević as powerless, his hand forced by the army, identifying the 
‘Belgrade ultra [radicals]’ and ‘warlords’ as being in control.260 The most dismissive 
conclusion asserted that “though Milošević desire[d] peace, he no longer…[had] the 
power to broker it.”261 Surprisingly this interpretation of Milošević’s declining powers 
and marginal role was corroborated in a Spiegel-interview with the Bosnian leader Alija 
Izetbegović. In one question Izetbegović was asked if Milošević had finally given up his 
idea of a ‘Greater Serbia’, to which the Bosnian President responded that 
“surely…[Milošević] had lowered his territorial ambitions.” When asked about the 
source of weapons belonging to the heavily armed Bosnian population, Izetbegović 
replied: “the Serbian population…[had] been armed by the army. The rest has been 
armed by fear.”262 Evidently the Bosnian President did not answer the question about 
the source of the weapons and instead used a seemingly well-prepared phrase to 
underline the Bosnians’ victimhood, even when speaking about armed violence. This 
interview is very interesting, as it does not give the perspective one would expect from 
the Bosnian President. Rather than focusing on his country’s victimhood and 
corresponding culpability of Milošević, the armed Bosnian population was emphasised. 
This gives the reader the sense of a civil war developing rather than one-sided Serbian 
aggression. Simultaneously, however, it is striking that the interviewer did not press 
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Izetbegović for more details for example how this Bosnian militia was funded, where its 
weapons came from and whether it had political support. This in turn indicates that 
Izetbegović was perceived as less dangerous and responsible for violence than his 
Serbian counterpart.  
The lacking interest in Milošević in all publications except for Welt stands in 
harsh contrast to the post-1995 secondary literature which focuses almost exclusively on 
Milošević and his nationalist policies to explain the violence. Here the nature of the 
primary sources which did not have the benefit of hindsight is crucial. In the early 
1990s, the German press nearly completely dismissed Milošević as a fading influence. 
Perhaps external observers could not yet discern whether Milošević, who at the time 
was President of Serbia – an office he created – would stay in power, especially in light 
of these secessionist movements. This interpretation is fortified by Josip Glaurdić, who 
remembers that “very few aspects of Milošević’s political career…suggested that he 
could become the political leader of the brewing nationalist movement.”263 
 
 
Representing the victims visually 
 
In addition to the interpretations offered by the different publications regarding 
the causes for the violence, it is worth considering how the victims of this violence were 
portrayed pictorially. All publications except for AJW, which did not publish any 
pictures in this timeframe, used the visual medium to depict the victims of the violence. 
One image, which resurfaced in BILD, Welt and FR is particularly striking.  
 
Figure 12: BILD, 9 December 1991, p. 2, also in: 
 Welt, 9 December 1991, p. 8 and FR, 3 April 1992, p. 15 
 
The notion of an old woman feeling so vulnerable and exposed to the violence around 
her that she travelled with a large rifle is very moving. It is remarkable that FR 
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published this image four months after BILD and Welt. This proves that the pictures a 
newspaper chose to publish at a specific time did not necessarily record a recent event. 
taz also presented the theme of an elderly woman with a rifle in one of its images, again 
depicting how exposed the civilian population was to violence.  
 
Figure 13: taz, 21 April 1992, p. 1 
This state of emergency was further underlined by the young boy following her, 
wearing ill-fitting clothing. While neither image showed violence directly being 
perpetrated or armed forces engaged in battle, the viewer discerned a stifling feeling of 
omnipresent terror from which even elderly civilians and young children could not 
escape. Equally both images convey the sense of a general war in which even the 
blatantly civilian population was armed. Both interpretations of either vulnerability or 
comprehensive warfare underline the prevalence of the previously discussed notions of 
mood and attitude of a picture.
264
 Moreover, both images included captions which 
revealed that the civilian victims were Croatian. With the absence of balancing pictures, 
the reader was left with an overwhelming perception of Serbian culpability. 
 Indeed, in the five months analysed in this timeframe, only four images 
portrayed Serbian civilians suffering from the war.  
   
Figure 14: BILD, 30 December 1991, p. 2  Figure 15: taz, 6 January 1992, p. 9 
  
 
Figure 16: FR, 7 May 1992, p. 2   Figure 17: FR, 4 January 1991, p. 18 
 
 
This reduced interest was congruent with the previously mentioned focus of the German 
publications on the Serbian-dominated JNA. Aligning the primary perpetrator of the 
violence with victims from the same ‘side’ was perhaps too complex. Another 
explanation for this imbalance could be that as the war was carried out on Bosnian and 
Croatian territory, there were simply fewer Serbian victims. Nonetheless, a one-sided 
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pictorial selection of the victims of the interpretation of the on-going violence was 
clearly evident in the coverage. Moreover, while the pictures showing Serbian civilians 
were quantitatively insignificant, qualitatively, they were very meaningful, as they 
portrayed genuine suffering and thus aroused deep sympathy. This was further 
underlined by the focus on elderly women and children. Moreover, the BILD-image 
(figure 14) was particularly striking, as it portrayed a fatal victim of the war. All other 
publications shied away from such images.  
 
 
Germany’s role in the Balkans 
 
Turning to a very different topic, it is worth exploring how the national press 
presented Germany’s foreign policy towards the Balkans in the 1990s. Particularly, 
Germany’s early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was covered with heightened 
interest in the national press and was treated largely positively. FR and Spiegel were the 
only publications to express careful scepticism regarding an active foreign policy in the 
Balkans, though they did not criticise the country’s recognition policy towards Croatia 
and Slovenia.
265
 Both saw Germany’s National-Socialist past as a reason to ‘tread 
lightly.’ For example, two FR-articles reported that some Serbian and European 
diplomats found it problematic to recognise Bosnia’s independence on 6 April, as Hitler 
had begun his air strikes against Belgrade on 6 April 1941, which could evoke 
unwanted inferences amongst the local population.
266
 With these cautions, FR’s articles 
demonstrated a degree of knowledge and sensitivity regarding Germany’s past and how 
the country’s foreign policy could be perceived, which is not present in other papers.  
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Spiegel was much more explicit about its view that Germany should not act in 
the region due to its historical baggage. A December-article stated that even if the war 
continued, German troop deployment to the Balkans was out of the question, simply 
because the Nazis had occupied Yugoslavia.
267
 This point of view was further 
underlined in an interview with Vuk Drašković, the main Serbian opposition leader 
against Milošević. In it he stated that “for historic reasons, Germany should not have 
been the driving force in Croatia’s secession.”268 However, while Spiegel’s articles 
asserted that Germany’s past should prevent military intervention, its pioneering 
diplomacy was deemed necessary because of its past, which had given the country 
particular diplomatic insights. An opinion piece, in which the author Olaf Ihlau referred 
to the ‘Greater Serbian chauvinists,’ sarcastically stated that in postponing the 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the EC-countries must have been waiting for a 
miracle, implying that Germany had identified the correct diplomatic path in the 
Balkans. This sentiment was fortified by the preceding paragraph which outlined 
Germany’s long-standing ties and extensive experience with the region.269 However, 
neither this article nor any other explored the notion that Germany and the international 
community could have prolonged or intensified the war through a hasty and ill-
considered recognition. Rather, Spiegel portrayed German politicians as experts in the 
field, who had triumphed in convincing their international allies of their course of 
action. This combined argumentation is interesting because it applied Germany’s 
historical baggage in two different, almost contradicting ways. With regard to military 
engagement, Germany’s fascist past was used as a reason not to get involved in the 
Balkans, while a pioneering diplomatic role was necessary because of Germany’s 
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history. This suggests that the weight of history – which could be interpreted in both 
ways – was utilised by Spiegel in whatever manner was deemed useful.  
In contrast, the conservative newspapers Welt, FAZ and BILD, but also the left-
wing taz did not include any restraints in their portrayal of Germany’s role in the 
Balkans, but rather whole-heartedly supported Germany’s foreign policy.270 Welt and 
FAZ explained that a unified Yugoslavia had become an impossible illusion. Thus 
Germany’s foreign policy had been realistic and pragmatic, as a Welt-article stated, 
continuing that Foreign Minister Genscher had rightfully proclaimed that non-
recognition would intensify the conflict.
271
 Numerous other Welt-articles reiterated that 
Germany insisted on respecting human rights, which was so important that it would be 
worth stepping out of European line in foreign policy for the first time since the Second 
World War.
272
 FAZ portrayed Germany to have become the ‘number one scapegoat’ 
amongst its Western partners and Serbia for insisting on this righteous principle.
273
 With 
such articles, both conservative broadsheets presented Germany as a country acting with 
the highest sense of morals and commitment to international law while the international 
community failed to appreciate or value this dedication. Two FAZ-cartoons further 
underlined this interpretation of Germany’s recognition policy as a genuinely good 
approach.  
 
Figure 18: FAZ, 20 December 1991, p. 3     Figure 19: FAZ, 21 December 1991, p. 3 
 
Figure 18 portrayed Germany’s ‘Anerkennung’ or recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
as the two countries’ only hope in a sea of darkness. Metaphorically this cartoon 
expressed that due to Germany’s recognition policy, Croatia and Slovenia now had the 
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basic means for survival, namely light, warmth and hope. Figure 19 depicted Chancellor 
Kohl dressed up as Father Christmas, bringing the gift of recognition to a burning city.
 Various articles underlined this positive estimation of Germany’s foreign policy 
by repeatedly covering Croatia’s gratitude towards Germany.274 taz and BILD reported 
that after the EC-recognition of Croatia, a ‘Café Genscher’ had been opened in Zagreb 
to acknowledge the support of Germany’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
who had been a strong advocate for the international recognition.
275
 Moreover, as taz, 
BILD and Welt reported, a pop-song entitled ‘Thank you, Germany’ became very 
popular, to which Welt published the lyrics.
276
 taz underpinned the Croatian gratitude 
visually, showing the celebrations in Zagreb after Croatia had been granted recognition. 
The caption explained that the jubilant Croatians were ‘tearing up’ the Yugoslav flag.  
 
Figure 20: taz, 17 January 1992, p. 10 
 
Seeing just the desecration of a state flag by protesting youth could have also been 
interpreted as destructive and dangerous. However, the accompanying text did not allow 
room for such interpretation. This underlines how versatile pictures can be when they 
stand alone.  
Other articles in taz even went so far as to accuse Germany’s partners of having 
betrayed their ally, as the title of an article summarised: “EG-Partners leave Bonn in the 
lurch”.277 A taz-interview with the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman reinforced the 
interpretation that Germany’s diplomatic Alleingang had been correct. Tudjman stated 
that an even earlier international recognition of Croatia’s independence could have 
prevented many victims of violence. In the interview Tudjman further insisted on the 
urgency of international recognition, mentioning that his people were suffering under 
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the ‘barbaric war’ that was being forced upon the country by Serbia.278 The timing of 
the interview is very important. Published in early December 1991, while heated 
debates about Germany’s Alleingang ensued, such an interview could have convinced 
the potentially sceptical German readership of the urgency to recognise Croatia in spite 
of international resistance. By implication this justified Germany’s policies and 
criticised the international community’s lack of support. The possible contrary 
perception – that Germany was acting selfishly and was thus harming the international 
cause – was not considered. 
The representation of Germany in the national press largely mirrored the 
dilemma faced by German politicians in the early 1990s who were aiming to find a path 
towards ‘normalcy’ while retaining the lessons learned from Germany’s past.279 As a 
result, the country’s National-Socialist past did not influence the publications’ 
evaluation of German foreign policy aside from a few exceptions in FR and Spiegel. 
This near complete omission both in the media, but presumably also in the general 
political discourse, sparked an angry reaction in AJW, expressing the only criticism of 
Germany’s recognition policy. Hermann Baumann stated in one article that it was 
“…unfathomable why Germany…[had] taken on this pioneering role” in recognising 
Croatia and Slovenia.
280
 He continued with historical references to the Third Reich and 
Hitler’s 1941 occupation of Yugoslavia, which Baumann considered ample reason for 
Germany not to play such a prominent role in the region. Though this argument was 
never further explained, it implied that Germany’s assertion of an independent foreign 
policy could awaken the feeling that the country would relapse into hegemonic 
strivings. The article went on to argue that ‘the Germans’ had a “tendency to suppress” 
their history, asserting that only this repression could explain why the country would 
                                                 
278
 Anonymous, “Tudjman: Frühere Anerkennung Kroatiens hätte Opfer verhindert”, taz, 07.12.1991, p. 
1. 
279
 See pp. 36-37. 
280
 Hermann Baumann, “Ein konzeptloses Vorpreschen”, AJW, 09.01.1992, p. 2. 
94 
 
pursue such an active Balkan policy.
281
 A second AJW-article reported that Germany’s 
Federal Criminal Agency (Bundeskriminalamt) had confirmed that German right-wing 
nationalists supplied weapons and fighters to the Croatian forces to fight against 
Serbia.
282
 Significantly, the article was a word-by-word dpa-dispatch,
283
 which while 
widely available, was not printed or used by any other publication.  
This portrayal of a country which continuously repressed its history, while 
simultaneously witnessing a renewed rise of a right-wing movement that was prone to 
violence, stands in direct opposition to the secondary literature about Germany’s 
collective memory of the Holocaust. This asserts that since the 1980s a public shame 
and a sense of collective guilt amongst the Germans dominated the country’s collective 
memory of its past.
284
 While scholars such as Bernhard Giesen gradually saw a more 
‘meta-physical’ guilt take the place of the exclusively German shame of the 
Betroffenheitsdiskurs,
285
 none have suggested that the country had returned to 
repressing its history. The almost unanimous euphoric evaluation of Germany’s 
Alleingang without mentioning the country’s past, could substantiate AJW’s assertions 
and indicates a departure from the Betroffenheitsdiskurs of the 1980s. This could be 
explained with a desire in Germany to show strength having been recently unified, 
which was clearly condoned by the country’s press.  
 
 
The Press’ Language 
 
The language utilised in the German print media coverage must also be 
considered, as this enables the identification of subtle undercurrents that coloured the 
coverage. Firstly, various articles in FAZ, taz and BILD used the blunt generalisation of 
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‘the Serbs’ to allocate responsibility for the violence and aggression emanating 
specifically from the Serbian leadership or armed forces. For example, one BILD-article 
stated that “the Serbs…[were] destroying Croatia’s churches, cultural monuments, 
Croatia’s economy and tourism.”286 This undifferentiated allocation of guilt can be 
found in various articles
287
 and by April BILD reported with deliberate provocation that 
“the Serbs…want[ed] a Greater Serbian Reich…”288 Using an equally undistinguished 
terminology, FAZ-articles reported that “the arguments the Serbs…[were] 
voicing…[were] fanatical and irrational.”289  
taz-articles used the term ‘the Serbs’ most frequently, however usually did so 
casually when talking about the Serbian people as a whole, simultaneously referring to 
‘the Croats’. While this was equally undifferentiated, mostly it was not as polemical. 
Nonetheless, various taz-articles utilised the generalisation to categorise and blame the 
entire Serbian peoples.
290
 For example, one article stated that “‘…they do not even 
shrink back from genocide. Already the Serbs are dominating everything here.’”291 The 
most drastic and thus memorable reference to ‘the Serbs’ was in an article written by 
Dunja Melčić, a Croatian guest contributor, in which she referred to “…the cannibals in 
Belgrade…”292 waging war. This expression unquestionably went beyond any ‘normal’ 
coverage and calls attention to the severe anti-Serbian stance that must be noted at this 
point.  
While such generic terms are not unusual for the press coverage of a complex 
conflict, which demands clear categorisations, importantly, only three publications 
resorted to this alignment and they range from right to left and from broadsheet to 
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tabloid. Interestingly almost all of the articles referring to ‘the Serbs’, were written by a 
correspondent from the respective newspaper. Therefore its utilisation cannot be 
explained with a common source such as press-agency articles but rather seems to be an 
interpretation particular to individual journalists and their deliberate choice of words. 
A second device used throughout the articles analysed in this section is the 
subtle integration of terminology that either originated from Nazi-Germany’s 
propaganda or was heavily associated with what the regime it represented. Phrases such 
as a Serbian desire for more ‘Lebensraum’,293 the never-ending Balkan violence 
becoming a ‘total war’,294 and that Serbian forces were conducting ‘pogroms’295 were 
interspersed in the coverage. This last term – while also used in different historical eras 
– would have been particularly meaningful to a German reader, as 
‘Reichsprogromnacht’ is the German term for ‘The Night of Broken Glass,’ on 9 
November 1938. taz also referred to Serbian ‘Blitzkrieg’-tactics296 and repeatedly 
reported that Serbia perceived international attempts to ensure peace as a ‘Diktat’.297 
Meanwhile FAZ reported that Serbians saw themselves as the region’s ‘Herrenvolk’ or 
‘master race’, creating references to Nazi-Germany’s strivings for a superior Aryan 
race. All these terms were so heavily loaded with Nazi-ideology that the mere 
placement of such key words, a German reader would very likely have associated 
Serbian politics with the darkest age of German history. The only publications with no 
fascist terminology were BILD and AJW. It is comprehensible that the latter avoided 
such language, as arguably the casual (mis-) use of fascist terms would trivialise a topic 
to which AJW-readers would be particularly sensitive. 
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In a Spiegel-article published in December 1991, the anonymous author 
criticised an attack launched by Politika, a Belgrade newspaper that had likened 
German Balkan policy to the striving for a Fourth Reich.
298
 While Welt, FAZ and taz 
also reported that Serbian propaganda had made such accusations, 
299
 Spiegel chose to 
counter these allegations with language equally reminiscent of the Nazi-regime. In the 
heated defence of Germany’s policies, the anonymous Spiegel-author denigrated 
Politika as being on the same level of the Nazi propaganda-organ Stürmer, which 
seemed to immediately dismiss these charges.
300
 It is worth noting that an April-article 
cited Politika again without noting its function as Milošević’s mouthpiece, even though 
one could assume that Spiegel would hesitate to rely on a publication it had likened with 
the Stürmer just four months earlier.
301
 This could indicate that the analogy to fascism 
had been deliberately utilised to dismiss Politika’s claims and not because the 
publication was deemed inherently unreliable. 
Interestingly, and to this author surprisingly, allusions to communism appeared 
in the coverage, though to a much lesser extent than the fascist terminology. All 
publications except for FR and AJW deliberately associated Serbia with communism. 
The two conservative broadsheets Welt and FAZ, but also the left-leaning publications 
Spiegel and taz included anti-communist language in their articles.
302
 For example 
Welt’s articles casually referred to ‘communist Serbs’ and warned the reader of the 
groβserbisch-communist Generals’ megalomania.303 Similarly Spiegel’s articles 
resorted to the terms ‘Bolshevik’ and ‘national-Bolshevik’ to describe the Serbian 
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leadership.
304
 One FAZ-article in particular is worth noting, as it summarised and 
partially quoted a piece former US-President Richard Nixon wrote for the Wall Street 
Journal. The FAZ-article stated that Nixon criticised American policy towards 
Yugoslavia for not clearly distinguishing between ‘aggressor’ and ‘victim’, elaborating 
that “the communist falcons have practically launched a coup against Croatia with their 
offensive.”305 This colourful yet undefined term may have left the readers with the 
uncomfortable notion that all Serbs were aggressive communists. 
In the taz-article, the author Roland Hofwiler reported that with Bosnia’s 
independence, the country was no longer a ‘socialist Republic, but a ‘free state of 
Europe’.306 This contrast between the shackles of communism and a free Europe 
epitomised the newspaper’s intended crude and negative association with communism. 
BILD also constructed linkages between Serbia and communism, referring to ‘Serbia’s 
communist government’307, Belgrade’s ‘communist hardliners,’308 the ‘communist 
army,’309 and simply the ‘Serbian communists.’310 None of these articles explained their 
juxtaposition of Serbia and communism, though a reader could assume that Belgrade’s 
desire to uphold Yugoslavia as it had existed under Tito’s communist reign caused these 
associations along with Milošević’s initial career as a communist apparatchik. Primarily 
however, the sporadic and at times clumsy linkages of Serbia to communism may have 
served the defamation of Serbia by association with the recently failed ideology.  
The fact that a simple word, laden with connotations from specific historical eras 
could subconsciously impact a reader’s understanding of the subject-matter is a 
mechanism both journalists and editors were well aware of and may have used 
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purposefully. Only one article considered here was a press-agency briefing, while all 
others were written by the newspapers’ own correspondents.311 This indicates that the 
dismissive language about Serbia was employed by individuals and was not a by-
product from press agency briefings. 
 
 
Authorship 
 
The issue of authorship is worth considering in detail. The articles analysed here 
featured three types of authors: those authored by the publications’ own correspondents, 
articles by press agencies such as AP or Reuters, and amalgamated press releases from 
different associations or organisations. In most cases the articles did not indicate what 
press release was consulted for the article, nor the organisation that had disseminated it. 
Some indicated their author by the acronym of the newspaper, such as ‘F.A.Z.’ for 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung or ‘DW’ for Die Welt.312 The attempt to identify 
authors is fraught with difficulties and only a partial analysis can be done. Spiegel and 
BILD rarely indicated individual authorship. In the case of Spiegel this stemmed from 
an editorial policy that all authors represent the publication’s opinions and thus are not 
named individually.
313
 BILD frequently published its Balkan-articles in news bulletins, 
which contain various 30 to 50 word-articles on different topics. None of these short 
‘news-blurbs’ contained any specification of individual authors. AJW, Konkret and JF 
did not publish enough articles in this timeframe to make a viable quantitative 
conclusion. In sum, only four publications examined here offered enough data for 
analysis.  
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Newspaper % of articles 
authored by 
correspondents 
% of articles 
authored by press 
agencies 
% of articles 
amalgamated from 
various press 
releases, etc. 
Welt 48% 9% 40% 
FAZ 43% 35% 21% 
FR 30% 67% 0,46% 
taz 47% 40% 8% 
Table 2: Percentages of articles according to authorship
314
 
  
The above table shows that the majority of articles in daily papers except for FR had 
been authored by the papers’ own correspondents. This dominant reliance in Welt, FAZ 
and taz implies a heightened interest in the region by these publications. However, 
simultaneously, all statistics for articles authored by correspondents lie below the 50%-
mark, which indicates that the majority of the papers’ resources in this respect still lay 
elsewhere. The only exception was FR, which primarily drew on press agencies as a 
main source of authorship. Usually these were collated briefings from various major 
press agencies, namely Agence France-Presse (AFP), Associated Press (AP), Reuters 
or Deutsche Presse Agentur (dpa). 
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Brief Chronology of Bosnian War: April 1992-July 1995 
 
The war which erupted in Bosnia in April 1992 lasted nearly four years, during 
which Sarajevo’s armed forces, various paramilitary formations as well as the JNA and 
the Bosnian-Serb army engaged in a bitter war. This was marked by grave war crimes, 
including ‘ethnic cleansing.’315 A 1994 UN-report entitled “The policy of ethnic 
cleansing” stated that all parties committed ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva 
Conventions.
316
 “These violations include the killing of civilians, rape, torture, and the 
deliberate destruction of civilian property, including cultural and religious property, 
such as churches and mosques.”317 The report continues that the majority of these 
crimes were committed by Serbians against Bosnian Muslims and that “Bosnian 
Muslim forces” – as the report labelled them – did not engage in ‘ethnic cleansing.’318 
Men of fighting age were the primary targets and were either eliminated in mass killings 
or confined in large detention centres, or concentration camps, as they were widely 
known.
319
 Moreover, women became victims of sexual violence perpetrated by police, 
army and paramilitary forces.
320
 While a coherent historical narrative of the four-year-
long Bosnian War goes beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief chronology will give the 
reader the necessary context to understand the next chapter.  
In June 1992, UN-troops (UNPROFOR) entered Bosnia, initially to protect 
Sarajevo’s airport, though their mandate was later expanded. The first year of the war 
was overshadowed by Bosnian-Serb concentration camps which were set up between 
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May and August in the East-Bosnian towns Omarska, Keraterm, Trnoplje as well as 
other locations. These were discovered by Western reporters in the summer 1992 and 
were widely covered in the international media. 1993 was marked by international 
efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the on-going war. In January, the UN-Special 
Envoy Cyrus Vance and EC-representative Lord Owen began negotiating a peace treaty 
between Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, known as the Vance-Owen Plan. However, this 
plan was pronounced officially failed on 18 June after a Bosnian-Serb referendum 
refused its terms. One month later, in July 1993, the UN-Special Envoy Thorvald 
Stoltenberg and EU-representative Lord Owen began negotiations for a further 
diplomatic effort, which was known as the Stoltenberg-Owen Plan. This in turn was 
rejected by the Bosnian Muslims on 29 August. Paralleled to these endeavours, the 
UN’s presence in Bosnia was strengthened throughout 1993. In April NATO 
implemented a no-fly-zone (“Operation Deny Flight”) over Bosnia following a UN-
resolution. On 6 May 1993, the UN declared ‘safe areas’ in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, 
Goražde, Tuzla, Žepa and Bihać, which on 4 June UNPROFOR-troops were authorised 
to protect. 
1994 was dominated by a combination of further atrocities and renewed attempts 
to find a peaceful solution. On 5 February, Sarajevo’s civilians were shelled by 
Bosnian-Serb forces at Merkale Market. Four days later, NATO authorised air-strikes 
requested by UN of Bosnian-Serb army in Sarajevo. In the same month, negotiations of 
the Contact Group
321
 Plan began, attempting to construct a peace treaty. This in turn 
was rejected on 28 August 1994 after a referendum in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. 
Nearly one year later, in July 1995, the Bosnian-Serb forces besieged Srebrenica, one of 
the ‘safe areas’ UNFROFOR-troops had been authorised to protect in 1993. The 
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massacre that followed and its coverage in the German press will now be analysed in 
more depth.  
 
104 
 
Chapter 3 
July 1995: Srebrenica – Reporting Genocide 
 
‘Genocide’, ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘extermination’ appeared in the 
indictment of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić made by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on 14 November 1995 for the Bosnian-Serb 
attack on Srebrenica.
322
 The synopsis of the atrocities in Srebrenica, which occurred 
between 6 and 13 July 1995, is widely covered in secondary literature as well as an 
extensive UN-report published in 1999.
323
 Before delving into the media coverage of 
the Srebrenica Massacre, a brief excursion will outline the historical background.  
Firstly it must be noted that the primary perpetrators of the massacre was the 
army of the Republika Srpska (RS), or the Bosnian-Serb army rather than JNA, which 
had been in the foreground of the press-coverage analysed in the previous chapter. The 
Bosnian Serbs had united in a constituent republic, the RS, due to Bosnia’s secessionist 
strivings. Radovan Karadžić was the President and based the Republic’s headquarters in 
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the town Pale, south-east of Sarajevo. General Ratko Mladić was Chief of Staff of the 
Bosnian-Serb army and spearheaded the attack on Srebrenica.  
 
Figure 21: Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić324 
 
As can be deduced from the plethora of literature on Srebrenica, a 
predominantly Muslim town according to a 1992 census, it had been an embattled area 
since the beginning of the Bosnian War.
325
 In 1993, when Srebrenica was on the verge 
of being captured by the Bosnian-Serb army, the town and its environs were declared 
one of six UN ‘safe areas’. With several UN-bases in and around Srebrenica, this 
scheme was intended to protect the Bosnian Muslim civilians.
326
 However, due to 
lacking consensus in the Security Council (UNSC), the UN-troops only had a peace-
keeping mandate, and therefore could not prevent the Bosnian-Serb offensive.
327
  
 
Figure 22: Map of Srebrenica Safe Area
328
 
 
Consequently, when the Bosnian-Serb army initiated the attack on Srebrenica 
under the military command of General Mladić and the political direction of Karadžić 
on 6 July 1995, there was no significant defence in Srebrenica and the Bosnian-Serb 
army quickly enveloped the enclave. The fierce shelling forced the UN-DUTCHBAT-
troops “…to abandon their observation post on the southern edge of the enclave…”329 
Horrified that the UN-soldiers were simply retreating from the Serbian offensive rather 
than defending themselves and the enclave’s civilian population, Bosnian Muslim 
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troops, which had also been unable to hinder the siege
330
 threw grenades at the 
DUTCHBAT-soldiers, attempting to stop their retreat.
331
 As a result, the Dutch soldier 
Raviv Rensen was killed on 8 July 1995.
332
 Indeed, the peacekeepers were so 
defenceless against the approaching army that several UN-soldiers were held hostage in 
the environs of Srebrenica and were used as human shields by the Bosnian-Serb army to 
protect strategically important buildings such as arms depots.
333
 Nevertheless, the local 
population poured into Srebrenica from the surrounding towns, hoping for protection on 
the UN-base. The town’s inhabitants rapidly increased to 45,000 people, tripling the 
pre-war population.
334
  
Based in an old battery factory in Potočari, near Srebrenica, the Dutch soldiers 
allowed between 3,000 to 4,000 refugees into their compound. However, when it was 
judged to be full, the entrance was closed off, leaving around 20,000 people were left 
outside.
335
 Due to the sheer number of people, the situation in and around the UN-base 
quickly turned into a humanitarian disaster. Beyond providing the most basic aid, the 
UN-soldiers could not do anything to stop the take-over of the enclave. Between 6 and 
16 July, the Bosnian-Serb forces expelled and displaced 23,000 Bosnian women and 
children, who were transported to a nearby town, Tuzla, in buses. Thousands of Muslim 
men were detained and later executed, which now counts as the largest single war crime 
in Europe since the Second World War.
336
 The 1999 UN-report on Srebrenica referred 
to the events in the enclave as ‘attempted genocide’ and stated that  
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…the Serbs began the systematic extermination of the thousands of Bosniac males being held in 
Bratunac [near Srebrenica] in the early morning hours of 14 July. [The only exception was]…a 
handful of individuals who survived by hiding under or among the dead bodies.
337
  
EU forensic scientists would later determine that in the months following the initial 
massacres, the Bosnian-Serb army dug up the mass graves and reburied the bodies in 33 
‘secondary sites’, attempting to hide the evidence of their atrocities.338 
However, none of this information was available to the international community 
and media at the time. Immediately after the Bosnian-Serb army had besieged the 
enclave, no representatives from international organisations were granted access. Thus, 
there was no definitive proof for the extent of these atrocities until 1996, when the war 
had ended and EU forensic scientists began uncovering numerous mass graves. This 
fact is largely disregarded in the secondary literature, but becomes crucial when 
considering the media’s understanding and coverage of the massacre as it was 
unfolding. Initially the displaced civilians gradually arriving in Tuzla were the only 
source of information. The regional UN-headquarters set up refugee camps on the 
airfield of Tuzla’s airport, which were quickly “…swarming with Western 
journalists.”339 In late July the men who had fled from the mass executions and who 
arrived in Tuzla after a six-day march offered additional information. DUTCHBAT-
soldiers gradually returning to The Netherlands also provided primary insights into the 
events in Srebrenica. 
Alongside the historical narrative, a harsh judgment of the UN’s failure to 
protect Srebrenica’s civilian population dominates the secondary literature.340 For 
example, David Rohde cited a Bosnian Muslim man who stated “…that Srebrenica’s 
Dutch peacekeepers were little more than greedy cowards. They had come here to make 
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money…not to protect the safe area.”341 Significantly, the indignation regarding the 
UN’s role in Srebrenica was not applied to the fatality of a peacekeeper. Due to the 
primary focus on the UN’s failure to protect Srebrenica’s civilian population, the reader 
is left with the impression that it was the UN’s ‘own fault’ for retreating rather than 
protecting the enclave from the Bosnian-Serb attack. This outrage that the Srebrenica 
Massacre could unfold under the watchful eyes of the international community is 
important to keep in mind when analysing the contemporary German press coverage, 
which we turn to now.  
 
The timeframe set out in this chapter – 6 July to 22 August 1995 – studies the 
German print media coverage commencing with the Bosnian-Serb attack on Srebrenica 
and the first weeks of the refugee crisis in Tuzla. The September 1995 issue of Konkret 
was also considered to trace if any information relevant to this chapter may have 
appeared later than expected due to the editorial cycle of the monthly publication. In 
spite of the limited information available to the international community and German 
media immediately after the siege, the nature of the Srebrenica-coverage offers valuable 
insights regarding the state of knowledge at the time and what interpretations were 
offered in this limited context. After analysing how the publications pieced together the 
details of the massacre, this chapter will examine how the German press reported on the 
role of the UN and specifically Germany. Here the impact of Germany’s National-
Socialist past will be considered, as well as the language and images used throughout 
the coverage.  
AJW will not be included in this chapter, as it did not report on Srebrenica at all. 
As noted previously, the weekly newspaper only reported on the Balkans when a 
connection could be made to the Jewish cultural sphere. Presumably the Srebrenica 
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Massacre did not seem directly relatable to its Jewish readership. This is surprising, 
considering that the events in Srebrenica were regarded as genocide by some observers 
early on, which could have been an interesting angle to explore further by AJW. 
 
 
Piecing together the events in Srebrenica 
 
 In light of the inaccessibility of the enclave, the manner in which the atrocities 
were reported on and what sources were utilised to piece together the details are worth 
exploring. In spite of repeated appeals by the UN-Security Council (UNSC) to be 
granted access to the town, the Bosnian Serbs did not allow any UN-personnel to enter 
Srebrenica in July and August 1995.
342
 Foreign journalists and employees from Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO) such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and Doctors without Borders (MSF)
343
 were subjected to the same 
restrictions. Consequently many NGOs based their spokespersons in Tuzla, where they 
communicated with the international media. One example was Ron Redmond, 
spokesman for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), who was cited repeatedly in the 
German press.
344
 However, this also meant that journalists had access to the same 
information as multilateral organisations. While the German publications did not 
mention this advantage explicitly, it gives the journalists’ reporting based on interviews 
with eyewitnesses expelled from Srebrenica more authority as they had access to the 
restricted information available at the time. However, in general the limited state of 
knowledge about the events in Srebrenica cannot be stressed enough, as it rendered 
much of the reporting fragmentary and speculative.  
Turning now to the coverage of the German publications, their treatment of the 
refugees and the atrocities in Srebrenica was very diverse, though it cannot be 
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categorised along the lines of political orientation. The reporting in BILD, Spiegel and 
taz featured strong and prolonged interest in the enclave. In contrast, Welt and FAZ, as 
well as FR were comparable in their reduced interest in the enclave. JF published a 
single article on Srebrenica, which focused on the DUTCHBAT-soldiers who were 
gradually returning from Srebrenica. This article quoted the Dutch foreign aid secretary 
Pronk to have said that massacres were ensuing in Srebrenica and that “genocide was 
occurring.”345 JF’s reproduction of this quote featuring the loaded term ‘genocide’ is 
striking, as the article did not include any other information about the events in 
Srebrenica. This loose utilisation of the term in the anonymous article suggests a 
missing interest to grapple deeply with the subject-matter. 
In comparison, Welt and FAZ, as well as FR reported on Srebrenica much more 
extensively, though they significantly based all stories on various ‘official’ voices, such 
as statements made by spokespersons from UN, UNHCR, MSF and ICRC, or later 
returning Dutch soldiers. These articles primarily outlined the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Tuzla and gave preliminary numbers of people who had 
arrived from Srebrenica, however none cited refugees directly. Due to the similitude of 
sources, Welt, FAZ and FR reported comparable details, for example that all boys and 
men above the age of 16 were being held in the football stadium of Bratunac to 
determine whether they were war criminals.
346
 Other articles reported that some 
refugees had seen men who had been shot and others who had their throats slit
347
 and 
that some women bore signs of severe abuse.
348
  
FAZ was particularly rigid in its editorial policy of exclusively citing official 
sources rather than refugee accounts. Consequently, the conservative broadsheet solely 
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conveyed carefully-worded official opinions which were constrained by diplomatic 
formulations or outright censorship. The result of this approach was that a sterile point 
of view dominated FAZ’s articles about Srebrenica, rather than a grass-root, 
humanitarian approach. This was also mirrored in FAZ’s selection of images, which 
shied away from showing the suffering civilians. Indeed, only three pictures from all 23 
published in FAZ in this period featured the victims of Srebrenica.
349
 Significantly, two 
of these three images depicted the refugees receiving aid from UN-soldiers. 
 
Figure 23: FAZ, 18 July 1995, p. 18 and Welt, 18 July 1995, p. 8 
 
 
 
Figure 24: FAZ, 17 July 1995, p. 2 
 
These images, while illustrating the refugees’ desperate situation simultaneously 
conveyed a sense of reassurance, as their anguish was seemingly being eased through 
the international efforts. This selection underlines FAZ’s superficial engagement with 
the subject-matter. Not only did the broadsheet’s readers absorb only the official version 
of the events in Srebrenica, but they also did not gain any pictorial insight into the 
extent of the catastrophe.  
However, a significant departure from this policy could be found in various 
articles which cited returning DUTCHBAT-soldiers. Although they were subjected to a 
‘rule-of-silence’ until all UN-soldiers had left Srebrenica for fear of their safety, some 
broke this rule and made statements in the media. One such FAZ-piece quoted a Dutch 
soldier who stated that the Bosnian-Serb forces abused their power, murdering and 
mutilating people. They “‘…cut off the ears of some, others they raped.’”350 Later 
reports featured equally graphic descriptions, for example that UN-soldiers saw “…a 
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truck full of corpses…” which were clearly adult men, or a tractor pulling a hanger full 
of corpses; a digger and tipper with corpses were also sighted and reported.
351
  
The broadsheet’s spotlight on peacekeepers rather than refugees was further 
underlined by this image, which was published in both FAZ and BILD on the same day.  
 
Figure 25: FAZ, 15 July 1995, p. 4 and BILD, 15 July 1995, p. 2 
 
 
The caption accompanying the FAZ-image read: “The faces of the Dutch soldiers mirror 
the situation of the UN after the conquest of Srebrenica.” Only the BILD-caption also 
drew attention to the Muslim refugees waiting next to the soldiers in the left corner of 
the picture. The photographer’s preferred angle focusing on the Dutch soldiers rather 
than the civilians is sharpened by FAZ’s failure to even mention them in the caption. 
A definitive reason for FAZ’s side-lining of Srebrenica’s victims remains 
unclear, but it could have stemmed from a cautionary awareness to the limited reliable 
information available at the time. Moreover, refugees were perhaps deemed too 
entangled to be reliable sources for reports, especially combined with the inability to 
cross-check and confirm their accounts. While a hesitation to quote eye-witnesses due 
to their depth of involvement is comprehensible, the newspaper’s reliance on statements 
given by soldiers who had officially been subjected to a ‘rule-of-silence’ is less 
comprehensible. Arguably, these soldiers would have recollected the incidents in 
Srebrenica selectively and perhaps aimed to present their own role in a positive light. 
Moreover, the motives of some soldiers to make press statements against official rules 
are never challenged in FAZ’s pieces.  
While also drawing primarily on official sources, FR and Welt also featured 
some exceptions. For example, Welt published two articles, both written by its 
correspondent, Ströhm who was based in Dubrovnik, Croatia. These pieces offered 
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detailed reports of the atrocities perpetrated by Bosnian-Serb forces in Srebrenica and 
were significantly based on refugees’ eyewitness reports. One such article reported that 
Bosnian-Serb soldiers had stolen uniforms from UN-soldiers in Srebrenica and wore 
them while rounding up Muslim men.
352
 In Ströhm’s second piece, he interviewed a 
female refugee in Tuzla, who had stated that many Muslim men from Srebrenica had 
been shot. She declared: “‘In the morning we saw that in Potočari…[they] had been 
slaughtered and hung up like animals.’” The eyewitness continued that the buses, in 
which the women and children were deported to Tuzla, had frequently been stopped and 
the passengers were forced to watch how men – their husbands, fathers and sons – were 
being killed by the side of the road. “Mothers had to watch as their daughters were 
raped.”353 By using such accounts, Welt offered its readers a detailed view of the events 
in and around Srebrenica which was missing in FAZ’s writing. However, it remains 
unclear why the two articles mentioned above were written while Ströhm was based in 
Croatia rather than Tuzla and how he could have gained in-depth insights without being 
on-site.  
Another example was the publication of the same article in both FR and Welt on 
14 July 1995, written by Zoran Radosavljevic, a Croatian journalist working for the 
Russian press agency rtr.
354
 However, only FR provided the author’s name, while Welt 
indicated the authorship as ‘DW’, standing for ‘Die Welt’ and even went so far as to 
indicated the co-author to be Welt’s own Ströhm. Though each article was slightly 
adapted, the majority of the content remained the same. Both started with the 
memorable description of the refugees from Srebrenica as: “ragged, hungry, 
disheartened and absolutely terrified…” They continued with stories told by individual 
refugees who recalled that they had to bribe Bosnian-Serb soldiers to gain access to the 
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buses to Tuzla. However men of fighting age were detained to investigate whether they 
were war criminals.
355
 The Welt-article featured additional details including that a “UN-
spokesperson declared that he had witnessed accounts stating that Bosnian Serbs had 
raped at least two women before displacing them to the no man’s land.”356 Perhaps this 
supplement warranted that Ströhm and ‘Die Welt’ were identified as authors rather than 
rtr’s Radosavljevic. This press-agency article is significant because it was the first and 
rare product of eyewitness accounts published in these newspapers. Written almost 
immediately after the siege on Srebrenica began, it offered the detailed information 
German publications perhaps could not obtain in other ways. In keeping with its rigid 
editorial stance not to include eye-witness reports, FAZ did not publish this rtr-story, 
which could have offered the readers a victims’ perspective and which was evidently 
readily available to the German print media. 
Similar to the textual exceptions in Welt and FR which occasionally drew on 
refugee accounts, both papers also juxtaposed their written pieces with pictures of 
Srebrenica’s victims, giving the reader a visual insight into their grief. 
  
Figure 26: FR, 14 July 1995, p. 2    Figure 27: FR, 15 July 1995, p. 2 
 
Figure 28: Welt, 15 July 1995, p. 3   Figure 29: Welt, 18 July 1995, p. 8 
 
These images showing both the grief and desperation of the refugees, as well as the 
extent of the humanitarian disaster are very different from FAZ’s pictures (figures 23 
and 24). Rather than emphasising the aspect of international aid, they conveyed the 
desolate misery and evoke much more empathy amongst the reader.  
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In contrast, taz, BILD and Spiegel relied heavily on first-hand reports from 
survivors in Tuzla, focusing more on the grass-roots, humanitarian angle than the 
previous newspapers, attempting to offer their readers as much insight into a convoluted 
series of events as was possible at the time. Taking taz first, a number of articles pieced 
together the “…new horror-stories [that] arrive[d] in Tuzla…with every bus-load of 
new refugees.”357 Their stories contributed not just to a general understanding and 
evaluation of what had occurred in Srebrenica, but gave graphic insights of the horror 
they had endured. A good example of the vivid vignettes the paper painted for its 
readers is the interview with Muhira Z., who said that “her son was ‘butchered with a 
knife’, right in front of her eyes. Her daughters…vanished…‘they are probably dead, 
they have murdered them, I only heard their screams.’”358 taz supplemented its striking 
articles with images that gave the reader a moving insight into the fate of the victims in 
Tuzla and by extension Srebrenica.  
  
Figure 30: taz, 15 July 1995, p. 11 Figure 31: taz, 15 July 1995, p. 1 and Welt, 15 
July 1995, p. 3 
 
A guest contribution in taz, authored by the famous American journalist Roy 
Gutman, who had written about the concentration camps in Bosnia was also memorable. 
Having won a Pulitzer Prize in 1993 for this coverage, Gutman had gained great status 
and was considered an authority on the Bosnian War. His 1995 article drew on various 
interviews, in which refugees recounted different aspects of Srebrenica’s siege. Several 
stated that they had heard Bosnian-Serb soldiers say repeatedly that their aim was to kill 
as many Muslims as possible. 42-year old Sadikovic recalled that “every night…young 
women were taken from the factory-building in Potočari. No one ever saw them again.” 
Gutman wrote that these experiences were so severe that some of the survivors could 
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not cope with them and committed suicide.
359
 The author included more specific details 
of one case: 
A young girl from Srebrenica got on the bus half-naked. She had severe abrasions and one could 
safely assume that she had been raped…Upon arrival in Tuzla, she hung herself on a tree.360  
Another taz-story, which had been published anonymously a few weeks earlier on 15 
July, had also reported that “a 20-year old woman, who was separated from her family, 
hung herself in the forest.”361  
In spite of these repeated references to this fateful story, taz never accompanied 
its articles with an image. In contrast, BILD did so on the same day as taz’s anonymous 
piece was published, namely 15 July and placed it on the first page. 
 
Figure 32: BILD, 15 July 1995, p. 1 
 
 
The BILD-article published along this image stated: “a picture accuses”, proceeding to 
describe what the 20-year old girl was wearing and that she used a torn blanket to hang 
herself.
362
 The image combined with this text indeed left the reader with a sense of 
being accused, underlining the power of images. This picture became widely-known 
and even iconic. For example U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, stated that upon seeing 
this picture, she had comprehended that the Bosnian War was producing innocent 
victims and that this was not a civil war in which all parties were guilty, as she had 
presumed. Michael Sells, who quotes her remark from the Congressional Record 
explains that this realisation was spurred by “…what the picture left unsaid…[Including 
answers to questions such as] what humiliations and depravations did she suffer, had 
she been raped, did she witness loved ones being killed?”363 The Senator’s reactions 
emphasise the power of images and how this particular example influenced the world’s 
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perception of Srebrenica. This international acclaim of the picture renders its non-
inclusion in almost all publications considered here even more surprising, though its 
absence in FAZ, Welt, FR and JF can be explained by the limited inclusion of the 
refugees’ fate.  
Returning to BILD’s textual reporting, it included detailed eyewitness accounts 
similar to taz. Due to the habitual brevity of the tabloid’s articles, these stories were not 
usually embedded in much contextual background, though they still gave the readers a 
reasonably coherent insight into the massacre. They predominantly featured the subject 
of rape, perhaps more prominently than other publications, which is in keeping with the 
tabloid’s focus on sensational stories. Some reported that mass rapes took place while 
Srebrenica’s women and children were cowering in the factory in Potočari, and other 
articles included more personal recollections.
364
 For example one story cited Nurika 
Hrustanovic, who remembered that in Potočari she saw one girl being dragged off the 
bus by her hair and then raped by 30 Chetniks, while UN-soldiers merely stood by.
365
 
Here the referral to the Bosnian-Serb soldiers as Chetniks is particularly striking and 
perhaps intends to dismiss ‘the Serbs’ as raging war criminals. As most BILD-articles 
were written anonymously and did not include a locality of the author, it is not possible 
to deduce whether they stemmed from on-site correspondents who interviewed 
refugees. However, none of the stories featured here could be found in other 
publications, which suggests that they were unique and not based on press agencies. 
Spiegel published two articles which offered vivid insights into the events in 
Srebrenica. On 24 July 1995, Renate Flottau gave a very graphic and detailed narrative 
of the refugees in Tuzla and what they had witnessed in Srebrenica. Though there was 
no geographic indication of where the story was researched and written, it was heavily 
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based on oral accounts, suggesting that Flottau was in Tuzla, speaking directly to eye-
witnesses. One refugee, Mukeleta, told the journalist about her husband and 13-year-old 
son who had been abducted. When attempting to run after her son, Serbian guards 
stopped her, saying: “‘we are just contemplating which parts of your son we’re going to 
cut off.’” The article continued that after she recapitulated her experiences, Mukeleta 
collapsed, weeping hysterically. Other refugees Flottau cited in her piece recalled that 
during their three-hour bus-ride from Srebrenica to Tuzla, the vehicles occasionally 
slowed down so the passengers could get a full view of the executed men on the side of 
the road.
366
 The title, “I kissed the feet of the murderer”, as well as the picture 
accompanying the piece (figure 33) summarised the horrors of what was occurring in 
Srebrenica in a very immediate manner.  
 
Figure 33: Spiegel, 24 July 1995, p. 112 
 
Other images published by Spiegel, evoked a similar emotional reaction in the readers.  
  
Figure 34: Spiegel, 17 July 1995, p. 115  Figure 35: Spiegel, 31 July 1995, p. 118 
 
 
The theme of wailing women appears regularly in these images. While this focus could 
be interpreted as a pre-selection on behalf of the photographer to feature a motif that 
would evoke strong empathy with the viewer, it must also be noted that the victims 
arriving in Tuzla were predominantly women and children, as most men had been 
detained, shot, or those who had managed to escape had not yet arrived in Tuzla. One 
particularly striking image was published by the news-magazine in mid-July. 
 
Figure 36: Spiegel, 17 July 1995, p. 112 
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As discussed in the introduction, and demonstrated by Susan Sontag’s work, it is very 
difficult to know what the message of an image truly is, or what events were 
specifically recorded at the moment a photograph was taken.
367
 The above image is a 
good example of these deliberations. One interpretation of figure 36 is that floods of 
refugees confronted the completely overwhelmed UN-soldiers, one of whom seems to 
have lowered his head in resignation. Of course one does not know if the soldier was 
not merely looking down or perhaps speaking to someone. Regardless, the instinctive 
mood conveyed by this Spiegel-image is one of a weak and resigned UN confronted 
with masses of people whom they cannot help. This is a very different image of the UN 
as displayed in FAZ’s images, which exclusively showed the international organisation 
as easing the pain of Srebrenica’s victims.  
 
 
Srebrenica’s men arrive in Tuzla 
 
In late July 1995, several thousand men who had managed to flee from the 
enclave by foot as the Bosnian-Serb siege unfolded, arrived in Tuzla.
368
 taz, BILD and 
Spiegel were the only publications that covered the men’s arrival, detailing what they 
had endured, and in doing so used this opportunity to continue piecing together the 
events.
369
 The lack of interest in the remaining publications is striking, as these men 
provided new information on what had occurred in Srebrenica. Spiegel’s account was 
based on the experiences of Mevludin Oric, a 25-year-old father of two. Speaking to the 
news-magazine’s correspondent, Walter Mayr, Oric recalled that he was one of 10,000 
men who had fled as the enclave fell. He recalled that he was supposed to be shot, but 
was saved by playing dead and hiding under corpses. During the night he stole away 
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and embarked on the long trek to Tuzla.
370
 A BILD-article featured a similar story, 
referring to a man who only succeeded in fleeing from Srebrenica because he had 
hidden under corpses of ‘slaughtered’ prisoners.371 It remains unclear if both 
publications referred to the same individual. Another BILD-article published one week 
earlier had reported of the harrowing experiences of a Bosnian soldier who arrived in 
Tuzla after days of wandering through the forests following his escape from Srebrenica. 
He explained that once the Bosnian Serbs had arrived in the enclave, “…they hauled 
away all men of fighting age in trucks….Women were raped and mutilated. Laughing, 
the Serbs cut off the refugees’ ears.”372  
taz’s correspondent Rathfelder recounted Husan Hrustanovic’s story. According 
to Rathfelder, the 38-year-old was initially reluctant to speak to the western journalist, 
but eventually did so. It emerged that on the way from Srebrenica many men were 
captured and arrested by Bosnian Serbs, while others were torn apart by landmines. 
Between 3000 and 4000 men had survived the journey thus far from the 15,000 who 
initially left Srebrenica. “The others are still struggling through the forest or have 
already been captured by the Serbs, perhaps murdered by them.”373 The contradicting 
numbers offered here – taz’s eyewitness spoke of 15,000 men while Spiegel’s testimony 
cited 10,000 men – strike an external observer, though the conflicting information may 
not have been noticed by a casual reader at the time. However, for the purposes of a 
media analysis, such instances underlined the absence of concrete, provable facts, which 
continued to cloud the German media’s understanding of the events in Srebrenica and 
perhaps explain why other publications chose not to report on the matter in much detail.  
taz and BILD underlined their textual coverage with an image both published in 
mid-July. 
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Figure 37: taz, 19 July 1995, p. 1 and BILD, 18 July 1995, p. 1 
 
Showing their readers a rare scene of a unified family, both newspapers communicated 
a sense of a ‘happy ending’ amidst all the emotional agony with the selection of this 
picture. Nonetheless, it is striking that both the mother and one of the daughters are 
crying while the other daughter and the father look distressed, in spite of the relatively 
happy occasion. Such a bittersweet picture underlined how tragic the events in 
Srebrenica must have been and how much sorrow the victims were faced with.  
 The articles in Konkret about Srebrenica differed decisively from the previous 
publications. Indeed, aside from some marginal remarks, the magazine’s commentary 
on Srebrenica did not develop until September 1995, long after the other publications’ 
coverage. At that point, the writing was dominated by the twin allegations that the 
German media “ranging from [the conservative] FAZ to [the left-leaning] taz,”374 was 
manipulating information.
375
 Another article pointed to the confusing coverage of 
missing people with figures ranging from 1,500 to 10,000, suggesting exaggeration and 
criticising that the media reported that the Serbs were ‘liquidating’ Srebrenica’s civilian 
population.
376
 Significantly, none of the publications considered in this chapter used the 
term ‘liquidation’ in their coverage, as Elsässer claimed, and the latter did not elaborate 
what specific publications he was accusing. Moreover, none of Konkret’s articles 
informed their readers of the difficulties to secure reliable sources and the 
inaccessibility of the enclave. This information could have explained the fluctuating and 
at times contradictory numbers published in the daily newspapers. Instead, Elsässer 
repeatedly argued that the ‘main-stream’ German media manipulated events of the 
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Bosnian War to fit their agenda.
377
 However he did not expand what this agenda was, 
who set it and with what intended effect. Consequently his allegations can be dismissed 
as unsubstantiated, especially considering the diverse coverage in the German press 
analysed here.  
 
Nonetheless, one of Elsässer’s articles must be considered, as it critiqued Roy 
Gutman’s previously mentioned guest contribution to taz.378 The author attempted to 
discredit Gutman at the outset, claiming that his discovery and coverage of the Bosnian 
concentration camps consisted of dubious eye-witnesses and questionable evidence.
379
 
Elsässer alleged that the same faulty methodology formed the basis of the taz-piece, 
which he claimed was based on suspiciously vague sources, such as a statement by a 
‘human rights investigator’.380 The author evidently aimed to criticise and depreciate not 
just this particular piece of writing, but also the German print media coverage in 
general. As a result of this desire to attack fellow German journalists, Konkret’s articles 
on Srebrenica failed to cover the fallen enclave in a significant fashion and thus did not 
offer their readers a general understanding of the matter. Entirely missing from its 
coverage was the plight of refugees in Tuzla and their experiences, not to mention the 
atrocities that were undoubtedly occurring in Srebrenica.  
 
Authorship  
 
 
Having focused on the manner in which the atrocities were covered and what 
sources were drawn on to piece together the factual details, the quantitative distribution 
of the articles’ authorship in the daily broadsheets must now be considered.  
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Newspaper % of articles 
authored by 
correspondents 
% of articles 
authored by press 
agencies 
% of articles 
amalgamated from 
various press 
releases, etc. 
Welt 61% 5% 34% 
FAZ 64% 31% 4% 
FR 34% 64% 0,6% 
taz 69% 25% 3% 
Table 3: Percentages of articles according to authorship
381
 
 
As the above table indicates, all daily newspapers aside from FR predominantly relied 
on pieces written by their own journalists rather than press agencies, in spite of the 
inaccessibility of the enclave and the difficulties of obtaining information. Moreover, 
Welt was the only paper which substantially drew on amalgamated press releases. The 
majority of FAZ’s stories were written by the broadsheet’s own correspondents, which 
indicates that the human resources were available to lead interviews with eyewitnesses 
and refraining to do so was perhaps the result of an inherent scepticism regarding the 
trustworthiness of eyewitnesses.   
 
 
Srebrenica and the UN 
 
Having analysed the way in which the various newspapers compiled their 
coverage of the uncertain events in Srebrenica, we turn to the press’ evaluation of the 
UN, which all publications except JF included in their reporting. Konkret stood alone in 
its assessment that any German commentator lamenting the UN’s inaction was an 
‘imperialist’ who condoned the meddling in another country and indeed the 
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fragmentation of a sovereign state.
382
 All remaining publications took a more moderate 
stance and expressed a general consensus that the UN’s reputation had suffered from 
mishandling the Srebrenica-crisis.
383
 Perhaps a bit dramatically, taz’s Erich Rathfelder 
concluded that “Bosnia…[was] turning out to be the UN’s grave.”384  
Welt’s articles were marked by a comparable approach, though they were more 
detailed and frequent than in the other publications. For example, numerous articles 
focused on the UN’s 50th birthday, which it would celebrate in October that year, 
doubting the present-day effectiveness of the organisation.
385
 Portraying the UN as 
being in a mid-life crisis, these articles sought to identify what problems had 
contributed to the DUTCHBAT’s inaction. These included that the UN did not have 
independent financial resources, no standing and independent troops and that national 
interests frequently dominated and conflicted with the decision-making process.
386
  
Spiegel’s reports were alone in presenting a more positive interpretation of the 
UN’s role in Bosnia. While conceding that the UN had unquestionably failed to protect 
Srebrenica’s civilian population,387 the news-magazine’s articles also called attention to 
Russia’s interest in the conflict. One, for example, speculated that if the UN pulled out 
of Bosnia due to its failures in Srebrenica, what would follow would be terrifying: 
“Washington [would] lift the arms embargo, Moscow [would] arm Serbia, Belgrade 
[would] officially step into the war…”388 By framing the UN’s presence in Bosnia as an 
important counter-weight to Russia in the region, Spiegel introduced an alternative 
interpretation of the UN’s role. However in doing so, it also re-introduced the Cold 
War-era opposition of Russia versus ‘the West,’ which had been present in the German 
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coverage of the early 1990s, but had not re-appeared in 1995.
389
 Nevertheless, Spiegel’s 
argumentation demonstrated that there were various ways of interpreting the events in 
Srebrenica and Bosnia, cautioning the reader of jumping to one-sided conclusions.  
Beyond these deliberations, the consensus that the UN was ineffective and had 
failed in Srebrenica led to the disregard in most German publications of the UN-fatality 
in Srebrenica following a Bosnian-Muslim attack. The weekly or monthly publications 
JF, Konkret and Spiegel did not report on the death of the UN-soldier at all, underlining 
that it was not deemed important enough to include beyond the day-to-day news-cycle. 
The daily newspapers, Welt, FAZ, FR, taz and BILD covered the incident on 10 July, 
two days after it occurred. All articles were marked by their marginalised treatment of 
the matter, merely mentioning that a Dutch soldier had been killed by Bosnian 
governmental troops as the UN-soldiers had attempted to retreat from their position.
390
 
This was epitomised by the over-simplified BILD-article which reported that “…a 
grenade exploded [and] a Dutch died.”391 None of these newspapers identified the 
soldier by name, nor did they mention him beyond these initial articles.  
In contrast, Welt reported on this incident with much more interest and most 
frequently, namely three times during July 1995.
392
 Helmut Hetzel, the author of two 
pieces, was Welt’s foreign correspondent in The Hague, which might account for his 
heightened interest in the fate of the Dutch UN-soldiers.
393
 Significantly, Hetzel’s 
articles identified the deceased soldier by name, demonstrating an immediacy no other 
publication introduced.
394
 This proximity is further underlined by a picture of Rensen’s 
coffin being carried to an airplane by his comrades. 
 
Figure 38: Welt, 13 July 1995, p. 8 
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The conservative daily was the only publication to publish an image of Rensen. Notably 
it was very small and could have easily been missed by a casual reader. Nonetheless it is 
significant that the coffin of a UN-soldier killed in combat was shown at all.  
Surprisingly the press releases published by the UN-Security Council (UNSC) at 
the time did not mention Rensen’s death or his name either. Indeed it was not until 21 
July – at a time when no German publication, not even Welt, covered the incident 
anymore – that a UNSC-press release even alluded to the role of the soldiers. In this 
statement made by the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, 13 days after the fatality, 
Boutros-Ghali paid tribute “‘…to the sacrifice of those United Nations personnel 
who...[had] given their lives to defence peace and human dignity.’”395 The content of 
the press release was unquestionably about Bosnia and Srebrenica, but the vague 
statement did not mention Rensen by name, nor the circumstances which caused his 
death. Moreover, Boutros-Ghali did not give any indication of the number of UN-
personnel who had lost their lives. The lack of official engagement with the UN-fatality 
reveals how sensitive the subject was. Arguably the publicised death of a UN-soldier in 
Bosnia would have weakened public support for the mission, which could explain the 
reserved statements. The vague and almost uncomfortable treatment of the UN-fatality 
in Srebrenica in the German daily press, but also in official UN-communiqués 
underlines the uncertainty of how to assess the situation. Mirroring the secondary 
literature about this incident, the German press coverage is marked by its lack of 
outrage about the UN’s loss. 
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The publications’ opinion 
 
Amidst the day-to-day coverage that attempted to piece together the convoluted 
events in Srebrenica and reported on the UN’s role in the enclave, most articles did not 
offer a clear opinion or judgement. While nuances in their interpretation and 
argumentation indicated what perspective an author agreed with most, these were rather 
subtle. Editorials, cartoons and in one case a Feuilleton-article were much more explicit 
in expressing their opinion and are therefore worth considering in more detail. 
Commencing with the latter, the Feuilleton is a particularly unique section of the daily 
German newspaper. The genre allows the author more journalistic freedom with regard 
to content and style. Thematically the section traditionally picks up on current issues, 
focusing primarily on social, cultural and ethics questions. It is of particular relevance in 
this chapter due to the inaccessibility of the enclave. With missing or unproven 
information omnipresent in the press’ understanding of Srebrenica, the Feuilleton could 
have offered ample space for long exposés and discussions concerning the implications 
of Srebrenica on Germany, ‘the West’ in general and how this instance of extreme 
violence would affect German foreign policy in the region. However, only FR made use 
of its Feuilleton section, publishing a single, but very memorable article.  
Authored by Nenad Popović, it was provocatively entitled ‘Addio, Bosnia’, 
which picked up on a headline of the Italian newspaper La Reppublica from 14 July, as 
the author explained. Indignant about the UN’s inaction in Srebrenica, the piece’s most 
poignant section was the bitter comment accusing no one in particular and yet everyone: 
“while we are enjoying the summer of 1995 (this July has been particularly hot, hasn’t 
it?), the screams from the torture dungeons below us are getting quieter.” The author 
continued that gradually the only noise that remained was a faint humming, just like the 
noise that came out of the “…shower rooms in concentration camps filled with humans 
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and Cyclone B…”396 This article, striking for its direct reference to the Nazi gas 
chambers and concentration camps, confronted the reader with the moral outrage that 
Srebrenica had occurred which no other article either in FR or other German 
publications articulated. In this case the Feuilleton-section gave the author more 
opportunity to make emotive cross-references, as the guest author was not confined by 
journalistic etiquette. 
Editorials and cartoons – both formats which equally allow more editorial 
freedom – were featured much more frequently. JF and Konkret did not utilise either to 
comment on Srebrenica and the weekly Spiegel featured only one cartoon and no 
editorials. However, all daily newspapers employed caricatures very frequently to voice 
their opinions. One theme found in the cartoons of all daily publications were scathing 
comments on the weak UN that was unable to stop Karadžić’s and Mladić’s siege of 
Srebrenica. 
 
Figure 39: FAZ, 28 July 1995, p. 3   Figure 40: taz, 22 July 1995, p. 10 
 
 
The FAZ-cartoon (figure 39) showed Karadžić and Mladić laughing impishly and 
viewing the ICTY, the UN and EU as mere scarecrows rather than real threats. 
Similarly, figure 40 depicted Karadžić as a school-master and UN as a scrawny, 
helpless school boy who repeatedly wrote “I shall not disturb” on the blackboard. 
  
Figure 41: FR, 18 July 1995, p. 1    Figure 42: Welt, 13 July 1995, p. 8 
 
 
The FR-cartoon (figure 41) showed Karadžić ablating the UN’s Bosnia-presence one 
safe-zone at a time – starting in this case with Srebrenica and Žepa. The portrayal of the 
UN-soldier whose helmet is too big and has fallen into his face, but continues to hold 
his presence even though he is completely useless, strikes the viewer as pathetic. Welt’s 
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cartoon (figure 42) characterised Karadžić as a tank, shooting in the direction of 
Srebrenica. The three chicken wearing UN-helmets are depicted as hearing, seeing and 
saying nothing, again underlining their incompetence and indeed the UN’s deplorable 
behaviour. 
 These caricatures are very interesting, as they featured a level of indignation 
regarding the UN’s role in Srebrenica, which was not present in the articles at the time. 
The stark contrast between the textual coverage, which generally reported that the UN 
had mishandled the situation,
397
 and the accusatory caricatures is striking. This 
underlines the freedom of the latter. Two further cartoons found in FAZ and Spiegel 
must also be considered. Both conveyed the blanket-accusations of ‘the Bosnian Serbs’ 
or Serbia in opposition to the UN, already discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Figure 43: FAZ, 17 July 1995, p. 3   Figure 44: Spiegel, 24 July 1995, p. 115 
 
 
Spiegel’s single caricature (figure 44) published in this period shows a menacing figure 
representing the ‘Bosnian Serbs’ on a pile of skulls with the UN’s ‘declaration of 
bankruptcy’ framed on the wall behind him. Moreover, the words written at the bottom 
of the image, “Srebrenica, etc.” implied that the fallen enclave is only one of many war-
crimes the Bosnian Serbs were guilty of. Similarly, the FAZ-cartoon (figure 43) was 
published on 17 July, just as the atrocities of Srebrenica were becoming known to the 
world through the refugees arriving in Tuzla. Serbia was crudely portrayed as the 
omnipotent figure of death against whom the angel of peace is powerless. The miniscule 
figure representing the UN underlines the international community’s complete 
insignificance as well as its difficult task to attain peace in the region.  
 This placement of blame with Serbia was also mirrored in FAZ’s editorials, 
which introduces the third format used to express opinions. These were frequently 
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authored by one of its five editors and repeatedly focused on Serbia. For example, on 13 
July, Dr. Günter Nonnenmacher wrote that the lesson learned from Srebrenica was that 
the UN would have to decide whether to engage actively in the war and would thus 
become a “warring party”, or pull out completely. Immediately the editorial stressed 
that UN-soldiers had been used as human shields.
398
 This juxtaposition served as a 
reminder that they had been exposed to horrific experiences and a withdrawal could be 
justified. Reiβmüller, another FAZ-editor published an editorial explaining the fall of 
Srebrenica as the consequence of ‘Greater Serbian’ politics.399 This is particularly 
significant when compared to a ‘normal’ FAZ-article published the same day. In it, 
Matthias Rüb stated that the causes for the fall of the enclave were difficult to explain 
and that it was not clear what the Bosnian Serbs had gained from capturing the small 
enclave.
400
 This cautious coverage was not at all congruent with the definitive 
explanations and accusations expressed in Reiβmüller’s editorial just a few pages later, 
emphasising the extent of freedom to publish the author’s personal opinion in editorials. 
Moreover Reiβmüller’s opinion piece underlines the broadsheet’s continuing anti-
Serbian stance, which had already been established in the newspaper’s coverage in the 
early 1990s. 
FR’s Roman Ares warned that if the West did nothing, “…genocide…[would] 
lose its reprehensibility.”401 The concerted use of the term ‘genocide’ in conjunction 
with the editorial’s publication date – 10 July – is striking. Mere days after the siege of 
Srebrenica, the fate of the thousands of missing men was not yet determined. While the 
mass displacement of thousands of women and children arriving in Tuzla was self-
evident, the extermination of Srebrenica’s male population was merely speculative at 
this point. These subtle distinctions of language will be explored with more detail later 
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in this chapter. However, for now it is worth noting that the format of an editorial was 
used in FR to introduce this loaded term. 
Editorials in BILD and Welt used their platform to launch appeals for a more 
active intervention from the West.
402
 Emphasising the aspect of human suffering, 
BILD’s editorial by Dana Horakova is particularly interesting. The German-Czech 
journalist and politician articulated disgust and contempt, stating that she could no 
longer stand the misery in Srebrenica, “because I cannot nor want to believe that this 
war cannot be ended.” Explaining her outrage, Horkova described scenes from 
Srebrenica: “Children, who…[hung] on their mothers’ hands, and they march[ed] and 
march[ed].…Stony roads. Death. It is so horrible.”403 It remains unclear whether the 
author had been to Tuzla or Bosnia, but this was not crucial at this point. The vivid 
image of the human suffering in Srebrenica presented was the main message the author 
wanted her readers to comprehend.  
Ströhm’s Welt-editorial is particularly striking, in which he asserted that certain 
“…voices…[were] becoming more audible which suppose[d] that the UN and the major 
powers had consciously played Srebrenica into the Serbians’ hands.”404 This drastic 
accusation that the UN had purposefully allowed the enclave to be taken over, implying 
back-door deals, is singular in the conservative broadsheet and reminiscent of Konkret’s 
articles proposing conspiracy theories of imperialist schemings. Ströhm’s editorial 
continued that it was increasingly disappointing that the Croatian and Muslim actions 
were reprimanded so severely by the international community, while Serbian atrocities 
were largely overlooked. Significantly the author did not specify who exactly he was 
accusing. With this vague yet severe argument, Ströhm’s editorial counters his paper’s 
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previously empathetic treatment of the UN-soldier’s death in early July, which had 
specifically accused the Bosnian Muslim army for causing the soldier’s death. 
The message conveyed in the cartoons, editorials and Feuilleton-article is 
marked by its focus on the UN’s failure and subsequent moral outrage about Srebrenica. 
Both elements had been missing in the day-to-day coverage, which was dedicated to 
piecing together the events surrounding the fallen enclave. Perhaps this stemmed from 
the remaining ambiguity surrounding the events in Srebrenica and the inability to cross-
check much of the information. It is commendable that emotional debates did not 
impact the press’ everyday reporting and that any expression of opinion was limited to 
artistic formats (cartoons) or ones allowing more editorial freedom (Feuilleton-article 
and editorials). This is particularly noteworthy when considering how emotionally and 
morally charged the Srebrenica Massacre and the UN’s failure to protect its civilian 
population is today, both in the public conscience and in much of the secondary 
literature, which professes assessments such as “…[that] Srebrenica will forever be 
associated with the triumph of evil.”405  
 
 
Srebrenica and Germany: The weight of history 
 
 With the increasingly prevalent notion that the UN had failed to protect the 
civilian population of Srebrenica, the international community debated whether NATO 
should launch a military intervention in Bosnia with the primary goal of instating a no-
fly-zone over the country and thus disabling the Bosnian-Serb forces.
406
 As the German 
press reported, plans were made for a ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ to be deployed to Bosnia, 
consisting of British and French troops, as well as German Tornado air-crafts. In 
addition, Bundeswehr-medics would support the mission with a military hospital in 
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Split, Croatia.
407
 This military contribution to a NATO-intervention would have been a 
significant departure from German foreign policy since the Second World War, which 
had been marked by non-intervention and an emphasis on diplomacy. Unsurprisingly, 
this controversial departure from German pacifist foreign policy and indeed justifying 
this shift with the country’s National-Socialist past was picked up by the German print 
media.  
Before analysing the discussion it provoked at the time, special attention must be 
drawn to a prominent politician from the pacifist Green Party, Joschka Fischer. As the 
Co-Chairman of his party in the Bundestag, he was a strong proponent of an 
international intervention following Srebrenica, in spite of his party’s pacifist roots.408 
Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, the 1968-generation, to which Fischer 
belonged, had been instrumental in propelling the collective memory of post-war 
Germany into the direction of assuming responsibility for its National-Socialist past. As 
Hans Kundnani has elaborated in his monograph, the Green Party and indeed Fischer as 
an individual had identified their political raison d’être through the paradigm ‘never 
again war.’ However, as Fischer revealed in an interview with Kundnani, after he had 
heard the news about Srebrenica,  
…he had difficulties looking at himself in the mirror. [He asked himself:]…‘How could it 
happen? What have you done?’…‘I was asking myself the same question that I had once asked 
my parents.’409  
This ominous statement was a direct reference to the shift of collective memory effected 
by the 1968-generation, Fischer’s first political home, whose followers had frequently 
accused their parent-generation of having allowed the Nazi-genocide to unfold and 
having ‘looked the other way.’  
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Following the catalytic wake-up-call, as Fischer viewed the Srebrenica 
Massacre, he wrote an open letter supporting a German military contribution.
410
 The 
controversial and indeed radical political shift cannot be over-stated. First, Fischer 
outlined the previous diplomatic endeavours which had attempted to find a peaceful 
solution in Bosnia without using military force. By the end of the first page, Fischer 
concluded that these peaceful undertakings had failed, which was epitomised in the 
Bosnian-Serb siege of Srebrenica.
411
 Repeatedly referring to ‘ethnic cleansing’ and 
‘ethnic war’, it is remarkable that Fischer distanced his assertions from the term 
‘genocide’. In the first instance this seems to deliberately disassociate the events in 
Bosnia from those perpetrated by Nazi-Germany. However, he quietly introduced a 
linkage to this historical era by stating that 50 years after the end of the Second World 
War, “war has returned [to Europe] with all its gruesomeness and barbarity…”412  
All publications aside from BILD reported on the controversial letter.
413
 
However, only one example in which Fischer’s moral interpretation of Germany’s past 
was supported, namely in FAZ. Written by Freimut Duve, a Social Democratic (SPD) 
member of the German Bundestag, the author lamented that after the Second World 
War, Germany had vowed ‘never again Auschwitz’, but was now watching the 
‘genocide’ in Bosnia without intervening.414 Duve continued with a plea that while 
Germany would need to be apprehensive about intervening in the Balkans due to its 
past, equally the country’s past must not be used as an excuse to accept further 
atrocities.
415
 This linkage was unique amongst the German print media. Interestingly 
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Duve’s father came from a Jewish family in Osijek, Croatia. Perhaps this family 
background inclined him to link Germany’s past to Srebrenica when other authors did 
not. 
This personal interest is further underlined with a second article he wrote for taz, 
a few weeks earlier, which echoed Fischer’s moral arguments based on Germany’s 
history. On 15 July already, Duve and three colleagues from the Bundestag, Christian 
Schwarz-Schilling (CDU), Marieluise Beck (Green Party) and Hildebrecht Braun 
(FDP), had launched a public cross-party appeal in taz, articulating the same arguments 
Fischer expressed in letter-form several weeks later. In the taz-piece the three authors 
stated that “we grew up in a country, which has aggregated endless guilt. Many of us 
only realised upon growing up that Germany is responsible for the most inhumane 
genocide in history.” The appeal continues that 50 years after the victory over fascism, 
‘genocide’ was unfolding again in Europe and “Europe can no longer claim to have 
learned from its history.”416 Importantly, this letter did not spark any reaction in other 
publications; this only occurred when Fischer put forward the same arguments. In both 
articles, Duve referred to ‘genocide’ unfolding. He never specified whether this was in 
reference to Srebrenica specifically or to the Bosnian War in general. Either way, the 
author seemingly employed the term to shock the reader and increase the sense of 
urgency to intervene. 
Aside from Duve’s article, which is noteworthy due to its timing, taz did not 
engage further with the debate and indeed did not pick up on it again when Fischer 
published his letter. Other than vague comments such as that Fischer had initiated a 
debate that was vital for his party and for Germany as a whole,
417
 the paper completely 
distanced itself from the topic. This retraction from the debate is striking, especially 
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since taz had previously represented the interpretation that Germany’s history created a 
moral obligation to intervene. Perhaps now that this issue had touched the very core of 
the Green Party’s philosophy and had split its members into opposing factions, the 
newspaper was unsure which side to take, especially in light of the fragmentary 
information available about Srebrenica. Nonetheless, the complete omission of the 
debate seems incomprehensible and even unprofessional for a daily newspaper.  
Duve’s echo of Fischer’s claims from August 1995 in his FAZ-article sparked 
strong disagreement in Konkret’s September issue, which referenced them in two of the 
three articles on Srebrenica.
418
 Klaus Bittermann’s piece explicitly criticised Duve, 
stating that “anyone who has the faintest idea about this conflict knows that this is a 
conventional war for territory…”, not ‘genocide.’ The author went on to say that rape 
and displacement were inevitable side-effects of war and thus the Bosnian War must not 
be compared to the Nazis’ crimes, which had left the world in ruins. Bittermann then 
launched into a number of conspiracy theories allegedly perpetuated by the ‘bourgeois 
press’ regarding the extent of the atrocities in Srebrenica, which was being (mis)used to 
justify a military intervention.
419
 Moreover he made the sweeping declaration that “their 
engagement in the Balkans has made the Germans a people in war fever.”420  
The magazine’s September-issue underlined Germany’s alleged enthusiasm for 
war with its front cover image, which featured Joschka Fischer in military uniform. 
    
Figure 45: Konkret, September 1995, cover  Figure 46: Spiegel, 07.08.1995, p. 112 
 
The satirical portrayal of the pacifist politician in a military uniform and a comical 
facial expression becomes even more snide with the realisation that the uniform 
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belonged to the Croatian President Tudjman (figure 46), who had frequently been 
associated with the fascist Ustasha.
421
 Perhaps an average reader would not have 
immediately comprehended that the uniform was Tudjman’s. However, with this photo-
alteration, Konkret’s editorial staff clearly intended to associate any military endeavour 
in Bosnia with fascism. Moreover, the poor quality of the photo-montage with which 
Fischer’s head is placed on Tudjman’s uniform – underlined by the tilted hat – may 
have encouraged any reader to wonder to whom the uniform belonged.  
JF’s single article also criticised any interpretation of a potential German 
involvement based on moral arguments. The paper featured an interview with Kurt 
Waldheim, former UN-Secretary General (1971-1981), who had been stationed in the 
Balkans as a Wehrmacht-soldier in 1942-1944. In light of the recent events in 
Srebrenica, Waldheim concluded that “…the German policy until now…[had] been 
right: not to engage militarily, and only give humanitarian support…”422 While this 
conclusion was not very controversial, JF’s choice of interviewee is striking. In 1986 it 
was disclosed that the Austrian diplomat Waldheim had concealed “…the fact that for 
three years he had served as a Nazi officer in combat zones and places of atrocities 
against Jews, Serbs, Italians and others.”423 Waldheim, who was soon associated with 
anti-Semitic remarks, was put on the ‘Watch List’ of the United States in 1987, barring 
him from entering the country.
424
 Though JF did not mention any of these details 
surrounding his person, the article readily drew on him as a source to comment on the 
prospect of German military participation in the Balkans. Moreover, considering that 
Waldheim was Austrian and arguably did not have a note-worthy insider’s perspective 
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on Germany’s foreign policy, JF’s choice could be seen as an attempt to reinstate 
Waldheim as a respected commentator on foreign policy.  
While most publications concentrated on evaluating whether Fischer’s argument 
of linking Germany’s past to the need for an intervention in Bosnia was valuable or 
faulty, Spiegel was the only example in the main-stream press which was overtly critical 
of Fischer’s proposition. In an interview with the Green politician – importantly the 
only one published in this period – Fischer asserted that ‘Never again War’ and ‘Never 
again Auschwitz’ were two important pillars of his political ideology and while these 
paradigms stood in diametrical opposition to waging war, at this point military 
interaction was necessary in Bosnia. Notably, the two Spiegel-correspondents who led 
the interview inquired whether this change in policy was a symptom of Fischer aiming 
to become a more viable and ‘electable’ candidate for a coalition-party in the 1998 
elections.
425
 Though Fischer quickly denied this motivation, the news-magazine’s 
confrontational approach was unique. Though this was never fully articulated, Spiegel’s 
interview insinuated that perhaps Srebrenica was being (mis-)used by Fischer to shift 
his party’s foreign policy stance to a position more suitable for governing, implying that 
the calls for an intervention due to ‘genocide’ could be inflated and serving a political 
agenda. As much of this appears to be conjecture, these implications were left unsaid. 
However, the leading questions in this interview suggested this interpretation to the 
reader.  
This interview was not the only instance in which the news-magazine expressed 
its opposition to Fischer’s policy proposal. In mid-July Spiegel published an article 
guest-authored by Gerd Schmückle, who had been NATO’s deputy commander-in-chief 
for Europe until 1980. Surprisingly this former high-ranking NATO-official voiced his 
scepticism towards Germany’s departure from its post-war foreign policy coined by 
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diplomacy and non-intervention. Primarily the author criticised that German politicians 
presented the military engagement as a ‘moral responsibility’, basing their arguments on 
Germany’s obligation stemming from the past as well as of being part of an alliance like 
NATO. Furthermore he criticised that the hypothesis was gaining prominence that “for 
50 years the others protected us, now we also need to protect them”.426 
Welt and FR were also sceptical of Fischer’s reinterpretation of Germany’s 
foreign policy, though they did not criticise him directly. Rather, they stubbornly placed 
any German contribution into the wider context of alliance politics. For example, Welt’s 
Rüdiger Moniac detailed that the task of the German air force would be to help the UN-
ground troops ‘earn respect at the front’.427 This was underlined again in another article, 
which stated that the German military would naturally be a part of an overall UN-
strategy and would not be acting independently.
428
  
Along with the national press, the German politicians’ treatment of Srebrenica 
must be considered. It is worth noting that only one parliamentary session took place in 
the timeframe considered in this chapter, presumably due to the summer recess that 
followed. Consequently, there was little opportunity for a profound political debate. 
This singular session took place on 13 July 1995; mere days after the siege of 
Srebrenica had begun. Dr. Rita Süssmuth (CDU), President of the Bundestag, opened 
the session with remarks on events unfolding in the enclave. Condemning the Bosnian-
Serb attacks, Süssmuth stated that “this week’s Serbian attacks show[ed] that the 
Bosnian Serbs…[were] planning nothing less than displacement, annihilation of the 
Bosnian-Muslim culture in the Balkans and concerted genocide.”429 This use of 
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‘genocide’ is surprising considering how little information was officially available at the 
time of the debate. Apart from Süssmuth’s opening remarks, there was no mention of 
Srebrenica in this session.  
 The interpretation of Germany’s foreign policy and whether this should be 
considered in combination with the country’s past can be embedded in the larger 
context of Holocaust memory. As discussed in the previous chapter, much of the 
literature argues that by the 1990s, the shame through the Betroffenheitsdiskurs had 
abated to a more general, ‘meta-physical guilt’, which could be traced in the German 
coverage of 1991/92 already. However, the genocide in Srebrenica seemed to 
reinvigorate the sense that Germany’s past shaped its foreign policy. Significantly, this 
revitalised discourse predominantly occurred in the political sphere rather than in the 
print media. It was Joschka Fischer, as well as Freimut Duve and his colleagues who 
interpreted German foreign policy through the lens of the Second World War, not 
journalists or editors. This presents an interesting disjoint between the German print 
media and simultaneous political discourse, emphasising how independently the press 
operated from the political sphere.   
 
 
The Language of the Media 
 
We turn to the last section of this chapter, namely the use of specific terms 
throughout the print media’s coverage. As considered in the previous chapter, language 
constitutes an important and subtle dimension to the writing. Firstly it must be noted 
that Welt and FAZ used ‘Bosnian Serbs’ and ‘Serbs’ interchangeably. Spiegel’s reports 
predominantly referred to ‘Serbs’, even calling Mladić and Karadžić ‘Serben-Chefs’ 
meaning ‘Serb-bosses.’430 This erroneous generalisation emphasises the superficial 
categorisations the press employed which implied an anti-Serbian tendency. FR and taz 
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did so less frequently, indeed some of taz’s articles referred to ‘Karadžić-Serbs’ to make 
this distinction.
431
 
The term Völkermord, or ‘genocide’ was used immediately in most publications 
except in BILD, Spiegel and Konkret, and it appeared primarily in the context of 
information regarding the missing men presumed to have been killed.
432
 While the 
Srebrenica Massacre has officially been termed ‘genocide’, for example in the ICTY’s 
indictment of Karadžić and Mladić,433 this could only be asserted with certainty once it 
was proven that the 8000 missing men from Srebrenica had been massacred. This was 
not the case in mid-July, mere days after the siege and shows that in this instance, many 
publications hastily jumped to conclusions. 
Consequently, when placed within the context of the limited information 
available at the time, the immediate utilisation of the word could be termed a hyperbole. 
Moreover, little reflection occurred regarding the legal implications of its usage. As 
noted earlier, applying the term ‘genocide’ creates the legal obligation to terminate it, 
which arises from the 1948 Genocide Convention.
434
 This link, while implied by 
Fischer, was never made in the German press coverage, which indicates a certain lack of 
profound engagement with the subject matter by those publications reporting on it. In 
contrast, the displacement of thousands of civilians from Srebrenica was evident by the 
waves of refugees arriving in Tuzla. The German press frequently used the term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ to describe their fate.435 This semantic differentiation indicates that in some 
instances, the publications analysed here deliberated very carefully what to report and 
what terminology to employ.   
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During the coverage of the Srebrenica Massacre, Cold War analogies found in 
the early phase of the war were no longer utilised. Rather, links to the Second World 
War were constructed frequently.
436
 For example, FAZ and FR reported on protests at 
the memorial site of the Buchenwald concentration camp.
437
 As FR’s article stated, the 
protestors carried a banner that read: “Europe has learned nothing from the Holocaust – 
Bosnia is a posthumous victory for Hitler.”438 The use of Buchenwald as a setting to 
perpetuate political causes could have caused indignation. However, neither FAZ nor 
FR commented on these crude associations or how they interpreted this linkage between 
Bosnia and the Holocaust, although the sensationalist setting was presumably the 
primary reason for the coverage of this relatively small protest of 30 Bosnian activists, 
as FAZ reported.
439
 This demonstrates how effective such cross-references were in 
terms of publicity.  
Welt and FAZ utilised analogies to the Holocaust in the bluntest manner, both in 
their articles and in their selection of official statements to quote from.
440
 The UNHCR-
spokesperson, Ron Redmond, and Welt’s correspondent Ströhm both compared 
Srebrenica’s inhabitants to inmates in a concentration camp.441 After Redmond made 
this comparison in Geneva on 12 July, presumably during a press conference, Ströhm 
utilised the exact analogy a day later when he wrote on 13 July that the inhabitants of 
the enclave were in reality “…a kind of concentration camp prisoner…”442 Similarly a 
brief BILD-piece published on 24 July used the word ‘concentration camp’ to describe 
Mladić’s tactics in Srebrenica while a FAZ-editorial on 15 July compared the separation 
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of males and females in Srebrenica to the methods used in a concentration camp.
443
 
None of the articles explained their comparisons further, nor did they contextualise 
them. Undeniably, they sought to elucidate a sense of commiseration and shock 
amongst their audience or readership. 
These comparisons and analogies to the Second World War and the Holocaust 
irrefutably coloured the content. However, considering the high number of articles 
published in July and August 1995, these modest examples must be considered in this 
quantitative context, especially as the majority of these examples stemmed from two 
papers, namely Welt and FAZ. Nonetheless it is safe to assume that the presence of these 
analogies and comparisons were examples of a prevailing discourse which continually 
influenced German perception. There was not, however, a particular intensification of 
this discourse as the German print media reported on Srebrenica.  
As this chapter has demonstrated, the events in Srebrenica were cloaked in 
ambiguity as they were occurring, which impacted the German press’ and thus the 
public’s understanding of the event. Nonetheless, Srebrenica’s role as a turning point in 
the war was not questioned or underestimated. To the present day, the Srebrenica 
Massacre remained central and indeed shapes the media’s discourse and commentary on 
foreign policy. This was particularly evident in the debate about a potential NATO-
intervention in Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring and arose again in 2012, in 
connection with Syria. For example an opinion piece authored by Professor Brendan 
Simms for The Independent in May 2011 was entitled “Road to Libya runs through 
Srebrenica.”444 Similarly, the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit published an article 
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about Syria in March 2012 poignantly entitled “Srebrenica-Moment.”445 Another 
featured the sub-title “Back then Srebrenica, today Homs.”446 The continued relevance 
of the Srebrenica Massacre until the present day emphasises how shocking the extent of 
the war crimes were and that Srebrenica will forever be associated with debates about 
international interventions.  
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Chapter 4 
November-December 1995: Peace in Bosnia – The Dayton Agreement 
 
Following the Srebrenica Massacre in July 1995, the international community 
and specifically the United States were increasingly determined to end the war in 
Bosnia. Exerting diplomatic pressure, combined with three weeks of NATO-air strikes 
(‘Operation Deliberate Force’), the international community intensified the urgency of 
ending the Bosnian War, which was apparent to all parties. In November 1995, the 
Balkan Contact Group (the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Russia) convened in Dayton, Ohio with Milošević, Izetbegović and 
Tudjman to find a peaceful solution after nearly four years of war. The agreement, 
which was drawn up at Dayton, was much more than a mere peace treaty. It was a plan 
to rebuild political structures “on the basis of little more than the ruins and rivalries of a 
bitter war,” making it “…the most ambitious document of its kind in modern history…” 
as Carl Bildt, Co-Chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference summarised.
447
 
On 1 November 1995, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and what was left of 
Yugoslavia – Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milošević – commenced 
peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. Milošević represented the Bosnian Serbs because 
Karadžić and Mladić had been banned due to their instrumental role in the Srebrenica 
Massacre, for which they had been indicted by the ICTY. Furthermore, this was part of 
an American strategy to hold Milošević accountable for the Bosnian Serbs’ actions and 
ensure their cooperation.
448
 The talks were steered by representatives of the 
international community, most prominently by the American diplomat Richard 
Holbrooke. However, all five countries of the Balkan Contact Group sent a delegation 
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to Dayton. The German committee was led by Wolfgang Ischinger, at the time Political 
Director of the Federal Foreign Office.  
In Dayton, the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian representatives were confined to a 
military air base, which was secluded from the outside world and the international 
media. The negotiations were intended to last 8-10 days, but took three weeks. During 
this time there were various moments at which the talks seemed to have reached an 
irreversible dead end.
449
 Particularly crucial and discordant topics included whether 
Sarajevo would be divided amongst the three entities, the right of return for refugees 
and most importantly the territorial partition of Bosnia in general. The avoidance of 
pivotal themes such as officially determining the fate of the indicted war criminals 
Mladić and Karadžić indicates a certain hesitance to further complicate the content of 
the negotiations. Similarly, the exclusion of Kosovo in the talks, which some diplomats 
viewed as the next imminent crisis in the Balkans, suggests an urge to avoid too many 
contentious topics, which could prevent a peace treaty for Croatia and Bosnia.
450
 The 
negotiations were concluded with the initialling of the agreement on 21 November 
1995; the official signing ceremony took place on 15 December in Paris.  
Weeks of discussions concluded that Bosnia would not be divided into separate 
states with Bosniac, Serbian and Croatian populations, but would rather consist of a 
Bosnian-Croatian Federation, which had been forged in Dayton and a Serbian sub-
entity, the Republika Srpska (RS). The RS – similar to the political status of a Swiss 
canton – was a legal entity within the federal structure of Bosnia and was allocated the 
right, for example to create an independent police force and school system, while 
remaining part of Bosnia. The ‘inter-entity boundary line’ allotted 49% of the territory 
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to the Bosnian Serbs and 51% to the Bosnian-Croat Federation.
451
 Moreover the treaty 
established “…a central three-man [rotating] presidency with representatives from each 
of the three ethnic groups, a Council of Ministers and a central Parliament.”452 A further 
stipulation was the deployment of an international Implementation Force (IFOR) 
formed by NATO, which would ensure that the cease-fire was adhered to and that the 
peace agreement was fully implemented.
453
 
The content of the Dayton Accords has been analysed widely in the existing 
secondary literature, most of which was published several years after the negotiations. 
All concentrate on the political stipulations laid out in the agreement, their 
implementation, how effective this process was and where its faults lay. Almost 
unanimously the key literature agrees that the Dayton Accords, which formulated a 
peace treaty and simultaneously laid out the constitution for post-war Bosnia, did not 
conclusively address all problems in Bosnia. While the immediate violence subsided, 
the systemic problems such as tensions and antagonism amongst Serbians, Croatians 
and Bosniacs, which had been exacerbated by years of war, remained.
454
 Moreover, the 
literature questions the agreement’s efficacy, arguing that Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia 
only committed half-heartedly after giving in to pressure from the United States.
455
 
Perhaps the most significant criticism was that  
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two of the belligerents – the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats – did not even properly sign 
the agreement but rather were ‘represented’ by the presidents of their respective patron states, 
Yugoslavia [Milošević] and Croatia [Tudjman].456  
Florian Bieber’s 2006 article offers a rare positive summary. He argues that the 
positive trends, which could be traced in Bosnian politics at the time – most importantly 
a decreased urge amongst nationalists to secede – proved that the agreement can boast 
long-term positive results.
457
 However, the difficulties Bosnia has faced since its 2010 
election to form a government and the continued dominance of nationalist parties in 
these elections questions the validity of Bieber’s assessment in the present day and 
underlines how volatile the peace-building process in Bosnia was and still is.
458
  
In addition to the predominantly negative assessment, another commonality in 
the secondary literature is the authors’ approach marked by political science. None of 
the works unlock the historical process of these negotiations and the intricate 
developments leading to the peace conference. Equally, there is no literature detailing 
the policies or perspectives with which the international delegations approached the 
discussions, what their objectives and negotiating-tactics were, and how they perceived 
their own role in comparison to the other delegations. Such insights are only offered by 
the two primary sources, namely the seminal accounts produced by active participants at 
Dayton: Wolfgang Ischinger and Richard Holbrooke.
459
  
Holbrooke’s minute record of the weeks leading up to the negotiations and the 
discussions themselves gives the reader a unique insight into the ‘shuttle diplomacy’ 
practiced by the American delegation. Acting as the intermediary between the three 
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Balkan countries, Holbrooke and his American colleagues ‘shuttled’ back and forth 
between Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb to broker compromises. This candid account 
reveals how difficult it was to bring the representatives from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia 
together and emphasises how divided and at times internally competitive the Bosnian 
delegation was in Dayton. Such revelations contribute to the wider context of the peace 
talks, underlining how laborious the process was.
460
 
Ischinger’s work is a collection of 53 telegrams he sent to Bonn during the on-
going negotiations. Published in 1998 by the German Foreign Ministry, this compilation 
offers a unique first-hand insight that cannot be found in any other literature, nor in the 
media coverage of the time. Some sensitive information remains censored and was 
blacked-out in the publication. Nevertheless, the crucial insight the reader takes away 
from this collection of telegrams is the tenacity of the discussions and how often they 
were on the brink of failing. As Ischinger writes, “we worked almost around the clock 
for three weeks, including Saturday and Sunday, without any breaks. We usually wrote 
[these telegrams] in the evening or during the night…”461  
One aspect that proves particularly important for the purposes of this chapter is 
how aware both diplomats were of a media presence. In his preface, Ischinger wrote that 
America’s Western partners were angered by the American media policy. On the one 
hand Holbrooke and his colleagues attempted to prohibit other delegations’ contact to 
the press. Simultaneously however, Ischinger noted, Holbrooke “consistently fed certain 
journalists [crucial information], of course emphasising America’s central role” in the 
negotiations.
462
 Ischinger’s telegrams also featured an acute media-awareness. For 
example, at times he advised his superiors in Bonn when to publish a press-release for 
the German media and what key points this communication should entail.
463
 Equally, 
                                                 
460
 Holbrooke, To End a War. 
461
 Ischinger, Deutsche Auβenpolitik 1995, p. 30. 
462
 Ischinger, Deutsche Auβenpolitik 1995, p. 32.  
463
 Ischinger, Deutsche Auβenpolitik 1995, Telegram Nr. 3, 02.11.1995, 1443 local time, p. 54. 
150 
 
the diplomat mentioned explicitly whether a meeting or conversation occurred in the 
presence of the media or not.
464
  
 
 
Media Censorship and Authorship 
 
This introduces the important issue of the media policy implemented during the 
on-going discussions, which were deliberately held on a restricted American army base. 
The resulting media blackout was enforced to prohibit that any representative used and 
misused the public sphere to promote certain agendas, endangering the peace 
negotiations.
465
 The international media was only invited to carefully chosen events, for 
example at the beginning and end of the talks, for a press-conference and photo 
opportunity. While all daily newspapers except for BILD mentioned and acknowledged 
this censorship, it was not criticised by any.
466
 Unsurprisingly this blackout impacted 
the articles’ authorship. While all daily newspapers published pieces written in Dayton, 
none of these were authored by their own correspondents, perhaps because it was too 
costly to keep a correspondent on site when there was so little information available. 
Rather, most articles submitted from Dayton were amalgamations from various press 
agencies, frequently citing three agencies as the author. Consequently the product would 
have been less shaped by correspondents’ interpretations. This qualitative nuance is 
important to keep in mind, as it disappears in the quantitative considerations below.  
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Newspaper % of articles 
authored by 
correspondents 
% of articles 
authored by press 
agencies 
% of articles 
amalgamated 
from various press 
releases, etc. 
Welt 54% 10% 36% 
FAZ 67% 32% 1% 
FR 48% 51% 0% 
taz 69% 27% 0,78% 
Table 4: Percentages of articles according to authorship
467
 
 
Comparing this distribution with the preceding chapter,
468
 the censorship seemingly had 
no impact on the authorship. In spite of the extenuating circumstances surrounding 
Dayton, more than half of the articles in Welt, FAZ and taz were written by the 
newspapers’ correspondents and FR still used more press-agency articles than the other 
papers. However, it is worth noting that while a large number of articles were authored 
by the newspapers’ own correspondents in this timeframe, most of these did not address 
the negotiations themselves, but rather more general topics such as the on-going 
violence in Bosnia. These were frequently authored by the newspapers’ correspondents 
based in Washington D.C. or the Balkans. This distinction underscores the limitations of 
purely quantitative considerations. In his memoirs, Holbrooke also addressed the topic 
of media censorship, explaining that  
…State Department Spokesman Nick Burns…[was] the only authorised spokesman on Dayton, 
and he…[briefed] the world from Washington. We did not even have a press briefing officer in 
Dayton.
469
  
This press policy resulted that the international media could not report on the 
negotiations when they deemed it important, but rather when the US-State Department 
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chose to reveal details of the process. This dynamic retracted a lot of power from the 
media, constructing a clear hierarchy between the political establishment and the news 
outlets.  
The selection of images published at this time is a further testament to the 
effects of the media blackout. The only pictures of the on-going negotiations were 
clearly staged events which had been opened to international media. 
  
Figure 47: Spiegel, 6 November 1995, p. 174 Figure 48: FAZ, 23 November 1995, p. 3; 
     FR, 23 Nov. 1995, p. 3 and Welt, 23 Nov. 1995, p. 1 
 
 
The initialling of the Dayton Agreement on 21 November (figure 48) was one example 
for a carefully-staged photo opportunity. Consequently the same image was printed in 
various German newspapers. The scarcity of images available of the actual negotiations 
is underlined by FR’s recycling of the same image (figure 49), which it published twice 
within less than two weeks. 
 
Figure 49: FR, 3 November 1995, p. 1 and 22 November 1995, p. 1 
 
 
 
The Dayton Agreement in the Press 
 
The articles that form the basis of the analysis for this chapter range from 1 
November to 20 December 1995, encompassing the negotiations in Dayton (1-21 
November) as well as the timespan until a few days after the treaty was officially signed 
in Paris on 15 December 1995. In addition to the coverage of the talks themselves, 
various themes that played a prominent role in the German press at the time will be 
considered. These include Germany’s role in the negotiations, Milošević’s position, the 
Srebrenica Massacre, and the debate about the deployment of German soldiers. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, these topics influenced and coloured the media’s over-all 
perception and coverage of the Dayton process.  
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Before delving into these themes, AJW’s coverage must be considered 
separately, as it did not explore any of these topics. In the six-week timeframe 
determined for this chapter, AJW only published two articles on Bosnia, neither of 
which specifically addressed the Dayton negotiations. Both were written by the press-
agency dpa and covered the Jewish community in Sarajevo. One reported that Ivan 
Ceresnjes, its chairman, had now left the country and had emigrated to Israel. It 
continued that Ceresnjes and Sarajevo’s Jewish community in general had always 
ensured its neutrality amongst the “opposing parties” and never taken any sides.470 
Similarly, the article itself did not give any indication of which side it identified with 
most. The second piece reported on ‘La Benevolencija’, a charity run by Sarajevo’s 
Jewish community and that it aimed to help the civilian population now that peace had 
been restored.
471
 
The two pieces clearly avoided the political perspective of the conflict and the 
on-going peace negotiations and instead concentrated exclusively on cultural aspects 
pertaining to Jewish life in Bosnia. This stands in stark contrast to a taz-article which 
asked Ignaz Bubis, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany to respond 
briefly to the question: “Are military interventions justified to stop genocide?” Bubis 
responded with a clear “…absolutely yes” and referred to the Srebrenica Massacre to 
support his argument.
472
 This public answer to a contentious issue in Germany proves 
that the official representative of the Jewish community in Germany did not shy away 
from the topic. Since AJW was published by the Central Council of Jews in Germany 
and could thus be considered its mouthpiece, the newspaper’s avoidance of this topic 
indicates an editorial policy specific to the publication rather than a general stance taken 
by the Council. 
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JF and Konkret also refrained from reporting about the peace talks. However, 
both publications contributed to the other debates mentioned previously, such as the re-
evaluation of the Srebrenica Massacre and the contribution of German soldiers to 
NATO’s IFOR-troops in Bosnia. All other publications considered here closely covered 
the Dayton negotiations and their intermittent progress. BILD’s characteristically short 
and superficial coverage of international affairs meant that the tabloid only reported on 
Dayton when a breakthrough occurred, for example when the opposing parties agreed 
on the creation of a Bosnian-Croatian Federation or the right of return for refugees.
473
 
Consequently the BILD-reader was left with the perception of steady progress without 
knowing about the convoluted background. Moreover, these articles – on average 33 
words long – did not offer its readers any form of evaluation, for example whether this 
agreement was fair or not.  
The remaining publications’ coverage was more discerning. For example, 
various articles covering the opening event, to which the international media had been 
invited, focused on the profound differences dividing the three Balkan leaders. Welt’s 
Manfred Rowold described the atmosphere as ‘clammy’ while the three Balkan 
politicians avoided eye contact with each other. The handshake initiated by Holbrooke 
between Izetbegović, Tudjman and Milošević visibly cost a lot of effort, especially for 
the Bosnian President, Rowold reported.
474
 Similarly a FAZ-article explained that “the 
insistence on individual translators is a further sign for the seemingly insurmountable 
divide between the three parties.”475 This detail was considered particularly remarkable, 
as Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian are different dialects of one Yugoslav language and 
could have been understood by all Balkan participants. Thus, the insistence on 
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individual translators seemed to suggest a political message to establish each country as 
a completely separate entity. 
While the difficult conditions of the negotiations were clearly recognised, the 
German press evidently did not see them as a sufficient explanation for what was 
deemed a sub-optimal outcome of the agreement. Rather than presenting the Dayton 
Accords as a successful first step towards peace in the region, all publications except 
Konkret pointed out the faults of the treaty. Welt for example lamented that ‘the Serbs’ 
only made up 30% of the population, but were allocated 49% of the territory. Even 
though “the Serbian territory is spread out to an economical and strategic disadvantage,” 
the Serbians could still record a considerable success.
476
 A FAZ-editorial took a stronger 
stance, stating that Dayton rewarded “…the Serbian aggressors at the expense of the 
victims,” suggesting that the fundamental divide between aggressor and victims would 
continue to separate Bosnian society.
477
 A cartoon published in the broadsheet portrayed 
this criticism pictorially.  
 
Figure 50: FAZ, 13 December 1995, p. 16 
 
The caricature’s abstract commentary dismissed the Dayton Agreement as cosmetic, 
consisting of fake grass and propped up cardboard trees. This deemed the treaty to be 
unable to offer profound solutions for the country. While JF did not cover the talks at 
all, an editorial published after they were concluded echoed FAZ’s assessment, labelling 
the outcome as “horse-trading” from which Milošević benefitted the most. Peter Lattas 
commented emphatically that Milošević was a “power and survival-genius” whose 
primary goal was to stay in power.
478
  
While the conservative and right-wing papers interpreted the short-comings of 
the agreement through the prism of how much Milošević and Bosnia’s Serbian 
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population benefitted from it, the left-leaning publications focused on the mistakes they 
believed the international community had made. Along these lines, a Spiegel-article 
criticised that the fate of war criminals was not discussed in any detail, rendering the 
Muslims the losers in this international power play, although they were ‘in the right.’479 
FR and taz focused on the negative aspects of America’s involvement in the peace 
process. Various articles stated that the peace treaty was forced by the USA rather than 
being an organic process. Thus, they argued, it remained unclear how serious the three 
Balkan politicians were about working towards a long-lasting peace
480
 – a theory also 
postulated in the academic literature.
481
 taz took a more extreme stance, arguing that the 
insufficient results were a sign of a faulty American negotiation strategy.
482
 One taz-
article assessed that “the US-diplomacy in Dayton had to fail, because it attempted to 
unite demands which are fundamentally contradictory.”483 This evaluation strikes an 
external observer as absurd. Naturally Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, which had engaged in 
violent wars for nearly four years, represented deeply contrary demands. By blaming 
America for attempting to bridge these differences, taz’s anti-American evaluation 
seems to avoid a more profound analysis.  
Another article criticised the agreement more generally that the “…ethnically 
‘cleansed’ areas…[would] stay ‘clean’. Or do people seriously expect that a banished 
Muslim will return to his village in the (Bosnian) Serb Republic…?” the taz-editor 
Thomas Schmid asked sarcastically.
484
 This interpretation was underlined with a 
caricature printed the following day.  
 
Figure 51: taz, 24 November 1995, p. 10 
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With the words “the form is preserved”, it expressed the opinion that while Bosnia still 
looks the same – alluding to its shape on the map – it had changed fundamentally, now 
that the Dayton Accords carved up the territory. The cross on the 1995-version of 
Bosnia could either represent an urn or could stand for the largely Christian population 
– whether Catholic or Orthodox – in a country that had previously been colourfully 
mixed. 
In spite of the varying interpretations along the lines of political orientation, the 
reader – irrespective of which publication – was left with a vivid sensation that the 
agreement was fundamentally unfair. For example, articles in various publications 
quoted Izetbegović’s assessment that it was ‘bitter medicine’ for Bosnia.485 Only one 
FR-editorial concluded: “But who cares? There is now electricity, gas and water in 
Sarajevo and the children can go to school again.”486 This summary re-aligned the 
critical perspective of the peace agreement, reminding the reader how disturbed 
everyday life in the war-torn city had been. However, apart from this exception, much 
of the German press-coverage at the time presented a similar interpretation of Dayton as 
the secondary literature produced several years later, namely a focus on the negative 
aspects of the peace agreement. 
 Another commonality found in the evaluations offered by the secondary 
literature and the German press-coverage of the time was that the tenacity of the 
negotiations was completely ignored. As mentioned previously, both ‘insider accounts’ 
by Holbrooke and Ischinger revealed how often the talks were on the brink of failing 
and how contentious and troublesome some of the seemingly small issues were. This 
context was missing in the literature on Dayton as well as throughout the coverage 
which consequently neglected to offer the reader viable reasons for what they deemed 
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an underwhelming outcome. It could be argued that the media at the time did not have 
detailed knowledge of the on-going negotiations, explaining this missing context. 
Equally however, none of the publications featured interviews with Holbrooke, 
Ischinger or other high-ranking officials who had been present in Dayton after the 
agreement had been signed. These interviews could have offered additional insights into 
the peace process and perhaps explained why certain – seemingly unacceptable – 
compromises had been made. Possibly no such interviews were published because by 
the time Ischinger had returned from the hermetically closed-off army-base in Dayton, 
the peace treaty was deemed ‘old news’ and its implementation appeared more relevant. 
 
 
Use of Images 
 
We turn now to the images published in this timeframe. As discussed 
previously, the diplomatic negotiations and an occasional picture depicting international 
statesmen shaking hands or signing a piece of paper were not the same interesting and 
evocative images other aspects of the war had offered. Interestingly, rather than 
omitting images from their Balkan or Dayton coverage altogether, all publications 
except for JF sought to pictorially remind their readers of the on-going violence in 
Bosnia. These focused on the civilian suffering in Bosnia.
487
  
 
Figure 52: FAZ, 23 November 1995, p. 3: “Cry for help in Sarajevo. One of many” 
 
  
Figure 53: taz, 5 November 1995, p. 24  Figure 54: taz, 11-12 November 1995, p. 8. 
  
Figure 55: Spiegel, 6 November 1995, p. 176 Figure 56: FR, 27 November 1995, p. 2 
 
 
These images presented various scenes of destruction, desperation and human suffering 
caused by the war while simultaneously showing the reader the state of chaos in Bosnia. 
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They consequently demonstrated – perhaps more tellingly than any article citing 
statistics – how difficult the post-Dayton path of reconstruction would be. Significantly, 
aside from the two taz-pictures (figures 53 and 54), none of the captions accompanying 
the images above elaborated whether the victims were Bosnian Muslims, Croats or 
Serbs. This augmented the sense of universal suffering. taz’s images were the only ones 
that explicitly showed Muslim civilians, as was explained in the respective captions. 
Equally however, the paper portrayed scenes of everyday-misery from a Serbian 
perspective, as did FR and Welt.  
  
Figure 57: FR, 9 December 1995, p. 3:   Figure 58: taz, 30 November 1995, p. 11:  
Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo Serbian female refugees from Krajina, unable to 
return home 
 
 
Figure 59: Welt, 14 December 1995, p. 1: “A Serbian woman hugging a skull at the mass-grave in 
Fakovici – she believes it belongs to a victim from her family” 
 
 
These pictures were especially meaningful, as they conceded that Serbian civilians had 
also suffered under the war. Particularly the Welt-image (figure 59) of a grieving 
woman cradling a skull is heart-wrenching and reminded the reader that Srebrenica was 
not the only instance of mass murder during the four-year-war. This approach is a 
surprising departure from Welt’s previous coverage, which had eagerly blamed ‘the 
Serbs’ for the violence and its lamentation that they had benefitted too much from the 
Dayton Agreement. The readiness of taz, FR and Welt to portray Serbian suffering, even 
if these examples were isolated cases, suggest an understanding that the post-Dayton 
reconstruction of the country would have to address and include Croats, Serbs and 
Muslims living in Bosnia.  
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Germany in the back seat 
 
 Throughout the coverage of the negotiations, the disregard of Germany’s role in 
the national media itself becomes apparent; Germany was deemed unimportant by 
omission. Instead the German press consistently focused on America and its 
representative, Holbrooke.
488
 This side-lining of Germany was manifested in nuances 
such as some articles quoting statements by the Russian and French Presidents, as well 
as US-Secretary of State Christopher, but not Chancellor Kohl or Foreign Minister 
Kinkel.
489
 Surprisingly this was also the case in FR and taz, which had conveyed a 
strong anti-American evaluation of the Dayton Agreement. 
The predominant focus on America’s role is comprehensible considering not 
only the locality of the negotiations, but also the engagement of high-ranking US-
politicians in the peace process. As mentioned in Ischinger’s telegrams and Holbrooke’s 
memoir, when the discussions faltered, either Secretary of State Christopher or 
President Clinton travelled to Dayton to signal their prevailing dedication to and interest 
in finding a peaceful solution.
490
 Moreover, Holbrooke’s memoir reveals that a number 
of American officials joined the negotiations intermittently to address specific 
problems. For example the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury helped construct 
a unified currency for Bosnia.
491
 This high-level commitment in the peace process was 
not demonstrated by any other country and thus the focus on America’s role in the 
German press coverage of Dayton could be seen as a reflection of reality, in which 
Germany simply did not play an important role.  
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This evaluation of Germany’s role in the region is corroborated by Michael 
Libal’s monograph. The author had been the head of the Southeast European 
Department of the German Foreign Ministry between 1991 and 1995 and thus offers a 
valuable ‘insider-account’ of German foreign policy at the time.492 Drawing on his 
personal and professional knowledge, Libal explored the diplomacy conducted by the 
EC, OSCE and Germany, concluding that the latter was not the dominant actor in the 
region, in spite of its initially prominent role during the recognition process.
493
 
However, the German press’ focus on America could also be the result of the American 
media policy, Ischinger had criticised in his telegrams, which highlighted America’s 
position in the peace process.
494
 
FAZ, Spiegel and BILD were the only publications that mentioned the German 
delegation in Dayton at all, and each did so in only a single piece. FAZ’s article outlined 
what questions and themes would be most pertinent to Ischinger’s German delegation, 
such as the fate of the refugees and post-conflict arms control.
495
 The Spiegel-article 
reported that the Political Director of the Federal Foreign Office [Ischinger] had been 
instructed only to leave Dayton if the negotiations had reached a dead end and the 
opposing parties were unwilling to compromise. The same article later elaborated that 
“the Germans would rank last…” at the festivities in Paris surrounding the signing of 
the agreement, due to their relatively unimportant role.
496
 However, the anonymous 
author did not include a judgement of this fact – for example whether this was justified.  
The BILD-article attributed the most importance to Ischinger and his German 
colleagues, writing that approximately half of the 140-page long agreement resulted 
from the contribution of the German delegation. Significantly the tabloid did not explain 
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how the author reached this conclusion, rendering the information questionable. The 
author then continued by exploring Ischinger’s career development and personal life, 
ending with the information that he would be taking a four-day skiing holiday over 
Christmas.
497
 This mirrors the tabloid’s habit of focusing on one individual’s story to 
explain wider themes and correlations. The feature-article of a German diplomat at 
Dayton offered a mechanism to avoid the complex world of international relations while 
still alluding to it. 
  The diminished interest of national newspapers in Germany’s involvement was a 
significant shift from the media coverage at the beginning of the conflict, particularly 
about Germany’s early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.498 Here, many of the 
arguments put forward by Welt, BILD, FAZ and taz had stated that Germany had a 
unique diplomatic acumen while its European allies were naïve in their insistence on a 
unified Yugoslavia. However, none of these publications lamented that Germany’s 
knowledge and pioneering diplomacy was relegated to the background during the 1995 
peace talks. This could suggest that the national media agreed with the retreat of 
German foreign policy into the realms of alliance-politics after this initial Alleingang.  
  
 
Milošević’s role 
 
Turning to a theme that captured the German print media’s interest, the role of 
Slobodan Milošević and his questionable transformation from a ‘war-monger’ to a 
respectable politician who was integrated in international diplomacy, received a lot of 
attention.
499
 In this matter the German press strongly disagreed with the modus operandi 
of the international politicians – an opinion frequently expressed in editorials. While the 
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politicians willingly overlooked Milošević’s past role in the Balkan Wars and 
concentrated on the necessity of including him in the peace-process to make the 
agreement binding, the print media considered here was less forgiving. Interestingly, the 
previously mentioned hierarchy established due to the politicians’ monopoly of 
information,
500
 did not stop the German press from taking a diametrically opposite 
stance on Milošević’s inclusion in the peace process.  
Various articles cautioned that Western politicians were willing to overlook 
crucial facts about the depth of Milošević’s involvement in war crimes to secure 
peace.
501
 Indeed all publications except for JF and Konkret linked Milošević to the 
Srebrenica Massacre. For example, articles in FR, FAZ and Spiegel cited witnesses who 
allegedly confirmed the participation of JNA-soldiers in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of 
Srebrenica.
502
 This stood in stark contrast to Milošević’s previous claims that his troops 
had nothing to do with the massacre and that he had lost control over Karadžić and 
Mladić. Other articles were less specific, reporting that rumours were brewing in 
America which suggested Holbrooke and other American politicians were holding back 
information regarding the depth of Milošević’s involvement in the Srebrenica Massacre 
to ensure that the peace process would not be disturbed.
503
 Welt and Spiegel explained 
that these allegations had been made by the Bosnian foreign minister, which could 
suggest a political agenda.
504
 However neither article examined this facet. Both 
publications later cited UN-General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who according to 
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Welt and Spiegel had stated that the peace process had ‘absolute priority’ to the 
prosecution of war criminals.
505
  
This political pragmatism was the main concern and crucial criticism in all 
publications except for JF and Konkret. Using terms such as ‘war-monger’,506 the 
‘father of the war’,507 and the ‘primary instigator of the war’508 who spoke with “angels’ 
tongues”509 to describe Milošević, the publications agreed that he should not have been 
invited to the negotiations. The anger expressed in Welt and FAZ editorials was 
particularly memorable. Welt’s Ströhm argued that Milošević should be in The Hague 
[at the ICTY] rather than Dayton and that his presence at the peace talks was an 
‘unreasonable imposition’ for any ‘halfway righteous person’.510 Similarly, FAZ-editor 
Reißmüller called it ‘grotesque’ to force the victims to sit at the same table with the 
aggressors.
511
 Indeed FAZ underlined this point pictorially with a cartoon depicting 
Milošević as a badly disguised peace dove, flying above a burning mosque. 
 
Figure 60: FAZ, 7 November 1995, p. 7 
 
While Ströhm had held Milošević responsible for the violence since the lead-up to the 
Bosnian War,
512
 Reißmüller’s focus on Milošević was a shift away from his previous 
stance that vehemently attributed the war to a renewal of ‘ancient hatreds’ in the 
region.
513
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The Srebrenica Massacre re-appears 
 
In addition to linking Milošević personally to Srebrenica, all publications aside 
from JF also re-examined the massacre in more general terms. Konkret only did so in 
one article, reminding its readers that there were various contradicting facts about 
Srebrenica and that a military intervention was in no way justified due to the so-called 
‘genocide’ in the enclave.514 However at this point, the enclave itself was still 
inaccessible to international observers, so the death toll remained an estimate and was 
usually quoted at around 6000 (as opposed to 8000, which is more accurate).
515
 In spite 
of these prevailing uncertainties, there was mounting evidence of Bosnian-Serb war 
crimes perpetrated in the enclave in July 1995, which had been supported by Serbia.  
FR, FAZ and taz covered a UN-report that had been commissioned in early 
November to investigate the details of the Srebrenica Massacre and assess who had 
been responsible for the crimes committed. In the words of FAZ, the UN-report 
“…described ‘scenes of unfathomable barbarity’. Thousands of men were executed and 
buried in mass graves, hundreds of men burned alive, men and women mutilated and 
‘butchered’.”516 All three daily newspapers drew on the same graphic example from the 
UN-report to portray the horrific war crimes that had been perpetrated, namely that a 
grandfather had been forced to eat the liver of his own grandson.
517
  
taz, Spiegel and FAZ chose to visually portray the suffering of Srebrenica’s 
expelled civilians who were still persevering in Tuzla in late 1995, unable to return 
home. 
  
Figure 61: FAZ, 23 November 1995, p. 3  Figure 62: taz, 15 November 1995, p. 8 
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The above images featured themes, which had already appeared in the pictorial 
coverage of the Srebrenica Massacre analysed in the previous chapter. However, an 
inversion is worth noting. As discussed in the preceding chapter, FAZ had not published 
a single image showing the anguish of Srebrenica’s victims or the refugees in Tuzla.518 
Rather the dominant motif of the broadsheet’s images had depicted instances of 
international aid alleviating the refugees’ suffering. Now for the first time, FAZ (figure 
61) published an image focusing solely on the human grief, typical of taz’s previous 
visual coverage (figures 30 and 31), while taz published a picture reminiscent of FAZ’s 
pictures (figure 62). FAZ’s shift in visual policy could result from the inescapable 
reality of the extent of the Srebrenica Massacre about which there was no doubt in late 
1995, even though the enclave remained sealed-off.       
 This inaccessibility renders the following Spiegel-image all the more striking.  
 
Figure 63: Spiegel, 27 November 1995, p. 47 
 
 
This picture is remarkable, as it features a scene from a street in the enclave itself rather 
than the flocks of refugees who had arrived in Tuzla. The source of the photo is 
indicated as “A. ZAMUR/GAMMA/STUDIO X”, which does not reveal the 
photographer’s locality. Unfortunately the accompanying article did not give any further 
information about this picture. Nonetheless, this picture suggests that if it shows 
Srebrenica, as it purports to do, scenes from the massacre had been documented in July 
1995. While a Bosnian-Serb camera team had documented the siege, as was revealed 
later, the only images released from this source were propaganda images like the one 
below, which had become available to the international media.  
 
Figure 64: Mladić and young boy from Srebrenica519 
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The motif of fatalities lying in a gutter does not seem to fit the style of figure 64, 
showing Mladić speaking to a young boy from Srebrenica. This Spiegel-image raises a 
number of questions regarding possible observers and witnesses while the enclave was 
officially inaccessible. While these questions cannot be answered at this point, they 
underline how revealing a single picture can be.  
 Another theme which recurs in various articles was the DUTCHBAT-soldiers’ 
depth of involvement at the time. This subject matter was fuelled by refugees’ 
statements, which fiercely accused the UN-soldiers of immoral actions. One example 
cited by Welt and Spiegel claimed that soldiers had refused to provide medical 
assistance to the Muslim civilians.
520
 This serious incrimination can be qualified with 
the explanation presented in a FAZ-article that the commanding UN-officer feared an 
exhaustion of medical supplies for the soldiers themselves, especially since it remained 
unclear how long the Bosnian-Serb siege would continue.
521
 More severe allegations 
were reported by FAZ, FR and taz, citing refugees from Srebrenica who had arrived in 
Germany and who claimed in a press conference that the peacekeepers had sold food, 
cigarettes and other supplies, such as clothing, for exorbitant prices.
522
 A taz-article 
further elaborated that to prove this allegation, one young man Ekrem who spoke at the 
press conference, held up a T-shirt with ‘Royal Dutch Army’ written on it. He claimed 
to have paid the Dutch soldiers 360 Mark for that T-shirt and a pair of socks.
523
 Both taz 
and FR went even further, stating that young girls were ‘persuaded’ to prostitute 
themselves. The Dutch soldiers usually paid two cigarettes, according to the statements 
made by these refugees.
524
 Considering the severity of these charges, it is surprising that 
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Konkret did not pick up on this topic. Judging from the magazine’s previous coverage, 
this kind of information usually sparked Konrekt’s interest.    
Official sources, especially the UN and the Dutch government denied these 
allegations and the newspapers reported this in a single sentence.
525
 In contrast, the 
accusations themselves were reported in much more detail. Consequently the reader was 
left with an over-whelming sense that the Dutch soldiers had acted immorally. This 
matter has not been re-examined in the existing secondary literature on Srebrenica 
(discussed in chapter three), and of course remain very hard to prove or disprove with 
any certainty. In retrospect, so much remains inconclusive. For example, the reader was 
never informed why the refugee had so much money to buy a T-shirt and socks, or why 
he found it necessary to purchase these items of clothing for such an exorbitant amount. 
Important questions were not explored or even mentioned in the articles at the time. 
Rather the newspapers presented the alleged immoral actions of the DUTCHBAT-
troops with such certainty that few readers would have been left with doubts of their 
culpability. These remaining questions and inconsistencies indicate a continuing 
tendency amongst the German press to present the UN-soldiers as guilty onlookers 
rather than victims of larger politics which had prohibited military engagement in 
Srebrenica. The near-omission of a UN-fatality explored in the previous chapter adds to 
this assessment.  
This was further underlined by numerous articles in taz and Konkret, which 
reported that indeed the American, French and German intelligence services had known 
about the imminent siege, but had deliberately chosen not to interfere.
526
 These 
incriminations were not echoed in any other publications considered here, but 
unquestionably left the reader with a sense of fault regarding the international 
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community. This would have been reinforced by the reproachful articles of the faulty 
negotiations in Dayton and particularly taz’s condemning portrayal of America in the 
peace process. taz’s intensified interest in Srebrenica, even in late 1995 was further 
exemplified in an article written by a nurse from ‘Doctors without Borders’ about her 
experiences in the enclave, almost in diary format. The content of the article did not 
necessarily add to the state of knowledge about the massacre. However, its style offered 
a sense of immediacy, which newspaper articles and editorials did not convey. The 
author painted a vivid picture for her readers when she wrote that “while heavily armed 
soldiers with German Shepherd dogs guarded and watched the displacement, horrible 
scenes occurred…as men were separated from their wives and children.”527 Schmitz 
witnessed the horrors of mass-displacements and heard shots coming from abandoned 
houses where Muslim men had been taken. She reflected: “What a strange feeling to be 
in this evidently empty city, pass by Serbian check-points and witness looting.”528 Such 
reflections offered the reader a much closer understanding to what had happened in the 
enclave. 
In contrast to taz, the massacre found almost no place in BILD’s articles 
produced in late 1995. Indeed, only three pieces mentioned the massacre at all – each in 
only a few sentences. In November, one BILD-article reported that eight refugees who 
had been hiding in the forest around Srebrenica for 130 days had now been found.
529
 
However, no further details are offered about new insights gained about the atrocities 
that had been committed in the previous months.  
The coverage of Srebrenica in late 1995 not only underscored the continuing 
restrictions of information, but also arguably influenced the readers’ perception of the 
on-going Dayton negotiations. While international diplomats were locked away on an 
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American air-base, negotiating a peaceful outcome of the Bosnian War, the German 
public read about new details of the Srebrenica Massacre, which the national 
newspapers linked to Milošević. While this connection gained a lot of attention at this 
point, it is important to remember that Spiegel had already identified this connection 
several months before, as the events were unfolding in July 1995. Written several 
months earlier, on 24 July 1995, an anonymous Spiegel-article had stated in relation to 
Srebrenica that “Western diplomats…are ignoring that the Belgrade government is still 
generously supporting…[the Bosnian Serbs]…with weapons and military-technical 
help.”530 Though at the time this was only mentioned in a single side-note, which may 
have easily been overlooked, this indicates a level of investigative reporting and 
analysis neither UNSC-press releases nor the other German publications presented. This 
link between Milošević and Srebrenica tainted the Dayton Agreement as insufficient 
and too advantageous for the Serbs, who were presented to be the initial aggressors of 
the war. It also created a sense of urgency to ensure such violence would never occur 
again. This second argument strongly influenced the domestic debate in Germany that 
followed the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995.  
 
 
The Domestic Debate: German soldiers deployed to the Balkans? 
 
 One stipulation pledged by the agreement was the deployment of troops to 
Bosnia to ensure that the various elements of the peace treaty would be implemented 
and the cease-fire adhered to. The Implementation Force (IFOR), as it was known, was 
formed by NATO and Russia, comprised 60,000 troops and was legitimised through a 
UN-mandate.
531
 “Its main task was to guarantee the end of hostilities and separate the 
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armed forces…”532 by controlling a four-kilometre wide demilitarised zone in Bosnia.533 
With the previously feeble attempts of international peacekeeping in mind, this peace 
force “…had very robust rules of engagement…”, as British General Richard Dannatt 
recalls in his autobiography.
534
 Consequently the deployed troops were more likely to 
engage in combat than their predecessors, the UN-troops, which only had a peace-
keeping mandate. As a partner in this alliance, Germany was faced with the difficult and 
controversial dilemma whether to send troops to Bosnia, as this would be a clear 
departure from post-war foreign policy marked by non-intervention. This controversy 
reignited the domestic debate already analysed in the previous chapter.
535
  
 As all publications except JF and Konkret reported, Chancellor Kohl and his 
cabinet proposed to contribute approximately 4000 Bundeswehr-soldiers to IFOR after 
the agreement had been signed.
536
 The majority of these soldiers were to be stationed in 
Split, Croatia rather than Bosnia and would primarily be responsible for transportation 
and logistics.
537
 The troop-deployment was ratified by the Bundestag with a large 
political majority, as various newspapers reported.
538
 Before delving deeper into this 
subject matter, it is important to highlight one particular controversy covered in all daily 
newspapers. In early December 1995, General Klaus Naumann, the Bundeswehr’s 
Inspector General, referred to the engagement of German troops in the Balkans as a 
‘combat mission’ in a television interview. This term was rapidly picked up by various 
newspapers, causing considerable controversy in political circles.
539
 The German 
Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, quickly denied the accurateness of the term, stating 
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that Naumann had no authority to make such an assessment and that German soldiers 
would not be part of a ‘combat mission’. Various daily papers elaborated that this was 
important because members of the opposition had declared their support for the 
deployment of German troops, but only under the condition that it was not a ‘combat 
mission’.540 However, the daily newspapers did not comment on this controversy 
beyond reporting on the political debate about it. Indeed, while the print media 
mentioned on the nuances of this debate, the articles did not include judgment. 
The politicians’ panic-stricken reaction to the misplaced use of a single term 
underlines how uneasy the German politicians were about the prospect of deploying 
troops into active combat. While this reluctance almost certainly resulted from 
Germany’s National-Socialist past and the hitherto preferred civilian or diplomatic 
foreign policy neither the press nor politicians explicitly stated this. Chancellor Kohl’s 
speech given in the Bundestag on 6 December 1995 about the possible deployment 
emphasised this. In it, Kohl barely mentioned Germany’s past. Only in one side-note 
Kohl remarked that “in many families the memories of the horrible, bitter…Second 
World War are still alive.”541 However his most central argument was the concept of 
‘Bündnissolidarität’, or alliance-solidarity, which he argued compelled German troop 
deployment. Consequently he emphasised that “…we cannot refuse a peace 
mission…which is expected by all of our friends and partners.”542 Significantly, Kohl 
spoke of a ‘peace mission’, calling attention to the peace treaty which had been agreed 
upon several days earlier and lay the foundation for the deployment of the IFOR-troops. 
Therefore the utilisation of this term was not an embellishment by Kohl. Most 
significantly the Chancellor seemed to consciously circumvent the moral dimension of 
the debate and instead emphasised the political realities of being a member of NATO. 
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However, while Kohl was exceedingly prudent in weighing the words used to 
describe the prospective mission, BILD was much more blatant. The tabloid’s avid 
support for the deployment of German soldiers was manifested in the ‘our boys’ 
sentiment created in various articles. Publishing statements such as “a clear majority [in 
the Bundestag] for our soldiers!”543 and “Take good care of yourselves!”544 the tabloid 
constructed a sense of communal support for the troops which is highly unusual for 
German discourse about soldiers and could not be found in any other publication. 
Moreover, BILD underlined its message with this picture printed on the first page, 
arguably awakening patriotic sentiments. 
 
Figure 65: BILD, 6 December 1995, p. 1: “Take care of yourselves!” 
   
However, BILD was the only publication to express such a strong opinion in favour of 
the troop deployment. Most publications merely reported that initially there had been 
political opposition to the cabinet’s proposition, but that eventually a broad political 
consensus had been reached in its favour.
545
 No articles, editorials or cartoons entailed 
any form of opinion. The only other clear manifestation of opinion was in opposition, 
which was published by taz- and JF-editorials.  
Starting with the latter, a JF-editorial argued that the deployment of the IFOR-
troops was not an example of simple Realpolitik, but rather morally-justified politics. 
This, Robert Hepp continued, was always based on the interpretation of the party with 
the stronger battalion, as “us Germans had figured out since Nürnberg…”546 The author 
implied that the Nürnberg trials that started in 1946 with the aim to bring the leaders of 
the Third Reich to justice, were not morally justified, but rather the result of the winners 
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of the Second World War imposing their ethical standards. This not only underlines 
JF’s extreme-right leaning, but equally emphasises the different interpretations and 
perspectives found in the press’ coverage of the on-going events. Ekkehart 
Krippendorff, a Professor at Berlin’s Free University, articulated his critical view in a 
taz-editorial, stating that the “militarily organised political career criminals” only 
followed one goal, namely to support “…legal and semi-legal arms manufacturers…” in 
their mercantile endeavours by initiating this international peace force.
547
 It is uncertain 
who the author referred to with his polemical term “political career criminal” – German 
politicians specifically or Western statesmen in general. Nonetheless, the article’s title 
“Intervene! Civilian Europe is now called upon in Bosnia” underlined the author’s 
rejection of a military deployment.
548
 However, Krippendorff did not outline what 
civilian measures should be taken in addition to the recently negotiated peace treaty. 
Another issue which neither Krippendorff nor any other articles considered here 
mentioned was that the soldiers to be deployed would be part of a peace force. With the 
initialling of the Dayton Accords on 23 November 1995, the war in Bosnia had ended 
and the IFOR-troops would not be deployed into active combat. While fighting could 
not be precluded completely, the matter at hand was not whether German soldiers 
should engage in active combat, as they would in the Kosovo War (1999). Rather they 
would contribute to a peace-force, a mission sanctioned by a UN-mandate, as they had 
numerous times before, for example in Kenya (1991), Somalia (1993-94) or Ruanda 
(1994).
549
 Significantly, none of the publications analysed here picked up on these 
points.  
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The Green Party and the ‘Genocide Clause’ 
 
While eventually a wide-ranging political consensus supported the German 
troop deployment, the opposition parties – SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (the Green 
Party) – launched into internal discussions regarding their position on this matter. Both 
convened in a party convention, which was covered extensively by the German press. 
The SPD convention, which took place on 14-17 November 1995, was reported on, but 
did not cause much sensation. The different factions within the party eventually found a 
consensus and agreed to support the decision to deploy German troops as long as this 
would not be a ‘combat mission.’550 Hans Monath commented in a taz-editorial that the 
speed at which a consensus was found in the SPD indicated that there was no true and 
open debate on the subject matter, which on the contrary was the case in the Green 
Party.
551
 
The Green Party convention (1-3 December 1995) was significantly more 
controversial in nature and was thus covered in much more detail. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Green Party in Germany had traditionally been a pacifist party 
since its foundation. However, by 1995, it was strongly divided between the ‘Fundis’, 
who wanted the party line to stay true to its fundamental ideology of pacifism and 
wanted to vote against the deployment, and the ‘Realos’, who aimed for a more realistic 
integration in politics and supported the deployment. Joschka Fischer, who would 
become Germany’s Foreign Minister in 1998, was the primary representative of the 
latter faction. As discussed in the previous chapter, Fischer had publicly vocalised his 
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support for Germany contributing in international interventions in a letter to his party.
552
 
As this debate touched the very core of the Green Party, numerous articles spoke of a 
‘Zereißprobe’, a crucial test; and with political ideology at the heart of this discussion, 
many of the themes were emotive and readily picked up by the media. The most 
prevalent themes were the concept of intervening militarily to stop ‘genocide,’ and what 
role Germany’s historical past played in this respect. 
 The dilemma of using force to stop ‘genocide’ versus upholding Germany’s 
post-war foreign policy that shied away from military interventions resonated heavily in 
the Greens’ debate and was fully reflected in the press coverage. The main arguments 
which were relayed and emphasised in the newspapers were the following: Joschka 
Fischer and his supporters (‘Realos’) argued that genocide demanded military force to 
stop it, while Ludger Volmer’s ‘Fundi’ faction argued that economic sanctions should 
be the most extreme measures the international community should implement.
553
 This 
faction further argued that Srebrenica and Bosnia in general was being (mis-)used as a 
reason to ‘militarise German foreign policy’ as FAZ, FR and Spiegel reported.554 
Fischer in turn criticised his party colleagues for being ‘isolationist’ and demanded that 
a ‘genocide clause’ be introduced into German foreign policy. As various articles 
reported, Fischer frequently referred to the Srebrenica Massacre as an example in which 
the international community should have intervened militarily.
555
 Judging that “‘in 
Bosnia, pacifism has failed,’” Fischer called for a new attitude in Germany’s foreign 
policy.
556
 Simultaneously, Fischer frequently referred to the Third Reich and the 
Holocaust, arguing that Germany’s past compelled them now to intervene in Bosnia, 
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and to stop genocide in the future. In doing so, Fischer initiated a debate on what impact 
Germany’s past should have on its perceptions of Bosnia. 
The publications analysed here expressed clear opinions on the Green debate and 
can be categorised by their political affiliations. While the conservative newspapers 
agreed with Fischer and drew heavily on Germany’s past to justify a possible military 
mission, the left-leaning publications were very reluctant to do so, arguing that it would 
qualify and perhaps minimise the unique horrors of the Holocaust. However it must be 
noted that while the left-leaning publications rejected the equivalence of the Holocaust 
to intervening in Bosnia, they did not at any point disagree with the deployment itself. 
JF, although extreme-right in its political affiliation agreed with the left-leaning 
publications, as it generally rejected Germany’s participation in multi-national 
endeavours.  
 Even though Welt and FAZ speculated whether Fischer was merely engaged in a 
political game of coalition-politics, both, along with BILD, supported the interpretation 
that the Third Reich and Holocaust created an obligation to stop genocide in the future 
and to deploy troops to Bosnia. Various FAZ-articles stated that the situation in Bosnia 
required Germany to consider the ‘lessons from its past’ and intervene in Bosnia in the 
name of the ‘genocide clause’.557 A Welt-editorial reminded its readers that Europe had 
failed miserably in stopping the violence in the Balkans when it had a chance in the 
early 1990s. Rather, it needed America to get involved. “And now the Germans of all 
people…are supposed to say ‘without me’?”, the author asked sceptically. Such a 
foreign policy would only create mistrust and incomprehension amongst Germany’s 
neighbours, Peter Phillips’ editorial argued.558 BILD’s articles reminded its readers in its 
usual declamatory manner that “we [the Germans] know what genocide is” and that 
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Germany had to support the UN’s attempts to stop the Bosnian ‘genocide.’559 Michael 
Wolfssohn, a Professor at the Free University in Berlin, cautioned in a further BILD-
article that “our rejection of the genocide back then [Third Reich] would not be credible 
if we allowed genocide to continue to unfold today.”560 
While all three conservative newspapers readily used references to the Holocaust 
to justify German troop deployment to Bosnia, only one single editorial (in Welt) 
explored if the term ‘genocide’ was even applicable to the Bosnian case. Here Herbert 
Kremp argued that “in spite of all the atrocities, genocide in its exact definition cannot 
be discerned in Bosnia,” as the Bosnian Serbs did not “…systematically exterminate the 
Muslims, as for example had happened to the Armenians or Jews…”. The author further 
accused Fischer’s faction of the Green Party of manipulating this term to their 
advantage.
561
 Unfortunately, this crucial consideration of whether ‘genocide’ was the 
correct term did not find any further resonance in the media or in the political discourse. 
However, while the application of the term to the entire Bosnian War must be 
questioned, Kremp’s article disregarded that Srebrenica had been officially labelled 
‘genocide’ and indeed the ICTY had indicted Karadžić and Mladić on 14 November 
1995 for perpetrating genocide in Srebrenica.
562
 While the Welt-article disregarded this 
important aspect, the author’s questions are important and underline how confused and 
confusing the coverage of this matter was. All three conservative papers stated that 
Germany should deploy soldiers to Bosnia and that Germany’s past obliged the country 
to stop ‘genocide.’ However, this argumentation merged two wholly different issues. 
The German soldiers’ mission in Bosnia was not to stop ‘genocide’, but to implement a 
previously signed peace treaty. While the Srebrenica Massacre a few months earlier 
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may have warranted such a debate, at this point a cease-fire existed and ‘genocide’ was 
no longer being perpetrated, rendering this discussion unnecessary.  
The missing differentiation of these two matters in the conservative coverage 
indicates two tendencies. Firstly, how omnipresent the trauma of Srebrenica remained in 
the analysis of Bosnia. The shock of what had unfolded in the enclave which was 
labelled ‘genocide’ by the ICTY and that the international community had not 
intervened spilled over into this debate on peace implementation in Bosnia. This creates 
a strong sense of needing to reconcile previous failures. Secondly, the merging of these 
two issues shows that the German past and the interpretation that it created a 
responsibility to act remained a strong influence in the conservative press’ coverage of 
Bosnia. 
In spite of their support for Fischer’s arguments, various editorials in Welt and 
FAZ, as well as a Konkret-article explained Fischer’s shift in policy with the politician’s 
long-term goal to make the Green Party a viable candidate to form a coalition-
government with the centre-left SPD in the 1998 elections.
563
 The Konkret-article linked 
Fischer’s policy specifically to his intention of becoming foreign minister.564 This 
notion, which had also been addressed in a Spiegel-interview with Fischer a few months 
earlier,
565
 was never explored in more detail – the speculative nature of such arguments 
presumably preventing a more in-depth discussion. Understandably, the journalists did 
not want to risk their professional reputation by publishing too far-reaching conjecture 
without supporting facts. Moreover, the scope of a newspaper article or editorial was 
perhaps too restrictive to elaborate on the above points.  
Contrary to the conservative press, the left-leaning publications taz and Spiegel 
disagreed with linking Germany’s past to the debate about troop deployment. Sibylle 
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Toennis’ taz-editorial focused on Fischer and criticised his argumentation because it 
drew on Germany’s past. She disapproved of the fact that “…Fischer refers to his 
biography, which also belongs to all of us” when justifying his stance. “He had parents 
who had tolerated genocide in their own country. The mission in Bosnia is supposed to 
compensate for Auschwitz.”566 By bluntly juxtaposing Bosnia and Auschwitz, the 
author aimed to underline the absurdity of attempting to reconcile one atrocity by 
intervening in another country. A further taz-article published in late November by Paul 
Parin was dedicated exclusively to the question of whether Bosnia and the Holocaust 
could and should be compared. Entitled “A comparison is a comparison is a 
comparison”, Parin criticised the perception that Bosnia “…is a posthumous victory for 
Hitler.” Indeed, he postulated that Bosnia and the Holocaust are as profoundly different 
“…as the Holocaust is from the atomic annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki…”567 
This criticism of using ‘the history argument’ to justify military engagement in Bosnia 
indicates a prevailing sense in taz that the horrors of the Holocaust and Third Reich 
should not be diminished through comparisons.  
A Spiegel-article also drew on Germany’s National-Socialist past to argue 
against a German troop-deployment, though its argument did not focus on the Holocaust 
as taz’s articles had. It stated that German soldiers should under no circumstances be 
stationed on Bosnian territory, because Wehrmacht-soldiers had been there ‘only 
recently’.568 The distinct and presumably conscious use of the term ‘recent’ to describe 
events that occurred 50 years earlier underlines the publications’ endeavour to use the 
‘history argument’ to reject future deployments. Though FR’s articles did not 
specifically comment on ‘the history argument’, one editorial harshly criticised Foreign 
Minister Kinkel’s claim that Germany’s military engagement in Bosnia was ‘morally 
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justified’. Sarcastically entitled ‘Leaseholder of Morality’, it questioned why Kinkel had 
to introduce the ‘heavy-weight concept’ of ethics and why he painted a black and white 
image rather than admitting that this debate was nuanced by many shades of grey.
569
 
With this criticism, the editorial rightfully drew attention to the problematic fusion of 
politics and morality. Interestingly however, this criticism was not applied to the debate 
within the Green Party, which equally merged the two concepts. 
 Amidst the depths of the heated discussion of linking the German past to its 
contemporary foreign policy, we must return to the crux of the Green Party’s debate: 
namely whether a ‘genocide clause’ should be included in German foreign policy. 
Considering the subject-matter from afar, this debate appears largely unnecessary. 
Having ratified the 1948 UN-Genocide Convention in 1954, Germany had already 
bound itself by international law to stop genocide when it occurred anywhere in the 
world.
570
 Consequently the debate initiated by Fischer and his ‘Realos’ appears 
redundant. Moreover, it is important to remark that the depth of coverage regarding ‘the 
Green debate’ was not congruent with its political importance. The Bundestag, which 
according to German law needed a 50% vote to deploy the soldiers, had the following 
compilation at the time:
571
 
CDU/CSU 294 seats 
FDP   47 seats 
 
SPD 252 seats 
Green Party   49 seats 
 
Accordingly, the CDU-FDP coalition claimed more than 50% of the 672 seats. Thus the 
government would have had enough votes, especially with SPD’s support, irrespective 
of the Green Party’s stance. This in turn rendered the internal party debate interesting, 
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but not crucial to the political decision. However, considering the highly contentious 
nature of the troop deployment, it was of course in the government’s interest to ensure 
as much cross-party support as possible, especially to avoid waves of protest that could 
be initiated by the Green Party and find popular support. Nonetheless this political 
constellation introduces the question why the subject-matter was covered so 
extensively. Though the discussion only occurred within the Green Party, it was indeed 
representative of a larger debate about Germany’s collective conscience. In a persistent 
effort to grapple with the past, Germany had to clarify its position on military 
interventions. This in turn underlines that while the secondary literature claimed that 
Germany’s collective memory had diluted and ‘internationalised’ since the early 1990s, 
the country’s past was still very present in 1995and significantly shaped the discourse 
on Bosnia.  
This debate regarding a ‘genocide clause’, linked with the deployment of 
German soldiers shows how many layers of discourse influenced the German print 
media’s coverage of the Dayton Agreement in November and December 1995. With the 
signing of the peace treaty, the Bosnia War was officially terminated, after nearly four 
years. However, this peace treaty would throw a longer shadow than many external 
observers initially presumed and in some ways led directly to the renewed violence in 
Kosovo. 
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Chapter 5 
 March-June 1998: Renewed Violence – The Kosovo Conflict 
 
 
 After the Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995, international 
attention in the Balkans turned to the implementation of the peace treaty and rebuilding 
the war-torn Bosnia and Croatia. However, by February 1996 – only two months after 
Dayton – violent conflict returned to the region, this time in Kosovo, a southern 
province of Serbia. This was manifested by the bombing of a Serbian refugee camp in 
the Krajina region, which was the first ‘declared action’ of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA).
572
 Their proclaimed goal was to use violent means to attain Kosovo’s 
independence from Serbia. The quest for sovereignty resulted from years of oppression 
and mal-treatment by the Serbian minority of the Kosovo-Albanians who made up 90% 
of Kosovo’s population.573  
 
 
Historical Background 
 
The secondary literature points to three main causes as catalytic in Kosovo’s 
path to violence: Milošević’s aggressive rhetoric of the late 1980s,574 which culminated 
in the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989,575 as well as the birth of the KLA.576 
The Kosovo-Albanian majority had sought more autonomy from Serbia for several 
decades. However, while Muslim Albanians had settled Kosovo for centuries, the 
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region had also been the “heartland of…[the Serbian] medieval empire and the site of 
the patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church.”577 Indeed, Kosovo was “… the centre 
of many of Serbia’s greatest works of religious art and architecture...”578 Due to the 
cultural centrality of the region to Serbia, any movement of the Kosovo-Albanians 
towards independence was repressed. Yugoslavia’s communist leader, Josip Tito, had 
sought to reduce these tensions by constitutionally granting Kosovo the status of an 
autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia in 1974.
579
 This promised the 
Kosovo-Albanians “…equality, schools in the mother tongue of its children, a full 
freedom for cultural expression and development as an ethnic group.”580 Moreover, 
being an autonomous region gave Kosovo the legal right to secede.
581
 As Tim Judah 
summarised, “after 1974 the province became a republic in all but name…”582 With 
these constitutional rights in place, the tensions were reduced significantly. 
 However, during the previously mentioned constitutional reforms introduced by 
Milošević in 1989, Yugoslavia’s two autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina lost 
all sovereignty.
583
 These changes granted Serbia “…more direct control over Kosovo’s 
security, judiciary, finance and social planning.”584 Immediately, Albanian schools and 
media outlets were closed and the Serbian police increasingly harassed the civilian 
population.
585
 According to Amnesty International, “most ethnic Albanians working in 
the state sector lost their jobs…” Moreover, the Serbian military presence in Kosovo 
increased significantly, fuelling the mutual distrust between Serbians and Kosovo-
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Albanians.
586
 These inequalities caused a more distinct striving for Kosovo’s 
independence on behalf of the Kosovo-Albanians. Consequently, unilateral 
parliamentary elections were carried out in May 1992, which were won by the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The only candidate, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, who 
was LDK’s leader, became the President of Kosovo.587 Rugova was a professor of 
literature at the University of Priština and had been the party’s leader since its founding 
in 1989.
588
 Rugova’s victory led to the establishment of “‘parallel’ institutions, 
including a parliament, a president, taxation and their own education and health 
systems.”589 This shadow-state was ‘sheer make-believe’, as Malcolm labelled it, but 
pursued the long-term goal that 
…foreign governments might eventually feel obliged to admit that they were the ones who were 
engaging in fiction when they continued to treat Kosovo as a mere region of the Serbian state.
590
 
However, Rugova’s pacifist policies were challenged by the creation of the 
‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ in 1996.591 The army’s declared goal was to attain Kosovo’s 
independence, resorting to military force against Serbians in the region. The KLA’s 
violence against Serbian police forces, Serbian civilians and suspected Kosovo-
Albanian collaborators, intensified the violent reprisals of the Serbian police units 
against Kosovo-Albanian civilians as well as the KLA. The latter, at times also referred 
to as UÇK, which stands for its Albanian name, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës,
592
 has 
thus been identified by various academics as the driving force in transforming the 
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conflict into a war.
593
 Particularly the exclusion of Kosovo in the peace talks at Dayton 
has been seen as a catalyst amongst Kosovo’s leading figures to realise that their 
problems had found no international interest and that this propelled the KLA into 
action.
594
  
The reasons for omitting Kosovo in the Dayton negotiations were manifold. The 
political status of Kosovo was that of an autonomous province within Yugoslavia and 
was thus deemed an internal Yugoslav affair. The diplomats in Dayton, who feared that 
insisting on including Kosovo in the negotiations would prevent a peace agreement for 
Bosnia and Croatia, dismissed the topic as too contentious. Roland Friedrich, who 
interviewed Wolfgang Ischinger, the leader of the German delegation at Dayton wrote 
in his monograph that Ischinger recalled broaching the topic of Kosovo with Milošević. 
The latter had ‘exploded’ at the mere mention of the province, insisting this was an 
internal problem of Yugoslavia in which the international community should not get 
involved.
595
 Interestingly, the academic literature does not represent the failure to 
include Kosovo at Dayton as a short-coming of ‘the West’. This suggests that the 
academics understood how difficult it had been to broker peace in Bosnia and Croatia 
and acknowledged that including Kosovo into these negotiations would have 
jeopardised the entire undertaking.  
It is generally agreed that the KLA was 30,000 men strong by mid-1999 and was 
predominantly funded by Kosovo-Albanian Gastarbeiter in Germany and Albanian ex-
patriots elsewhere.
596
 The army obtained most of its weapons in the spring of 1997 
when Enver Hoxha’s Communist government in Albania collapsed. During the political 
chaos, circa one million Kalashnikovs were released onto the Black Market for $16 
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each.
597
 The details of KLA’s leadership were secret, though Bujar Bukoshi, the Prime 
Minister of the Kosovo-Albanian shadow-state, who was exiled in Switzerland, was 
considered a key figure.
598
 The secondary literature is also largely unanimous in seeing 
Serbian atrocities against Kosovo-Albanian civilians as one of KLA’s primary 
motivations. While its militarised activities were contextualised and even justified in 
light of these atrocities, the army’s existence and activities were nonetheless portrayed 
to be a central reason for the Kosovo Conflict of the late 1990s. 
While the KLA has been subject to extensive research, comparably little 
concrete information is available about their Serbian counterparts: the police forces 
active in Kosovo, which had been trained specifically for fighting terrorism. These units 
were armed with tanks, artillery, helicopters and machine guns and thus resembled an 
army more than a police unit.
599
 According to German press coverage, Milošević was 
adamant about deploying police units rather than army troops, as the unrest in Kosovo 
was an internal matter. This was also Belgrade’s central argument why the international 
community should not get involved in Kosovo.
600
 No academic or journalistic sources 
cite any numbers, making it difficult to quantify KLA’s opponents.  
When considering the literature produced about Kosovo, two primary sources 
are worth noting. In 1998, Amnesty International published a report on the human rights 
violations in Kosovo. Offering a chronology of the violence between 1989 and 1998, 
the report features various individuals’ accounts. Including narratives of Serbian 
violence as well as KLA beatings and executions, the well-researched report seems non-
partisan and reliable. Having been published in September 1998, it does not include the 
culmination of the conflict and finally the 1999 NATO-intervention, but rather focuses 
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on the early phases of the violence.
601
 The second seminal primary source is a report 
published by the ‘Independent International Commission on Kosovo’ which followed 
the declared aim to offer an independent analysis of the violence in Kosovo. 
Importantly, the Commission was not appointed by any government or NGO and its 11 
members including academics, newspaper editors and politicians, participated solely in 
a private capacity. This project, endorsed by UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan, met 
with Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian representatives who had witnessed the violence, and 
drew on UN-documents, International Red Cross sources and interviews with Human 
Rights Watch personnel to piece together the events of the conflict. Published in 2000, 
it also aimed to offer a retrospective analysis of the entire conflict including the NATO-
intervention.
602
 
During the early phase of the violence in Kosovo, the Serbian police engaged in 
low-scale attacks on Kosovo-Albanian villages in the Drenica region; frequently the 
inhabitants were expelled or killed.
603
 As the region was a KLA-stronghold, Milošević 
was determined to obliterate the Kosovo-Albanian army, a campaign that was initiated 
in March 1998. Targeting Adem Jashari, a KLA-leader, who lived in Drenica, Serbian 
forces shelled and bombed “…Jashari’s compound for three consecutive days [starting 
on 5 March 1998], killing fifty-eight people…including eighteen women and ten 
children.”604 This attack initiated a wave of violence by Serbian police forces, which 
aimed to find and eradicate all KLA-members in the villages of the Drenica region. 
However, this went hand-in-hand with expelling or killing Kosovo-Albanian civilians – 
a process both academics and journalists termed ‘ethnic cleansing.’605 Responding to 
the intensified violence, the Kosovo-Albanian army increased its militarised activities, 
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attacking Serbian police units, Serbian civilians and suspected Kosovo-Albanian 
collaborators.
606
 As Wolfgang Ischinger, State Secretary in the German Foreign 
Ministry, evaluated in retrospect, the Kosovo Conflict cannot be understood without the 
violence that unfolded in Drenica at the time.
607
 
 The German press coverage of the violence in Drenica and other parts of 
Kosovo will now be analysed. By studying a four-month timeframe considered in this 
chapter – 1 March to 30 June 1998 – this chapter will consider how the primary sources 
portrayed the causes of the Kosovo Conflict as well as the Serbian forces and the KLA. 
Moreover, the historical comparisons made by the press to the Bosnian War and World 
War Two will be considered. Before proceeding, it must be mentioned that AJW will 
not be included in this chapter. The newspaper published by the Central Council of Jews 
in Germany did not feature a single article on Kosovo in this four-month period. While 
AJW’s interest in the Balkans had already been sparse during the Bosnian War, there 
had been occasional articles using Sarajevo’s Jewish Community as an entry-point to 
the topic. However, since Kosovo did not have a significant Jewish community, there 
was no interest in Kosovo as the conflict was developing. Moreover, by 1998, AJW had 
become a bi-weekly publication (as opposed to weekly until 1995). Falling circulation 
numbers and scarce finances could have been another reason for the reduced reporting 
of international affairs. However, the access to news agency reports and a previous 
limited interest in the Bosnian War rather suggest a continued disinterest in the Balkans. 
The other two publications with a targeted readership, JF and Konkret, did not report 
much on the conflict as it was developing. JF published various articles, though these 
are not relevant until the latter part of this chapter; Konkret published only one article 
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about Kosovo in this timeframe, which will be discussed where relevant. However, all 
remaining publications reported on the violence with heightened interest.   
 
 
Causes of the Kosovo Conflict in the German media 
 
With the advent of a further Balkan conflict within the same decade, the reasons 
drawn on by the German print media to explain the renewed violence will be considered 
first. Similar to the secondary literature analysed previously, the publications considered 
here contextualised the violence by drawing on the 1389 battle and on Milošević’s 1989 
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy. Before delving into the historical context given by 
the German publications, BILD must be considered separately, as there was only one 
instance where the tabloid explored the causes of the conflict. Almost as a side-note the 
single tabloid-article explained: “…Kosovo is the legendary Field of the Blackbirds, 
where the Turks conquered the Serbs and then the Hungarians.”608 This allusion to the 
1389 Battle of Kosovo was not expanded upon, nor was the reader offered an 
explanation why it would still be relevant in the 1990s. The sparse mention of historical 
context is congruent with the tabloid’s general coverage of international affairs. While 
the conflict itself was reported, the causes of the violence were not. 
Four other publications, FAZ, FR, taz and Spiegel drew on the historic battle 
more deeply, convincingly presenting it as a fundamental reason for Serbia’s 
determination to refuse Kosovo’s autonomy, let alone independence.609 For example, a 
FAZ-article stated that  
this battle offer[ed] the historical background to understand the crisis and the manner in which 
Serbia…[was] clinging on to Kosovo. No Serbian politician would ever give up Kosovo 
voluntarily.
610
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Some FR-articles labelled Kosovo as the ‘symbol of eternal Serbdom’ and the ‘historic 
heartland’ of the Serbian nation.611 Explaining that “history is more alive in the Balkans 
than anywhere else…”, these FR-articles underlined the prevailing importance of the 
1389 battle to Serbia’s national self-perception.612  
In addition to giving this historical context, three publications, Spiegel, FR and 
taz introduced a further facet, stating that the 1389-milestone would not be so relevant 
in the present day if Slobodan Milošević had not manipulated this 600-year-old battle to 
fuel Serbian nationalism and incite violence.
613
 As an anonymous Spiegel-article stated, 
“until the present day, this territory…[was] the grail of Serbian nationalism…which 
Milošević wanted to exploit to maintain his power.”614 With this important slant to the 
debate on the causes of the conflict, the three left-leaning papers portrayed Milošević to 
be stirring ancient hatreds and evoking violent nationalism and thus held him 
responsible for the renewed violence. Although the notion of long-standing antagonism 
between Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs was repeatedly alluded to, significantly, the 
concept of ‘ancient hatreds’ was never used explicitly. This is surprising considering 
how frequently it had been drawn on in the coverage of the Bosnian War in the early 
1990s
615
 and indicates a clear development in the way in which the Balkan violence was 
explained.   
This increased focus on the Serbian leader found in the press’ historical 
background can be seen as a continuation of the publications’ previous coverage during 
which Milošević had increasingly become the press’ focal point to explain the wars. 
Significantly, almost all German publications considered here intertwined Milošević 
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and his nationalist policies with a second historical milestone, namely the 1989 
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy. Welt, FAZ, FR, Spiegel and taz all mentioned this 
policy very frequently, implicitly deeming it the most important cause of the conflict.
616
 
However, these references were very repetitive and also distinctly superficial. For 
example, one Welt-article reported that “the EU demand[ed] that Milošević would re-
introduce Kosovo’s autonomy, which had been revoked in 1989.”617 Almost all 
references were of this nature and significantly failed to explain what the effects of this 
revocation of autonomy were or why this could cause a violent conflict ten years later. 
Only one Spiegel-article elaborated that a parallel state had evolved under the auspices 
of Ibrahim Rugova after Kosovo’s autonomy had been revoked.  
The Albanians boycotted the Serbian institutions in Kosovo, founded their own hospitals, 
schools and even a university; the classes took place in private apartments…In this 
manner they compensated for the loss of their autonomy, which had been granted by Tito 
in 1974 and had been revoked by Milošević in 1989.618  
The article went on to explain that the parallel state constructed after 1989 offered the 
Kosovo-Albanians a sense of self-government which ten years later they wanted to 
actualise. These details helped the reader understand what the direct effects of the 
revoked autonomy were and why they could have played a key role in perpetuating 
violence. 
As this section has demonstrated, the violence in Kosovo immediately sparked 
the German press’ interest, though its explanation was limited to Milošević’s nationalist 
policies of reigniting the 1389-myth and revoking Kosovo’s autonomy. The birth of the 
KLA and its guerrilla warfare was not seen as a catalyst for the violence by any of the 
publications, although this was such a prominent issue in the secondary literature. Only 
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FAZ, FR and taz explored alternative explanations, mentioning that Kosovo had not 
been included in the Dayton negotiations, though these were merely single references 
and would have been lost in the coverage.
619
 However, just like the secondary literature, 
the publications did not accuse ‘the West’ for this exclusion. It is worth noting at this 
point that Welt’s articles published in this four month timeframe focused solely on 
Milošević’s policies. This narrow interpretation is reminiscent of the newspaper’s early 
coverage of the Bosnian War, in which Welt’s main Balkan-correspondent, Carl Gustaf 
Ströhm, accused Milošević personally for the outbreak of violence long before other 
journalists.
620
 While Ströhm was no longer Balkan-correspondent at this time and 
indeed did not write any of the articles considered here, there appears a similar stance in 
this later coverage.  
 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Civilians  
 
Turning now to the publications’ coverage of the violence itself, this was 
portrayed with a lot of detail, focusing primarily on the suffering of the Kosovo-
Albanian civilians. Concrete numbers of casualties for the four-month timeframe of this 
chapter remain unknown, though between February 1998 and March 1999 a total of 
circa 400,000 civilians were forced to leave their homes and more than 1000 civilians 
were killed by Serbian police forces.
621
 All publications reported on this violence. For 
example, FAZ’s Matthias Rüb reported in mid-June that Kosovo-Albanians had been 
“massacred with axes [and] ripped apart by grenades…” in the killings that had taken 
place in the small town Prekaz during February and March.
622
 Similarly taz’s Balkan-
correspondent Erich Rathfelder painted a vivid picture of the violence in the Drenica 
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region, specifically Prekaz, writing that the Kosovo-Albanian civilians were distressed 
at a funeral “…by the shattered skull of a woman, the children whose mouths were 
crying out in agony and the disfigured faces of the men.”623 Another taz-article reported 
that “one inhabitant [of an attacked village] had his throat slit…”624 Several days later, 
Rathfelder described those fleeing “…from the hell in Kosovo”: “The shapes are 
emaciated. Two days and two nights they have been in transit since leaving their 
village…”625 The adjective ‘emaciated’ may strike the reader as overly dramatic to 
describe people who had not eaten in 48 hours, but the images these words conjured 
were very effective. 
A BILD-article, notably co-authored by Welt’s Boris Kalnoky reported that 
“crying women, streaming with blood…[ran] into the open, carrying crying babies. 
Rocket-launchers and mines rip[ped] apart those who…[fled].”626 Other articles 
reported of “mass executions, mass rapes, mass flight,”627 as well as mass graves.628 The 
fate of thousands of Kosovo-Albanian refugees fleeing their villages was encapsulated 
in the moving story of one 12-year-old girl called Shipe Caca. The anonymous piece in 
BILD reported that “after grenades hailed down on her village, she suddenly stood alone 
with five small Mitflüchtlinge [co-refugees]. Shipe took the children by their hands and 
made her way across the meadows.”629 This same story was reported in Welt,630 
demonstrating a further over-lap of the two papers, both produced by the Axel-Springer 
publishing house.  
This replication of the same content in a broadsheet and tabloid offers an 
interesting opportunity to compare the coverage in different types of newspapers. 
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BILD’s tendency to sensationalise can be found in the use of descriptions such as 
“grenade showers, hailing on the village” and children being left “utterly alone”. 
Moreover, the method of reporting that focuses on a personal story can often be found 
in the tabloid. The broadsheet’s article on the other hand, refrained from such staggering 
word-choices. Moreover, while featuring the same details about Shipe’s fate, it also 
included more general news on the developments in Kosovo, for example the KLA’s 
mobilisation, embedding the suffering of a single girl in the larger context of the on-
going violence. This awareness of the larger conflict surrounding one individual’s 
narrative cannot be found in the tabloid which only focused on the personal fate of a 
single girl whose story could have occurred in any war-torn country. 
Continuing with Welt’s reporting on the fighting in the Drenica region, Boris 
Kalnoky wrote in a Welt-article that “the children’s corpses…[did] not look like they 
had been killed in battle by stray bullets or grenades. Their little bodies…[were] mostly 
unharmed, only their heads are shattered.”631 The author continued that the youngest 
victim was three years old and the eldest 92, suggesting that children and elderly were 
the primary targets. This is encapsulated by the article’s title: “Children and elderly 
were the victims.” Another piece described a Kosovo-Albanian video that had become 
available to the author, showing victims of the recent violence. “In a bullet-ridden room 
lie the corpses of the Ahmeti family; a pregnant woman without head; the other bodies 
full of bullet wounds.”632 Articles in taz and FR emphasised the same perspective.633 
For example FR’s Stephan Israel wrote that “in the hills and woods surrounding 
Drenica, journalists have found whole groups of terrorised and traumatised women and 
children.”634 Various FR-articles underlined that the victims were not ‘terrorists’, as 
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claimed by Serbian propaganda, but mostly women, children and elderly.
635
 This 
argument was conveyed succinctly in Israel’s article entitled “For the Serbs, also 
women, children and elderly are terrorists”.636 This significantly polemical and sarcastic 
condensation of the on-going violence was strongly anti-Serbian and very memorable to 
the reader.  
In early March a Spiegel-article reported on an old Kosovo-Albanian woman 
who was about to bury her sons, nephews and grandsons after an attack by Serbian 
policemen. The account described the victims: “one of them they battered to death in 
front of the house, teeth and bits of brain…[lay] under a pile of brushwood, next to it a 
large, blood-stained stone.”637 This very graphic description reporting on the brute force 
administered by Serbians against Kosovo-Albanians featured one significant difference 
from the other German publications: it focused on young, able-bodied men and thus 
potential soldiers as victims, rather than emphasising the suffering of women, children 
and elderly. While this was an interesting distinction, it was singular and various other 
cases concentrated on female victims in the Spiegel-articles’ narratives. For example, a 
piece written by Renate Flottau described the fate of a Kosovo-Albanian woman in the 
late stages of pregnancy who had to flee from a Serbian attack and spend two nights in 
the cold without any bread or water.
638
 Another article authored by Flottau focused on 
the 28-year-old Merita who “…ran her shaking hands through her hair and cried out of 
anger” because her entire village had been destroyed.639 
Interestingly, none of the stories published in the German press at this time 
featured interviews with the victims, but instead consisted of the correspondents’ 
observations as external onlookers. This unusual manner of reporting allowed the reader 
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to learn about the details of the on-going violence, however only through the eyes of the 
correspondent. With no citations by local eye-witnesses, the journalists became the only 
medium through which the readers learned about the fighting. Due to this reporting 
style, the shock experienced by the correspondents upon witnessing the violence stood 
in the forefront of their pieces. On the one hand this contributed to their immediacy, 
while simultaneously adding a layer of interpretation to the coverage which confined the 
readers’ understanding of the events. The journalist’s role as a ‘gate-keeper’ of 
information is consequently emphasised. While the correspondents always select the 
narratives the readers learn about, by omitting direct citations of eye-witnesses, the 
reader is more subjected to the journalists’ personal interpretation than in previous 
instances. 
The graphic descriptions found in the textual coverage about crushed skulls and 
slit throats were comprehensibly not translated to the visual representation of the 
Kosovo-Albanian victims. Rather than showing instances of such brute force, the 
images found in all publications except JF pictured refugee treks to portray the human 
suffering. The focus on quantity showing the large numbers of displaced people perhaps 
circumvented the individual horrors. 
 
Figure 66: Spiegel, 22 June 1998, p, 125 
  
Figure 67: BILD, 8 June 1998, p. 2   Figure 68: FAZ, 9 March 1998, p. 8 
 
 
While in the first instance there seems to be a disjoint between the graphic articles and 
the images above, indeed the visual and textual analysis complemented each other. 
Through the pictorial coverage, the reader grasped the extent of displacements, while 
the articles revealed the horrific details of the violence and specifically of fatalities. 
When combined, the textual and visual coverage gave a detailed overview and evoked 
deep empathy with the fate of the Kosovo-Albanian civilians in the readers.  
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 This identification with the Kosovo-Albanian perspective is brought out further 
through other images published in this timeframe. These frequently showed Kosovo-
Albanians partaking in peaceful demonstrations during which they were confronted 
with Serbian policemen.  
 
Figure 69: FAZ, 17 March 1998, p. 6 
 
  
Figure 70: Welt, 2 May 1998, p. 6    Figure 71: Spiegel, 4 May 1998, p. 150 
 
Strikingly, all pictures were taken from a perspective that emphasised the difference in 
strength, contrasting defenceless Kosovo-Albanian civilians to large, armed Serbian 
soldiers. The viewer was left with the sensation that the Kosovo-Albanian population 
had no choice but to rebel, being oppressed by an exceedingly powerful police force. 
Furthermore, while figure 70 is too grainy to enable a thorough analysis, it seems to 
have been taken at the same event as figure 71. Indeed, both pictures presumably 
portray the same two soldiers; the one on the left having shifted slightly between the 
two snapshots. This implies that the photographers were only granted access to a certain 
segment of the event, underlining how limited the coverage was that eventually reached 
the German reader. Mere snapshots of the full extent were conveyed. The amount of 
information these images expressed simply through the place and angle from which 
they were taken, is quite astounding.  
 
Figure 72: JF, 13 March 1998, p. 3 
 
JF also published an image portraying Kosovo-Albanian demonstrators, confronted 
with presumably Serbian water guns. Significantly, by not showing the Serbian forces, 
the viewer is compelled to focus on the clearly un-armed victims, conjuring a feeling of 
solidarity with them. The publication of such an image in JF is astounding, as the 
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newspaper had not previously portrayed the Kosovo-Albanians in such a compassionate 
way.  
 A second setting featured heavily in the pictorial coverage of Kosovo-Albanian 
civilians in this time-period was funerals. The accompanying articles explained that 
these frequently turned into spontaneous demonstrations against the violence 
perpetrated by Serbian forces in Kosovo. 
   
Figure 73: FR, 29 April 1998, p. 2   Figure 74: taz, 5 March 1998, p. 11
     
 
 
Spiegel chose to illustrate this theme by singling out a young boy, who – wrapped in the 
Kosovo-Albanian flag – might be seen as a symbol of the despairing population and 
hopeless future of the Kosovar youth.  
   
 Figure 75: Spiegel, 9 March 1998, p. 149   Figure 76: Spiegel, 9 March 1998, p. 148 
 
However, what in the first instance appears to be a spontaneous and genuine expression 
of grief and solidarity, which was confirmed in the accompanying article,
640
 has to be 
qualified upon closer inspection. Three months later, on 8 June, Spiegel published 
another picture of the same boy at the same event.  
 
Figure 77: Spiegel, 8 June 1998, p. 153 
 
Taken from a different position, the viewer realises that he was the only individual 
amongst the masses to be wrapped in a Kosovo-Albanian flag. It also shows that he was 
standing alone amongst the corpses, which were also cloaked in the flag and placed 
between the crowd and organisers. It is now evident that the whole event was more 
choreographed than suggested in the first article. The stage area was also draped in the 
same flag and equipped with amplifiers and microphones, in the background of figure 
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77 emphasised this. This suggests that the funeral was also used as a political rally. 
Considering these images together, the placement of a young boy cloaked in a flag as 
the protagonist of such a politicised gathering evokes a sense of sinister nationalism that 
utilises youth to mobilise masses. However, a casual reader at the time probably would 
not have realised this connection especially as the images were published three months 
apart. Nonetheless, for our purposes it underscores how carefully choreographed some 
of these seemingly casual or spontaneous pictures were.  
 
 
Serbian civilians 
 
Considering that the province’s population consisted of 90% Kosovo-Albanians, 
combined with more institutionalised and well-equipped Serbian forces, it is 
unsurprising that the majority of the victims were Kosovo-Albanian. Nonetheless, one 
must not disregard the militarised activities of KLA, which specifically targeted Serbian 
forces, but also civilians living in Kosovo. However, featuring Serbian civilians as 
victims of targeted violence was a dimension barely found in the German publications 
considered here. JF, Konkret and FR did not cover this theme at all. FAZ, Spiegel and 
taz were the only publications to report that the Serbian civilians also suffered from the 
violence and indeed were forced to flee their homes due to KLA’s operations.641 A taz-
article guest-authored by the Belgrade-based journalist Andrej Ivanji quoted a Serbian 
civilian who was afraid that the Serbian cultural and religious sites which were 
“Orthodox islands floating helplessly in the Albanian ocean” would now be looted and 
burned down by the KLA.
642
 This aspect was underlined with a picture published the 
following month. 
 
Figure 78: taz, 27 April 1998, p. 11 
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As the caption explained, this Serbian woman had fled to a Christian-Orthodox 
monastery to seek refuge from the on-going violence. While the short description 
detailed that elderly Serbian women – clearly not combatants – were victims of this 
conflict, the image itself did not have the same effect as the previously discussed 
pictures of the affected Kosovo-Albanian. This underscores the effect of quantity in 
some images. The masses of Kosovo-Albanian refugees or of mourners were the most 
memorable feature from the other images. This in turn evoked such sympathy amongst 
the viewers, which was not generated by this picture of a single victim. 
Other articles in FAZ and Spiegel also reported on Serbian civilians suffering, 
but took a different perspective. They clearly circumvented the link to KLA and rather 
focused on Milošević’s policies as the primary cause for their misery. For example, 
Spiegel’s Renate Flottau wrote that “the Serbs [living] in Kosovo…[felt] like Belgrade 
has deserted them in the middle of their enemy’s land.” The article asserted that 70% of 
the Serbs living outside of Kosovo had no interest in going to war over this ‘historical 
outpost.’643 Similarly, FAZ’s Matthias Rüb revisited the wars Serbia had led against 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and now Kosovo, underlining how exasperated and frustrated 
the Serbian people presumably were with Milošević for dragging them into so many 
wars – all of which had been lost.644 Almost contrary to this picture of helplessness, Rüb 
also described Serbian civilians as accessories to the police, who he claimed had 
“…systematically armed the Serbian civilians.”645 Welt exclusively featured this 
dimension. For example, Boris Kalnoky reported that both sides were preparing for 
violence and “…Serbian civilians were equipped with weapons.” This implied a 
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militarisation of the civilian population and thus their direct involvement in the armed 
conflict.
646
 
The lack of interest for Serbian civilian suffering is presented most clearly when 
considering the quantity of the pictorial coverage of this theme.  
Publication Number of 
images 
between 1 
March and 
30 June 
1998
647
 
No. of 
pictures 
showing 
Kosovo-
Albanians 
as victims 
 
 
% 
No. of 
images 
showing 
Serbians as 
victims 
 
 
% 
Welt 51 17 33% 1 2% 
FAZ 47 19 40% 0 0% 
FR 24 17 71% 0 0% 
taz 38 18 47% 2 5% 
BILD 15 4 27% 0 0% 
Spiegel 42 12 29% 0 0% 
Table 5: Number of images showing victims of violence 
 
As table 5 demonstrates, only Welt and taz featured images of Serbians as victims, 
although even these were so marginal that a casual reader at the time could have easily 
over-looked them. However, only one of the three pictures of Serbian victimhood was 
of a Serbian civilian suffering from the conflict (figure 78).  
  
Figure 79: taz, 23 May 1998, p. 10   Figure 80: Welt, 3 June 1998, p. 1 
 
The other two images (figures 79 and 80) showed Serbian soldiers who had died in 
combat. While this still portrayed them as victims rather than perpetrators, their active 
involvement in the war – rather than being innocent bystanders – was likely to have 
diminished the readers’ sympathy.  
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The Serbian Forces 
 
Departing from the German press’ coverage of the civilians, equally the 
depiction of the perpetrators is worth considering. Surprisingly, detailed information 
about the Serbian forces did not find much attention in the German publications. 
Accordingly, none mentioned how many policemen were in Kosovo, who important 
commanders were and how many people they had killed. This omission portrayed them 
as an undefinable, threatening and omnipresent entity.
648
 This was emphasised by the 
images featured in almost all publications at this time. 
  
Figure 81: Spiegel, 15 June 1998, p. 135   Figure 82: Welt, 11 May 1998, p. 5
  
 
 
Figure 83: taz, 24 April 1998, p. 10 and Spiegel, 16 March 1998, p 179 
 
 
Figure 84: BILD, 1 March 1998, p. 2 
 
The primary message conveyed in these pictures was the Serbian supremacy, for 
example how heavily they were armed. This becomes particularly prevalent when 
considered in conjunction with the previous images of the waves of Kosovo-Albanian 
refugees. Such an opposition created a distinct sense of the victims being Kosovo-
Albanian and Serbian perpetrators. Judging from these images, Milošević’s distinction 
that these were police units and not soldiers
649
 was merely formal. 
The textual coverage portrayed the Serbian army in an equally negative light. In 
one Welt-article, poignantly entitled, “Singing Serbian troops celebrate their ‘slaughter 
party,’” the author described the heavily-armed squads moving from one village to the 
next, wreaking havoc.
650
 Significantly, this piece referred to ‘troops’ rather than the 
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official description of police forces. Perhaps this distinction was included consciously to 
make a statement about this artificial distinction. Another explanation could be that to 
eyewitnesses such as the author, they simply appeared more like troops than policemen. 
A FAZ-article was more explicit on this matter, stating that it had become clear “…that 
Belgrade…[was] not pursuing legitimate police-operations in Kosovo to uphold 
order…but that they…[were] carrying out war.”651 FR did not mention the Serbian 
soldiers at all while Spiegel and BILD only did so once, in a very cursory manner.
652
 
 
 
Milošević – the main culprit? 
 
In spite of these occasional references in the textual and visual coverage, the 
Serbian forces did not play a very prominent role in the German press’ understanding of 
the violence. Rather they repeatedly held Milošević personally responsible for the 
violence. JF was the only exception, mentioning him only once in this period.
653
 As the 
previous section on the causes of the conflict has shown, the German press frequently 
linked historical causes with Milošević’s policies. However, blaming him for the 
renewed violence in Kosovo was not merely embedded within the historical context, but 
was presented in a much more direct manner. For example, Welt’s Boris Kalnoky wrote 
that Milošević was not a “…guarantee for stability, but rather for violence in the 
Balkans.”654 Other articles portrayed him as a manipulative political gambler, or as FR’s 
Rolf Paasch stated “a tactician”655 who would appear to make concessions in 
negotiations while continuing the process of ‘ethnic cleansing’.656 Various pieces in 
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FAZ, BILD and Spiegel referred to him as simply the ‘Serb-leader’657 and reminded the 
reader of Milošević’s decade-long wars of aggression in the Balkans.658 BILD’s 
characterisation of Milošević was particularly memorable due to its tabloidesque 
bluntness. For instance, one editorial referred to him as a ‘butcher’.659 Numerous other 
articles featured over-simplified language which portrayed Milošević personally to be 
the perpetrator. Whether this was intentional or not cannot be determined. For example 
on 13 June, one anonymous article stated that “…65,000 people…[had] been displaced 
since the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević…expelled Albanians from the South-
Serbian province Kosovo.”660  
Interestingly, taz’s treatment differs from the publications considered above. 
While various articles portrayed Milošević to have manipulated the international 
community to attain exactly what he wanted in Kosovo,
661
 he was never directly linked 
to the violence. This is surprising, especially considering the newspaper’s unhalted 
accusations of Milošević being a war-criminal in previous chapters. Moreover, Erich 
Rathfelder and Andreas Zumach, both taz-correspondents during the Bosnia War, 
authored the majority of the articles. Consequently one could suspect that their portrayal 
of Milošević would have been influenced by the Serbian President’s involvement in the 
Srebrenica Massacre, for example. However, the utmost connection Rathfelder made 
between the on-going violence and Milošević was in an editorial, where he stated: 
“Milošević has settled for the military solution.”662 One explanation for this detachment 
could be the attempt to re-assess the new conflict in Kosovo without any preconceptions 
stemming from previous wars.  
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It must be noted that almost all of this treatment of Milošević as the main culprit 
was featured in editorials, which allowed more personal interpretation than ‘normal’ 
articles. Perhaps the larger political context could explain this peculiarity. After the 
Bosnian War had ended, Milošević had not been indicted for war-crimes, nor had he 
been ousted from power in Belgrade. Consequently the publications could have seen 
him as more politically stable. As a result, linking Milošević personally to the renewed 
violence in Kosovo could have been deemed more interpretation or conjecture than fact 
at this early stage in the conflict and thus been predominantly published in editorials 
rather than articles. This preference of a format that allowed more editorial freedom is 
further underlined with the use of cartoons. All four daily newspapers, except for BILD 
which did not use this medium at all, published caricatures to present a direct causal 
link between Milošević and the violence. The cartoons published in this timeframe can 
be categorised into abstract and graphic styles. Starting with the former, the more 
detached examples could be found in FR and in one case Welt.  
  
Figure 85: FR, 9 April 1998, p. 1   Figure 86: FR, 13 June 98, p. 1 
 
 
Figure 87: Welt, 22 June 1998, p. 4 
 
All three caricatures depicted Milošević as the omnipotent ruler over Kosovo. 
Moreover, all three included direct criticism of the international community’s failure to 
stop him. This denigration was significantly absent in the articles, which as mentioned 
previously, never accused ‘the West’ of failing in Kosovo.663 In the Welt-cartoon (figure 
87), this is emphasised by the small and ineffective bee labelled ‘NATO’ buzzing 
around Milošević, but unable to harm or stop him. The noticeable size-difference of an 
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oversized Milošević sweeping Kosovo away underlined how easy the Serbian President 
was finding the process due to the uneven distribution of power.  
 The second category also focused on Milošević, but presented the violence he 
was blamed for much more explicitly.  
 
Figure 88: Welt, 6 June 1998, p. 4 
 
The Welt-cartoon was the most explicit in some respects, featuring him with blood-
stained hands and armed with a gun. However, it also used more abstract commentary 
through the introduction of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ showing Milošević hanging up a 
‘cleansed’ shirt labelled ‘Serbia’. Similarly, the caricatures in FAZ and taz also 
emphasised the brute force administered by the Serbian President very graphically. 
 
Figure 89: FAZ, 4 March 1998, p. 10 
 
Figure 90: taz, 30 June 1998, p. 12: “Would you kindly get out of here, this is my domestic 
concern!!” 
 
 
Both showed Milošević holding a blood-covered club. Considering the previous 
analysis of taz’s textual reporting, which did not link Milošević to the on-going 
violence, this cartoon expresses the opposite. However, it must be emphasised that taz’s 
cartoon was singular and can be seen as an exception and perhaps expressed the 
personal opinion of the caricaturist. This in turn underlines the artistic freedom cartoons 
offered and that their message did not necessarily have to mirror other interpretations 
offered in the newspaper. FAZ’s cartoon on the other hand reinforced the broadsheet’s 
textual coverage, portraying Milošević as a General who after Vukovar, Sarajevo and 
Srebrenica had also added Kosovo to his victories. This is particularly meaningful, as it 
distinctly linked Milošević to past war-crimes such as Srebrenica and simultaneously 
placed the violence in Kosovo on the same level as this instance of Bosnian genocide.  
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A further FAZ-cartoon is also worth noting, as it introduced a hitherto dormant 
issue.  
 
Figure 91: FAZ, 18 March 1998, p. 9 
 
Portraying Milošević as a Chetnik soldier holding an old-fashioned weapon, and 
Kosovo dressed in a traditional Muslim outfit, it underlined the perception of outdated, 
savage violence and implied that the region was ‘different’ and backward. Moreover, 
Milošević’s sign, “We do not tolerate interference” commented on his repeated 
insistence that Kosovo was a domestic issue. In the background, Muslim villages are 
burning, identifiable by the minaret and mosque. With this detail the cartoon raised the 
religious dimension of the conflict which was missing nearly completely in the articles.  
As the secondary literature reveals, Kosovo-Albanians are predominantly 
Muslim while Serbians are largely Christian-Orthodox. However the former were not 
simply referred to as ‘Muslims’, as had been the case with Bosniaks in the German print 
coverage of the Bosnia War. Indeed, a reader at the time, gathering his knowledge about 
Kosovo exclusively from the press would not even have been aware of this religious 
divide; it was mentioned in only two articles. A FAZ-article stated that “most of the 
Albanians are Sunni Muslims, though there are also around 50,000 Christians among 
them.”664 A Spiegel-article quoted a Serbian living in Kosovo who stated that until 
1996, “...Serbian and Albanian families celebrated the holidays together, in spite of 
different religions.” However, now each group was segregated and barricaded 
themselves behind a wall of fear, as the article’s title indicates.665 While both articles 
alluded to religion as a potential cause for the conflict, it was not explored in more 
depth and was also a notable omission in the secondary literature. This over-sight could 
be explained with the focus on Milošević and his destructive policies to explain the 
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renewed violence in early 1998. Presumably this resulted from his role in the preceding 
wars in Bosnia and Croatia. However, by placing him in the centre of the narrative, the 
Kosovo Conflict was portrayed as a ‘simple’ war of nationalist aggression, disregarding 
possible larger systemic issues.  
 
 
The Kosovo Liberation Army 
 
This heightened interest in Milošević as an individual and subsequent disregard 
for possible alternative causes of the conflict introduces a further theme: the German 
press’ representation of the KLA. The portrayal of the Kosovo-Albanian combatants 
was a contentious issue, as the army had been labelled a ‘terrorist organisation’ by 
Robert Gelbard, Bill Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans in early 1998.666 This was 
harshly criticised in all newspapers except for FR, Konkret and BILD. The 
argumentation brought forth – mostly in editorials – stated that while the attribute 
‘terrorist’ may be accurate, officially calling it such gave the Serbian forces reason to 
continue the massacres and persecution of Kosovo-Albanians.
667
 Perhaps as a reaction 
to Gelbard’s negative assessment, the publications used a plethora of explicitly positive 
terms, ostentatiously avoiding the label ‘terrorist’. Accordingly, terms including 
‘independence fighters’,668 ‘freedom fighters’669 or ‘underground army’670 replaced 
more accurate labels such as ‘soldiers.’ This nomenclature used in almost all 
publications suggests a positive disposition towards the KLA’s cause.  
Only four exceptions could be found, namely in Welt, BILD, Konkret and JF. 
While one Welt-article referred to ‘Albanian nationalists,’ which had negative over-
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tones, a BILD-article described the KLA as outright ‘illegal.’671 The articles in Konkret 
and JF were much more explicit. JF’s Alexander Beermann asserted that the KLA had 
contributed to the escalating conflict, reminding his reader that “…no ethnic conflict 
only has ‘good guys’ on one side and ‘bad guys’ on the other.” He continued that while 
this was sometimes forgotten in the German news coverage, “…some of the...UÇK’s 
actions were utter terror, which cost the lives of innocent Serbian civilians…”672 This 
phrasing was the closest even these more sceptical articles came to labelling the KLA a 
‘terrorist organisation.’ Similarly, Konkret’s Ralf Schröder expressed his disbelief that 
the Kurdish PKK, the Irish IRA and Basque ETA were all deemed ‘terror organisations’ 
while in Kosovo “…a bandit…[becomes a] ‘fighter’, a gang of murderers a ‘liberation 
army’…”673   
 In spite of this evasive treatment of KLA, Welt and FAZ offered their readers 
detailed dossiers about the army, while simultaneously acknowledging that many details 
remained unknown. In fact, the depth of knowledge that could be obtained from these 
articles is equal to what is now available in the academic literature on the KLA. FAZ’s 
Rüb reported that in 1996 the KLA first came into appearance with assassinations of 
Serbian policemen and political functionaries and that ‘KLA-fighters’ were pursuing 
guerrilla tactics rather than a conventional conflict with front-lines.
674
 Rüb’s referral to 
fighters manifests a more straightforward treatment of KLA than other FAZ-articles 
featured. Welt’s Kalnoky also authored an in-depth dossier, reporting that “a ‘Kosovo 
Liberation Army’, which no one…[seemed] to know anything about – [for example] 
who its leader…[was] and who…[was] fighting for them – had their first battle in 
November.” Now they were becoming increasingly active in Drenica, a heavily 
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embattled region in Kosovo, which they “…triumphantly declared ‘Serb-free 
territory.’”675 This article succinctly summarised the problem regarding the KLA: on the 
one hand they undeniably existed and were militarily active; on the other hand very few 
details were known about them. As a result it was very difficult to know how best to 
portray them. 
Nonetheless, both FAZ and Welt attempted to offer as many details as was 
possible at this time. Welt’s Kalnoky demonstrated his diligent research by drawing on a 
report by “a Western secret service” which stated that the KLA allegedly consisted of 
several hundred exiled Albanians and had its headquarters in Germany. The man in 
charge was thought to be Bujar Bukoshi, the Kosovo-Albanian Prime Minister who 
lived in Geneva. The army was known to have training camps in Northern Albania, 
from where they also obtained their weapons.
676
 This indicates an increasing level of 
organisation and of professional skill, which is reiterated by other articles published in 
April, reporting that KLA-soldiers could now be seen wearing uniforms.
677
 Various 
FAZ-articles drew on official KLA-communiqués, which described their recent military 
actions.
678
 While they did not give many details regarding for example the number of 
Serbian policemen or civilians they had killed, they did provide information such as 
where and when the Serbian forces had been pushed back. Though the FAZ-
correspondents mentioned that these communiqués were sent directly to the 
newspaper’s local office – indicating an easy access to the information – no other daily 
newspapers utilised them. Spiegel was the only other publication to cite these 
communiqués.
679
 The broadsheets’ active interest to research and assess the Kosovo-
Albanian combatants suggests a very straight-forward approach to the subject matter. 
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However, what also becomes clear is that these dossiers functioned as a survey of the 
mysterious KLA and its origins. None included any prognostic analyses of how the 
KLA may develop or how this could impact the conflict in general. Both broadsheets 
published pictures of Kosovo-Albanian soldiers, demonstrating that they did not shy 
away even from visual representations.  
   
Figure 92: FAZ, 4 March 1998, p. 10  Figure 93: Welt, 24 June 1998, p. 8 
 
  
These two images also functioned as proof for the KLA’s existence while 
simultaneously corroborating that the KLA-soldiers were uniformed and well-armed, 
indicating a high level of organisation. Consequently they further substantiated the 
portrayal of the KLA in the two broadsheets. 
While this level of investigative reporting was unique to Welt and FAZ, other 
publications also devoted their attention to the Kosovo-Albanian combatants. Here two 
main themes were prevalent: the smuggling of weapons and contrasting or even 
justifying KLA’s activities with civilian suffering. Commencing with the latter FAZ, FR 
and taz
680
 all offered an explanation for this increased militarisation of the conflict by 
juxtaposing Kosovo-Albanian civilian suffering with the army’s activities. For example, 
various FAZ-articles published in March had mentioned that the Drenica region was a 
KLA-stronghold where its soldiers were heavily armed and highly respected by the 
local population.
681
 Only a few weeks later, in late-March, Rüb revisited the region. The 
correspondent reported that various ‘operations’ by the Serbian police had led to 80 
civilians losing their lives; many people now lived in refugee camps. Such events, Rüb 
wrote, strengthened the support for the KLA, which would fight back against the 
“overpowering Serbian police.”682 This contrasting of the Kosovo-Albanian suffering 
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and the hope given by the KLA created the impression that the latter, while an illegal 
military formation, was the only hope for the civilians to gain security. 
Similarly FR’s articles portrayed the KLA as taking “…revenge for the 
Albanians who had been killed during the weekend”683 and that it was “…finding more 
and more adherents due to the increasing oppression from the Serbs.”684 A further FR-
article quoted Venton Surroi, the editor of a Kosovar newspaper, Koha Ditore, who 
called the KLA “…‘a kind of peasant-guerrilla that is trying to protect its own villages 
and families.’” The same article also stated that it “…has prevented larger 
massacres…”685 An account by Stephan Israel echoed that many young men were 
joining the KLA. Quoting the 18-year-old Adnan Fetahu who stated “…‘we don’t just 
want to allow ourselves to be butchered’…”686 their armed struggle was presented as 
comprehensible.  
 Spiegel’s articles took a slightly more nuanced approach. The news-magazine 
explained KLA’s popularity by illuminating the social problems of Albanians in 
Kosovo, especially young people, such as high unemployment and a frustration with 
politics.
687
 However, unlike other publications, Spiegel portrayed the KLA as having a 
negative effect on the region. It argued that the attacks initiated by the “mysterious 
‘Liberation Army’” in turn provoked revenge massacres by the Serbian police and was 
consequently pushing the region closer to war. Writing that “these fanatics use[d] all 
means, no number of victims…[was] too high”, the anonymous author painted what 
appears to be extraordinarily detrimental picture of the KLA.
688
 However, it only seems 
to stand out as negative when compared to the overwhelmingly positive coverage in 
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other publications. When considering the assessment independently, it actually reflects 
some of the findings in other sources, for example the Amnesty International report.
689
 
 The second theme prominent in the coverage of the KLA was the smuggling of 
weapons. As mentioned in the secondary literature, the army obtained its weapons from 
Albanian arms depots, which could be accessed after Enver Hoxha’s communist state 
had collapsed in 1997 and chaos ensued.
690
 While the smuggling of weapons from 
Albania to Kosovo seemed to be the only viable option to increase its military power, 
this was naturally a controversial matter, as the source was a collapsed state and the 
smuggling of weapons can be seen as a main element of a terrorist organisation – a label 
the media was avoiding. BILD, Welt and FR covered the smuggling in a very superficial 
manner, merely alluding to its existence in side-notes.
691
 This cursory treatment linked 
with FR’s previously mentioned portrayal of the KLA as the only hope for the 
oppressed Kosovo-Albanians suggests sympathy for its activities. Welt’s omission of 
the army’s illegal procurement of weapons in light of the broadsheet’s previously 
mentioned detailed dossier also indicates a mild treatment of the Kosovo-Albanian 
combatants. BILD’s single reference to the topic was embedded in an interesting piece 
marked by the omission of certain details. In late June an anonymous article reported 
that at least 22 people died in the last days; including “…10 Albanians in Kosovo [who] 
were shot by Yugoslav border troops.”692 The mention of the border troops linked with 
the timing of the account makes it clear that this incident occurred in the course of 
smuggling weapons from Albania to Kosovo. However, this was not mentioned by this 
or any other BILD-article, leaving the theme unexplored and allowing the reader to have 
the impression that ordinary Albanians were being massacred. 
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Spiegel, taz and FAZ on the other hand devoted more attention to this topic. In 
an article by taz’s Erich Rathfelder, he reported new attacks with fatalities. “The dead, 
aged between 20 and 37, had tried to smuggle weapons across the border a week 
earlier…” This statement was quickly qualified with the assessment: “these are 
amateurs who have prepared themselves to stand against professionals.”693 Rathfelder 
repeated this contrast between laypersons and experts in a later article published in 
June.
694
 Equally, by including their age, Rathfelder emphasised the youth and therefore 
the innocence of the victims. Interestingly, he never considered that these young men 
were actually of fighting age, may have been KLA-members and not simply ‘in the 
wrong place, at the wrong time.’ 
Various FAZ-articles portrayed KLA’s activities in a similarly favourable 
manner.
695
 However, the most ardent support was articulated in an editorial written by 
FAZ-editor, Johann Georg Reißmüller:  
the fewer weapons arrive from Albania and elsewhere for the Albanians in Kosovo, the more 
peaceful it will get, because the Serbs will encounter less and less defence in their oppression of 
the Albanians. Is this the kind of peace the West wants?
696
  
This outright endorsement for KLA’s smuggling of weapons is underlined by a picture 
showing mules carrying small loads of weapons. This image – remarkably the only 
picture in all newspapers showing the smuggling – aimed to underline how futile the 
attempts were and that the KLA probably did not have much hope of winning its cause 
if this was how their supplies were being replenished. This is especially brought to the 
fore when compared with the portrayal of Serbian forces and tanks considered earlier. 
 
Figure 94: FAZ, 17 June 1998, p. 11 
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Spiegel’s articles also portrayed KLA’s procurement of weapons as a useless endeavour, 
which could not effectively counter the organised Serbian military forces. Learning 
about mules that carried Kalashnikovs and anti-tank rocket launchers from Albania, the 
reader gained the sense that the process was very hard and ungrateful.
697
 Moreover such 
descriptions portrayed the KLA to be rather quaint and unperilous. In that sense it 
qualifies the written reports of attacks on Serbian soldiers because the image rather 
evokes a sense of optimistic and somewhat futile efforts against an unconquerable 
opponent. 
 JF differed from all publications above, as its articles neither addressed the 
smuggling of weapons, nor did they justify civilian suffering with the KLA’s activities. 
However, in mid-March 1998, JF published an interview with Bujar Bukoshi, the 
elusive Prime-Minister of the Kosovo-Albanian shadow-state who was thought to be in 
charge of the army. In this unique interview, JF’s Gerhard Quast asked Bukoshi who 
was to blame for the conflict, which the interviewee attributed to “…Serbian politics 
[and its] criminal politicians…” After rejecting that Kosovo was Serbia’s internal affair, 
as Milošević continually claimed, Bukoshi continued that the KLA was gaining support 
from the Kosovo-Albanian population and was developing into their “…only beacon of 
hope…”698 This interview is remarkable because it de-mystified Bukoshi who was 
frequently portrayed as one of many unattainable KLA-leaders in exile. If JF, being a 
relatively small German newspaper with limited funds, was able reach him, surely other 
publications with more resources for investigative reporting could also have interviewed 
him. Moreover, this interview – which did not contain any sceptical or critical questions 
– departed from JF’s previous more pro-Serbian stance. While KLA was deemed a 
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military organisation, it also conveyed Bukoshi’s view that this was the only hope for 
the Kosovo-Albanians.  
 
As the above section has shown, the Kosovo-Albanian combatants were 
acknowledged and reported on in all publications, though the coverage was dominantly 
in favour of KLA’s activities. In spite of these detailed insights about the army’s 
structure and acquisition of weapons produced by the German press, Kosovo’s leader, 
Ibrahim Rugova, who insisted that his pacifist policies were the only correct path to 
attain independence, continually denied that a militarised formation existed.
699
 For 
example, FAZ and Spiegel reported Rugova’s claim that the KLA was an invention of 
Serbian propaganda.
700
 When it was no longer possible to deny the army, Rugova made 
declarations such as: “the KLA mostly consists of normal civilians, who want to defend 
their homes”701 or “I am convinced that the KLA would also listen to my command,”702 
which articles in FAZ and Spiegel cited. Rugova’s assertions disregarded the 
independent command structure the KLA had established and its systematic expansion 
through training camps. Interestingly, none of the publications criticised Rugova for 
these naïve assessments of the developments in his own country. Arguably undermining 
and discrediting Rugova publicly would have hurt the cause of Kosovo’s struggle for 
autonomy or even independence, which the print media – in this case very partial – 
found easier to avoid. 
This publication of Rugova’s claims without further queries or criticisms 
introduces the question if his statements were truly naïve, or rather a deliberate deceit 
by the media to uphold clear categories and a linear narrative. One could speculate that 
Rugova was publicly presenting himself as a pacifist to please ‘the West’ while secretly 
                                                 
699
 Petritsch and Pichler, Kosovo-Kosova, p. 102.  
700
 Matthias Rüb, “Spannungen zwischen Belgrad und Tirana“, FAZ, 20.04.1998, p. 7 and Anonymous, 
“‘Kollektiver Selbstmord’”, Spiegel, 09.03.1998, p. 148. 
701
 AFP/AP/Reuters/epd, “Aufruf zur Kontrolle der UCK”, FAZ, 20.06.1998, p. 7.  
702
 Anonymous, “‘Wir wollen Luftangriffe’”, Spiegel, 22.06.1998, p. 126. 
218 
 
supporting the KLA. Such musings can never be confirmed without a personal 
interview with Rugova, who passed away in 2006; though one could not be assured of 
the veracity of his answers. However, during the later Rambouillet peace talks (March 
1999), where Rugova as well as KLA-delegates were represented, it became clear that 
the former truly was opposed to the army’s violent means and belonged to a very 
different faction of Kosovar politics. Indeed, some accounts revealed that Rugova 
refused to speak to and negotiate with his KLA-counterparts, enraging the EU and 
American diplomats.
703
 
 
 
Language and Authorship 
 
In the course of this coverage, the intricacies of language in the different 
publications are worth considering; starting with the simple nomenclature utilised to 
refer to the two sides. As the violence was unfolding, all newspapers except Spiegel and 
Konkret, published details of ambushes. Due to their weekly or monthly publication 
cycles, neither reported on the day-to-day fighting and rather covered larger themes. 
The choice of words used to describe these incidents is revealing. All referred to the 
“fighting between Albanians and Serbian police”. In other words, the Serbian side 
consisted of armed forces, which were juxtaposed with the general term ‘Albanians’, 
rather than its equivalent, KLA-soldiers.
704
 There were some exceptions, for example 
various articles referred to ‘armed Albanians.’705 Moreover the dossiers in Welt and 
FAZ discussed previously, intermittently referred to KLA’s members as combatants. 
However, these were rare exceptions and were clearly outweighed by the day-to-day 
reporting which avoided terms such as ‘KLA-soldiers’ or ‘Kosovo-Albanian fighters.’  
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The early stages of the Kosovo Conflict were marked by massacres and the 
expulsion of the civilian population. All newspapers except JF used the phrase ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ for the violence, although its specific utilisation differed. Firstly, Welt, FAZ 
and Spiegel always used the term in quotation marks. FR and BILD were not consistent, 
at times using quotations marks and omitting them at other times. taz on the other hand 
never used quotation marks. This suggests a conscious assertion that ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
was indeed taking place and was not merely an abstract term. Moreover FAZ, taz and 
Spiegel only used the term when they were reporting on assessments made by 
politicians, frequently quoting the Kosovo-Albanian President Ibrahim Rugova.
706
 This 
could indicate a certain avoidance to use the term of their own accord. Considering the 
wider context, this reluctance to refer to ‘ethnic cleansing’ is inconclusive. While the 
term had been used constantly during the Bosnian War, there had not been any incidents 
where the application of the term had been criticised, let alone contested. Conversely, 
the more post-war information was becoming available about mass-graves being found 
in Bosnia, the more the use of the term was legitimated. Perhaps there was a general 
awareness not to overindulge the term. 
Nonetheless, FR, Welt and BILD
707
 also used the term independently, both in 
articles as well as editorials, though not very frequently. For example one FR-article 
stated that “the Belgrade regime…[did] not want any witnesses of the ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’“708 Similarly, Welt’s Kalnoky wrote that observers were starting to fear that 
Milošević would “…solve the problem like he had in Bosnia, namely ‘ethnic 
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cleansing’.”709 This use of the term again suggests the perception that ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
was being implemented by Belgrade. Moreover the Welt-article implied a heightened 
awareness of the subject due to the previous Bosnian War. This will be explored later in 
this chapter. 
Conversely, the term ‘genocide’ was scarcely used. taz did not include the term 
at all in this four-month-period, and FR only used it once, when directly quoting 
Rugova.
710
 Spiegel and FAZ only employed it in the context of the debate surrounding a 
potential UN or NATO intervention and under what circumstances this would be 
justified.
711
 The context for these articles was the on-going debate amongst international 
politicians whether it would be legitimate to initiate a NATO-intervention in Kosovo 
even without a UN-mandate. Russia and China had indicated very clearly that they 
would veto any resolution in the UN-Security Council that would give NATO a 
mandate to intervene militarily, stating that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia and thus an 
‘internal affair.’ Consequently many international politicians – including Bill Clinton 
and Klaus Kinkel – were advocating a NATO-intervention without a UN-mandate, even 
though this would be against international law. They believed that the extensive human 
rights violations, and as Spiegel and FAZ reported the threat of genocide, could justify 
such an international initiative.   
There is one remarkable article published by FAZ which reported that an OSCE-
ambassador in Tirana had received a “truly horrible report” about people being put in 
camps “…which possibly resemble those we have seen in other parts of the world.”712 
This ominous but indirect reference to the concentration camps in Bosnia of the early 
1990s and the Third Reich was not mentioned by any other newspaper, nor did FAZ 
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follow up on this matter, implying that the initial report was not substantiated. However, 
the willingness to publish this suspicion underlines the sensitivity of the newspaper to 
elements resembling ‘genocide’.  
However, the conservative Welt and BILD were not as discerning, using the term 
sparingly, but with considerable force.
713
 For example, in early March Welt’s Kalnoky 
alleged that the Serbian policy of massacres carried “…the signature of a coolly 
organised genocide.”714 The BILD-article explicitly stated that Milošević was pursuing 
genocide in Kosovo.
715
 It is worth pausing to think about these allegations. With the 
benefit of hindsight, one can consult various documents by the UN and Amnesty 
International to find that the crimes perpetrated by Serbian police forces between March 
and June 1998 did not constitute genocide.
716
 While this can be said with certainty now, 
it remains incomprehensible why the two Springer-publications Welt and BILD chose to 
utilise the term. The evidence available at the time indicated that Kosovo-Albanian 
civilians were being expelled from their homes and at times massacred. While observers 
confirmed a certain system in the Serbian course of action, there had been no accounts 
of ‘genocide’ thus far. While the hyperbole of utilising the term could be brushed off as 
sensationalism typical for the tabloid BILD, the same cannot be said for the broadsheet 
Welt. Perhaps a continued desire to discredit Milošević fuelled the misplacement of this 
term. Significantly, these idiosyncrasies were largely found in articles written by the 
publications’ own correspondents rather than those authored by press agencies or pieced 
together from press releases. This reveals that the articles featuring particularly 
significant terms or embellished references to KLA-soldiers were not by-products of 
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other sources or casual references, but rather mirrored the interpretation sanctioned by 
the publications’ editors-in-chief.  
These considerations introduce the wider theme of authorship. The distribution 
of these articles according to their source is best presented by quantity. 
Newspaper Total number 
of articles 
published 
% of articles 
authored by 
correspondents 
% of articles 
authored by 
press agencies 
% of articles 
amalgamated 
from various 
press releases, 
etc. 
Welt 230 54% 27% 5% 
FAZ 299 73% 26% 0.3% 
FR 198 43% 56% 0% 
taz 174 57% 43% 0% 
Table 6: Percentages of articles according to authorship
717
 
 
The above table indicates that in this timeframe, all daily broadsheets aside from FR 
published the majority of their articles authored by the publications’ own Balkan-
correspondents. The presence of international correspondents in the Drenica region and 
the expenses associated with this indicates a heightened level of interest at this early 
stage of the Kosovo conflict amongst the German media. Unfortunately, none of the 
articles produced by the publications’ correspondents offered any insights into their 
daily work routine amidst this renewed violence in Kosovo or how they gathered 
information for their pieces. 
However, Rathfelder’s memoir, Kosovo (2010), offers a unique understanding 
regarding the method of research he and probably his colleagues from other publications 
were pursuing. One must make allowances when considering this information that the 
author presumably used his memoir to present himself in a favourable way. Writing 
about his experiences in Drenica in early March 1998, Rathfelder recalls that they were 
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exploring the region in a cross-country vehicle, driving through forests and hidden roads 
to avoid Serbian forces.
718
 Dodging Serbian military jeeps and shots fired at his car, 
Rathfelder underlines how adventurous and dangerous his investigative reporting 
was.
719
 No such background details were published in the correspondents’ articles at the 
time, which underlines how little the reader learned about the perils of journalism in 
Kosovo.  
 
 
 The Weight of History: Bosnia and World War Two 
 
While such information remained unknown to the reader at the time, one more 
present feature was the cross-references to the Bosnian War and the Second World War 
in the German press’ coverage of the violence in Kosovo. Starting with the former, all 
publications except JF and Konkret repeatedly referenced the previous Bosnian War 
during the emerging Kosovo Conflict. In various cases, these were introduced in 
citations of speeches by international politicians, including Richard Holbrooke, Bill 
Clinton, Javier Solana, Joschka Fischer and Kofi Annan. All of them warned that 
Kosovo could become a ‘second Bosnia’, as was reported in various publications.720 
This caution was frequently deemed self-explanatory, though some contained a 
reference to the Serbian massacres of Bosnian civilians to further explain these 
comparisons. In addition, some of the newspapers’ own correspondents also drew on 
this analogy. Significantly, these instances were marked by the overriding message that 
‘the West’ was once again allowing Milošević to wreak havoc, as he had in Bosnia.721  
However, the strongest accusation and most emotive comparisons to Bosnia 
appeared in editorials. For example, Rathfelder’s taz-editorial published in late-May 
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accused: “as [had] already occurred in Bosnia, Europe…[was] acting irresponsibly…the 
war in Kosovo continue[d] unabated, even with increased intensity. However, 
Europe…[was] looking away.”722 A month later, BILD’s Georg Gafron deplored in an 
editorial:  
again massacres against innocent people!...This time the butchers of Serb-President Milošević 
are going about their business in Kosovo….NATO must act now, even though it’s almost too 
late again. A second Bosnia must not happen!
723
    
Various examples in Welt evoked a similar sense of urgency by comparing Kosovo to 
Bosnia.
724
 In early March Kalnoky wrote two separate editorials stating that just like in 
Bosnia, we were seeing “depressing pictures of fleeing civilians on tractors”725 and as in 
the previous war, the Serbian tactic did not “…allow mercy for the victims and does not 
want witnesses for is crimes.”726 These loaded analogies to the Bosnian War helped the 
reader recall the images seen just a few years ago, making the events in Kosovo more 
pressing. These conjured images created a sense of urgency to act which may else not 
have appeared this early on. 
In addition to the allusions made to the previous war in Bosnia, taz, Spiegel, FR 
and FAZ also made specific references to the Srebrenica Massacre.
727
 The two Spiegel-
articles referred to Srebrenica as the central reason for why NATO was considering an 
intervention in Kosovo much more quickly than in Bosnia, possibly even without a UN-
mandate.
728
 A potential NATO-intervention without a UN-mandate was naturally 
controversial and had also been picked up in a FAZ-article on 10 June, which quoted 
Germany’s Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, who, remembering Srebrenica stated that 
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“…there are situations in which it could be immoral not to deploy soldiers.”729 Two 
days later, in his FR-editorial, Rolf Paasch asked the poignant question: “an intervention 
in breach of international law or a second Srebrenica? What would you rather have to 
answer to?”730 
However, Srebrenica and the recent Bosnian War were not the only historical 
milestones alluded to in the coverage. References to the Second World War could also 
be found in the coverage, though significantly only in FR and Welt. FR’s correspondent 
Paasch warned that Germany should not get too involved in a potential military 
response against Milošević. After all, Serbia was a country “…in which German 
bombers and German troops caused a lot of destruction in the past.”731 The conservative 
Welt took a different stance on the matter. In an editorial, Kalnoky addressed an 
accusation made frequently by the Serbian propaganda that Germany was pursuing a 
‘Fourth Reich’ by getting involved in the Balkans. The first time this term was used 
occurred in 1991 when Germany recognised Croatia’s independence before the other 
EU-countries. From then on, Serbian politicians and state-controlled media outlets 
voiced this accusation regularly throughout the Bosnian War. When the Serbian media 
accused Germany of constructing a “…fascist ‘fourth Reich’....” again in 1998, Welt’s 
correspondent dismissed these allegations as Serbian propaganda reminiscent of the 
Bosnian War, instead emphasising Milošević’s continual rampages in the Balkans.732 
Comparing these sparse references to the coverage in 1991/92, as the Bosnian War was 
developing, it is clear that significantly less attention was paid to the Second World War 
as the Kosovo Conflict was developing. The scant references are highly significant and 
suggest that after initial difficulties, the German print media no longer saw Germany’s 
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active involvement in Europe’s foreign affairs, even military involvement, as 
problematic due to the country’s past. 
227 
 
Chapter 6 
January 1999: The ‘Račak Massacre’ 
 
On 15 January 1999, 45 people were killed in a Kosovo-Albanian village called 
Račak, though it remains contested whether the fatalities were massacred civilians, as 
the KLA and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) claimed, or 
if they were KLA-soldiers who died in combat as Belgrade asserted. This incident has 
found considerable attention in the secondary literature and is frequently included as 
one of the important milesones that led to NATO’s military intervention in March 
1999.
733
 Numerous secondary sources
734
 and primary accounts
735
 mention Račak, 
emphasising the catalytic role it had in the international community’s engagement in 
Kosovo. For example, Heinz Loquai alleged in his monograph that the Račak 
‘massacre’ was exploited “…for an increased intensification of the conflict and as a 
justification for a further military escalation.”736 Wolfgang Petritsch echoed this 
interpretation, stating that “the pressure to find a quick solution in light of the 
developments which had spun out of control was reinforced by the media’s handling of 
the events around Račak/Reçak.”737 
As there is no generally accepted narrative of the incident, this chapter will 
firstly give an account of the events before proceeding to the media analysis of German 
publications. Following the initial surge of violence in 1998 discussed in the previous 
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chapter, a ceasefire known as the Holbrooke-Milošević-Agreement was negotiated on 
13 October, 1998. This stipulated amongst other points that 2000 unarmed OSCE-
observers headed by the American diplomat William Walker would monitor Kosovo 
and ensure that the ceasefire was adhered to.
738
 Nevertheless, both Serbian and Kosovo-
Albanian combatants continued their military endeavours on a small yet persistent scale, 
consolidating their strength.
739
 Soon conflict escalated “…around the country, with 
Račak being one of the ‘hot spots’” where 45 people were killed.740 Previously, on 8 
and 10 January, two Serbian soldiers had been ambushed and killed by KLA-fighters 
from Račak, a KLA stronghold.741 In retaliation, Serbian forces moved towards Račak, 
where fighting broke out between Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian combatants during the 
morning of the 15 January. Serbian soldiers pushed back the KLA and took over the 
village. According to Judah, 
twenty-three men were...taken away. Shooting was heard at 3.00 pm...The villagers thought that the 
23 had been taken to Štimlje police station, but…at 4.00 a.m., according to the testimonies given to 
Human Rights Watch, the villagers discovered the bodies.
742
  
These bodies were found in a ditch while other fatalities were detected in various 
locations in the village. When the bodies were discovered on 16 January 1999, Walker 
immediately labelled the incident a ‘massacre’ and ‘grave crime against humanity’ in a 
press conference and blamed the Serbian forces for the atrocities.
743
 Although these 
were his personal conclusions and lacked judicial or forensic evidence, his accusation 
was widely echoed in the international media.  
Based on this sequence of events, the killings in Račak could accurately be 
termed a ‘massacre.’ However, sceptical voices in the international media, for example 
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The Guardian and Le Monde and within the OSCE itself expressed their reservations, 
deeming Walker’s assessment too unreflected and one-sided.744 Moreover, the Serbian 
government vehemently contested this version and maintained that all the fatalities were 
KLA-soldiers who had fallen in combat and had later been changed into civilian 
clothing by the KLA to make the incident appear as a ‘massacre’ of innocent victims.745  
Due to these competing perceptions of the events in Račak, it is worth 
considering how the secondary literature and primary accounts label the incident. 
Starting with the latter, the works produced by actors
746
 involved at the time refer to 
Račak as a ‘massacre’ without any qualifications and add to the general perception that 
the victims were civilian.
747
 The secondary literature on the other hand was more 
discerning. While Roland Friedrich’s seminal work on German foreign and security 
policy towards Kosovo avoids the term ‘massacre’ altogether, referring instead to 
‘events,’ Loquai’s carefully researched monograph places it in quotation marks. The 
latter explains that as there has never been an in-depth criminal investigation, the term 
cannot be used.
748
 Following this example and due to the remaining ambiguities 
surrounding the incident, the term ‘massacre’ will only be used in this chapter when in 
direct citations, or else placed it in quotation marks. 
Regardless of the competing version of events in Račak, the international 
community perceived the incident as an indisputable breach of the cease-fire by Serbian 
forces and as a sign that the violence in Kosovo would persist unless diplomatic and 
military pressure was applied. In spite of this increased international interest and the 
importance of Račak attributed by the secondary literature, this controversial incident 
has not received much attention in the field of media analyses. While there are several 
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well-researched studies, particularly on the months of NATO’s bombardment,749 very 
few scholars have considered the events that preceded it, including the Račak incident. 
Mark Wolfgram’s media analysis entitled “Democracy and Propaganda: NATO’s War 
in Kosovo” is the only exception, though its academic usefulness is limited aside from 
its background information. In the abstract, Wolfgram explained his project as follows:  
This article uses…the fighting at Račak [as one of three examples]…to illustrate how democratic 
governments in the US and Germany attempted to manipulate public perceptions of the Kosovo 
conflict to justify the 1999 war.
750
 
Yet the author does not quote a single German government document or protocol of a 
Bundestag-debate to substantiate his bold claim of manipulation on behalf of the 
German government. Moreover he only quoted three articles from the German print 
media, two from Spiegel and one from the daily broadsheet Süddeutsche Zeitung. This 
small sample size combined with limited primary sources renders his conclusions 
questionable.  
Analysing the German press coverage between 15 January to 24 March 1999
751
 
– from the day of the killings until the first day of the NATO-intervention – this chapter 
examines the coverage of three important developments: firstly, the Račak incident 
itself, secondly, the publication of the autopsy examination and lastly, the domestic 
debate surrounding German involvement in a potential NATO-intervention. AJW will 
not be included in this chapter. During the selected timeframe, as the newspaper did not 
publish any articles about Račak, Kosovo, or the German involvement in a prospective 
NATO-intervention in this timeframe. This complete lack of interest is congruent with 
the development already traced in the previous chapter and can likely be explained with 
the absence of a notable Jewish community in Kosovo. The closest the paper came to 
covering any events in Kosovo was on 22 January 1999 in an article that covered the 
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Jewish community in Sarajevo and what it meant to re-build a life after a war. However 
the piece did not contain any cross-references to Kosovo.
752
  
 
 
The Račak Incident in the German press 
 
All other publications analysed here devoted considerable attention to Račak. 
Remarkably, all daily newspapers except for BILD reported on 16 January 1999 – one 
day after the incident and before further information had become available – that there 
had been fighting in Račak and according to the Serbian information centre in Priština, 
15 KLA-fighters had died.
753
 The willingness on behalf of Welt, FAZ, FR and taz to 
publish information based on Serbian sources indicates that these newspapers’ 
correspondents did not exclusively rely on Kosovo-Albanian information. Following a 
weekend during which more information had become available and the head of the 
OSCE-mission in Kosovo, Walker, had issued his statement condemning the Serbian 
atrocities, all daily papers stated from 18 January onwards that the incident in Račak 
was a ‘massacre’ of 45 Kosovo-Albanian civilians. None qualified that this term was 
Walker’s personal assessment. Numerous articles elaborated that OSCE-observers had 
found the fatalities; most had been shot in the head or neck. The articles also detailed 
that there were three women and one twelve-year-old boy amongst the victims.
754
 The 
weekly Spiegel published this information a few days later, on 25 January 1999.
755
  
Following Walker’s statement, the previous information that KLA-soldiers had 
died in the Račak incident re-appeared in three of the papers which had initially reported 
it; Welt did not pick up on it again. FAZ, FR and taz all stated that the KLA itself had 
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openly stated that it had lost 7-8 soldiers during the fighting in Račak.756 One of the FR-
articles was accompanied by a map of Kosovo which contained an arrow with the 
description “Massacre of Albanian UÇK-fighters and civilians”.  
 
Figure 95: FR, 18 January 1999, p. 2 
 
In spite of this acknowledgement of combatants amongst the fatalities, all following 
articles continued to refer to 45 civilian victims, rather than reducing the number to 37 
or 38. Moreover, after 18 January, none mentioned the KLA-fatalities again. This 
inconsistency implies a subtle preference of the Kosovo-Albanian side of the story. This 
was further underlined by the utilisation of the term ‘massacre’ in their headlines.757 
Many of the articles covering the incident immediately included graphic 
details.
758
 Unlike the initial coverage of the violence in Kosovo, these articles drew 
heavily on eyewitness reports. A Welt-article cited a survivor who stated that many of 
the corpses exhibited traces of abuse, for example a decapitated man with a smashed 
skull and gauged-out eyes. “The perpetrators had even removed the brain from the skull 
with a spoon,” he was quoted as saying.759 The opening line of a Spiegel-article was 
equally striking. A local eye-witness, Bedri Azemi stated amidst sobs: “Only the bottom 
jaw still hung on the neck…that’s how I found my beloved brother Banush out on the 
field; his head had been chopped off with an axe.”760 Similarly taz’s Schmid quoted a 
man who recounted that “‘my brother was executed right next to me’, pulling a piece of 
skull, stained with dry blood from his pocket…”761 The FR-article underscored the 
victims’ ages and gender, perhaps to suggest that they were not KLA-soldiers. “The 
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grandfather lies dead in front of the barn…An 18-year-old woman was obviously shot 
from behind.”762  
Generally, the press’ coverage of Račak was immediately accompanied by a 
sense of outrage. Welt’s Kalnoky wrote that the ‘massacre’ was ‘perverse’763 while a 
FAZ-editorial referred to the ‘Belgrade extermination-machine’.764 This blunt and 
forceful word-choice demonstrated a sense of indignation which could not fail to 
register with readers. To further underline the horrific nature of the events, various 
pieces included emotive evaluations made by German politicians. For example, a Welt-
article cited Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer that “…the massacre filled him with 
disgust.”765 A Spiegel-article quoted Minister of Defence Rudolf Scharping who had 
stated that the ‘massacre’ had to be explained in its “entirety of abomination.”766 
Articles in FAZ, FR and taz all quoted Walker who declared that Račak exceeded 
everything he had ever seen, even in other war zones.
767
 It is striking that the journalists 
readily published these evaluations without including qualifications of their own, 
perhaps in editorials. Many of these correspondents – Matthias Rüb of FAZ and taz’s 
Thomas Schmid to name two – had also covered the Bosnian War and Kosovo’s surge 
of violence in October 1998. It would seem that in these long years of witnessing and 
reporting on violent warfare and in the case of Srebrenica, genocide, they would have 
found Walker’s assessment of 45 fatalities being worse than anything else he had seen 
in other wars slightly hyperbolic. Only taz’s Erich Rathfelder wrote that Račak was “not 
entirely surprising”768 which he later echoed in his memoirs.769 However, this vague 
implication that considering the preceding Serbian violence, Račak was not 
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extraordinary, would have easily been overlooked by many readers. The general 
reluctance of the correspondents to publish their own opinions and preference to reflect 
what politicians could result from the sparse concrete evidence available at the time. 
However, none of the articles presented their information as sparse, unreliable or 
limited. Consequently the lack of published personal opinion and interpretation on this 
matter, including in editorials or cartoons, where more editorial freedom is granted, 
remains curious.    
The articles about the atrocities in Račak were accompanied by various images, 
which offer another perspective to the textual coverage.  
 
Figure 96: FAZ, 18 January 1999, p. 3 
 
The above picture was FAZ’s only visual of the incident. However, Spiegel, BILD, taz, 
FR and Welt published similar pictures of this ditch at roughly the same time, making it 
one of the most recognizable visuals of the incident.
770
 Welt, taz and FR have indicated 
that the image was taken by a news agency; AP, Reuters and dpa respectively. This 
gives a sense of how many journalists and photographers must have been on-site in 
Račak shortly after the bodies were found. 
 
Figure 97: Spiegel, 25 January 1999, p. 136 
 
The ditch-image corroborated the content of the textual coverage. It is clearly visible in 
this image that the corpses were wearing civilian clothing and did not have weapons on 
them, which was the central narrative in many of the articles.
771
  
 In addition, BILD published a more gruesome picture in which all the victims 
were laid out on the street. Especially the corpses lying closest to the camera show 
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blood-covered faces. This visual is also very striking because it gives a clearer 
impression of the large number of victims involved. 
 
Figure 98: BILD, 30 January 1999, p. 1 
 
While the primary focus of the picture is the fatalities in the foreground, the groups of 
people found in the background – presumably journalists, though the image is too 
grainy to be sure – underlines the international attention Račak attracted. taz published a 
similar image, showing the corpses laid out in the local mosque, as the caption 
explained.   
 
Figure 99: taz, 12 February 1999, p. 10 and 18 March 1999, p. 3 
 
Considering the above image in contrast with BILD’s picture (figure 98) offers 
interesting insights regarding the mood of an image discussed in the introduction has a 
big impact. taz’s image featured some of the corpses’ heads covered with pieces of 
white cloth, implying mutilations, but leaving specifics unsaid. In contrast, the tabloid’s 
picture was taken from an angle where precisely these more sanguine and gory details 
were in the foreground. The intended effect of shock and horror, especially in the visual 
coverage, was not unusual for the tabloid. However, comparing it to the more sombre 
taz-picture, in which the mourning of an elderly man and young child are more 
prominent than the mutilations, the plethora of messages that can be conveyed through 
images is underscored.   
 An interesting commonality could be found in BILD, Spiegel, taz and Welt, all 
of which featured images of this ditch showing the same elderly man wearing a white 
hat, seemingly showing the journalists around.  
 
Figure 100: taz, 18 January 1999, p. 1 and Welt, 18 January 1999, p. 3 
 
Figure 101: BILD, 17 January 1999, p. 3 
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None of the publications explained who this man was. His repeated appearance raises 
questions about his identity: were international journalists only granted access if they 
were guided by a local? Judging from his attire, the man was Kosovo-Albanian. Did his 
narrative influence the content of the articles? These questions unfortunately remain 
unanswered, though they underline how many unknown factors influenced the article 
that ultimately reached the reader. 
 JF did not publish any pictures of Račak, nor did it offer the same detailed and 
emotional information about the atrocities. However, in the single article that mentioned 
the incident, JF uniquely embedded Račak into the wider context of on-going violence 
in Kosovo. Reminding the reader that both the KLA and the Serbian forces had been 
using the cease-fire to re-organise their troops, the author indicated that Račak was one 
of many examples of violence.
772
 This balanced reporting resembles the accounts in 
some of the secondary sources discussed at the beginning of this chapter, but is an 
extraordinary exception compared to the other publications’ coverage at the time. 
Interestingly, this deliberate content of the article was contradicted by the article’s title: 
“The goal is genocide.” Combined with the information derived from the article that 
Serbian police had ‘massacred’ Račak’s civilian population, the title and terminology 
expressed an underlying message that Belgrade was ultimately aiming to exterminate 
the Kosovo-Albanian population in Kosovo and Račak was just one of many more 
incidents to come. Though the article itself did not explicitly say this, the utilisation of 
the term ‘genocide’ and ‘massacre of civilians’ implied this. Such subtleties in language 
and terminology will be explored in more depth later in this chapter.  
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Račak: The Serbian perspective 
 
As mentioned previously, the events surrounding Račak were contested almost 
immediately, with the Serbian narrative differing from the Kosovo-Albanian version. 
However, given the general inclination to the Kosovo-Albanian perspective found in the 
previously discussed articles, the German mainstream press did not entertain the idea 
that Račak was manipulated or staged by the KLA. Welt, Spiegel, FR, taz and FAZ, all 
included the Serbian interpretation in their articles, though all but Welt dismissed it very 
quickly. Significantly, none of the articles openly stated that the Serbian version was 
untrue or unreliable. Rather, through subtle techniques such as discrediting the Serbian 
source or unequally contrasting one version with the other left the reader with an 
unmistakeable conclusion that had never actually been articulated.
773
 
For example, the single Spiegel-article that mentioned the different versions of 
events primarily focused on the Kosovo-Albanian interpretation, outlining the Serbian 
atrocities that had been committed in Račak. Only later it alluded to the Serbian point-
of-view in a single sentence, stating: “Milošević insisted…that all victims were killed in 
combat.”774 This side-note received comparably little attention and indeed was buried in 
other details of the article. The authors continued that the “radical nationalist” Vojislav 
Šešelj had accused the Albanians of changing the “UÇK-terrorists’ [clothing]” to make 
them look like civilians. After introducing this Serbian version, the authors reminded 
the readers that Šešelj’s favoured war tactic included “…massacres of civilians as well 
as ethnic cleansing and the torching of Albanian settlements.” This immediate 
discrediting of the source automatically dismissed his assessment and thus rendered the 
Serbian version of events mere propaganda.
775
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In FAZ and FR, the technique of unequal juxtaposition was utilised. In all cases 
the Serbian narrative was included, however their structure was laid out in such a way 
that the reader was confronted with overwhelming evidence to the contrary. For 
example, on 18 January, FAZ’s Matthias Rüb started his article with the Serbian 
assertions that the attack on Račak was a search-and-punish-action by the Serbian 
police, looking for what they called KLA-terrorists who had shot a Serbian policeman 
in the region just a few days before. The article continued that “according to 
eyewitnesses and the OSCE-mission, the incident was naturally portrayed 
differently”776 and ended with Walker’s quote “Jesus Christ, at least cover them”, which 
Rüb wrote he spluttered when he saw the corpses, some of which had been mutilated.
777
 
By structuring the article in this way, the author leaves no question which version of 
events he found more plausible. Indeed by the time the reader had finished the article, 
the beginning about KLA-soldiers being involved could have easily been forgotten. 
Similarly a FR-article wrote that Washington Post had reported its possession of live 
recordings of ‘Serb-leaders’ in which the Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Šainović called 
General Sreten Lukić in Kosovo to inquire about how the ‘attack’ was proceeding. With 
shots being fired in the background, Lukić was heard to answer that so far 22 people 
had been shot, suggesting cold murder taking place during a casual phone conversation. 
The FR-article ended with the information that according to the official Serbian 
account, the 45 people who had been shot in Račak had been KLA-soldiers.778 
However, a reader would have easily forgotten this version amidst the more memorable 
story of the phone conversation. 
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In contrast, various Welt-articles repeated the Serbian account without using 
subtle devices to counter them.
779
 This made the conservative broadsheet the only 
German publication to seriously present the Serbian point-of-view. This is particularly 
striking as it is a significant shift from the paper’s previous anti-Serbian and anti-
Milošević inclination found in the articles dating from the early to mid-1990s, as well as 
earlier articles that had called Račak ‘a perverse massacre.’780 This discrepancy within 
the same timeframe could be explained with the differing authors. All articles that 
included the Serbian perspective were authored by ‘DW’ or ‘Die Welt’ and were 
amalgamations of several press releases. In contrast, the memorable description of 
Račak being ‘perverse’ was produced by Boris Kalnoky, though significantly not in an 
editorial. This matter of authorship and its influence on the articles will be discussed in 
more detail at a later point, however here it is worth noting that Welt uniquely included 
several articles featuring the Serbian perspective. 
 In addition, Welt and taz reported that various French and British newspapers, 
for example Le Monde or The Guardian, were publishing articles which claimed that 
some of the information on Račak was inconclusive, assessing that the ‘massacre’ may 
have been staged. In a Welt-article, the author went as far as posing the question 
whether the fatalities in Račak were “…part of a macabre play staged by the 
underground army UÇK to motivate the West to intervene”.781 Welt cited a Guardian-
article which had reported that the OSCE had provided information revealing that while 
some of the corpses did exhibit close-range bullet-wounds, other victims had clearly 
been killed at a different location from where they were found. “…Skid marks and trails 
of blood or brain-mass allow the conclusion that the corpses had been moved from 
elsewhere.”782 Equally taz’s article referred to the doubts raised by two French 
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newspapers, Liberation and Le Monde. The German daily reported that Le Monde’s 
articles wondered why there was “so little blood” in the ditch where the corpses were 
found and whether this was an indication that the event had been staged.
783
 While Welt 
and taz reported that these international news-outlets doubted the linear narrative of 
events in favour of the Kosovo-Albanians, both detached themselves from such 
musings. Neither published further articles in this direction. Nonetheless, their 
engagement – though only in one article each – suggests that the authors were intrigued 
if nothing else by the two interpretations of the Račak incident.  
Konkret also cited French newspapers – in this case Le Monde and Le Figaro – 
to present the interpretation that the events in Račak could have been manipulated and 
were perhaps being misused by the international community to justify armed 
intervention in Kosovo. In March Otto Köhler published an article about Račak, 
questioning whether “…the massacre was really a massacre.” Preferring the more 
neutral term ‘Leichenfund’ or ‘discovery of corpses’, Köhler’s article stated that Le 
Figaro’s journalists had not found many shell casings near the corpses, which they 
concluded indicated that they had not been massacred. Köhler then turned to the article 
in Le Monde, which claimed that the ‘massacre’ was simply ‘too perfect’. There was too 
little blood in the ditch for the killings to have taken place there. Moreover “the village 
had…been observed the whole day and no one had noticed anything indicating a 
‘massacre.’”784 Though Köhler himself stopped short of offering a personal view, his 
choice of citations left little doubt as to his intended argument. Moreover, as this was 
the only Konkret-article about Račak in this timeframe, the readers were presented with 
a one-sided narrative. 
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In connection with the predominant preference of the Kosovo-Albanian 
narrative in most publications, the distribution of the articles’ authorship is worth 
considering. 
Newspaper Total number 
of articles 
published 
% of articles 
authored by 
correspondents 
% of articles 
authored by 
press agencies 
% of articles 
amalgamated 
from various 
press releases, 
etc. 
Welt 158 51% 18% 31% 
FAZ 173 78% 21% 1% 
FR 147 54% 46% 0% 
taz 165 70% 29% 0% 
Table 7: Percentages of articles according to authorship
785
 
 
As the above table shows, these daily newspapers preferred to publish articles authored 
by their own correspondents. This suggests that the pieces produced for the reader were 
frequently based on eyewitness accounts collated by the correspondent himself; the 
sources he or she chose to give a voice to and ultimately the journalists’ personal 
interpretations. This in turn suggests that the generally quick dismissal of the Serbian 
narrative or the unchallenged replication of Walker’s assessment were examples of the 
publications’ and correspondents’ pro-Kosovo-Albanian interpretation. 
 
 
 The Autopsy Report 
 
 Soon after the fatalities had been discovered in Račak, a forensic examination of 
the corpses took place. Directly after the incident, the bodies had been examined by a 
Serbian-Belorussian forensic team, which the international community deemed 
unreliable and biased. Consequently, approximately ten days later, the European Union 
Forensic Expert Team (EU-FET) was appointed to conduct what they deemed neutral 
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examinations. The Finnish experts, led by Dr. Helena Ranta began their work on 22 
January and summarised their findings in a document produced by Ranta on 17 
March.
786
 The presentation of the forensic report on 17 March revived the German 
press’ interest, which had abated after the initial surge. JF was the only publication not 
to pick up on the matter.  
First a summary of the autopsy report itself, as well as an article published in the 
journal Forensic Science International by members of the Department of Forensic 
Medicine, University of Helsinki will give a sense of the forensic inquests that 
followed.
787
 The report itself was only six pages long, though Ranta also submitted the 
ca. 3000 photographs and 10 hours of film taken during the autopsies.
788
 While brief, it 
featured some notable clarifications regarding the controversies that had surrounded 
Račak. It stated that  
most of the victims wore several warm jackets and pullovers. No ammunition was found in the 
pockets…The clothing bore no identifying badges or insignia of any military unit. No indication 
of removal of badges or insignia was evident. Based on autopsy findings…it is highly unlikely 
that clothes could have been changed or removed.
789
  
The report further stated that “there were no indications of people being [anything] 
other than unarmed civilians.”790 However, it concluded that the mutilations which had 
been cited by many newspapers as proof of the brutality of Serbian criminals occurred 
post-mortem and “…most likely related to animal activity – such as stray dogs…and 
other wild animals.”791 This could also account for the decapitations that had frequently 
been reported on in the German press coverage. “Gnaw marks were presented on the 
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vertebrae and base of the fractured skull.”792 Other instances of mutilations mentioned 
by eyewitnesses, such as that a brain had been scooped out with a spoon
793
 was not 
discussed by Ranta. This in turn introduces questions regarding the reliability of 
eyewitness accounts. 
Dr. Ranta also drew attention to problems and limitations of her findings. As the 
opening sentence clarified, this was a ‘medicolegal investigation’ which constituted 
“…only a part – but […did] not cover the whole spectrum – of criminal 
investigations.”794 Consequetly, based on this report alone, it was not possible to 
definitively assess whether the victims in Račak were indeed ‘massacred’, as that “…is 
a legal description of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of persons...” and could 
only be applied after “a full criminal investigation [was] combined with the 
interrogation of witnesses…”795  
The German print media responded in a variety of ways. The daily publications 
reported that the Račak-victims were deemed civilians by Ranta and her team, which 
was the most important conclusion the newspapers featured.
796
 Other details, for 
example that the mutilations had been considered to be inflicted by animals could be 
found in some articles.
797
 All newspapers except for FAZ and Spiegel mentioned that 
the forensic team did not explicitly label the incident a ‘massacre’ because there had 
been no criminal investigation.
798
 FR made this fact most explicit by including it in its 
article-title: “Medics leave the word massacre for the jurists”.799 In spite of 
qualifications expressed in FR’s headline, significantly the term ‘massacre’ was not 
placed in quotation marks, implying that it still could not to be dismissed altogether. 
                                                 
792
 Rainio et al. “Independent forensic autopsies”, pp. 182-83. 
793
 See footnote 759. 
794
 EU-FET Report, p. 4. 
795
 EU-FET Report, p. 4. 
796
 Welt, 18.03.1999, p. 8; FAZ, 18.03.1999, p. 2; FR, 18.03.1999, p. 2; taz, 18.03.1999, p. 1; and BILD, 
18.03.1999, p. 1. 
797
 Matthias Rüb, “Massaker von Recak als Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit bezeichnet”, FAZ, 
18.03.1999, p. 2; and Schmid, “Racak - ein Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit”, taz, 18.03.1999, p. 3. 
798
 Welt, 18.03.1999, p. 8; FR, 18.03.1999, p. 2; and taz, 18.03.1999, p. 3. 
799
 Stephan Israel, “Das Wort Massaker überlassen die Mediziner den Juristen”, FR , 18.03.1999, p. 2. 
244 
 
Similarly, the conservative broadsheets Welt and FAZ stubbornly included ‘massacre’ in 
their titles, although the articles reported that Ranta had not used the term.
800
 Indeed, 
Welt’s title, “The report about Račak-Massacre leaves questions open” directly refuted 
the article’s content which stated that Ranta refused to utilise the word. The continued 
appearance of the term ‘massacre’ in Welt’s and FAZ’s titles, even after Ranta had 
distanced herself from the term suggests that the publications aimed to preserve the 
understanding of events they had presented in January. Conversely, taz did not place the 
term in its title, instead proclaiming: “Račak-victims were civilians”.801  
Both FAZ and Spiegel covered the report and its contents very superfically and 
instead used its publication as an opportunity to summarise the events in Račak.802 
Rüb’s FAZ-article only devoted the last few sentences to the autopsy report and even 
then failed to include any of the limitations Ranta had warned of.
803
 The Spiegel-article 
took the same approach, mentioning the document in only one sentence.
804
 Due to this 
limited coverage, both publications included a factual error: they stated that Walker’s 
assessment (that Račak had been a ‘massacre’), had been confirmed by the autopsy 
report.
805
 While the Spiegel-article did not give any indication of the author’s locality, 
the FAZ-article was written from Budapest rather than Priština, where Ranta had 
presented her findings, which could explain the superficial reporting. Rüb himself was 
clearly not in Pristina, leaving the impression that Ranta’s presentation was deemed 
unimportant by either the newspaper, the journalist, or both.  
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A Konkret-article mentioning the autopsy report was equally superficial. Otto 
Köhler dismissed it as unreliable, stating that from the beginning Ranta’s examinations 
had served the purpose of proving what OSCE’s Walker had alleged right away, namely 
that Račak was a ‘massacre’. Disgruntled the author wrote: “never mind that the Serbian 
and Belorussian forensic scientists have already eliminated the option that Račak was a 
massacre. Serbs! Russians!”806 The forensic findings were presented as proving Walker 
right, which – by refusing to use the term ‘massacre’ – was clearly incorrect. However, 
the article’s subtitle, “…Such lustfulness for war has not existed since 1914”, 
demonstrates the author’s intention to prove that ‘the West’ was moving towards a 
NATO-intervention, no matter what the ‘facts’ were. However, Konkret’s Köhler did 
correctly point to a certain prejudice against the Serbo-Belorussian forensic team. 
Ranta’s report made a point to state that “at the professional level, the team experienced 
no problems in collaboration with Yugoslav or Belorussian pathologists.” Indeed, 
according to Ranta, there was a “…cooperative working atmosphere,” which was not 
mentioned in any publication.
807
  
In contrast, FR’s coverage was much more detailed. Here the correspondent, 
Stephan Israel, included a description of the presentation: that Ranta stood on a stage, 
flanked by diplomats, to present the report. Such vivid details of the proceedings 
suggest that the journalist was present. He wrote that after relentless questions by the 
journalists, Ranta deemed Račak a ‘crime against humanity’, though she did not want to 
attribute the label ‘massacre.’808 In this respect, FR’s coverage of the report was the 
most discerning and accurate. However, one interpretation was not included in the 
article, namely what it could mean that Ranta made her presentation in the presence of 
diplomats. Perhaps this interest of the international community to witness and possibly 
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steer the event could have been viewed as an affirmation that manipulation – in 
whatever form – was taking place.  
 
 
The Press’ Language 
 
Throughout this coverage of Račak, some changes in language became evident; 
for example the vocabulary used in reference to the KLA. While previous articles 
(considered in chapter 5) had been cautious and even protective of the KLA, this had 
partly changed. For example, all mainstream publications spoke of ‘KLA-fighters’809 in 
their coverage, rather than referring to them ambiguously as ‘Kosovo-Albanians’, as 
they had before. Moreover the use of quotation marks around ‘Kosovo Liberation 
Army’ is revealing. 
Publication Use of quotation marks in 
1998 (chapter 4) 
Use of quotation marks 
during Račak-coverage 
Welt Yes No 
FAZ Occasionally No 
BILD Occasionally No 
FR Occasionally Occasionally 
taz No No 
Spiegel No No 
Junge Freiheit Yes No 
Konkret Yes No reference to KLA 
Table 8: Use of quotation marks around ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ 
 
This table demonstrates that the conservative newspapers Welt, FAZ and BILD as well 
as the extreme-right JF all shifted in their use of quotation marks. During their coverage 
of the initial violence in Kosovo, analysed in the previous chapter, these publications 
had occasionally or consistently placed quotation marks around ‘Kosovo Liberation 
Army,’ indicating an uncertainty about how to label this army and whether they deemed 
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 For example: Welt, 22.01.1999, p. 7; FAZ, 19.03.1999, p. 5; FR, 16.01.1999, p. 1; taz, 27.01.1999, p. 
4; Spiegel, 01.03.1999, p. 155; and BILD, 30.01.1999, p. 1. 
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it a legitimate formation or not. However, by January 1999, all papers except 
occasionally FR no longer used quotations marks. This suggests a more straightforward 
treatment with the army as an actor in the violence.  
Additionally, JF continually referred to KLA-fighters as ‘partisans’ and called 
their military actions ‘partisan-strikes.’810 This may have been aimed to evoke 
connotations of World War Two, where communist partisans led by Tito fought against 
the fascists. An interview with Zoran Jeremić, the Yugoslav ambassador in Bonn 
reiterated this. When the term ‘partisan’ was used in a question posed to Jeremić, he 
replied “according to our perception, partisans are those who fought against fascism 
during the Second World War. However regarding the UÇK, we are speaking of 
terrorists…”811 The continued use of this misplaced term, even after Jeremić’s 
correction is puzzling. While the term ‘partisan’ alluded to the KLA’s guerrilla tactics, 
perhaps JF’s utilisation was an attempt to avoid the term ‘terrorist.’ However, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, a JF-article had described KLA’s tactics as ‘utter 
terror,’ leaving this new term jarring.812  
Moreover, an idiosyncrasy of FAZ’s coverage is noteworthy. All articles 
consistently used the Albanian spelling of Račak and Priština, namely Reçak and 
Prishtina. In the early coverage, FAZ’s articles – all authored by the newspaper’s 
Balkan-correspondent, Matthias Rüb – had continued to include the Serbian version in 
brackets.
813
 This could be a desire to express the broadsheet’s sympathy for the Kosovo-
Albanian side, while simultaneously reassuring the reader that this was not merely a 
spelling mistake. However, the newspaper persistently used the Serbian version for 
Kosovo, rather than switching to Kosova, probably as this was more familiar to the 
reader.  
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The concerted utilisation or avoidance of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ are also worth considering. The latter was used sparingly; indeed only in 
FAZ and taz.
814
 These articles – predominantly published in FAZ – merely reported that 
‘ethnic cleansing’ was occurring in Kosovo, but did not refer specifically to Račak. 
While Welt and FR each used ‘genocide’ once, this was not in connection to the Račak 
incident. The Welt-article, for example, stated that Milošević could end up perpetrating 
‘genocide’ in Kosovo if things continued as they were, while the FR-article called 
Milošević a ‘suspected genocidaire’ or ‘Völkermörder.’815 However FAZ and JF 
specifically linked ‘genocide’ to Račak. The latter alleged that Belgrade’s ultimate goal 
was ‘genocide’ and even used this word in the title of an article, as mentioned 
previously.
816
 FAZ reported that a lobby group called ‘International Helsinki 
Federation’ had attributed this label in its assessment of Račak.817 Significantly, the 
article did not qualify this evaluation, which it could have done simply by citing 
someone with the opposite view. Even if the fatalities in Račak had been ‘massacred,’ 
the employment of the term ‘genocide’ in this respect is erroneous and highly inflated, 
perhaps utilised to present the Serbian forces as negatively as possible by linking them 
to ‘genocide.’ In this context it must be noted that the Srebrenica Massacre continued to 
reappear in Welt, FR, taz and Spiegel. These references reminded their readers that the 
‘last time,’ during the Bosnian War it had taken 8000 deaths in Srebrenica to convince 
NATO to finally intervene. They continued by expressing their hope that this time the 
international community would not wait as long.
818
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Use of Images 
 
Aside from the Račak incident itself, the on-going violence in other parts of 
Kosovo continued to interest the German press. The images accompanying these 
articles portrayed various different themes, though three are worth considering in more 
detail: the depiction of Serbian forces, KLA-soldiers, and the victims of the violence. 
The latter theme presented a clear polarisation: there were almost no pictures showing 
Serbian victims. The only exceptions were in taz and Welt. 
   
Figure 102: taz, 5 March 1999, p. 5   Figure 103: Welt, 2 February 1999, p. 7 
 
Both visual representations featured grieving women – a favoured theme perhaps to 
evoke sympathy. Figure 102 showed the funeral of a Serbian man who had been killed 
by the KLA, as the caption explained; figure 103 showed the mourning family of a 
Serbian policeman who had been killed. These singular pictorial exceptions showing 
Serbians as victims could have been easily over-looked at the time. As the violence 
ensued in Kosovo, where 90% of the population was Kosovo-Albanian, one could argue 
that inevitably there were significantly fewer Serbian victims of violence, explaining the 
reduced visual coverage. However, the two images which were published tell an 
important narrative otherwise missing in the German press-coverage: that the KLA 
killed Serbian whose families mourned and suffered, just as the Kosovo-Albanians. This 
dimension – if covered in more detail – would have given the reader a more complete 
understanding of the violence in Kosovo and the KLA’s activities. 
 In contrast, the visual presentation of the Kosovo-Albanian victims of the 
violence was much more prominent. The refugee treks were a common theme, which 
underlined the dimensions of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding.  
 
Figure 104: FR, 10 March 1999, p. 3 
 
    
250 
 
Figure 105: Spiegel, 15 March 1999, p. 208  Figure 106: BILD, 22 March 1999, p. 2 
 
 
Upon closer consideration, some images in Welt, FR and taz presented an odd mixture 
of messages. 
  
Figure 107: taz, 10 February 1999, p. 10  Figure 108: Welt, 25 January 1999, p. 6 
 
 
Figure 109: FR, 13 February 1999, p. 2 and Welt, 13 February 1999, p. 7 
 
While the grief in the above images is very striking, the captions revealed that the dead 
mourners were grieving for KLA-soldiers. As the caption for figure 109 explained, this 
image was the first prize winner of the prestigious photo-journalism contest ‘World 
Press Photo’ of the year 1998. Originally published in the American broadsheet 
Washington Post in November 1998,
819
 this picture shows the widow of a KLA-
commander at his funeral. It is interesting that the papers were willing to value the 
emotions of the survivors of KLA-combatants as much as they would have done had the 
person who had been killed been an innocent bystander or a civilian. In light of the 
absence of comparable images featuring grieving Serbian widows and children of fallen 
Serbian combatants, this could suggest sympathy with the KLA. The publications’ 
pronounced emphasis on the Kosovo-Albanian suffering rather than the KLA-induced 
violence coincides with the near-complete omission of picturing Serbian civilians as 
victims mentioned previously.  
 Congruent with the one-sided portrayal of the victims of the violence, the visual 
representation of the perpetrators was imbalanced.  
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 World Press Photo Website, Online Source: 
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 Publication Number of images 
in total excluding 
maps 
 
Number of images 
showing KLA-
soldiers 
 
Number of images 
showing Serbian 
forces 
 
Welt 53 3 8 
FAZ 37 2 3 
FR 29 0 4 
taz 48 7 3 
BILD 11 0 1 
Spiegel 35 2 6 
Table 9: Number of images showing Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian force 
 
As the table above demonstrates, JF, FR and BILD did not publish any images of KLA-
soldiers. Moreover, all publications aside from taz published more images of Serbian 
forces, making them a more memorable cause for the violence. While quantitatively the 
KLA was barely represented, the few images that did portray the army must be 
considered from a qualitative perspective. The publications frequently published 
pictures showing the KLA in an organised, militarised manner.  
  
Figure 110: Welt, 5 February 1999, p. 1  Figure 111: FAZ, 15 January 1999, p. 6 
 
  
Figure 112: Spiegel, 25 January 1999, p. 1  Figure 113: taz, 18 February 1999, p. 10 
 
This repeated pictorial evidence of the KLA emphasised how structured and heavily 
armed its soldiers were and gave the impression that they had a strong presence in 
Kosovo, monitoring checkpoints, for example. Comparing the above images with the 
visual coverage of KLA in the preceding chapter, such as the image of a man smuggling 
weapons a mule, the Kosovo-Albanian army was portrayed as much more professional 
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here. This mirrored the linguistic changes relating to the KLA, as discussed 
previously.
820
 
The Serbian forces were often featured with tanks and heavily armed soldiers to 
underline their over-powering strength.  
  
Figure 114: Welt, 5 March 1999, p. 7  Figure 115: FR, 19 March 1999, p. 2 
 
 
Figure 116: Spiegel, 1 March 1999, p. 154 and Welt, 23 February 1999, p. 8 
 
In some instances, for example in figure 116, the Serbian soldiers were directly linked 
to the destruction of the war, which in turn emphasises the true effects of the war and 
makes the violence perpetrated by the Serbian forces very concrete.  
Before proceeding to the German print media’s discussion about the imminent 
NATO-intervention, it is worth considering the distribution of articles pertaining to 
Račak in a graph. The horizontal axis lists each day analysed in this timeframe and the 
vertical axis indicates the number of articles published per day, ranging from zero to six. 
 
Graph 1: Publication of articles in daily press between 15 January and 24 March 1999 
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As this graph indicates, all daily newspapers featured a heightened interest in Račak just 
after the corpses had been discovered. However, after this initial surge, Račak was 
barely mentioned in the print media and by mid-February was omitted entirely. Only the 
publication of the long-awaited autopsy report in mid-March, caused a renewed interest 
in the press. Thus, while Račak may have ‘woken up’ the international community and 
initiated a debate about terminating the violence in Kosovo using military force, the 
incident’s influence did not extend beyond this catalytic function. This was further 
underlined in the analysis of editorials and cartoons which called for a military 
intervention to stop Milošević – none of which, with the exception of one FAZ-cartoon, 
referred to Račak specifically. Rather the general violence which continued to dominate 
the day-to-day coverage of Kosovo initiated these appeals. The complete omission of 
Račak in the Bundestag-debate on 25 February 1999 – the only parliamentary session in 
this timeframe that discussed the situation in Kosovo – further corroborates this point. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the causal link between Račak and the NATO-
intervention frequently claimed in the secondary literature was not prevalent in the 
German press coverage.
821
  
However, the Račak incident did directly lead to a peace conference in 
Rambouillet, France. Similar to the Dayton Accords, representatives from the opposing 
parties were confined to the negotiation venue for a designated time-period (in this case 
between 6 and 23 February 1999). In addition to delegations from the Balkan Contact 
Group, Serbian and the Kosovo-Albanian politicians were present. Significantly, Ratko 
Markovič, Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister represented Serbia rather than Milošević and 
the Kosovo-Albanian delegation was comprised of both KLA-representatives and 
Rugova. The media was excluded from these talks, though taz’s Erich Rathfelder 
claimed that there were some leaks to the press without detailing who disclosed what 
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information.
822
 As can be read in the extensive literature covering Rambouillet,
823
 the 
negotiations were unsuccessful and both parties left France on 23 February without 
signing a peace treaty. After the Balkan Contact Group exerted diplomatic pressure on 
both sides, the Kosovo-Albanian delegation eventually returned to Paris and signed the 
peace-treaty on 18 March while Markovič, continued to refuse. Serbia’s reasons for this 
rejection were manifold. They included that civilian and military implementations laid 
out in annexes infringed on Serbian sovereignty and that “…the Albanian delegation 
was provided with concessions amounting to the guarantee of an independent 
referendum.”824 Nevertheless, as a result, Serbia was blamed for the failure to settle the 
Kosovo-conflict peacefully. As the threat of NATO-bombardment was omnipresent if 
no agreement to end the violence was found, Serbia’s refusal to sign this peace treaty 
immediately introduced the option of a NATO-intervention.
825
 
 
 
NATO-Intervention and German Politics 
 
This prospective bombardment of Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia itself 
was controversial because Russia and China – both veto-powers in the UN-Security 
Council – deemed Kosovo Serbia’s internal affair and had indicated that they would not 
pass any UN-mandate. Consequently, NATO had declared its prospective operation a 
‘humanitarian intervention’ and thus circumvented the UN Security Council.826 
According to NATO, the alarming humanitarian catastrophe in the region caused by the 
approximately 863.000 displaced persons justified such an intervention.
827
 Moreover, 
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the majority of the displaced persons found refuge in neighbouring Albania and 
Macedonia, which strained these already instable countries, threatening to weaken the 
region even further.
828
 In spite of the ambiguous framework regarding international law, 
Germany agreed to contribute 14 Tornado-airplanes and 500 soldiers to NATO-
operations in Kosovo and therefore potentially deploy German soldiers into active 
combat for the first time since the Second World War.
829
 Before delving into the 
analysis of how the German press reported on this issue, it is worth considering the 
political situation in Germany at the time.  
After 16 years in office, the conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) lost 
the elections to Gerhard Schröder (SPD) in October 1998, just as the violence in 
Kosovo intensified. The SPD formed a coalition government with the Green Party, 
which made Joschka Fischer Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister. This Red-Green 
coalition, which according to party lines was traditionally sceptical of war – or in the 
case of the Green Party fundamentally pacifist – had to face the difficult decision of 
including German soldiers in a potential NATO-intervention against Serbia. While the 
German contribution to the NATO-intervention was controversial, it was supported by 
all parties in the German parliament aside from the left-wing Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus (PDS). This was largely due to the humanitarian catastrophe which was at 
the centre of the political debate at the time.
830
 Irrespective of political inclinations, 
Germany’s post-war foreign policy had generally shied away from using military 
force.
831
 For example Hanns Maull argued that this foreign policy was “…shaped by 
Germany’s traumatic past: the lessons of history led to aversion, or at least profound 
scepticism, vis-à-vis any use of military force…”832 However, Schröder and Fischer 
significantly departed from this conventional foreign policy, which was further 
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amplified when it became clear that NATO would potentially launch its intervention 
without a UN-mandate, as Russia and China had indicated that they would veto any 
such endeavour in the UN-Security Council.
833
  
Significantly, the German press was not as sceptical of German involvement due 
to the country’s past, as might be expected. Indeed, only JF and Konkret disagreed with 
a possible strike against Serbia, though for different reasons. Konkret expressed its 
disapproval of a NATO-intervention in various articles, drawing on Germany’s 
National-Socialist past to oppose war, while simultaneously cautioning that the 
information about the events in Račak was still fragmentary and that it was too early to 
jump to conclusions.
834
 JF’s articles were decidedly in opposition to a potential 
intervention, though none gave a coherent reasoning for this position or offering any 
detailed information to the reader. For example, one article expressed the decisive 
assertions such as ‘the bombardment of Belgrade is out of the question,’835 without 
offering supporting facts or explaining why this was an unfathomable development. 
Similarly, Peter Lattas stated in early February that “…as long as the grandfathers of the 
prospective soldiers…[were] defamed as murderers of the Wehrmacht,…such a 
deployment…[was] not worth…a single bone of a German grenadier.”836 With this 
forceful statement Lattas alluded to Bismarck’s famous quote that “the Balkans…[were] 
not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.”837 Moreover, Lattas reminded his 
readers that the mandatory draft of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War meant 
that not all soldiers who had fought for Hitler were Nazis and the duty these soldiers 
served their country should not be forgotten. However, the cryptic message Lattas was 
attempting to convey with this link did not contribute to the reader’s understanding of 
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the potential deployment of soldiers to Kosovo. Perhaps the contributor to the weekly 
JF assumed that the readers obtained details to contextualise this debate through other 
channels such as television or other publications. Nonetheless, the coverage given by 
the paper itself appears disjointed and superficial in this respect.     
While JF and Konkret disagreed with Germany’s involvement in a NATO-
intervention, their limited circulation and targeted readership prevented their arguments 
from being widely recognised. All other mainstream newspapers, ranging from 
conservative to left-wing, unanimously supported a NATO-intervention and Germany’s 
involvement in it.
838
 Their articles voiced two main arguments to explain their support: 
firstly, that the ‘civilised world’ needed to take a stance and stop the mass killings; and 
secondly that Milošević needed clear actions and not empty words.  
Starting with the former, Welt, FAZ, Spiegel and FR introduced the moral 
dimension to their articles, contrasting Serbia to ‘the West.’ Markedly, a Welt-editorial 
authored by Katja Ridderbusch encapsulated this opposition by presenting Milošević as 
an autocratic, backward politician and the West as ‘civilised.’ Ridderbusch argued that 
“bit by bit the West has to urge Serbia towards a civilised political co-existence…”839 
Numerous other articles conveyed the same message, simply by portraying Milošević’s 
policies as barbaric and most importantly something ‘the West’ had matured from since 
the Second World War. For example, articles published in Welt and FR cited Germany’s 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer who had stated that “…‘we will not accept a 
development towards mass murder and war in Europe…’”840 Another Welt-article 
quoted Scharping’s proclamation that “we will not allow new heaps of corpses,”841 
which the Defence Minister had uttered during a parliamentary debate on 25 February 
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1999.
842
 FAZ and Spiegel also cited Scharping, who at a different occasion stated “we 
will not watch as humans are being butchered.”843 Fischer articulated this moral 
dimension in the bluntest manner in a speech he gave in the Bundestag. Here he 
professed that  
Europe is currently divided in half. When we look to the Balkans, we see the Europe of the 
past… of wars and of ethnic cleansing, when we look to Brussels, we see…the Europe of the 
future….[and] integration.844 
Such normative arguments, present in the political discourse as well as the press’ 
coverage, constructed clear oppositions between good and bad; ‘the West’ and Serbia or 
specifically Milošević; the defender of human rights and the perpetrator of war crimes. 
With such clear-cut categories presented to the reader, a military intervention seemed 
easily comprehensible and appeared to be the only logical solution to the current 
situation. Nonetheless, it must be noted that these moral arguments generally addressed 
the violence in Kosovo; none mentioned Račak specifically.  
A multitude of articles produced in all mainstream publications – Welt, FAZ, FR, 
taz, Spiegel and BILD – echoed this normative argument with the interpretation that 
Milošević was to be blamed personally for the violence. This in turn created a sense of 
urgency that NATO had to stop him through strong actions and not half-hearted threats. 
Various articles portrayed the Serbian President as manipulating the international 
community to gain his ends.
845
 For example Spiegel published an article entitled 
‘Milošević pokert hoch’ or ‘Milošević is pushing his luck,’ which portrayed him as 
persistently breaking ceasefires and unflinchingly manipulating the international 
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community.
846
 An interview Welt published with NATO-General Naumann after he had 
visited Milošević cited the former: “we are sensing a complete insensitivity towards our 
arguments…[they] all…completely bounced off of President Milošević,”847 confirming 
the impression that Milošević was not taking the international community seriously. 
This message was also conveyed in several other articles, which frequently explained 
Milošević’s non-cooperation with his political audacity.848 Headlines such as 
‘Holbrooke-Mission in Belgrade unsuccessful’849 and ‘Holbrooke failed in Belgrade, 
Clinton: Military-strike is the right decision’850 underlined this. However, one particular 
reason for his attitude was not considered at all. Richard Holbrooke, who had been the 
chief architect of the Dayton peace treaty, had published his memoirs To End a War in 
1998. This insightful book, which was a seminal source in the previous chapter on the 
Dayton negotiations,
851
 outlined in detail what negotiating tactics he had used with 
Milošević and how difficult it had been to convince NATO to bomb Bosnian-Serb 
forces in 1995, even for just a few days.
852
 It is plausible that Milošević, who was fluent 
in English, or his advisors read the book, and could have deduced that NATO’s renewed 
threats against him were equally half-hearted. While FAZ and taz mentioned that 
Holbrooke had published this book,
853
 these were only cursory remarks and did not 
include any speculations how such a revealing publication could influence the on-going 
diplomatic efforts in Kosovo. 
 Irrespective of this possible link, all daily newspapers continued to focus 
exclusively on Milošević’s uncooperative policies, issuing forceful calls to ‘finally 
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intervene,’ which primarily appeared in editorials and in some cases cartoons. The 
freedom these formats offered to publish opinions and interpretations more bluntly was 
perhaps fitting for these personal interpretations expressed by the respective authors. 
For example, Welt’s Nikolaus Blome asked impatiently: “how often has the time run out 
for Slobodan Milošević? Twice? Four times?”854 FR’s Rolf Paasch echoed this: “how 
many ‘last chances’ can one person get?”855 FAZ’s editorials were more forceful, 
comparing Milošević to Saddam Hussein, even calling him “the Saddam of the 
Balkans.”856 Here the freedom offered by editorials bordered on name-calling. Two taz-
editorials, both authored by Rüdiger Rossig, also expressed a clear call for the 
international community to stop Milošević. Rossig wrote hopefully:  
the time has come: almost eight years after the war began in Former Yugoslavia, NATO is ready 
to bomb targets in Serbia. Considering that…Milošević has constantly jerked around the 
international community since 1991, lying to them and provoking them, this is not surprising.
857
  
However, when the international community decided instead to continue applying 
political pressure rather than resorting to military force, Rossig aired his disappointment 
in a second editorial.  
So, Serbia will not be bombed. The Albanians in Kosovo have to continue living in a police 
regime. The West has still not understood…after eight years…that Serbia’s leadership only 
reacts to threats of military action when…they are put into action.858  
In both cases the author referred to an eight-year war, emphasising that Milošević had 
also been responsible for the violence in Bosnia and Croatia, which his readers would 
have been familiar with. Later Rossig reiterated that Milošević was pursuing a ‘war of 
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extermination,’859 underlining the urgency to stop him as soon as possible. It must be 
reiterated that for taz, a left newspaper that was usually sympathetic to pacifist 
arguments, such calls for military intervention were highly remarkable. However, 
throughout the paper’s coverage of the Balkan violence, a heightened interest in the 
human dimension of the war has been traced, for example in its coverage of the 
Srebrenica Massacre. This focus on human suffering and the West’s inability to stop it – 
for example in Srebrenica – could explain a gradual movement towards condoning a 
military intervention.  
 An accusation which permeated the editorials was that the West was allowing 
Milošević to pursue his manipulative and destructive policies. This message was also 
conveyed in various cartoons that satirised NATO and other Western institutions as 
impotent ‘paper-tigers.’    
    
Figure 117: FR, 19 January 1999, p. 1:  Figure 118: FR, 24 March 1999, p. 1 
“What shall we take today?” 
  
Figure 117 presented NATO, EU and OSCE as clueless characters, dithering between 
protests, threats, negotiations, condemnations and indignation, indicating how pathetic 
their collective response was. Similarly, figure 118 featured a NATO-fire fighter 
without water standing helplessly before a burning house labelled ‘Kosovo.’ A similar 
image of a fireman standing in front of a burning house labelled Kosovo had already 
been featured in April 1998 and effectively contrasted the urgency of intervening 
alongside NATO’s profound inability to end the mayhem.860  
Welt’s depiction of a victorious Milošević covered in a pile of paper labelled 
‘ultimatum’ communicated a similar message, namely that diplomacy would not stop 
the violence. 
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Figure 119: Welt, 25 February 1999, p. 10  Figure 120: Welt, 4 March 1999, p. 10 
 
 
 
A less humorous stance was taken in Welt’s caricature (figure 120). The cartoon 
illustrates fax machines in Belgrade and Brussels: while Belgrade received one 
ultimatum after another from Brussels, the latter collected endless death notices from 
Belgrade. Two FAZ-cartoons linked the bloody violence in Kosovo more bluntly to 
Milošević.  
 
Figure 121: FAZ, 23 February 1999, p. 2   Figure 122: FAZ, 20 January 1999, p. 3 
“Finally leave me at peace!” 
 
The first cartoon (figure 121) showed Milošević as a brutish butcher caught in the act of 
killing someone – presumably representing Kosovo – and angrily shouting at the 
international community, which is depicted as terrified and powerless to stop him. 
Figure 122 was both macabre and poignant. Two images of death as the grim reaper 
look over Račak and say: “We should at least write Mr. Milošević a thank you letter.” 
The tabloid BILD did not confine such accusations of Milošević personally to its 
editorials. In late March it published a page-long article acutely entitled: “Is this man 
dragging all of Europe to war?”861 Alongside the article was a picture of Milošević and 
one of tanks, visually linking him to destruction and suffering of the civilian population, 
especially women and children. 
 
Figure 123: BILD, 22 March 1999, p. 2 
 
Amongst these forceful charges against Milošević and advocating military 
strikes to stop him, only Spiegel, Welt and FAZ voiced cautionary counter-arguments. 
For example FAZ’s articles reminded the readers that a bombardment of Serbian troops 
in Kosovo and Serbia proper was a complex matter that could raise new issues. The 
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authors cautioned that questions needed to be considered, such as how Milošević would 
react once he was under attack. Perhaps this would motivate him to intensify the 
violence against the Kosovo-Albanians.
862
 A further concern was that NATO would 
inadvertently become the KLA’s air force and perhaps be misused to carry out the 
army’s military goals.863 This fear was also voiced in various Spiegel-articles.864 In an 
interview with Scharping, Spiegel’s correspondents asked why Milošević was seen as 
the primary problem when he had been portrayed as a factor for stability at Dayton just 
a few years ago. Scharping conceded that there were more problems in the Balkans than 
just Milošević, but that he was primarily responsible, as he ruined, or as Scharping 
termed it, ‘torpedoed’ every agreement.865   
In spite of these appeals for caution in three publications, the dominant argument 
remained that ultimately NATO would have to end the suffering of the Kosovar people 
and that it should do so as quickly as possible. Arguably, the bluntly formulated, 
accusatory editorials and poignant cartoons had a more profound effect on the reader’s 
opinion than some of the more carefully phrased articles. The strength of these 
arguments in forming the reader’s opinion could be seen in a Welt-article from mid-
February which published a poll answering the question: “Do you see a military strike 
against Serbia as necessary?” From the 2008 people asked, 65% said yes and 30% voted 
for no.
866
 While this poll did not represent the German population as a whole, as it only 
questioned Welt-readers, it nevertheless illustrates a profound support in Germany for 
military intervention.  
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The weight of history 
 
 Amidst the press’ arguments for and against a potential NATO-intervention, the 
predominant focus was clearly on Milošević. Accordingly, most German publications 
no longer saw the country’s National-Socialist past as an influential factor in assessing 
Germany’s foreign policy in Kosovo. For example, JF published an interview with 
former Bundeswehr General Schultze-Rhonhof, in which he was asked: “…how do you 
evaluate the Bundeswehr-mission in Kosovo considering the experiences in the Balkans 
during the Second World War?” He responded that the contemporary problems in the 
Balkans had nothing to do with the past and therefore the Wehrmacht did not play any 
role. The two issues should be considered completely separately.
867
 With this clear 
separation of past and present foreign policy, the article did not address the question 
whether the deployment of German soldiers was the right decision, but rather if the 
debate should be linked to Germany’s past. FR’s article took a similar approach, 
quoting Chancellor Schröder. In a speech justifying Germany’s involvement in a 
potential NATO-strike, Schröder stated that he understood that some would question 
whether German soldiers should participate due to the “National-Socialist crimes of 
German soldiers” in the past. However, “the German debt in the Balkans could also be 
‘paid’ by German soldiers ‘preventing more murder.’”868 This citation of Schröder’s 
speech at the Munich Security Conference of 1999, which is not available in its 
archives,
869
 was not questioned or criticised by FR. The quote, not found in any other 
daily newspaper, could thereby be seen as a stance the paper supported. The speech was 
only mentioned in one other publication, namely Konkret. In the March-edition, Otto 
Köhler criticised it for showing too much eagerness to forget the past. He dismissed the 
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Munich Security Conference as “NATO’s annual intimidation-event”, and vented his 
dismay at Germany’s involvement in a NATO-intervention.870  
Moreover, the two conservative broadsheets Welt and FAZ casually stated that 
Germany was staying in the background due to what FAZ termed its “special historical 
situation.”871 A Spiegel-article reminded its readers that when thinking of 
bombardments, the Belgrade-residents reverted to 6 April, 1941 “…when Hitler’s pilots 
attacked the city and according to Serbian information 15,000 people died…” However, 
the same article also mentioned that the Serbians had since constructed a myth out of 
this with the underlying message of “us against the rest of the world.”872 With this the 
article quickly dismissed the importance still attributed to 1941 as part of a Serbian 
propaganda effort. 
The diminished importance of Germany’s National-Socialist past in evaluating 
the country’s impending deployment of soldiers to Kosovo is particularly noticeable 
when comparing the discussion to the debate about German soldiers supporting the 
international peace force in November and December 1995.
873
 Interestingly, editorials 
in Welt, FR and taz lamented the missing context in the debate whether German soldiers 
should be involved in a possible NATO-intervention. For example, Welt’s Jacques 
Schuster wrote that “for the first time in the country’s recent history, Germany faced a 
war, faced a combat mission…” and instead of debating the implications of this, 
Germans preferred to discuss Michael Jackson, a possible tax-raise or the bickering 
within the coalition government.
874
 taz’s Rossig noted that it was “odd that those who 
had fought over the sense of a military intervention in Bosnia and Croatia…have fallen 
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completely silent now.”875 A Konkret-article entitled “Steel-helmet Pacifists” was much 
more straightforward in naming those who had fallen silent. Andreas Spannbauer 
criticised the Green Party specifically for abandoning its founding pacifist principles for 
a new German foreign policy. The author primarily viewed the fact that the Green Party 
was now in government and had made certain promises during its election campaign as 
the main reason for this shift.
876
  
FR’s editorial also held the Green Party accountable, which the author saw 
responsible for ensuring that such a discourse occurred. Richard Meng’s first sentence 
was perhaps the most striking: “of course it would be too easy to simply reproach…[the 
Greens] with their slogans from yesterday. [For example] the ‘make peace without 
weapons’-slogans or the ‘all soldiers are potential murderers’-quotes.”877 Meng 
consented that the times had changed and with it the individuals in the Green Party, 
such as Fischer. However, he could not understand that this disengagement with earlier 
principles was happening so quickly and that as a result there was no thoughtful or 
serious debate about a possible Kosovo-intervention. Meng feared that in spite of their 
biographies – alluding to Fischer’s past as a pacifist revolutionary in the 1960s – the 
individuals were trying to “free themselves from the inhibitions of the post-war 
years.”878 Without ever naming the individuals he was referring to, Meng alluded to the 
1968-generation in Germany whose raison d’être had been not to allow Germany’s past 
to be forgotten. However with the absence of historical debate about a potential NATO-
involvement, this was exactly what was occurring.  
It is striking that after mentioning the missing historical context in the debate, 
these authors did not offer it themselves. After all, they were the contributors to the 
forums where such debates could have been initiated. Their surprise followed by no 
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action could indicate that while they may have been mildly astonished to realise that 
Germany’s history was no longer as important, they also considered this development 
comprehensible. The relative paucity of references to Germany’s history in the press 
refines the theses put forward by some academics that have placed Germany’s trauma 
from the Second World War in the foreground when analysing the country’s decision-
making process to support a NATO-intervention.
879
 Maull for example claims that three 
succinct slogans formed Germany’s policy in Kosovo: ‘never again’, ‘never alone’ and 
‘politics before force.’880 However, in the coverage leading up the NATO-intervention 
in 1999, the ‘never again’ mantra seemed to pertain to never allowing another 
‘genocide’ to unfold rather than never again engaging in war. Previously the two had 
been inextricably linked, but this was no longer the case here. 
To understand this lacking historical debate over the German military 
intervention, one must turn to the progression of collective memory, which has been 
completely disregarded in the existing literature. As outlined in the introduction, the 
collective memory of the Holocaust had evolved during the post-war decades and by the 
1980s had culminated to what historians termed Betroffenheitsdiskurs or ‘discourse of 
dismay.’ The public shame that marked this discourse resulted in a sense of collective 
guilt amongst the Germans. According to the literature this diluted to a more ‘meta-
physical’ guilt which applied to everyone and not exclusively Germany by the early 
1990s. While previous chapters argued that indeed the collective shame was more 
present in the 1990s than has been suggested,
881
 October 1998 marked a significant shift 
in the discourse on Germany’s collective memory. Martin Walser, a prominent German 
author, proclaimed in a speech accepting the prestigious Peace Prize of the German 
book industry:  
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Everybody knows our historical burden, the never ending shame, not a day on which the shame 
is not presented to us...But when every day in the media this past is presented to me, I notice, 
that something inside me is opposing this permanent show of that shame.
882
  
With this controversial speech, Walser publicly moved away from the shame-filled 
Betroffenheitsdiskurs. He expressed the diminishing enthusiasm amongst the German 
population to embrace collective shame. This well-publicised speech sparked a heated 
debate between Walser and Ignaz Bubis, President of the Central Council of Jews in 
Germany,
883
 and has been seen as a sign for a movement away from the shame and guilt 
of the Betroffenheitsdiskurs.
884
 The German press’ near complete omission of 
discussing a potential German deployment in the context of the country’s National-
Socialist past manifests this. Moreover it suggests a desire to be an actor on equal terms 
in the Western alliance-structure.  
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Chapter 7 
March-May 1999: Reporting ‘War’ – The NATO-Intervention in Kosovo and 
Serbia 
 
“Dear Fellow Citizens, tonight NATO began its air strikes against military targets in 
Yugoslavia. In doing so, the alliance aims to prohibit further severe and systematic 
human rights violations and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.”885 
- Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
 
  
On the evening of 24 March 1999, NATO began its military strikes against 
Serbian forces in Kosovo, which was the first engagement of German soldiers in active 
combat since the Second World War. Though war was never officially declared, the 
alliance bombarded targets in Kosovo and later Serbia until 20 June 1999.
886
 This was 
highly controversial, partly because it had not been legitimised by a UN-mandate. Out 
of fear that Russia and China would block such an endeavour in the Security Council, 
the NATO-states preferred to launch air-strikes without a mandate. Immediately, 
opponents termed it a ‘war of aggression,’ as they deemed this NATO-intervention a 
direct violation of international law. However, proponents labelled it a ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ and argued that NATO’s actions were nonetheless justified because their 
goal was to stop the undeniable refugee crisis unfolding in Kosovo.
887
  
 As some had feared, NATO’s bombardment did not have the desired effect of 
immediately alleviating the humanitarian disaster. Rather the Serbian forces intensified 
their violence against Kosovo-Albanians as NATO began its air-strikes, and within 
mere days approximately 863,000 Kosovo-Albanian civilians were forced to find refuge 
from the violence in the neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. Further 590,000 
civilians were internally displaced. Indeed, almost 90% of the Kosovo-Albanian 
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population had to leave their homes during the conflict.
888
 The long treks of Kosovo-
Albanian refugees who had been forcefully displaced shocked the international 
community and dominated the German pictorial press-coverage. 
 
Figure 124: BILD, 31 March 1999, p. 1 
 
  
Figure 125: AJW, 29 April 1999, p. 15  Figure 126: FR, Easter 1999, p. 1 
 
 Simultaneously however, these images reinforced the declaration by NATO-
members including the German government that the ‘humanitarian intervention,’ as it 
had been declared, was fought for ‘moral values’ rather than ‘traditional national 
interests.’ Peter Rudolf argues that this distinction fundamentally shaped the discourse 
of the war, leading to a ‘hypermoralisation’, particularly by Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer and Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping. This manifested itself in the use of 
“dubious historical parallels” to the Second World War, epitomised in the famous and 
frequently repeated phrase “Nie wieder Auschwitz.”889 Loquai and Friedrich also noted 
the moral interpretation of the war, judging Scharping’s statements to have been laden 
with “rampantly emotional language.”890 Furthermore Friedrich criticised the Minister 
of Defence for consciously linking his word-choice to National-Socialism when 
describing Serbian politics.
891
  
Much of the secondary literature about the Kosovo War was written shortly after 
its end. In the first instance, it aimed to establish whether the intervention had been 
legal,
892
 while simultaneously constructing an account of the war.
893
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Michael O’Hanlon’s monograph is particularly helpful in constructing a coherent 
narrative of events, as it was written under the auspices of the prominent and well-
connected Brookings Institution, which granted the authors access to a large range of 
official government documents and key figures involved in the decision-making process 
who were interviewed by the authors.
894
 While their systematic and reliable analysis 
clearly supports NATO’s intervention, it also leaves room for alternative conclusions. 
Reminding the reader that in 1999 one million Kosovo-Albanians had been forced to 
leave their homes, the authors underlined the humanitarian urgency of the situation – 
especially when compared to numbers from the previous year, when ‘only’ 300,000 
people had been forced to flee. Eye-witness reports of “summary executions” and rape 
were frequent and could be verified after the war by being cross-checked with the other 
accounts.
895
 A significant lacuna in the secondary literature available in German and 
English exists on the topic of the Serbian civilians suffering caused by NATO’s 
bombardment. In spite of the aim to construct a coherent narrative of the NATO-
intervention, this aspect precipitated by the direct bombardment of Belgrade, Novi Sad 
and other major Serbian cities has been largely ignored.  
When taking public opinion into consideration, a clear majority of Germans 
polled were in favour of the NATO-intervention at the beginning, though their support 
dwindled after a few weeks.  
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Graph 2: “Do you agree or disagree with NATO’s air-strikes against Serbia and Kosovo?” :  
31 March – 1 June 1999896 
 
As this graph shows, German public opinion was quite volatile. Even in the first week 
after the bombardments began, when support for the NATO-intervention was at its 
highest, 30% of the population – a significant minority – were against the air strikes 
(dark-blue, dotted lined). After several weeks of bombardment, the opponents even 
overtook the supporters, which was primarily because the intervention had proceeded 
without any clear results. These divergent opinions could be a reflection of the great 
diversity of viewpoints available in the German press at the time, which will be 
discussed in more detail in a moment.  
Interestingly, the political debate in the Bundestag was much more unanimous. 
Indeed, the left-wing Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) – which held 36 of 
669 seats – was the only faction which opposed the war.897 With CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD 
and the Green Party – comprising 95% of the seats in parliament – in favour of the 
NATO-intervention, there was a noticeable accord of opinions voiced in the three 
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debates held in the Bundestag during the period considered in this chapter.
898
 The 
session on 25 March did not initially entail a debate on Kosovo and neither Chancellor 
Schröder nor Foreign Minister Fischer were present due to a simultaneous EU-summit 
they attended in Berlin. The protocol from this parliamentary session reveals that after 
heavy protest from the left-wing PDS, the President of the Bundestag, Wolfgang 
Thierse, hesitantly altered the agenda, allowing all factions to speak on the situation in 
Kosovo.
899
 Defence Minister Scharping (SPD) made an impromptu speech about the 
NATO-intervention, reminding his listeners of Germany’s “responsibilities stemming 
from the experiences from the first half of this century.” He argued that Milošević’s 
government did not have “the right…to systematically murder” Kosovo-Albanians.900 
Angelika Beer, speaking for the Green faction, reiterated that there was no alternative 
but to stop the “war and murder in Kosovo.”901 Both representatives of the Red-Green 
coalition appealed to the emotions of the audience, referring to normative term 
arguments. Whether these were repeated or contradicted in the German publications will 
be analysed in this chapter.  
The following day, on 26 March, members of the parliament engaged in a more 
in-depth debate on Kosovo, during which Chancellor Schröder (SPD) and various other 
members of parliament voiced their opinion. As the first speaker, Schröder reminded 
the listeners of the political efforts of the preceding weeks, concluding that no option 
remained but to launch “air-strikes against military targets in Yugoslavia”, carefully 
avoiding the term ‘war’ throughout his speech.902 A particularly interesting occurrence 
arose while Joschka Fischer (Green Party) addressed the Bundestag. According to the 
transcript, Fischer responded to an interjection from the opposing PDS-faction, turning 
                                                 
898
 Debates were held on 25 March, 26 March and 15 April 1999.  
899
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, Stenographischer Bericht, 30. Sitzung, 25.03.1999, pp. 2421-
2429. 
900
 Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, 25.03.1999, p. 2424. 
901
 Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, 25.03.1999, p. 2426.  
902
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll, Stenographischer Bericht, 31. Sitzung, 26.03.1999, p. 2571. 
274 
 
to them to address their comment. Dr. Helmut Hauβmann (FDP) seemed to have 
criticised Fischer’s addressing the PDS, though his comment was not audible. However, 
Fischer responded: “Why shouldn’t I speak with the PDS? The PDS is articulating a 
position which is widespread in the German population and which is legitimate in light 
of war and peace.”903 This brief and seemingly insignificant exchange suggests that the 
overwhelming majority in the Bundestag in support of NATO’s intervention 
encouraged a one-sided debate in which criticism of the intervention was more likely to 
be ignored than engaged with.  
On 15 April, the debate on Kosovo covered 41 pages of the session’s transcript, 
of which only 6 pages addressed reflections against the war, namely when the chairs of 
the PDS-parliamentary group Gregor Gysi and Heidi Lippmann spoke.
904
 Their main 
arguments stated that NATO had engaged in a ‘war of aggression’ due to the missing 
UN-mandate;
905
 that bombardments would not solve a humanitarian crisis;
906
 and that 
the NATO-bombing was intensifying the refugee crisis.
907
 The Green Party ‘Fundi’, 
Hans-Christian Ströbele who insisted on his party’s pacifist roots, reinforced this stance 
in an emotional speech. In it he proclaimed: “after 54 years, German soil is tainted by 
war again...” which was applauded by the PDS.908 However, aside from these 
exceptions, the members of parliament were widely in favour of the NATO-intervention 
as well as Germany’s contribution to it.   
We now turn to the analysis of the German print media coverage at this time, 
which will shed light on the extent to which the German press mirrored the largely 
conform political debate and whether instances of this alleged media manipulation can 
be found. To answer these questions and others, this chapter analyses two intervals of 
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the three-month NATO-intervention. The first period will cover 25 March to 17 April 
1999, analysing the coverage of the first three weeks of the NATO-bombing and second 
timeframe will examine the coverage from 12 May to 17 May 1999, studying the days 
leading up to the Green Party Convention, which took place on the 14 May 1999, and 
the days following it. Here the domestic debate regarding the war climaxed, making this 
time particularly interesting.  
The analysis of two sections does not serve a methodological purpose, but was 
devised to make the exceedingly large quantity of articles more manageable. Thus any 
comparative conclusions made with previous chapters, for example the quantity of 
articles published, will treat this as one time-period. Both timeframes were selected by 
the author to include themes and discourses that were relevant to this thesis and that 
would contribute to understanding larger themes considered in preceding chapters. 
Consequently the first timeframe ended after the discussion ensued surrounding the 
alleged existence of concentration camps in Kosovo, which was a highly relevant theme 
and used as a useful termination for the first section. The second period was selected to 
capture the domestic discussion justifying the intervention, which climaxed at the Green 
Party convention.   
The chapter will begin with an analysis of several sub-themes which the 
publications used to underline their approval or disapproval of the war, such as: the 
portrayal of Milošević, how the term ‘genocide’ was used, and how Serbian civilians 
were covered. It will then turn to other themes which shaped the coverage, namely 
references to Račak and Srebrenica, the role of the Green Party and collective memory, 
as well as the publications’ self-reflection of their delicate role as opinion-formers in 
time of war. The first point to make is that there was a significant surge of articles on 
Kosovo published at the NATO-intervention began. Even the tabloid BILD which had 
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previously included very short and limited articles reflected the increased interest. A 
quantitative comparison of the five daily publications underscores this increase. 
Publication Number of 
articles: NATO-
Intervention
909
 
Number of 
articles: Račak910 
 
(see chapter 6) 
Number of 
articles: early 
Balkan violence
911
 
(see chapter 2) 
Welt 
 
422 159 191 
FAZ 
 
422 173 258 
BILD 
 
257 64 47 
FR 
 
485 147 217 
taz 
 
511 154 190 
Table 10: Total number of articles published in three selected chapters 
 
As the table shows, the total number of articles published in the five dailies was much 
greater than the quantity devoted to Račak, and even more so when measured against 
the coverage of the early stages of the Bosnian violence in 1991-92. However, as each 
of the three timeframes consisted of an unequal number of days, analysing the increased 
ratio of articles per day is even more revealing than the absolute numbers. This is 
demonstrated in the table below, which reveals that Welt published 6.1 times as many 
articles per day during the NATO-intervention than in the previous chapter on Račak 
and 11.8 times as many since the beginning of the violence in Bosnia between 1991/92. 
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 30 days in time-frame. 
910
 69 days in time-frame 
911
 163 days in time-frame. 
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Publication Increased ratio between 
NATO-Intervention and 
Račak-coverage 
Increased ratio between 
NATO-Intervention and 
early Balkan violence 
Welt 
 
6.1 11.8 
FAZ 
 
5.6 8.8 
BILD 
 
9.5 28.7 
FR 
 
7.7 12.5 
taz 
 
7.1 14.2 
Table 11: Increased ratio of daily articles per day between three timeframes 
 
By far the biggest change occurred in BILD’s coverage, increasing 9.5 times since the 
Račak incident and 28.7 times since the beginning of the violence. The lowest alteration 
occurred in FAZ’s coverage, which could stem from the fact that the broadsheet had 
always shown more interest in the Balkans than other publications.  
The surge of articles could be explained with Germany’s contribution to the 
NATO-intervention, deploying soldiers into active combat, which turned Kosovo into a 
domestic issue. This is underlined by the fact that Welt, FR and BILD devoted an entire 
sub-section of the paper to the intervention entitled for example ‘The Kosovo-War’ 
(Welt) or ‘NATO at war’ (BILD). However, it should be noted that one can trace a 
steadily increasing interest in the Balkans throughout the German press since the 
beginning of the violence in 1991/92. From this perspective, the increased coverage can 
also be seen as a gradual progression, demonstrating greater awareness and interest in 
the region and its violence.  
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The media’s arguments for and against the war 
 
 All publications analysed in this chapter clearly expressed their support for, or 
opposition to, the NATO-intervention and this position can be categorised by their 
political affiliation. The conservative papers endorsed the NATO-intervention, arguing 
that military strikes against the Serbian forces were the only way to stop the violence in 
Kosovo since all previous diplomatic efforts had failed.
912
 As a Welt-editorial 
articulated, the bombardment would only cease “…if the murder and torture in Kosovo 
stopped immediately and the Serbs retreated.”913 This view was emphasised in a Welt-
interview with the Minister of Defence Rudolf Scharping, who had expressed “…that 
every plea with Milošević was futile and that there…[was] no point talking to him about 
human dignity [and] human rights…”914 AJW’s interpretation of the NATO-intervention 
was equally supportive of military action. Quoting Iganz Bubis, President of the Central 
Council of Jews in Germany, one AJW-article argued that it was necessary to break the 
vicious circle of violence in Kosovo and that employing military force was better than 
watch ‘genocide’ unfold.915 The repeated use of the term ‘genocide’ in AJW’s articles is 
worth noting and will be analysed in more detail later.  
 In contrast, the left-leaning and extreme publications generally opposed 
NATO’s bombardment. FR, taz and Spiegel argued that since it was difficult to evaluate 
Milošević as a political opponent, a military intervention was too uncertain. If 
Milošević refused to compromise and sustained the violence in spite of NATO’s 
bombing, the alliance did not have an alternative strategy to counter this.
916
 Secondly, 
articles in these publications argued that NATO’s bombardment had intensified the 
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 For example: BILD, 26.03.1999, p. 3; Welt, 25.03.1999, p. 10; and FAZ, 26.03.1999, p. 1. 
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 Martin Lambeck, “Schröders Härtetest”, Welt, 31.03.1999, p. 1. 
914
 Karl-Ludwig Günsche, “Der Überzeugungstäter”, Welt, 07.04.1999, p. 3. 
915
 AJW, “Hilfe in der Nato”, AJW, 15.04.1999, p. 1. 
916
 For example: FR, 26.03.1999, p. 3; taz, 25.03.1999, p. 12; and Spiegel, 05.04.1999, pp. 22-28. 
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refugee crisis rather than alleviating it,
917
 drawing on similar arguments as those PDS 
had voiced in the Bundestag.
918
 As one FR-article, entitled “This vain men’s war must 
stop” underlined, the war was allegedly not motivated by human rights concerns, but by 
politicians eager to make a political mark.
919
 This approach was even more noticeable in 
taz’s articles, which declared that the intervention had failed almost immediately – an 
assessment which was constantly reiterated.
920
 This is particularly striking in a taz-
article published on 25 March – 24 hours after the NATO-bombardment had 
commenced – which asserted that there were “many indications that NATO had 
miscalculated and would not be able to stop the Serbian offensive against Kosovo-
Albanians…”921 This critical stance is curious considering taz’s Rüdiger Rossig’s 
previous disappointment aired in two editorials when NATO decided not to bomb 
Serbia and attempt another diplomatic solution in February 1999.
922
 The discrepancy 
can be explained by the fact that Rossig did not write any of the current pieces critical 
of the intervention. These were written by various other correspondents including 
Andreas Zumach, taz’s UN-correspondent in Geneva who had specialised in human 
rights issues. This diversity underscores how prevalent the correspondents’ opinions 
were in editorials and that they were not necessarily syndicated by the editor-in-chief.  
Rudolf Augstein, who had founded Spiegel in 1947, strongly opposed the war, 
occasionally publishing his opinion in Spiegel-editorials.
923
 One, entitled “What are we 
doing in the Balkans?” reminded the readers that Augstein himself had experienced the 
Second World War and knew what fighting actually meant. Most actors in favour of the 
NATO-intervention had never experienced combat. If they had, he argued, they would 
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 Anonymous, “‘Ich darf nicht wackeln’”, Spiegel, 05.04.1999, p. 23 and Sergej Krylow, “Die Nato will 
die Signale aus Belgrad nicht hören”, FR, 08.04.1999, p. 5. 
918
 See pp. 272-273. 
919
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Stefan Reinecke, “Krieg macht dumm”, taz, 07.04.1999, p. 1. 
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 Andreas Zumach, “Jetzt geht’s ums Ganze”, taz, 25.03.1999, p. 2. 
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 See p. 260. 
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 Spiegel, 29.03.1999, p. 24; 05.04.1999, p. 24; 12.04.1999, p. 26; and 17.05.1999, pp. 98-99. 
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not be as eager or at all enthusiastic about war. He also posited that it did not make 
sense to bomb the territory of the population [Kosovo] whom NATO was trying to 
help.
924
 Augstein’s editorials are especially noteworthy, as this was the first time he 
published his opinion about the violence in the Balkans. Moreover, they stood in 
contrast to the news-magazine’s general stance on the war. As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, various Spiegel-articles had argued that Milošević could only be 
stopped with clear military actions and not vague verbal threats.
925
 It is evident that 
Spiegel’s founder and members of the magazine’s editorial team were not synchronous 
with one another and that Augstein used his editorials to make known his contrary 
opinion.  
JF also protested against the NATO-intervention in Kosovo, arguing that 
dropping bombs on Belgrade would not solve any of the region’s problems. On the 
contrary, Milošević would just take advantage of the situation and persecute the 
Kosovo-Albanian population more vigorously.
926
 It also condemned the strikes as a 
‘war of aggression,’ as the alliance’s territory had not been attacked.927 This 
condemnation of the NATO-intervention was congruent with JF’s general anti-
international stance, which was sceptical of NATO-membership and preferred Germany 
to stand alone. Konkret also clearly disagreed with the war, though its articles did not 
systematically elaborate on the reasons for their disapproval of what they repeatedly 
called a ‘war of aggression.’928 Konkret’s opposition was encapsulated by its articles’ 
titles, for example “Surgical Strikes without Anaesthesia”, which clearly emphasised 
the fact that the NATO-bombardment still led to physical human suffering.
929
 Other 
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281 
 
articles under headings such as “Never again Peace”930 or “The German War”931 were 
more general, but expressed bitter and strong criticism of a militarily active Germany. 
This, perhaps more than the issue of Kosovo, was central to Konkret’s opposition. The 
monthly magazine published articles relevant to this chapter in two issues, May and 
June 1999, both of which proclaimed that they were a “war-edition” on the cover.  
  
Figure 127: Konkret, May 1999   Figure 128: Konkret, June 1999 
 
Both expressed brutally direct and very powerful accusations against the German 
government, as well as other Western politicians. For example, figure 127, which 
portrayed Scharping on its cover, featured the headline “Clinton, Blair, Schröder: 
Politicians are murderers.” The headline of the second issue (figure 128) – “The first 
victory in the third war” – provocatively implied that Germany was engaged in a Third 
World War, which represents a scathing critique of the country’s military involvement. 
Various articles included in these special issues dismissed NATO’s claim that the 
bombardment was alleviating the civilian suffering, arguing that this was “government-
propaganda.” But they did not openly address the refugee crisis, nor offer insights into 
the suffering of the Serbian civilians under the NATO-bombardment.
932
  
It is evident even from this brief review that while the press’ coverage offered a 
wide range of interpretations, various individual publications focused on specific 
themes that allowed them to emphasise their distinctive opinions. The publication of 
views that contradicted previous interpretations in FR, taz and Spiegel could partially be 
because of the missing UN-mandate, or through changes in authorship. This underlines 
the varying opinions which sometimes existed within one editorial office, where the 
interpretation of events differed significantly. The editor-in-chief’s willingness to 
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 Hermann Gremliza, Konkret, May 1999, p. 9.  
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932
 Hermann Gremliza, “Wessen Krieg ist der Krieg”, Konkret, June 1999, p. 9 and Georg Fülberth, 
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publish contradicting views, thus presenting the reader with a balanced pool of opinions 
is to be commended. However, it is also worth noting that although the left-leaning and 
extreme publications did not support the war, their reasoning did not include arguments 
trivialising Serbia’s violence in Kosovo, nor did they address Germany’s National-
Socialist past as a reason to avoid a military intervention. Rather a general scepticism 
towards war, which was typical in light of their political affiliation, marked their 
interpretation. 
 
 
‘Genocide’ and concentration camps in Kosovo 
 
However, besides these general interpretations, various themes emerged in the 
reporting that were used by the different publications to underscore their particular 
viewpoints and thus manifest a rather unbalanced reporting style. The first theme was 
the question of whether ‘genocide’ was occurring in Kosovo. The German Minister of 
Defence, Rudolf Scharping, had declared the situation was “incipient genocide,” (“Hier 
beginnt Völkermord”) a citation which appeared in various articles in Welt, FAZ, BILD, 
as well as FR, Spiegel and taz.
933
 FR and taz merely reported Scharping’s claim, though 
their articles did not contain judgement. The conservative papers on the other hand, 
agreed with Scharping’s assessment, arguing that the international community was 
consequently compelled to act. Moreover, Welt and FAZ praised Sharping for being 
“the first politician to speak of genocide in Kosovo.”934 Welt’s Wolfram Weimer 
continued in an editorial: “when the henchmen of the Serb-leader Milošević murder and 
displace, we cannot look away. Their atrocities are not singular deeds, but 
systematically planned…”, continuing that the international community must put an end 
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to “the genocide quickly and effectively.”935 Welt’s liberal use of the term ‘genocide’ 
was epitomised in a striking advertisement published on 10 April, announcing its 
forthcoming Sunday edition. 
 
Figure 129: Welt, 10 April 1999, p. 4 
 
The advertisement promised to disclose details of “The Genocide” under the sub-
headings: “mass executions, mass rapes and mass displacement.” Even though Welt am 
Sonntag is not included in this study, a brief analysis of this issue revealed that contrary 
to its advertisement, there was no particular mention of ‘genocide’ in any of the articles 
on 11 April.
936
 This suggests that Welt’s employment of the term was used as an 
unscrupulous marketing device to shock and evoke public interest.  
BILD’s most striking contribution was an editorial written by Elie Wiesel, a 
famous author and Auschwitz-survivor. He wrote on 14 April:  
54 years later, many people feel reminded of the murder of the Jews by the National-Socialists 
during the Second World War, due to the violence in Kosovo. However this time the world was 
not silent. This time the world answered. This time we intervened!
937
  
Interestingly, Wiesel employed the term ‘violence’ instead of ‘genocide.’ However, the 
allusions to the Holocaust he generated were strong enough to create a sense of moral 
imperative. Moreover the echo of Auschwitz may have underlined the perception in the 
reader that ‘this time’ Germany was on the ‘right side.’ Wiesel, who had reached 
international acclaim for his memoirs, Night (1960), had been a vocal supporter of 
international intervention in the Balkans from the early 1990s. For example, at the 
opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. in 1993, Wiesel 
addressed President Clinton who was also present in his speech: 
                                                 
935
 Wolfram Weimer, “Frieden am Boden”, Welt, 03.04.1999, p. 1. 
936
 Welt am Sonntag, 11.04.1999, pp. 1-6. 
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Mr. President, I cannot not tell you something…I have been in the former Yugoslavia. I cannot 
sleep since for what [sic] I have seen. As a Jew I am saying that we must do something to stop 
the bloodshed in that country!
938
 
Wiesel’s acclaim as a supporter for an international intervention along with his 
experiences as a Holocaust-survivor were presumably the main reasons for BILD’s 
choice to feature an article by him. Publishing such a call from a prominent Holocaust-
survivor gave the NATO-intervention more authority.  
In contrast, Spiegel cautioned that Scharping could be using strong terminology 
such as ‘genocide’ to persuade the population that the cause NATO was pursuing was 
just; something it termed a “major rhetorical offensive.”939 AJW – which did not quote 
Scharping’s evaluation – cautioned against misusing the term ‘genocide’ to label the 
events in Kosovo. One editorial alleged: “What is currently happening in Kosovo is 
ethnic cleansing; Auschwitz was no ordinary war crime.”940 This stance was 
underscored in an interview with Aca Singer, President of the Union of Jewish 
Communities in Yugoslavia:  
Constantly we hear the comparison that this is genocide. This isn’t genocide – genocide is what 
was done to the Jews. There have been crimes against Albanians and also against Serbians. But 
that has nothing to do with genocide.
941
 
Singer’s reiteration of the uniqueness of the Holocaust raises an important issue. There 
were no deliberations amongst the more widely-read German publications and 
politicians whether comparisons between the Holocaust and Kosovo impacted the 
historical-political as well as cultural perception of the Holocaust. Nor did any 
publications systematically compare the definition in the UN Genocide Convention with 
the violence in Kosovo to establish whether the label ‘genocide’ was applicable. 
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Consequently, a legal term was turned into a political cause, in the coverage of the 
conservative papers, reiterating Peter Rudolf’s previously mentioned theory of a 
‘hypermoralised’ discourse.942 Whether the press was merely searching for a fitting 
word to describe the catastrophic situation in Kosovo or if they consciously misused the 
term to generate support for NATO’s intervention amongst their readers remains open.  
To solidify his claims of ‘genocide’ unfolding, Scharping also stated that 
concentration camps existed in Kosovo, which was reported by Welt, FAZ, BILD, taz 
and FR.
943
 However one week later, these claims could not be substantiated and indeed 
were disproven by photographic evidence of the alleged site taken by Bundeswehr-
drones. Significantly, none of the papers that had quoted Scharping without hesitation 
rectified their error. Spiegel reported on the subject after it had been disproven, perhaps 
helped by its weekly editorial cycle.  
The treatment of the alleged concentration camps in BILD-articles is worth 
noting. On 1 April, the first-page-article stated: “KZ.944 Concentration camp. A 
nightmare is revived again. Reports are accumulating that the Serbs are rounding up 
thousands of Albanians in huge camps....”945 Though the article reported that Scharping 
had referred to “first indications” that such camps existed, this BILD-article and various 
others portrayed the camps as proven facts. The sensationalism was carried over into an 
editorial which stated that the “horror-institutions” in Kosovo meant that “Hitler and 
Stalin…[had] risen from the dead through Milošević.”946 Astonishingly, a further article 
published the same day stated that the German Ministry of Defence was in possession 
of videos showing concentration camps, although it did acknowledge that there were 
problems with this evidence: “However, it is not one-hundred-percent certain if these 
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videos are current or if they were taken during the Bosnian War.”947 This admittance 
that the basis for the articles remained unproven was largely lost in the emotionally-
laden content. The image and headline on the first page of that edition arguably had 
much more impact than any article could have had, evoking, by now familiar images of 
Jews marching to concentration camps in the Second World War.  
 
Figure 130: BILD, 1 April 1999, p. 1: “…They are herding them to the concentration camp” 
 
While it is fully comprehensible that the press would cite a statement made by the 
Minister of Defence, BILD’s coverage clearly went beyond this.  
Spiegel, taz, Konkret and AJW were much more sceptical of Scharping’s claims, 
which taz deemed part of his “rhetorical repertoire”, along with comparing Milošević to 
Hitler.
948
 Several Konkret-articles reiterated that there was no proof to substantiate 
Scharping’s claims and criticised the Minister for using unproven and false information. 
However, none analysed this issue any further.
949
 Spiegel’s articles also demonstrated a 
sense of indignation at Scharping’s claims about concentration camps without 
producing the necessary proof.
950
 In an interview with Chancellor Schröder, Spiegel 
stated accusingly: “If the Defence Minister speaks of concentration camps, he needs 
proof.” After an evasive answer from Schröder, the news-magazine pressed him further:  
two weeks ago, there was information that 10,000 or 20,000 people were being subjected to 
unbelievable brutality in Pristina’s [football] stadium. When the Bundeswehr…sent drones over 
the stadium, the pictures proved that the stadium was empty. 
To this repeated demand for an explanation Schröder simply replied: “those who want 
to see the misery of flight and expulsion don’t need to wait for the proof from the aerial 
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reconnaissance.”951 Schröder’s admission regarding the careless treatment of proof or 
lack thereof is striking. Moreover, the news-magazine’s insistence on a straight-forward 
comment from the Chancellor shows the indignation of the negligent misuse of claims 
as well as Spiegel’s reluctance to simply regurgitate what politicians were telling the 
press. No other publication at this time underlined Scharping’s mistake as emphatically 
as Spiegel. 
One explanation for this doubtful reporting of Scharping’s claims of 
concentration camps in Pristina in most German publications could stem from a larger 
matter. While the German press’ discovery and coverage of concentration camps in 
Eastern Bosnia in the summer of 1992 was not analysed in this thesis, this was a 
watershed moment for the international community, epitomised by the pictures below.    
   
Figure 131: Cover of American TIME-Magazine,  Summer 1992
952
 
 
 
Figure 132: Cover of UK tabloid, 7 August 1992
953
 
 
The above image continued to demand international interest when the freelance German 
journalist Thomas Deichmann wrote an article in 1997 entitled “The picture that fooled 
the world,” in which he alleged that this image had been fabricated. These allegations 
were qualified in 2000 when the publishing journal, Living Marxism, was sued in a libel 
case and had to pay £375,000 for publishing Deichmann’s article.954 Nevertheless, in 
Spring 1999, the international journalists were presumably over-sensitive to Scharping’s 
unproven allegations of concentration camps. While neither this controversy, nor the 
                                                 
951
 Leinemann, Knaup and Aust, “‘Ich bin kein Kriegskanzler’”, Spiegel, 12.04.1999, pp. 35-36. 
952
 Online Source: http://iconicphotos.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/time-serb-jpg.jpeg%3Fw%3D700, 
Accessed 10.08.2012.  
953
 Online Source: http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/attachments/warfare-modern-
age/24072d1296383378-photographs-do-lie-mirror_crop.jpg, accessed 26.11.2012. 
954
 Anonymous, “ITN launches libel action”, BBC, 29 February 2000, Online Source: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/659818.stm, accessed 25.11.2012 and Anonymous, “ITN wins 
Bosnian war Libel Case”, BBC, 15 March, 2000, Online Source: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/677481.stm, accessed 25.11.2012. 
288 
 
Bosnian concentration camps were mentioned explicitly in any articles, this may have 
influenced the journalists’ evaluation of Scharping’s claims. 
Moreover it is worth noting that in spite of this distinctly unprofessional 
behaviour of disseminating unproven facts, Scharping never publicly justified himself. 
Gregor Gysi (PDS) reminded the Bundestag of Scharping’s exaggerations during a 
speech he made on 15 April.
955
 However, when the Minister of Defence spoke later in 
the debate, he did not address the issue, although he responded to various other matters 
Gysi had raised.
956
 Furthermore, in Scharping’s memoirs, he omitted the subject 
completely. This could underline the gravity of his error, which Scharping seemingly 
wanted to white-wash in his official record.
957
  
 
 
Milošević – the main culprit? 
 
The portrayal of Milošević was another important theme in all publications aside 
from AJW and Konkret. The conservative newspapers Welt, FAZ and BILD accused 
Milošević of having forced NATO’s hand, leaving the alliance no choice but to put an 
end to the inhumane events in Kosovo.
958
 “Milošević wanted this war…” one Welt-
article stated bluntly – an assessment underlined by a poignant cartoon.959  
 
Figure 133: Welt, 6 April 1999, p. 10 
 
A FAZ-editor, Berthold Kohler, expressed a similar assessment in his editorial: “this 
war was virtually forced upon the dithering NATO.”960 He reinforced this opposition of 
good NATO versus bad Milošević one month later in his description of the latter as a 
“dictator gone wild” who had forced NATO into this war and that “his murder-machine 
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in Kosovo [must] be stopped”.961 Other FAZ-articles equally interpreted the Kosovo 
War through a clear-cut binary opposition, portraying NATO as good and Milošević as 
evil. For example on 27 March, Matthias Rüb contrasted the “comprehensive 
destruction of the Serbian-Yugoslav army in Vukovar, Sarajevo, Kosovo and other 
places in former Yugoslavia” to NATO’s “surgical intervention aimed at weakening a 
military-apparatus.”962 This comparison was further underlined by the assessment that 
Milošević was pursuing ‘ethnic cleansing’ – an ‘injustice’ that NATO now needed to 
‘make right.’963  
This interpretation was also presented in a cartoon published in FAZ, which 
portrayed Milošević as a grinning politician who pursued his goal of constructing a 
Greater Serbia – symbolised through his hand-gesture, the Chetnik-salute – while 
destroying Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Kosovo to achieve his goal. 
Only with NATO’s attacks on Belgrade, did Milošević finally alter his stance. 
 
Figure 134: FAZ, 27 March 1999, p. 5 
 
Interestingly, this caricature equates the genocide in Srebrenica to other instances of 
Serbian violence such as the destruction of Dubrovnik, the siege of Sarajevo, or the 
events in Kosovo, none of which have been termed ‘genocide’. While a reader at the 
time may not have noticed this detail, it emphasises the lack of discernment regarding 
the topic, even in abstract terms, found in other instances throughout FAZ’s coverage. 
BILD’s treatment of Milošević can be summed up as an excessively populist 
depiction.
964
 Mere days after the NATO-intervention had begun, BILD published an 
article which reported that “they call him [Slobodan Milošević] the ‘butcher of the 
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Balkans’. His wife is simply called…‘the witch of Belgrade.’”965 The article never 
detailed who specifically called Milošević and his wife these names and considering 
that there was no opposition worth mentioning in Serbia at the time,
966
 this claim seems 
concocted. However, from this point onwards almost all BILD-articles referred to 
Milošević simply as ‘der Schlächter’ or ‘the butcher’.967 Two juxtaposed images 
published on 27 March, both printed on the first page, encapsulate this populism.  
 
Figure 135: BILD, 27 March 1999, p. 1: “The Butcher” 
 
The picture of Milošević was accompanied by the following caption: “Yugoslavia’s 
President Slobodan Milošević: While civilians are dying gruesomely, he lights a 
cigar.”968 The civilian suffering for which BILD made Milošević personally responsible 
was then portrayed pictorially in the picture below. In this context, one must remember 
that the tabloid, with a circulation of 4,45 million, was the most-read daily newspaper in 
Germany.
969
 Significantly, BILD’s populist treatment of Milošević was strongly 
criticised by JF. As an editorial by Peter Lattas asserted provocatively, Hitler’s 
Propaganda Minister “Joseph Goebbels would have been proud of BILD…”970  
The left-leaning publications did not portray Milošević in the same excessive 
manner as the conservative press, though they also allocated responsibility for the 
violence to him personally. The left-wing taz was the most explicit, describing 
Milošević as an “ego-maniacal dictator” who had thrust the Balkans into a decade of 
war.
971
 A FR-article stated that “there is no…[option of] peace [when dealing with] 
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more than an alleged war-criminal.”972 This slightly awkward description – in the 
original German: “…mehr als [ein] mutmaβlicher Kriegsverbrecher” – presumably 
aimed to express that even though Milošević had not been indicted by the ICTY, to the 
author, there was no doubt about the severity of his war crimes. 
Spiegel’s portrayal of Milošević was two-fold. On the one hand its articles made 
Milošević responsible for the war973 and attributed derogative names to him, which 
hitherto only BILD had done. Terms such as ‘Serb-tsar’974 and ‘Belgrade despot’975, as 
well as the colloquial ‘Über-Serb’976 were repeatedly used to describe Milošević while 
words such as ‘butchers,’977 and ‘Milošević-killers’978 described the Serbian forces. 
Simultaneously however, Rudolf Augstein argued in various editorials that Milošević’s 
insistence on Kosovo’s belonging to Serbia was comprehensible, as the region was an 
important element of the Serbian national conscience.
979
 Moreover Augstein reiterated 
that ‘moralising’ arguments such as declaring Milošević to be one of the worst criminals 
of the 20
th
 century were useless and did not contribute to finding a solution. Instead he 
focused his attention on what he described as the “war-trio Schröder-Scharping-
Fischer,” wondering why no one was accusing them for getting Germany involved in 
Kosovo.
980
 This divergence of Spiegel’s articles and the opinion of the news-magazine’s 
founder offering different interpretations must be noted. Nonetheless, the articles that 
made Milošević responsible for the war outweighed Augstein’s single editorial. 
Moreover, Spiegel’s coverage emphasises that while the liberal/left-wing publications 
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were fundamentally against the war, they nonetheless held Milošević personally 
responsible for the on-going violence, just as they had done before. 
 The manner in which these publications portrayed Milošević, substantiates the 
conclusion Grundmann draws in his media analysis that Germany’s press tended to 
‘demonise’ Milošević, as the author argued.981 Another conclusion Grundmann reached 
was that the German press used direct analogies and comparisons to the Third Reich. 
Moreover, Savarese concluded in her comparative European media analysis that 
Milošević was frequently likened to Hitler in various international publications 
including the French Le Monde and the Italian Il Corriere della Sera. This calls for a 
consideration of the German press’ likening of the Yugoslav President to Hitler. The 
only newspapers to utilise such comparisons were BILD and FAZ, though the tabloid 
did so in only one article.
982
 However, the broadsheet featured them repeatedly, arguing 
that the harsh word-choice was justifiable considering Milošević’s policies.983 There 
was one single exception in an editorial authored by Frank Schirrmacher, one of FAZ’s 
editors-in-chief. “Milošević is not Hitler. And Kosovo is not Auschwitz”, Schirrmacher 
wrote. When contrasting this evaluation with the previous eagerness of FAZ-authors and 
even Schirrmacher’s co-editor-in-chief, Kohler, to use such analogies to underline the 
justification of NATO’s intervention, it becomes all the more clear that editorials were 
personal opinions which at times stood in contrast to other members of the editorial 
team. Unfortunately this discerning article was easily lost in the majority of opposite 
interpretations found in FAZ’s coverage. 
 All other publications also voiced their disapproval of such comparisons, though 
for different reasons.
984
 AJW strongly disapproved of likening Milošević and Hitler, as 
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well as Kosovo and the Holocaust, deeming them plainly incorrect.
985
 Similarly, Welt 
argued, that such comparisons distorted the “Hitler-genocide” while simultaneously 
giving the reader a wrong sense of what was unfolding in Kosovo.
986
 An editorial 
published in mid-May, entitled “The wrong Hitler”, was even more explicit: “it is rude 
and politically stupid to stylise every military enemy as Hitler.”987 taz published various 
articles criticising such associations, as they “…trivialised the Hitler-crimes. The Jews 
may have been grateful if Hitler had merely lugged them to the border.”988  
 This demonstrates that while comparisons to the Holocaust and Hitler could 
occasionally be found in the German press coverage, they were also perceived critically 
and limited to mostly one publication. Nonetheless, the treatment of Milošević in the 
German press was marked by what could be seen as an internal struggle. After nearly a 
decade of blaming Milošević for the Balkan-violence, it was perhaps gratifying to see 
NATO’s attack against him. On the other hand, all publications except BILD – though 
to a differing degree – were weary of entangling themselves in unfitting historical 
comparisons. This dichotomy could explain the at times fluctuating treatment of 
Milošević. Moreover the bipartisan movement away from comparing Milošević to 
Hitler – again except in BILD as well as FAZ – manifests a sensitivity in the 
publications’ editorial offices. 
 However, in this focus Milošević with regard to the NATO-intervention all 
publications disregarded KLA as a significant contributor to the initial violence in 
Kosovo. A few months earlier, all had analysed KLA’s activities and while there was a 
tendency to embellish their guerrilla warfare,
989
 their contribution to the violence was at 
least acknowledged. This was no longer the case now that NATO was at war and 
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needed a clear enemy. Even those publications, which did not approve of NATO’s 
intervention, did not include KLA in their analyses. This is partially comprehensible 
considering the drastic humanitarian catastrophe caused by the Serbian forces at this 
time. In comparison, KLA’s violence may have seemed like needle-pricks. Nonetheless, 
it must be noted that the German press completely disregarded an important actor who 
had been central to the coverage mere months earlier. This underscores a tendency to 
condense the conflict to a clear-cut black and white interpretation.  
 
 
Serbian civilians and the war 
 
Amidst the coverage supporting and opposing the war, the treatment of Serbian 
civilians in the German press is very revealing. Serbian civilians, especially those living 
in Belgrade and other major Serbian cities, were strongly affected by the NATO-
bombardment, particularly when power plants, media outlets, bridges and other targets 
NATO deemed tactically important were hit. Most nights were spent in air-raid shelters 
and many attempted to flee from Serbia. Similar to the secondary literature, FAZ and 
Konkret did not treat this subject-matter at all. Konkret’s neglect is particularly 
surprising due to the magazine’s avid opposition to the war. This would have made their 
coverage of the civilian suffering under NATO-bombardment particularly relevant.  
Spiegel, JF, Welt and BILD gave it limited coverage.
990
 The only BILD-article 
on this topic painted a vivid picture: “deafening sirens wailing, the crash of the 
explosions, blazing columns of fire…the Yugoslav capital [had]…almost completely 
collapsed.”991 This reduced interest in the suffering of Serbian civilians under NATO-
bombardment may have resulted from the difficult situation the German press was in. 
Even though some publications were critical of the intervention, none approved of the 
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Serbian violence in Kosovo. Consequently Serbians primarily remained the perpetrators 
in a very condensed portrayal of the conflict. This was further underlined in various 
articles and editorials published by FAZ and Welt, which painted a very negative image 
of Serbian civilians. Some articles argued that the Serbian population had no sense of 
collective responsibility, let alone guilt for what was happening or what Milošević was 
doing in Kosovo.
992
 One FAZ-editorial, entitled “Collective Blindness” stated that the 
Serbian people had a severe deficit in the “sense of wrong-doing”, and this was 
compounded by their “self-righteous not-wanting-to-look” attitude and their 
construction of a “victim-myth.”993 Clearly it was hard for them to be sympathetic for 
Serbians suffering from NATO violence. 
FR and taz were the only publications that gave insight into the life of Serbian 
civilians at the time.
994
 Many of these articles were written by their respective 
correspondents based in Belgrade: Stephan Israel for FR and Andrej Ivanji for taz. Israel 
reported that there was no sense of normalcy. “The people in Belgrade don’t have a 
single quiet night anymore,” since NATO-bombs were regularly hitting the city centre. 
When the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior was destroyed by a NATO-bomb, Israel 
reported: “In the silent faces around the barrier in front of the ruins there is a mixture of 
anger and indignation. No one is speaking…”995  
taz’s Ivanji also painted a sympathetic picture of Serbian civilians. He reminded 
his readers that the terror Belgrade’s citizens were living through every single night 
reminded the population of the Nazi-attacks in 1941. Ivanji closed the article with an 
anecdote told by an older woman to a younger woman as both found shelter from the 
NATO-bombs in a cellar. The former reminded her listener that Sarajevo had been 
besieged for three whole years – a siege she said, Serbians had condoned. And 
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Sarajevo’s population had endured so much longer.996 Ivanji’s reminder that Serbians 
recognised their previous role as perpetrators stands in harsh contrast to the stance taken 
in the conservative papers which argued that Serbians had constructed an myth of 
victimhood and refused to acknowledge their country’s part in the on-going violence. 
However, the author also reminded his reader that it was very difficult even in Belgrade 
to find out what was really happening in Kosovo and that most people in the capital 
were kept in the dark about these events.
997
 This article is remarkable, as it merged 
‘normal’ reporting of civilians in Belgrade with a commentary on their world-view. 
Rather than covering the many hostile anti-NATO protests in Belgrade, Ivanji chose to 
portray a quiet, reflective scene in an air-raid shelter. The result of this careful selection 
gave the taz-reader a rarely likable portrait of Serbians. 
Images showing Serbian civilians in air-raid-bunkers such as figure 136 were 
printed along-side these articles, which gave the reader a more memorable impression 
of the Serbian civilians’ fate. 
 
Figure 136: BILD, 29 March 1999, p. 4
998
 
 
 
Other pictures published by taz and Spiegel presented Serbian civilian suffering more 
graphically, linking it directly to the NATO-bombing.  
  
Figure 137: taz, 7 April 1999, p. 6: Serbian civilian after a NATO-bomb mistakenly struck a 
Serbian residential area in a town called Aleksinac.
999
 
 
 
Figure 138: Spiegel, 12 April 1999, p. 174: “A NATO-strike in Pristina” 
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We turn now to three side-issues which proved important in shaping the publications’ 
reporting: the influence of Srebrenica and Račak; the Green party and collective 
memory of the Holocaust; and the media’s self-reflection of its role in the war.  
 
 
The impact of Srebrenica and Račak  
 
 Srebrenica and Račak can be seen as milestones in the international 
understanding of the Bosnia and Kosovo War respectively. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the incident in Račak – whether it was a ‘massacre’ or not – had sparked 
considerable interest in the German print media, but this subsided soon after. However, 
as the German press covered the NATO-intervention in Kosovo, Račak re-appeared in 
some publications. AJW understandably did not mention Račak in this context, as it had 
not covered the incident at the time. BILD, taz, Konkret and JF, which had reported on 
the incident previously, did not refer to Račak now, though Welt, FAZ, FR and Spiegel 
did.
1000
 Mostly they reminded the readers of the conflict’s length and the level of 
violence the Kosovo-Albanian population had been subjected to in the past. 
Significantly, the term ‘massacre’ was used indiscriminately in all four publications, in 
spite of the legal ambiguities surrounding the term.
1001
 Curiously Spiegel also published 
the by now familiar ‘ditch-scene’ from Račak twice – on 29 March and in mid-April. 
 
Figure 139: Spiegel, 12 April 1999, p. 191 
 
While the caption in March clearly labelled the image as portraying a scene from Račak, 
the picture above, taken from the April edition was merely described with the following 
caption: “Massacred Albanians (1999): ‘Brutal violence.’” This could indicate that the 
picture was deemed universally known, reiterating the prominence of the incident in the 
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understanding of events in Kosovo. However, the condensed caption also underlined 
Spiegel’s stubborn referral to Račak as a scene of ‘massacred’ Kosovo-Albanians 
without mentioning that 7-8 KLA-soldiers had been amongst the fatalities, nor that 
Serbia contested this version altogether, which the news-magazine had already 
disregarded this matter in its initial coverage of the Račak incident.  
Nonetheless it must be noted that although Račak re-appeared in some 
publications’ articles, none of them argued that this was a particularly striking incident 
or that it justified the NATO-intervention. Indeed, the echo of the Srebrenica Massacre 
played a much bigger role in the coverage of the NATO-intervention than Račak, 
although BILD, Konkret and AJW did not refer to it. All other papers used references to 
Srebrenica to underline the desperate fate of the Kosovo-Albanian civilians and remind 
the reader of the atrocities Milošević had already been involved with in the past.1002 
Again Spiegel presented its reminder of Srebrenica with an image: 
 
Figure 140: Spiegel, 5 April 1999, p. 174: “Muslim refugees from Srebrenica, 1995” 
 
The selection of this picture is telling, as it presents refugees fleeing from Srebrenica 
rather than the victims of the massacre itself. As elaborated in the previous chapter on 
Srebrenica, the enclave had been inaccessible to international journalists and observers 
as the genocide was unfolding. Consequently, the only sources of information at the 
time were the refugees who had fled to Tuzla. However, by the time this image was re-
published in April 1999, forensic excavations of the mass graves in Srebrenica had been 
underway for several years and other images had become available. However, by 
choosing this picture of refugees, Spiegel’s aim presumably was to remind the reader of 
known information rather than introduce new details. Moreover, this image of 
Srebrenica’s displaced civilians draws a clear parallel to the current pictures of Kosovo-
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Albanian refugees, underlining the continuous destruction by ‘the Serbs.’ These 
underlying nuances which resonate with this image reveal how much Srebrenica 
influenced the interpretation of Kosovo. 
This is further highlighted by two FAZ-articles reminding the reader that little 
had been known about Srebrenica as the massacre was unfolding in July 1995, but that 
four years later the public knowledge of the event was becoming more complete and the 
extent of the fatalities visible. With Srebrenica in mind, the articles argued, NATO’s on-
going intervention in Kosovo was legitimate. No one could be sure of knowing more 
than a fraction of what was really going on in Kosovo.
1003
 The message conveyed by 
these articles regarding the doubts of how reliable information was is very important, as 
it underlines the influence of the previous Bosnia War on the analysis of the on-going 
conflict in Kosovo.  
taz, which had extensively reported on Srebrenica, used its references 
differently. One article argued that because Serbia had been the enemy during the 
Bosnia War, as well as the Kosovo War and was responsible for the Srebrenica 
Massacre, politicians were letting their trauma over the Srebrenica killings influence 
them, even though the on-going situation in Kosovo was very different to that in Bosnia 
earlier.
1004
 Another taz-article criticised Scharping’s statement that a second Srebrenica 
– where, according to the Defence Minister, 30,000 civilians had been murdered – was 
happening in Kosovo. The taz-editorial reminded its reader that UNHCR estimated the 
Srebrenica fatalities at 7.076. “But such details do not matter if you are on the ‘right’ 
side of a war…” the author remarked sarcastically.1005 taz’s critical editorial not only 
stressed that even four years later, the complete number of fatalities remained 
                                                 
1003
 Udo Ulfkotte, “Die Nato ist im Bilde, doch gibt sie nur wenig preis”, FAZ, 10.04.1999, p. 4; Also in: 
em., “Ein Einzelner”, FAZ, 13.04.1999, p. 49. 
1004
 Jonas Viering, “Das Himmelfahrtskommando”, taz, 07.04.1999, p. 8. 
1005
 Stefan Reinecke, “Krieg macht dumm”, taz, 07.04.1999, p. 1. 
300 
 
unknown.
1006
 It also drew attention to the occasional inflated cross-references made to 
Srebrenica, which exploited the massacre in a time of war. 
 
 
The Green Party 
 
 As NATO’s bombardment continued over several weeks without any signs of 
Milošević surrendering, the German public became increasingly sceptical of the war. 
Particularly the Green party base criticised ‘their’ politicians – mainly Fischer – for 
abandoning the most fundamental element of their ideology, namely pacifism. 
Consequently, on 14 May 1999, when for the first time since March there were more 
war-opponents than supporters,
1007
 a special Green Party convention was organised in 
Bielefeld, Germany, where this issue was debated. Here the delegates had to decide 
whether they would support Fischer and his policies, which meant a continuation of the 
war, or if Fischer should lose the backing of his party. This would mean that the Green 
Party was no longer regierungsfähig, or ‘able to govern,’ ending the Red-Green 
coalition. Facing this political crisis, Fischer gave a passionate speech to rally support 
for his policies, which was partially quoted or even printed in its entirety in all main-
stream publications.
1008
 In it Fischer reiterated “Auschwitz is incomparable. But I stand 
for two principles: Never again war, never again Auschwitz; never again genocide, 
never again Fascism: for me, both belong together…and that’s why I joined the Green 
Party.”1009 
In the German press’ coverage of this speech, readers learned that after several 
attacks of Fischer and his colleagues with paint bombs and butanoic acid, the 
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convention ultimately voted in support of Fischer.
1010
 However, it is striking that none 
of the publications commented on his linkages between Germany’s past and the 
country’s present foreign policy. Indeed, apart from the occasional reiteration that 
German soldiers were engaged in active combat for the first time since the Second 
World War
1011
 and allusions to the irony that a traditionally anti-war or even pacifist 
Red-Green coalition had made this decision,
1012
 there was no profound discourse on 
Germany’s past and the role it played in the present. Christiane Eilders and Albert Lüter 
demonstrated in their media analysis that Germany’s self-image had developed to the 
point that it was no longer defined primarily by the Second World War.
1013
 The German 
press’ coverage of the Green Party convention corroborates this conclusion. None of the 
publications considered the broader themes that resounded in this speech, for example 
how Germany would generally position itself in terms of foreign policy, having 
departed from its previous doctrine; and what the ‘normalisation’ of Germany and its 
past meant for the broader theme of Holocaust memory. This last theme highlights an 
interesting development in the German press coverage. While a debate on the collective 
memory of the Holocaust played a reduced role in the press, the Second World War and 
the Holocaust were omnipresent in the coverage, for example in the discussion about 
concentration camps.   
 
 
German expellees: No one knows it like us 
 
Another example for the omnipresence of the Second World War is this last 
theme found in the coverage. Throughout the NATO-intervention JF, Welt and BILD 
introduced an interesting phenomenon into their coverage, creating a link between the 
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plight of the Kosovo-Albanian refugees and Germans who had been forcefully expelled 
from Eastern Europe after 1945. To understand this cross-reference, a quick historical 
excursion is useful. During the 18th and early 19th century, Germans were settled along 
the Danube River in South-Eastern Europe, including modern-day Serbia. The 
Habsburg Empire had conquered this territory in wars against the Ottoman Empire 
between 1683-1699 and 1716-1718.
1014
 These settlers are often referred to as 
‘Donauschwaben’ or ‘Danube-Swabians.’1015 According to a 1931 census 500,000 
Germans lived in Yugoslavia. Most of them were peasants in the Vojvodina region 
north of Belgrade.
1016
 After the Second World War, these Germans were associated with 
Nazi-Germany and were thus dispossessed and forced to leave their homes. Long 
refugee treks formed, which headed towards Austria and Germany. The Germans living 
in Yugoslavia who refused to leave were subjected to mass-executions and some were 
confined in ‘internment-camps.’1017 Their fate was interpreted in very different ways. 
Many refugees, their ancestors and sympathisers saw them as victims of history who 
were associated with the Nazis and the regime’s policy of east-ward expansion using 
settlers, even though they had lived in these territories for approximately 200 years 
before the Third Reich. However, after 1945, this sense of victimhood did not find 
much sympathy in Germany’s public discourse.    
Returning to the links made to these German refugees in the reporting of the 
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, JF published two articles about Kosovo which 
emphasised the German expellees who had been forced to leave the East-European 
territories – including the former Yugoslavia – after the Second World War. The 
extreme-right paper argued that these ‘Vertriebene’ or expellees knew only too well 
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what the Kosovo-Albanians were experiencing, as “the Kosovo-Albanian exodus” was 
being implemented with similar methods to those used in 1945 when the Germans were 
forced from their homes.
1018
 This was underscored with a cartoon.  
 
Figure 141: JF, 9 April 1999, p. 2: “The century of displacement” 
 
Welt’s article voiced its incomprehension that there was so much solidarity for the 
Kosovo-Albanian refugees when the Germans who had been expelled “from the East” 
did not benefit from such understanding.
1019
 To underscore the similarities between the 
suffering of the Germans in 1945 and the Kosovo-Albanians in 1999, two sets of 
pictures accompanied this article. 
 
Figure 142: Welt, 17 April 1999, p. 6: “The expellees” Figure 143: Welt, 17 April 1999, p. 7 
 
BILD’s article featured graphic details of the atrocities the Germans had been 
subjected to in 1945: Serbians raping women and burning them with iron rods; men 
“…being chopped up in a corn husking machine or used as fuel in steam engines.”1020 
Along with these gruesome details, a memorable quote from Hans Sonnleiter, the 
chairman of a cultural foundation for these German expellees, termed their fate 
‘genocide.’ The BILD-article did not question this term and the manner in which it was 
juxtaposed with the descriptions of atrocities, the author seemed to agree with this 
argument. Even though the article did not draw comparisons specifically to the fate of 
Kosovo-Albanians in 1999, the article was published under the page-heading “NATO at 
war”, creating a direct link to the on-going war. It illustrates in particular the anti-
Serbian undertone of most articles and their tendency to portray ‘the Serbs’ as 
historically cold-blooded murderers. 
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This connection was met with criticism in a Konkret-article published in June 
1999. Entitled “Sudeten-Germans everywhere”, it decidedly rejected the link made by 
other newspapers between German expellees and Kosovo-Albanian refugees. Andreas 
Spannbauer argued that it was only a matter of time before “…the Germans started 
speaking about their own refugees…”, which the author deemed a German effort to 
trivialise their own crimes by establishing themselves as victims. The article continued 
to remind the reader that the expulsion of the Germans in 1945 followed the Nazi’s 
“racially-motivated policy of extermination”, implying that the situation in Kosovo was 
very different and that the Germans were to blame for their own suffering.
1021
 
These articles, while quantitatively insignificant, are very important 
qualitatively. They demonstrate a shift in self-perception in German public discourse 
and perhaps even in the self-perception of Germans and of Germany. In previous 
chapters – until roughly 1995 – the ‘discourse of dismay’ which dominated the 
collective memory of the Holocaust would not have allowed pity or understanding for 
German victims of the Second World War. However, by 1999, the reminder that 
Germans had also suffered under Serbians, even to the extent of terming this ‘genocide,’ 
indicates a major development in the stages of collective memory in Germany. 
Moreover these articles demonstrate that the blanket conclusion put forward by Eilders 
and Lüter that the Second World War was no longer important to Germany’s self-
understanding is too simple.
1022
 In fact, it had become multi-dimensional and more 
complex, and could now also include the understanding of Germans as victims. 
 
 
Media and War 
 
We turn now to the role of the print media during the war and most importantly 
the press’ self-perception of its delicate role as an opinion-maker. While international 
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correspondents were allowed to stay in Belgrade or Serbian territory during NATO’s 
bombardment, they were quickly expelled from Kosovo. All main-stream publications 
drew attention to this inaccessibility and stated that the additional strict censorship in 
Belgrade made it very difficult to obtain trustworthy information on what events were 
unfolding in Kosovo.
1023
 FR was perhaps most adamant to reiterate this regularly, 
repeatedly printing a text, which informed the reader that “the war-coverage of Kosovo 
is subjected to difficult circumstances. Only few independent journalists are still active 
in the Yugoslav territory, amongst them FR-correspondent Stephan Israel in Belgrade.” 
The text further cautioned that it was hard to verify facts and that all parties involved 
could be propelling their own propagandistic interests.
1024
 But not all the problems came 
from Serbia’s power. A taz-article entitled “NATO-show: talking a lot, saying nothing” 
starkly condemned NATO’s inadequate information policy.1025 Other articles reported 
that NATO was publicising what they deemed unproven information without offering 
exact references regarding the sources.
1026
 This underlines that journalists felt both were 
compromising the quality of information available to the press. 
FR’s Stephan Israel, based in Belgrade, gave the reader further details regarding 
the painful process of gathering local information. Those who attempted to leave the 
city were quickly suspected of espionage. Journalists who wanted to know what was 
happening outside of Belgrade could only do so by joining a tour organised by the 
Serbian army. These trips focused on showing the destruction caused by NATO-
bombing. Moreover “only those…[were] allowed to join who submit[ted] their reports 
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to a kind of pre-censorship.”1027 Israel further stated that no one could really know what 
was going on in Pristina or Kosovo because all international journalists had been forced 
to leave shortly after the NATO-bombing had begun. Consequently the only sources of 
information available were the Kosovo-Albanian refugees who were arriving in Albania 
and Macedonia and the reliability of these sources was also deeply problematic. These 
examples indicate that the press was very aware of its extraordinary role in the war. 
Moreover, it communicated effectively to the readers that some of the information 
published at this time was fragmentary and difficult to verify. Arguably the images of 
Kosovo-Albanian refugee treks and especially BILD’s loud and provocative headlines 
were more memorable than these quiet self-reflections. However, these would not have 
gone unnoticed to an attentive and critical reader.  
 Only Spiegel was able to avoid the news-blackout and this only due to the fact 
that its reporter Renate Flottau had refused to leave Kosovo. In her compelling ‘war-
journal’ published in the form of Spiegel-articles, she gave an extraordinarily close 
insight into the day-to-day life in Pristina, as well as reporting on the perpetual danger 
she was in as an international journalist.
1028
 Through Flottau’s journal, the reader 
learned about routine harassments by Serbian police, the long refugee treks lining the 
roads in Kosovo, and that the majority of Serbians had very little knowledge of the 
events unfolding in Kosovo or the extent of violence Serbian forces were perpetuating 
there.
1029
 Flottau did not expand on why she was only able to stay in Pristina by dodging 
Serbian authorities as long as she could. Eventually she was forced to leave Pristina and 
reported from Belgrade, where authorities continued to harass her. For example, in one 
entry she described the difficulties the Serbian authorities were imposing on her as a 
journalist. On the one hand they revoked her press pass, but on the other hand they did 
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not expel her from the country, consequently leaving her in an uncomfortable limbo-
situation.
1030
 It remains unclear whether this harassment also affected her articles in 
terms of censorship. In spite of Flottau’s extraordinary proximity to the events, her 
articles did not report on the suffering of Serbian civilians. Especially once she was 
based in Belgrade and witnessed the heavy bombing, this must have been apparent to 
her. An explanation for this omission remains speculative. Perhaps she did include such 
details, which her editors in Germany cut from the article. Or one could speculate that 
having witnessed the disproportionate suffering in Kosovo may have narrowed her 
perception. 
 In light of the difficulties in obtaining reliable local information, the distribution 
of authorship in this time-frame is worth considering. 
Newspaper % of articles 
authored by 
correspondents 
% of articles 
authored by press 
agencies 
% of articles 
amalgamated from 
various press 
releases, etc. 
Welt 73% 15% 8% 
FAZ 80% 15% 4% 
FR 52% 45% 1% 
taz 69% 24% 2% 
Table 12: Percentages of articles according to authorship
1031
 
 
Similar to the previous timeframes, all publications continued to prefer articles 
published by their own correspondents. For the first time, even FR published more 
articles in this category than derived from press agencies. The presumed desired result 
was that the correspondents – many of whom had covered the previous Bosnia War as 
well – could give the reader more insights and contextual analysis. Moreover, 
considering how careful the journalists were in alerting the reader to the limitations of 
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their information, such articles were more nuanced than amalgamated press releases, 
which were barely published in this period. 
 
 
The Press’ Language 
 
The level of self-awareness in the German press is further underlined by the 
reluctance to use official NATO-terminology such as ‘collateral damage’ rather than 
‘civilian fatalities’ or ‘military actions’ instead of ‘war.’ As one FR-article reported, the 
German Journalist Association had requested journalists to avoid such military 
jargon.
1032
 While this caution was undoubtedly relevant, especially considering some of 
the exaggerated terminology employed at times, the term ‘collateral damage’ was barely 
used. Indeed, it only appeared in FAZ, taz, JF and Spiegel, and in all cases it was used 
sceptically.
1033
 FAZ’s Matthias Rüb referred to “so called ‘collateral damage’” in his 
article reporting that a passenger train had been hit, killing Serbian civilians.
1034
 The 
Spiegel-article criticised ‘the Serbs’ on the one hand for positioning their radar 
equipment right next to kindergartens or hospitals so that any mistake made by NATO 
could be exploited by propaganda. In the next sentence, however, the article 
disapproved of the alliance’s trivialising these deaths with terms such as ‘collateral 
damage.’1035 This criticism of both NATO and the Serbian forces not only gave an 
interesting insight into how media coverage could be exploited by both sides, but also 
reiterates the news-magazine’s critical stance towards NATO’s military jargon. 
Furthermore it demonstrates that generally the German press did not merely regurgitate 
the information it received from NATO, as some existing media studies have 
                                                 
1032
 afp, “Journalisten-Verband rügt ‘Hetzsprache’ in Medien”, FR, 30.03.1999, p. 7; See also: 
Anonymous, “Kosovo-Krieg: Presserat mahnt zu besonderer Sorgfalt”, Press Release from the German 
press Council, 19 May 1999, Online Source.  
1033
 Andreas Wild, “Chirurgische Eingriffe”, JF, 14.05.1999, p. 11; Barbara Örtel, “Schuld ist immer nur 
Milošević”, taz, 16.04.1999, p. 3. 
1034
 Matthias Rüb, “Trotz Satelliten und Videokameras keine Klarheit über die Ereignisse im Kosovo”, 
FAZ, 17.04.1999, p. 3. 
1035
 Alexander Szandar, “Minenhund und Bodyguard”, Spiegel, 29.03.1999, p. 203. 
309 
 
alleged.
1036
 This is further underlined by some images printed in various publications 
which graphically presented this ‘collateral damage.’1037 
Equally the use of the term ‘war’ was used liberally in the press, even though the 
official political language avoided this word. Chancellor Schröder’s speech on 24 
March 1999, explaining to the German people that NATO, including Germany, had 
commenced air-strikes against Yugoslavia, had clearly avoided the term ‘war,’ opting 
instead for ‘military actions’ or ‘air-strikes.’ Only when denying its existence did he 
utilise the term, reiterating that “we are not leading war”1038 – a statement quoted by 
FAZ, FR and BILD.
1039
 However, none of the publications analysed here mirrored such 
linguistic evasiveness in their coverage, repeatedly speaking of ‘war’ without using 
quotation marks or qualifying the assessment in any way.
1040
 Moreover, FAZ, Welt, FR, 
taz and JF, all reflected on why the official word-choice was shying away from such 
terminology, each offering an explanation that coincided with their interpretation of the 
war. The conservative FAZ and Welt attributed the politicians’ avoidance to the “two 
world-wars” which they argued negatively coloured the label.1041 Conversely, articles in 
JF, taz and FR alleged that NATO was aiming to manipulate public opinion with 
linguistic embellishments, reminding the readers of their view that the war was 
fundamentally illegal.
1042
 As the FR-article expanded, NATO’s official language was 
euphemistic – using ‘ethnic cleansing’ instead of ‘genocide’; ‘bombardment’ rather than 
‘war’ – to avoid an ‘international outcry.’1043 While the author makes a valid point, she 
presented ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a dilution of ‘genocide’ and disregards that these are two 
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very different things and indeed have vastly different legal implications for the 
international community.  
As the media did not simply absorb the official terminology offered by NATO 
and the German politicians, a degree of scepticism can be attributed to its coverage. 
They deliberated such issues carefully and indeed alerted and encouraged the reader to 
ask why politicians were using certain terms. This self-reflection was further 
underscored when Welt, taz and Spiegel remarked how manipulative the British media 
and politicians were. Welt criticised the “effect-seeking” pictures of tattered Kosovo-
Albanian refugees, even British broadsheets such as The Independent published.
1044
 taz 
criticised the tabloid Sun, which had published an article entitled “Beat up Slobodan” 
and called him “Serbian butcher.”1045 It is striking that taz did not apply the same 
criticism to BILD, which also routinely referred to Milošević as “the butcher”, or that 
Welt acknowledged that the motif of desolate Kosovo-Albanian refugees was also 
present in the pictures published in German broadsheets.
1046
 
 Welt and Spiegel directed their criticism towards the political process behind the 
media-coverage in Great Britain. Since the bombardments had started, not a day had 
gone by without either Prime Minister Blair himself or one of his cabinet-members 
“…publicly hurling a forceful accusation at the Serbian dictator” – which Welt called 
“massaging the public conscience.”1047 A Spiegel-article took a similar approach, 
portraying Alistair Campbell as Blair’s ‘spin doctor’ who increasingly dominated 
NATO’s media strategy to manipulate public opinion.1048 Such criticism implied that all 
three publications considered German media and politicians to be much better. Neither 
publication extrapolated the British example to the German case, deliberating how this 
affected the German press and whether the same mechanisms were also in place in 
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Berlin. While a systematic and academic comparison to the British publications goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the critical and cautious coverage of the German press is 
worth noting. 
  Contrary to the conclusions of a homogenous German press coverage made by 
other media analyses, this chapter demonstrates that the articles covering the NATO-
intervention were very diverse in the nine publications considered. Unlike the previous 
coverage analysed in earlier chapters, the publications were clearly divided along 
political lines. Broadly speaking, the conservative papers (Welt, FAZ and BILD) 
supported the NATO-intervention, which the liberal/left-wing papers (Spiegel, FR and 
taz) did not. Both extreme-left and extreme-right publications also opposed the war, 
though for different reasons, while AJW endorsed the NATO-intervention, but 
disapproved of comparisons between Kosovo and the Holocaust. This division along 
political lines also ensured that various views and interpretations were available to the 
German readers throughout NATO’s bombardment of Serbia and Kosovo. This balance 
arguably compensated for the at times biased reporting in some – usually conservative – 
publications. Moreover, the press’ coverage was more diverse than the parliamentary 
debates at the time.  
From the beginning of the intervention, arguments for and against NATO’s 
military strikes were available to the German public. Nonetheless, as the analysis of the 
larger themes – ‘genocide’ and concentration camps, the portrayal of Milošević and the 
treatment of Serbian civilians – showed, the conflict was at times marked by biased 
reporting, which compromised the information offered to the public. This bias was 
marked by articles which lacked deliberation but instead featured blunt categorisations 
of good and bad. Simultaneously however, in each of these cases, a more balanced 
coverage could be found by reading other main-stream publications which qualified the 
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partial coverage. AJW, JF and Konkret will not be considered here, as they catered to a 
very particular and narrow readership and did not treat all the themes explored above. 
Theme Issue One-sided 
coverage 
Balanced coverage 
‘Genocide’  
 
Unreflected and 
unqualified use of 
the term ‘genocide’ 
  
Welt, FAZ, BILD FR, Spiegel 
Concentration 
Camps 
 
Reporting of alleged 
camps without proof 
BILD taz, Spiegel 
Portrayal of 
Milošević 
 
 
Excessive populism 
 
NATO good/ 
Milošević bad 
BILD, Spiegel 
 
FAZ 
 
None 
Milošević = Hitler Comparisons/ 
analogies 
 
FAZ, (BILD) Welt, taz 
Coverage of Serbian 
civilians 
No consideration of 
Serbian civilian 
suffering 
 
Welt, FAZ, BILD FR, taz 
Table 13: Themes of main-stream media coverage 
The table allows us to see at a glance that the section of ‘one-sided coverage’ is 
dominated by the conservative newspapers, particularly the tabloid BILD and the 
broadsheet FAZ. Only in one instance the liberal Spiegel joined the category, namely 
when in the section pertaining to the portrayal of Milošević. The balancing role 
frequently taken by the left-leaning media could arguably result from their scepticism of 
war and their inclination to question NATO’s endeavours. However, when considering 
how Milošević was portrayed, none of the publications balanced out the excessive 
populism and black/white categorisation presented by BILD, Spiegel and FAZ. In 
conclusion, when considering the coverage in the condensed format offered by the 
above table, one can discern that while there were incidences in which some 
publications revealed a biased reporting, the broader press coverage available in 
Germany at the time was more balanced than has been suggested in the existing 
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academic literature. The only exception here is the portrayal of Milošević, who was held 
responsible for the violence by all publications.    
314 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This media analysis of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo has emphasised how 
many varied interpretations were presented by the German press as the complex 
conflicts were unfolding. Moreover, the recurring influence of different historical events 
on the reporting of Bosnia or Kosovo underlines that a conflict or war is frequently 
interpreted through the prism of preceding events. The ever-present Second World War 
and the re-examination of the Srebrenica Massacre during the Kosovo coverage are two 
prime examples for this interplay.  
The structure of two parallel parts in this thesis offers interesting comparative 
conclusions. It must be noted that all quantitative comparisons will only evaluate the 
five daily newspapers, namely Welt, FAZ, BILD, FR and taz. The remaining 
publications were weekly, bi-weekly or monthly editions and are therefore not 
measurable with the daily press for this purpose. First, we consider the quantity of 
articles published in the German daily press throughout the studied timeframes.  
 
Graph 3: Ratio of articles published per day in daily newspapers 
 
Due to the varying number of days in the six timeframes, the ratio of articles published 
per day is more significant than the absolute numbers. As the above graph indicates, 
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there were two peaks of interest. The Srebrenica Massacre (timeframe two, July-August 
1995) resulted in a significant spike in reporting during the Bosnia War, while the 
coverage climaxed due to the NATO-intervention in timeframe six during the Kosovo 
War. The explosion of interest marked by the NATO-intervention in 1999 can be 
ascribed to the deployment of German soldiers into active combat for the first time 
since the Second World War, which transformed a foreign conflict into one with 
domestic relevance. It is remarkable that, apart from FAZ, the press’ initial interest in 
the outbreak of violence in Kosovo (timeframe four), was only marginally higher than it 
had been at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia (timeframe one). This underlines that 
the press’ attention was not devoted to long-term systemic problems in the Balkans, but 
rather that its interest was sparked by imminent violence. Lastly, it is significant that the 
Račak incident did not attract a disproportionate interest in the German press compared 
to the other five periods.  
 A second quantitative comparison pertains to the ratio of images published per 
article, which adds to the qualitative image analyses in the preceding chapters.   
 
Graph 4: Ratio of images
1049
 to articles in daily newspapers throughout all chapters 
 
                                                 
1049
 All data excludes maps and graphics and pertains only to caricatures and photographs. 
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Significantly, the distribution of images (graph 4) was not as linear as the ratio of 
articles per day (graph 3). Generally one can see in the above graph that FAZ was 
comparably reluctant to publish images alongside its articles, while taz was more 
inclined to do so. Surprisingly, BILD’s ratio was average and during the Račak coverage 
even lower than all other newspapers. While a common preconception of the tabloid’s 
coverage could have been that it published more images than other publications, this 
was not the case in its coverage of the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. Similar to the 
preceding graph, there were peaks during the Srebrenica coverage and in most cases 
during the reporting of the NATO-intervention, which indicates an increased interest in 
both in the visual coverage, along with the high numbers of articles published in this 
timeframe. Clearly, all publications except FAZ were more inclined to portray the horror 
resulting from the Srebrenica Massacre pictorially, than from Račak, even through 
Srebrenica itself was inaccessible. This is an important observation considering the 
alleged ‘media-spectacle’ surrounding the Račak incident.   
 One last quantitative comparison addresses authorship, which has been 
mentioned throughout this media analysis.  
 
Graph 5: Percentage of articles authored by newspapers’ correspondents 
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As the above graph depicts, most newspapers relied more on the reporting of their own 
correspondents rather than amalgamated press agency reports or press releases. Only in 
the case of Welt did the proportion of articles authored by the paper’s correspondents 
gradually decrease, though it surged again during the NATO-intervention. This 
demonstrates that the publications preferred articles based on their correspondents’ 
research, representing their selection and interpretation of events. A remarkable 
conclusion which can be drawn from graph five is that all newspapers published more 
correspondent-articles during the Dayton negotiations – which were heavily censored – 
than at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia. This peculiarity is striking, but 
explicable with qualitative considerations. Here the content of the articles must be 
discerned: not all articles published in the third timeframe were about the Dayton 
negotiations themselves; many also addressed the on-going violence in Bosnia or 
NATO’s preparations for the deployment of the International Peace Force. This 
underscores how limiting and at times misleading a purely quantitative study can be 
without considering qualitative nuances. 
 With this in mind we turn to the qualitative conclusions which can be drawn 
from the press analysis. Most importantly, in many cases the publications’ basic 
political affiliations did not prescribe the interpretations published about themes related 
to the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. As mentioned in the introduction, the selection of 
primary sources for this thesis was construed to allow a broad comparison of discourses 
ranging from extreme-left to extreme-right. While a multitude of interpretations and 
perspectives was indeed present, in numerous cases, the clustering of publications was 
not confined by political orientation. To demonstrate this, some key examples have 
been taken from the analysis: the right-leaning newspapers are marked yellow and the 
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left-leaning publications marked green. The first example stems from the Srebrenica 
coverage in chapter 3. Here the fate of the refugees was covered with   
reduced interest by: Welt, FAZ and FR prolonged interest by: taz, Spiegel and 
BILD. 
 
Similarly, the quick dismissal of the Serbian version of events regarding the Račak 
incident was not defined by the publications’ political affiliation. The Serbian 
perspective was  
dismissed by: FAZ, FR, taz and Spiegel considered by: Welt and Konkret 
 
It is noteworthy that FAZ never published an interpretation which could have been 
categorised as traditionally ‘left-leaning.’ Rather, taz occasionally featured content 
which could be deemed generally conservative. Germany’s diverse media landscape in 
turn emphasises that when analysing the German print media’s coverage of the wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, one cannot speak of ‘the conservative newspapers’ or ‘the left-
leaning publications,’ let alone ‘the media.’      
 Nonetheless, there were some exceptions to this non-partisan reporting. One 
such example is Scharping’s use of the term ‘genocide’ to describe the violence in 
Kosovo, as discussed in chapter 7. His careless employment of such a loaded term was  
supported by: Welt, FAZ, and BILD rejected by: FR, taz and Spiegel 
 
This alignment was mirrored in the coverage of the NATO-intervention in 1999, which 
was  
supported by: Welt, FAZ and BILD rejected by: taz, FR, Spiegel, and Konkret. 
 
At times a convergence occurred along the lines of the publications’ political 
affiliations, especially during the coverage of the NATO-intervention. However these 
remained exceptions and the analysis of each publication’s individual, nuanced and 
multi-faceted interpretations offered much more valuable insights. 
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Further qualitative conclusions can be drawn with regard to the four larger 
themes which have been traced throughout the entire thesis. Firstly, the changing 
perceptions of the German press regarding the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević 
and who was to blame for the conflicts; secondly, how the armed forces, including the 
Yugoslav Peoples’ Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army were presented in the 
German press; thirdly, the persistent presence of the Second World War in the press’ 
reporting, as well as the Holocaust and how they shaped the press’ interpretation of the 
violence; and lastly, how Germany’s role in the region was evaluated by the national 
press – both in the realms of diplomacy and military intervention.  
Starting with the first theme, most German publications initially explained the 
outbreak of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo with references to long-standing antagonism 
in the region. This mirrored the general stance found in the secondary literature 
available at the time. Thus, the reasons for conflict cited by the press in 1991/92 mostly 
reflected what was written in the secondary literature. This congruence suggests that as 
violence erupted in this largely unknown region, most journalists informed themselves 
by turning to the secondary literature. However, throughout the coverage of the Bosnia 
War, the German press increasingly focused on the role of Milošević, seeing him as the 
primary cause of the violence by 1995. In spite of this progression, there was no 
excessively populist portrayal of Milošević or ‘name-calling’ in the press’ coverage at 
this time. By 1998, when the violence in Kosovo intensified, there was an exclusive 
focus on Milošević’s policies and the concept of ancient hatreds was no longer 
important. This progression reveals the evolving perception regarding the causes of 
violence in the German press, which gradually made the journalists’ own interpretations 
more prevalent. The near exclusive focus on Milošević during the Kosovo conflict 
partially stemmed from his role in the preceding war in Bosnia and especially the 
Srebrenica Massacre. This underlines the influence of the Bosnian War on the 
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journalists’ interpretation of the violence in Kosovo. Moreover the gradually increasing 
importance of Milošević in explaining the violence suggests a certain learning curve on 
behalf of the journalists. With violence erupting in former Yugoslavia somewhat 
unexpectedly in the early 1990s, the observers inevitably had to construct research-
based interpretations in a volatile and unknown political situation. However, as the 
correspondents spent more time on-site and perhaps understood the complex conflict, 
the more they could communicate their own insights and interpretations.   
This growing focus on Milošević in most publications analysed here introduces a 
second theme that re-appeared throughout this thesis: the portrayal of the parties 
involved in both conflicts. Throughout the Bosnian War, the German publications 
presented the JNA and later the Bosnian-Serb army as the only combatants. Sarajevo’s 
armed forces were not mentioned at all, which was epitomised by the negligent 
reporting of a UN-soldier’s death in Srebrenica in the third chapter. This one-sided 
focus on the Serbian forces was mirrored in the coverage of the initial violence in 
Kosovo, which embellished KLA’s belligerence. Indeed, as analysed in chapter five, 
some publications displayed a tendency to ‘spare’ the KLA by explaining their actions 
with the Kosovo-Albanian civilian suffering. However, a few months later, in early 
1999, the KLA was portrayed perhaps more realistically as an organised, heavily-armed 
force, especially in pictures. 
The third theme traced throughout this thesis, namely the presence of the Second 
World War in the German press coverage revealed an interesting interplay between the 
war itself and the collective memory of the Holocaust as well as its influence on the 
foreign political debate. On the one hand, the Second World War continuously 
influenced the German press’ word-choice in reporting on the wars in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. In the Bosnia coverage, terms such as ‘Lebensraum’, the Serbian ‘Herrenvolk’ 
and ‘pogroms’ were used, while in the reporting on Kosovo, ‘concentration camps’ and 
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‘genocide’ were used regularly, even when the terms were inaccurate or blatantly wrong 
in some cases. On the other hand, the collective memory of the Holocaust and its 
influence on the discourse led in the German press decreased. During the Bosnian War, 
the debates published in various German publications were strongly shaped by the 
Holocaust. Consequently, many considerations about Germany’s foreign political 
involvement were contextualised with deliberations about the country’s National-
Socialist past and whether this permitted a diplomatic or military involvement. This 
interpretation matched the secondary literature on Germany’s collective memory 
explored in the introduction, which saw the Betroffenheitsdiskurs of the 1980s and early 
1990s as the climax of collective memory and shame. This confined Germany to being 
the ‘country of perpetrators’ and hindered any active foreign policy by Germany, let 
alone a military engagement. Academics found that by the early-1990s, the 
Betroffenheitsdiskurs was gradually replaced by the concept of the ‘universality of guilt’ 
which meant recognition by the international community for its partial responsibility 
with regard to the Holocaust. This transformation could also be traced in the German 
press coverage, though at a different pace than suggested by the literature. Judging from 
the German press coverage on Bosnia, the Second World War continued to play a 
central role in the press’ coverage until 1995. Only from the Kosovo coverage in 1998 
onwards did the German publications analysed here nearly completely omit any 
interpretation of Germany’s foreign policy and potential military involvement with 
regard to the country’s past.  
This decreasing focus on the foreign political restraints resulting from the 
Second World War went so far that some conservative papers likened the Germans who 
were expelled from various territories in Eastern Europe after 1945 – including Serbia – 
to the Kosovo-Albanian refugees of 1999. These German expellees, some of whom 
continue to fight collectively for the reappropriation of their lost property after the 
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Second World War, were often dismissed as basking in Germany’s National-Socialist 
past. Consequently this likening to the Kosovo-Albanian refugees in the late 1990s 
indicates a desire in the Welt, BILD and JF to recognise the German refugees’ 
victimhood and thus suggests a movement away from the pure absorption of guilt and 
shame.  
This gradual ‘normalisation’ of the country’s self-perception can be traced 
throughout all chapters with regard to the German press’ evaluation of Germany’s role 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Surprisingly, the national press attributed progressively less 
importance to Germany throughout its Bosnia-coverage. After the pioneering position 
Germany took in Balkan politics in the early 1990s by recognising Croatia’s and 
Slovenia’s independence before its European partners, the country took a back-seat. 
This was particularly emphasised in the reporting from November-December 1995, 
during which the German publications barely acknowledged the presence of a German 
delegation in their reporting on the Dayton negotiations. It was further manifested in the 
coverage of the violence in Kosovo, where the term ‘Bündnissolidarität’, or ‘alliance-
solidarity’ was drawn on persistently. This progression to blend in with the Western 
alliance-structures and ‘normalise’ its foreign policy within these supranational 
institutions can also be linked with the politics of Holocaust memory, which has 
permeated the print media analysis throughout.   
 
In addition to these large themes, other conclusions are worth noting. The 
German press coverage of the two watershed-examples of atrocities – the Srebrenica 
Massacre and Račak incident – is very interesting. The inaccessibility of the Srebrenica 
enclave strongly influenced the press coverage of the massacre at the time. Analysing 
the press’ articles produced at the time revealed that the number of fatalities and the 
dimension of what would later be termed ‘genocide’ were not available until much later. 
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With this in mind, the reaction regarding Račak becomes more comprehensible. While 
some observers deemed the immediate presence of journalists in Račak part of the 
‘media spectacle’ which was allegedly being staged by KLA and the OSCE, perhaps 
this seemingly hasty reaction was simply an instance where the international community 
had learned from the past. As discussed in chapter six, the Srebrenica Massacre 
continued to play a significant role in the press’ interpretation of events, especially as 
the extent of the fatalities was uncovered. Consequently, one could conclude that with 
Srebrenica in mind, journalists and international observers attempted to visit Račak as 
quickly as possible before it could be closed off and remain inaccessible for years to 
come.  
A further development that can be traced throughout the Bosnian War is the 
consistently decreasing importance of Russia in the German press-coverage. While the 
reporting in the early 1990s still featured a lot of anti-Russian language, reminiscent of 
the Cold War, this had vanished almost completely by the mid-1990s. While Russia’s 
pro-Serbian position in the UN-Security Council during the Kosovo Conflict was 
covered in the German print media, the antagonism which still dominated the German 
press’ interpretation of the early violence in Bosnia did not return. Considering the 
progression of international relations at this time, this is understandable. As the Bosnian 
War unfolded in 1991/92, the Cold War had just ended and the Soviet Union had 
recently collapsed. Consequently post-Soviet Russia was still perceived as an 
unreckonable force which was distrusted by almost all German publications analysed 
here. However, by December 1995 Russia had become a relatively trusted partner which 
included itself in international endeavours, such as the post-Dayton peace 
implementation force headed by NATO. This gained Moscow enough trust amongst 
international observers and may account for omission of anti-Russian word-choices in 
the German publications and indicates a more nuanced review of relations with Russia.  
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AJW’s coverage of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo – albeit non-existent in some 
timeframes – allows another interesting conclusion. Some secondary literature 
postulates that the Jewish Lobby in America was very influential in the country’s policy 
towards Bosnia, which was an interesting point of departure to analyse AJW.
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However, the newspaper’s publisher, the Central Council for Jews in Germany, did not 
use AJW to disseminate its viewpoints regarding the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo or 
Germany’s foreign policy in this respect. While AJW categorises itself as a weekly 
cultural publication, it did address political debates, ranging from the legitimacy of 
Palestinian territories to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995. 
However, the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo, the controversial comparisons made 
between the Holocaust and Kosovo, or the genocidal dimension of the Srebrenica 
Massacre never found their way into AJW’s coverage. This in turn indicates that 
disseminating its core values and conveying important messages to the public, for which 
the Central Council for Jews in Germany would likely have used its organ AJW, was not 
of central importance until the NATO-intervention of 1999.  
The reporting of the two extreme publications, JF and Konkret must also be 
considered separately. Surprisingly, both frequently offered comparable interpretations 
throughout their coverage of Bosnia and Kosovo. Brought together by their anti-
American and anti-multilateral stance, articles in JF and Konkret frequently called for 
abstinence from military involvement in the Balkans. However, in spite of some 
parallels in their coverage, both were strongly entrenched in their extreme-right or 
extreme-left positions. Konkret in particular was simply contrary to almost all 
viewpoints expressed in the mainstream press rather than substantively contributing to 
their readers’ understanding of the subject matters.  
                                                 
1050
 Mira Beham, Kriegstrommeln, p. 8 and Jörg Becker and Mira Beham, Operation Balkan.  
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Returning to the media theories briefly discussed in the introduction, the key role 
of the journalist is worth noting at this point. With respect to the press-coverage of the 
wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it would be impossible to substantiate the ‘gatekeeper’ and 
‘agenda-setting’ theories with empirical examples. Attempting to assess to what extent a 
journalist truly functioned as an ‘agenda-setter’ or ‘gatekeeper’ – what information was 
included in an article and why – would involve too many counterfactuals and 
conjecture. Nonetheless, the centrality of a journalist in forming the news presents itself 
in this thesis. In many instances, a particularly partisan piece or a significant word-
choice could be attributed to a particular correspondent rather than a press agency 
article or press release. Moreover, many journalists covered both the Bosnia and the 
Kosovo wars for the same publication. Consequently, after a decade of reporting on the 
violence in the Balkans, it can be presumed that correspondents had experienced a deep 
engagement with and had profound knowledge of the region, its history and perhaps 
languages, as well as a wide network to the political and cultural elites. Perhaps it was 
this individual experience and knowledge that formed the distinctive opinions found in 
the editorials, which expressed at times contrary voices in the publications. In this 
respect, the journalists’ biographies are worth considering to understand what factors 
may have influenced their articles. Where possible, such connections have been made 
throughout the thesis. However, unfortunately detailed biographies were frequently 
inaccessible, disabling more such analyses without speculating too much.  
Lastly, the visual analysis of both pictures and cartoons conducted in this thesis 
proved to be a valuable facet of the German press’ reporting. The memorable pictures of 
long refugee treks, heavily armed soldiers and destroyed homes produced an immediacy 
that was difficult to produce in the day-to-day articles. Moreover, pictures and cartoons 
expressed viewpoints or issues that were left unsaid in the articles. This was particularly 
relevant in the reporting of Srebrenica, during which most publications’ articles shied 
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away from blaming the international community for not intervening, perhaps due to the 
limited information available at the time. However, the cartoons published in almost all 
newspapers expressed a scathing criticism of the international community’s inaction. 
Additionally, the image analysis in various chapters revealed that some pictures were 
reprinted after several days or weeks. This underlined that the pictures viewed by the 
reader did not necessarily stem from a recent event, but may simply have been in the 
publications’ image catalogue. Lastly, the close examination of the pictures printed in 
Spiegel as the violence unfolded in Kosovo (analysed in chapter 5) underlined that a 
seemingly spontaneous snapshot may have been more choreographed than suspected. 
These considerations underline the power of images in war-journalism and emphasise 
the importance of incorporating them in a press analysis.  
 
This thesis has offered a comprehensive analysis of the German press coverage 
of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, taking into account many themes, currents and 
interpretations which have thus far been under-researched. The plurality of perceptions 
and viewpoints offered by the various publications at different stages of the wars has 
underlined that no unanimous opinion dominated the Germany press’ understanding. 
Indeed, the German war-journalism of Bosnia and Kosovo was diverse and at times 
even contrary to the argumentation of leading politicians. Thus, a careful analysis of the 
German print media contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the complexities 
surrounding the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 Since the end of violence in the Balkans, there has been continuous change and 
development in the region. Milošević was ousted from power in 2001 after domestic 
upheaval and was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in The Hague, where he died of 
a heart failure in 2006. Slovenia became a member of the EU and NATO in 2004 and 
introduced the Euro currency in 2007. Croatia will become an EU-member in 2013. 
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Bosnia has been a potential EU-candidate country since 2003, however tensions 
between Croats, Serbs and Muslims living in the Bosnia prevail. Kosovo declared 
independence in 2008, though Serbia amongst other countries refuses to recognise this 
status.  
However, amidst all these developments towards a more stable and peaceful 
region, the ghosts of the past remain. Belgrade’s city centre remains marked by 
NATO’s 1999 bombardment.  
 
Figure 144: Personal photograph, Ministry of the Interior, Belgrade, taken August 2012 
 
 
For example, the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior (figure 144) has been left as a sign 
of what many Serbians still consider an unjust NATO attack. Simultaneously, graffiti 
highlighting the 1389 Battle of Kosovo is a common sight. 
 
Figure 145: “We are not giving up Kosovo. 1389”1051 
 
Moreover, when attending a football game in Serbia’s capital in August 2012, the 
radical ultra-fans of Belgrade’s ‘Partizan’ football club chanted “Kosovo is ours!” as the 
atmosphere heated up with a victory in sight. These examples underline how 
omnipresent the recent past remains in the region and the long path that lies ahead.  
                                                 
1051
 Blandm, “We’re not giving up Kosovo. 1389”, picture taken on 18.02.2007, Online Source: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/blandm/403755323/, accessed 29.10.2012. 
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Appendix 
 
Brief Chronology of conflict and war in the Balkans (primarily Bosnia and Kosovo) 
 
8 May 1989 Slobodan Milošević becomes Serbian President and introduces 
constitutional reforms 
22 April and 2 May 
1990 
Elections in Croatia; Franjo Tudjman becomes President of 
Croatia 
20 December 1990 Alija Izetbegović becomes President of Bosnia 
25 June 1991 Declaration of Independence by Croatia and Slovenia 
27 June-7 July 1991 Ten-Day War between Slovenian territorial defence forces and 
Yugoslav Peoples’ Army  
19 December 1991 Bosnian-Serbs proclaim a Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska) 
23 December 1991 Germany’s recognition of Croatia’s and Slovenia’s 
independence 
15 January 1992 Remaining EC-members recognised Croatia’s and Slovenia’s 
independence 
January 1992 Deployment of UN-soldiers (UNPROFOR) to Croatia 
29 February-1 March 
1992 
Bosnian referendum on independence 
3 March 1992 Bosnia’s Declaration of Independence 
5 April 1992 Bosnian-Serb military begins siege of Sarajevo 
6 April 1992 Open fighting in Bosnia between Bosnian Muslim, Serbian and 
Croatian forces, as well as the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.  
25 May 1992 Unilaterally proclaimed elections by Kosovo-Albanians; 
Ibrahim Rugova elected President of Kosovo 
June 1992 UN-troops (UNPROFOR) deployed to Bosnia, initially to 
protect Sarajevo’s airport. 
6 May 1993 UN establishes ‘safe areas’ in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Goražde, 
Tuzla, Žepa and Bihać 
May-August 1992 Bosnian-Serb concentration camps were set up in the East-
Bosnian towns Omarska, Keraterm, Trnoplje and other 
locations. 
Summer 1992  Discovery and coverage of concentration camps in international 
media. 
January 1993 UN-Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and EC-representative Lord 
Owen began negotiating a peace treaty with the warring parties, 
known as the Vance-Owen Plan.  
April 1993 Following a UN-Resolution, NATO implemented a no-fly-zone 
(Operation Deny Flight) over Bosnia. 
6 May 1993 UN declared ‘safe areas’ in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Goražde, 
Tuzla, Žepa and Bihać 
4 June 1993 UNPROFOR-troops are authorised to protect these ‘safe areas’ 
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18 June 1993 Vance-Owen Plan pronounced officially failed after a Bosnian-
Serb referendum refused its terms. 
July 1993 UN-Special Envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg and EU-representative 
Lord Owen began negotiations for Stoltenberg-Owen Plan 
29 August 1993 Rejection of Owen-Stoltenberg Plan by Bosnian Muslims. 
9 November 1993 Destruction of Mostar’s landmark bridge by Croatian forces 
following several years of war. 
5 February 1994 Bombing of Sarajevo’s Merkale Market 
9 February 1994 NATO authorised air-strikes requested by UN of Bosnian-Serb 
army in Sarajevo  
February 1994 Negotiation of Contact Group Plan began, attempting to 
construct a peace treaty 
28 August 1994 Referendum in Bosnian-Serb Assembly rejected the plan. 
December 1994 UN-troops used by Bosnian-Serb army as ‘human shields’ 
against NATO-attacks 
June 1995 EU and NATO establish “Rapid Reaction Force” for Bosnia  
2 June 1995 An American aircraft is shot down my Bosnian-Serb artillery 
6 July 1995 Bosnian-Serb attack of UN-‘safe area’ Srebrenica 
30 August - 20 
September 1995 
Operation Deliberate Force: NATO-bombardment of Bosnian-
Serb forces 
1 - 21 November 
1995  
Negotiations of Dayton Agreement in Ohio 
14 December 1995 Dayton Agreement formally signed in Paris 
February 1996 First declared action by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
March 1998 Intensified violence in Kosovo, especially in the Drenica region 
13 October 1998 Holbrooke-Milošević-Agreement negotiated: cease-fire and 
deployment of OSCE-observerers 
15 January 1999 Račak Incident, killing 45 people 
6 - 23 February 1999 Negotiations to find a peace agreement in Rambouillet 
18 March 1999 Publication of EU-autopsy report on Račak fatalities 
and 
Kosovo-Albanian delegation signed Rambouillet Agreement; 
Serbia refused 
22 March 1999 OSCE-observers withdrawn from Kosovo 
 
24 March 1999 NATO-bombardment of Serbian targets in Kosovo and Serbia 
began 
3 June 1999 Milošević  signed agreement to allow peacekeeping-troops to 
be stationed in Kosovo 
20 June 1999 Termination of NATO-bombardment 
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